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Abstract 
Many analysts consider that land degradation in Mongolia is in part the result of 
overgrazing. Many have argued that this is due to the absence of property rights or the 
inability of formal pastoral institutions to regulate access to pastureland as common 
pool resources (CPR). Consequently, both national and international development 
agencies have attempted to strengthen local pastoral institutions by implementing 
policies that are based on market-based land reform and community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) derived from popular theoretical approaches to 
analyze problems with CPR management. To date, there has been limited research on 
how these policy reforms have contributed to altering local pastoral resource 
management and why these theoretical approaches have failed to explain the CPR 
dilem1na in Mongolia. This research seeks to understand why policies based on these 
approaches have largely stn1ggled to adjust historical pastoralism within the existing 
frainework of the property regimes approach and define property rights to pastoral 
resources. This thesis examines why herders are changing how they access seasonal 
pasture and how this change affects pastoral land management. It thereby investigates 
why new approaches have proven incompatible with local means of regulating pastoral 
resources (pasture and water). This qualitative study applies an access approach to 
understand different mechanisms, which are beyond exclusive property rights and 
which are involved in local actors' access to pastoral resources. Based on twelve months 
of field research and the study of archival and policy documents in the Herlen Bayan-
Ulaan, the oldest State Reserve Pasture Area, I argue that improvements to pasture land 
1nanagement in Mongolia cannot be achieved si1nply through the application of western 
approaches to property rights and conservation and land-based policies without 
considering the significance of historically integrated production management. The 
HBU case reveals that the property regime approach is inadequate to explain the 
property relations of pastoralism in Mongolia. This analytical inadequacy led to a 
compartmentalized approach to managing key components (livestock, labour and land) 
of the integrated pastoral production management. This resulted in blocking herders ' 
seasonal movements that are necessary for maintaining their ulamjlalt pastoral 
production. These analytical failures contributed to difficulties in adjusting historical 
pastoralism and problematic approaches to controlling access in the pastoral context. 
My thesis is that, by putting property in its place in the larger socio-political and 
ecological context, policy initiatives can strengthen historically integrated property 
lV 
relations and long-established social patterns, which are embedded in mainstream forms 
of ulamjlalt pastoral production management that function within the boundaries of the 
state territorial administrative units. 
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1 Mobile pastoralism, access and policy: Introducing the challenges 
of Common Pool Resource Management in Mongolia 
.. .I have not tried [getting/applying for a campsite] yet. It seems strange neither to 
get it or nor not to try for it [ applying for one]. We may need to get (legal 
possession of campsite) one. However, if we get one, then I may need to argue with 
someone to protect it [ campsite and pasture around it] from others. If I do not 
argue, then others would come and use it. Also, if there is no grass or water, then 
we have to leave for elsewhere. So, there are troubles with it [legal possession of a 
campsite] ... 
A poor migrant herder in HBU bag (InterviewlO) 
This is a study of natural resource management and mobile pastoralism in Mongolia. 
Since 1990, Mongolia has shifted its economic policy from a centrally planned to a 
market economy. This policy transition has led to dramatic modifications in 
environ1nental management practices in mobile pastoralism. This has resulted in a 
decline of formal pastoral institutions and customary land use practices. This decline 
has led to livestock overgrazing and increasing conflict over natural resource use among 
actors (herders, local and national level officials from different jurisdictions) involved in 
resource management, which has contributed to land degradation in Mongolia. A 
majority of national and international advocates have identified the problem as 'open 
access' or an absence of property rights to pastureland. They suggest that the collapse of 
the former negdel collective institution has led to an absence of legal mechanisms to 
control the herders' access to pastoral resources. As a consequence of such assessments, 
national and international development agencies have attempted to strengthen local 
pastoral institutions by implementing policy approaches such as market-based land 
reform and conservation-oriented community-based natural resource management 
(CBNRM). Both policy approaches focus on defining a key actor to control natural 
resources by introducing exclusive property rights to pastureland land. However, these 
policy approaches have failed to improve Mongolia ' s pastureland management. At 
present, the disputes over the use of pastureland and overgrazing have become two of 
the major challenges to rangeland management in Mongolia. 
1 
1.1. Background 
The current conservation-oriented land management policies are based on a poor 
understanding of the rangeland ecosystem and the pastoral production (Miller and 
Sheehy, 2008, p 191 ). This poor understanding is in fact rooted in global perceptions of 
mobile pastoralism (Khazanov, 1994). Mobile pastoralism has long been under pressure 
from sedentary colonial and modem development policies that aim to shift the 
production system from mobile pastoralism to agrarianism, primarily seeking to make 
use of natural resources more effectively in economic terms and avoid environmental 
degradation (Hardin, 1968, Khazanov, 1994). This pressure has arisen from a 
questionable perception that nomadic pastoralism is an economically inefficient and 
primitive production system and causes overgrazing (Khazanov, 1994, Sneath, 2007, 
Hardin, 1968). This perception has continued into the 21 st century. In the international 
development literature, pastureland management is a contested issue in rural and 
environ1nental development. This is because mobile pastoralism and its pastoral food 
production depend upon exploiting com1non pool resources (CPR) such as pastureland, 
water and forests. CPR is a system of resources in which it is hard to pursue exclusion 
and management is costly, because the resources are large and migratory. The users' 
exploitation of the resources subtracts from the availability -of the same resources to 
others, because they are shared among 1nany actors (Ostrom et al., 1999, Feeny et al., 
1990). 
This perception has been reflected in two major policies adopted by the governments of 
post-socialist and post-colonial countries. Firstly, the state took control over pastureland 
management and nationalized the pastoral production system in most pastoral societies 
in Afrj ca and Inner Asia. When the centralized economy failed, the state control of 
production systems was weakened. Secondly, some international development 
advocates viewed the role of the market as positive for development, but sometimes the 
1narket is constrained by the lack of capacity in the governments of the developing 
countries. Thus, in 1970-1990, the World Bank introduced its Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP) with the aim of shifting the economy of indebted countries from a state 
controlled to a 1narket-based economy (Razavi, 2003 , Sneath, 2004). The aim of the 
SAP was to '"emancipate' the economy from the political structure" and allow its own 
nature to imbue through private property and the market (Sneath, 2003 , p 442). 
2 
As a complementary activity to the SAP, the World Bank also introduced land refonn, 
as land is the key resource for agricultural production. Land reform aims to achieve 
economic growth through increasing efficiency in agricultural land management. 
Landholding systems have been conventionally seen as static and inflexible in the face 
of changing economic conditions, because traditional community-based land tenure is 
considered to be unable to respond to these changes (Yngstrom, 2002). Thus, the World 
Bank aimed to introduce a more effective land tenure system through land titling by 
way of a process of registering and certifying existing informal or formal rights 
(Griffinl 995). The interest in titling initially derived from a concern that smallholders, 
who are the key players of agricultural growth, did not have sufficient access to and 
control over land. Now, under the land reform, secure tenure was to be guaranteed to 
individuals and 'household' units through land entitlement. This interest in titling 
gradually became tied to the economic policy of privatization of state properties, 
especially of land rights, in order to restructure economic processes (Yngstrom, 2002). 
Rural land would be privatized as a way to restore agricultural export growth and 
improve rural incomes and livelihoods (Razavi, 2003). This privatization was expected 
to trigger the development of a market for land, and consequently provide collateral for 
credit and pro1note economic efficiency by facilitating the transfer of land to those who 
would make the best use of the land. It was argued that this would eventually lead to 
increased productivity and better land stewardship (Griffin, 1995, Femandez-Gi1nenez 
and Batbuyan, 2004, Razavi, 2003, Yngstrom, 2002). The World Bank consistently 
advocated the titling of land managed under state property regimes in order to stimulate 
long-term 1narket-driven processes. Thus, land reform was introduced to both agrarian 
and pastureland, in the latter case as a response to environmental degradation. 
Yet, ironically, in many cases these policies themselves resulted in environmental 
degradation. Degradation of pastureland is defined as: 
a 1nore or less permanent decline in the rate at which land yields livestock 
production, although it is often impossible to determine whether declines in 
productivity are permanent and to what extent they result from human or natural 
processes (Sneath, 1998, p 114 7). 
The land refonns have had a profound impact on the environment, in two significant 
ways. First, they changed the land use practices and the value of the land. Land and 
natural resources have become commoditized through the creation of marketable 
entitlement. The direct benefit from a resource is valued in terms of the cash income 
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derived from it. Second, the refonns contributed to a growing disparity between the rich 
and the poor and exacerbated the increasing conflict between state and communities and 
individual households (Devereux, 1996, Izumi, 1999). Following the commoditization 
of natural resources, the very allocation of rights has also become commercialized and 
has attracted the attention of different, non-primary users; this is seen, for example, in 
land grabbing by political elites, and has resulted in the appropriation of village land 
and resources by the state. Locally, in many cases male community leaders and 
household heads, who are registered for land entitlement, have gained control over a 
resource (Meinzen-dick et al., 1997). Nevertheless, market-based land reform policies 
continue to pressure mobile pastoralism to wholly shift to sedentary agrarian and/or 
intensive livestock production systems to secure land tenure and boost economic 
efficiency. 
More recently a growing number of scholarly works have also recognized the 
significance of mobile pastoralism and its associated production system, which is seen 
as providing a secure livelihood option that is adjusted to the existing environmental 
conditions (Hu1nphrey and Sneath, 1999, Miller and Sheehy, 2008). Natural resource 
management has been considered alongside agriculture as a way to eradicate poverty 
and strengthen environ1nental stewardship (Bruce and Mearns, 2002). Effective 
resource management has been considered crucial to preventing famine and 
environmental degradation caused by the 'mismanagement of pastoral lands' and 
desertification, since the survival of rural livelihoods hinges on natural resources and 
pastoral livestock husbandry in addition to settled agriculture (Bruce and Mearns, 2002, 
Fratkin, 1997). Thus, some international development agencies have trends to shift their 
policy focus on pastureland management in some countries from a state or market-based 
policy approach to a conservation oriented CBNRM (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999, 
Fratkin and Mearns, 2003). 
Mongolia is one of the few remaining pastoral societies outside of Africa and Middle 
East, and faces 1nultiple challenges in CPR management. Land degradation is a 
rangeland management problem in dry-land ecology (Sternberg, 2008). Generally this 
degradation is a proble1n for the Inner Asian steppe societies including Mongolia, Tuva, 
Chita and Buryatia in Russia and Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia in China. Degradation in 
these areas is widespread not only in grazing land, but also in agricultural land (Sneath, 
1998). However, there is no consensus about the extent of degradation in Mongolia. 
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Dramatically different estimates, ranging from nine to 90 percent1 have been quoted 
(Addison et al., 2012, Sternberg, 2008). Nevertheless, Mongolia along with Tuva in 
Russia has experienced a comparatively low level of land degradation when co1npared 
to other nearby pastoral societies in Russia and China (Sneath, 2003, Sneath, 1998, 
Humphrey and Sneath, 1999). This is because degradation appears to be related to a 
reduction in mobility while Mongolia and Tuva in Russia have maintained a greater 
level of mobility (Humphrey and Sneath, 1999). Furthennore, CPR management is 
considered to have been effective2 in Mongolia due to the retention of customary 
management regardless of the changes in the political and economic systems (Ostrom et 
al., 1999). In other words, Mongolia retained its ulamjlalt production and pasture use 
rules and norms to a great extent until the 21 st century. 
1.2. Engaging with emic understanding 
In this thesis, I use the Mongolian term ulamjlalt ( customary) to refer to pastoral 
production management in order to contribute an emic3 understanding of pastureland 
management and property relations in that country. This is related to my background as 
a Mongolian. I was born and grew up in the heart of Ulaanbaatar. Also, I have been 
extensively exposed to a rural herding lifestyle since my childhood, helping 1ny 
grandparents for almost a decade from 1987-1995 and spending the past decade 
vvorking with herders in different parts of Mongolia in order to understand their role in 
environmental manage1nent and their pastoral production. My observations have shown 
me that it is important to understand that property rights and community concepts are 
much 1nore locally contextualized in mobile pastoralism than might be anticipated by 
applying externally derived theoretical concepts. 
1 This is due to the use of different scales, indicators and sampling regimes, or figures cited out of context 
of the methods or methodological assumptions (Addison, Friedel et al., 2012). It can also be due to 
ecological factors such as variable annual rainfall or human actions or a combination of different 
variables (Sternberg 2008). Also, see Addison & Friedel (2012), Sternberg (2008) for explanations of 
these different figures. It appears that land degradation occurs in one-tenth of the total pastureland of 
Mongolia, three-quarters of the pastureland in Russia and more than one-third in China. Estimates for 
degradation Mongolia are 9%, 30%, 70%, 80% and 90% of the whole pastureland (80% of the total 
territory). Mostly, 70% is quoted, but this is contested (The World Bank, 2003 cited in Addison & Friedel 
2012). Except for Tuva, it is more than 75% in Russia and more than 90% of the pastureland (40% of the 
whole territory) in China. 
2 In my research, effective resource management refers to ecological sustainability. This does not 
necessarily imply resource use that is ecologically or economically optimal (Eerkes et al., 1989). 
3 Ernie approach highlights local people 's understanding and explanation of their rules and norms. Etic 
approach focuses on researchers ' (Kottak, 2006) 
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The Mongolian term ulamjlalt embodies the complete context of land use practices in 
the pastoral production of the country. The terms ulamjlalt ma! aj ahui (pastoral 
production that is customary or passed on or inherited by) and ulamjlalt be/cheer 
ashiglalt ( customary pasture management) have been broadly recognized by national 
and some international scholars (Upton, 2009, Erdenetsogt, 1998, Bazargur, 1998). It is 
necessary to use these terms, because mobile pastoral production is still a safety net and 
one of the main national economy, a dominant food production system in Mongolia 
(Mearns, 2004a). These terms support the herders' claim to their pastureland more than 
'indigenous' or 'traditional' claims with regard to historical property relations in 
Mongolia. Mongolian pastoralism is an indigenous production system (Sneath, 2003). It 
is not in the sense of traditional production, but as a main stream production system in 
present time. The use of these terms may be limited in their effect to protect herders' 
rights to land4 . Thus, it is questionable to identify herders' property rights to specific 
land with terms like indigenous or traditional rights. The Dana declarations5 use of the 
term 'indigenous' may be useful for protecting Mongolian herders' right to practice 
their lifestyle. However, it may not be helpful for individual herders' to claim their 
rights to specific land in each jurisdiction. Many herders changed their jurisdictions 
because of dynainic migration movements due to war, severe weather events or 
-
conditions, and changes in socio-political and economic systems. This is why some 
mining companies6 contest herders' property rights to specific jurisdictional land when 
herders use term 'indigenous' to claim their rights to pastureland. As long as herders 
practise ulamjlalt production in an area, they must clai1n the right to their land under the 
notion of nutag orondoo ezen ni baih, bolj turuh (to be or to be born as master or 
authority7, owner8 and to be there for their nutag as a local resident and represent and 
take care of their nutag) through their residency in their current jurisdiction. 
4 The use of these terms will create an ambiguous property rights situation similar to that which has 
occurred among urban and rural Maori communities contesting fishing quotas (Meijl 2006). 
5 Dana Declaration at http: //www.danadeclaration.org/ 
6 http: //bankwatch.org/sites/default/files/letter-EBRD-OT-l 5Feb2013 .pdf. 
7 Sneath (2007) used ejen or ezen for master or main authority as 'notions of order and authority', which 
is a "central value, one that applied to series of social scales-from the imperial to the 
domestic ... Proprietary authority was so central to the notion of social order that t be 'master less' was to 
be wild or chaotic. The term ejengui baidal (literally, a situation without an ejen) means 'anarchy"' 
(Sneath, 2007, p 194). Those who define access to pastureland as open access, absence of property rights, 
almost assume there is this ejengui baidal or masterless anarchy occurring to the land. Sneath's argument 
is important for my argument because there is a notion of nutag orondoo ezen ni baih, another way of 
using the word ezed (plural of ezen), which have been regulating Mongolian pastureland among different 
levels of ezed (state to domestic) through production. Thus, the question is why does overgrazing and 
disputes occur in the presence of control of these ezed. The answer is related to how transition policies 
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Current pastoral production is based on the ulamjlalt production management, the 
historical fundainentals of which has two characteristics. First, globally, the pastoral 
production management system involves control of the three 1nain components of 
production: livestock, labour and pastureland (this refers to both a campsite and the 
pasture around it) (Bazargur, 1998, Erdenetsogt, 1998, Bjorklund, 2003). Regarding 
land, ecologiin zohistoi nutag ( ecologically preferable land) was the most important 
aspect to pursue pastoral production (Bazargur, 1998). The controlling system of these 
components can be dual, which refers to an integrated system of formal and informal 
institutions (Mearns, 2004b, Fernandez-Gi1nenez, 1999a). Historically the state allowed 
ulamjlalt rules and norms over production and pastureland management in each 
jurisdiction (Natsagdorj, 1972, Natsagdorj, 1967, Vreeland, 1954, Fernandez-Gimenez, 
1999a). In other words, jurisdictional territory was large enough to contain ecologically 
preferable land. 'Formal' refers to the state's use of regulations set forth in the statutory 
law. In the pastoral context in Mongolia, the state historically controlled ulamjlalt 
pastoral production and pasture management through jurisdictional authority. 'Informal' 
refers to herders' practice of ulamjlalt rules and norms for controlling production and 
pasture use within the jurisdiction. In other words, the state formally recognized the 
-
concept of ( during certain periods a few aspects were formalized) ulamjlalt production 
and allowed herders' use of ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms, granting them a 
certain amount of informal control (Fernandez 1999a)'. At the same time, the state did 
not formalize every single ulamjlalt rules and norms in order to maintain herders' 
flexibility of 1novement and to continue to benefit from herders' pastoral production. 
The concept of dual control can be understood as a form of co-management9. 
Nevertheless, the historical concept of dual control, regulating resource access within 
production management, was overlooked by both national and international advocates 
when they introduced co-management models for resource management in Mongolia. 
This co-management model is a conservation-oriented 10 approach, and is not 
affected the rights, authority and ability of or property relations among these actors by changing the 
mechanisms they use in managing pastoral production and pastoral resources. 
8 Not in terms of bundle of rights or exclusive individual land ownership. 
9 Co-management refers to the sharing of power and learning-by-doing in managing natural resources. 
Co-management in natural resource management is defined as "collective action among stakeholders 
working together with a government agency to undertake resource management or plan implementation. 
Co-management can promote learning, develop shared capital and build both community and ecosystem 
resilience" (Randolph 2012, p 91 ). 
1
° Co-management in pastureland in Mongolia refers to pastureland management, proposing a legal lease 
of a particular area of pastureland to a group of herders with exclusive use rights for management in 
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production-oriented (Mearns, 2004b ). Thus, this notion of co-management overlooks 
the importance of acknowledging the role of pastoral production in pastureland 
1nanagement. 
1.3. Statement of the problem 
Numerous studies have been conducted on pastureland management in Mongolia. These 
studies have contributed greatly to creating important perspectives and understandings 
of pastoralism in Inner Asia. However, these works offer limited explanations regarding 
how market and conservation-based land policy reforms have contributed to altering 
pastoral production and pastureland management and why the theoretical approaches 
which e1nbed these policies fail to explain the CPR dilemma in Mongolia. Several 
analysts defined the problem as being 'open-access' to pastureland due to an absence of 
formal instititions to regulate access or to insecurity in property rights over pastureland 
(Mearns, 2004a, Griffin, 2003, Ickowitz, 2003, Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2008, 
Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004, Sneath, 2003, Mearns, 2004b ). This 
perception triggered national and international policy initiatives based on international 
policy discourses of property regimes or collective action in order to reform pastureland 
management (Mearns, 2004b, Upton, 2008, Griffin, 2003). The develop1nent discourses 
referred to here are mainly based on narratives derived from a variety of theories on 
property regimes, community, and self-governing institutional arrangements, among 
others. 
These policy discourses led to the following policy initiatives in Mongolia. First, after 
the collapse of the negdel formal institution, international policy advisors depicted that 
herders' use of pastureland would lead to 'unregulated commons' according to Hardin's 
tragedy of the co1nmons (Hardin, 1968). Thus, they advocated land reform in order to 
clarify the property rights in pasture land manage1nent (Korsun and Murrel, 199 5, 
Nixson and Walters, 2006). Also, reflecting on experiences of protected area 
management during socialism, the policy advisors devised and put in place a territorial 
strategy for natural resource management that expanded the protected areas system in 
Mongolia (Bedunah and Sch1nidt, 2004 ). Second, using the prevailing property regime 
collaboration with a co-management committee composed of representatives from the herders, bag, soum 
and aimag government (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002, p 68). This proposal is also discussed in SDC report 
(SDC, 2010) 
8 
approach, the policy advisors defined Mongolian property regimes as pastureland 
management with overlapping state or local community management (Mearns, 2004b, 
Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004 ). Consequently, the CBNRM approach led to a 
third initiative, which prioritized the herders' historical role in conservation and led the 
policy advisors to adopt Ostrom's self-governing institutional design principles as a way 
to strengthen co1nmunity pastoral institutions based on herder group formation (Mearns, 
2004b, Schmidt, 2004, SDC, 2010). 
However, these policies do not necessarily reflect the reality of the historical pastoral 
production system in Mongolia. In particular, they do not penetrate to the core logic of 
the herders' flexible CPR use pattern, nor do they explain how the herders gain access 
to pastoral resources and manage their production. Thus, although attempting to adjust 
historical pastoralism to a modem property regime framework, these policies led to the 
state dis1nantling the historical fundamentals of the production system in the following 
ways: 
a) De-coupling the three components of pastoral production: livestock, labour and 
pasture land; 
b) De-coupling uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar, winter and spring campsites, from 
pasture land; 
c) De-coupling dual (fonnal and informal) control over pastoral production and 
pastureland management by prioritizing only the herders' property rights to pastureland, 
whilst diminishing jurisdictional authority in resource governance; 
d) Re-shaping management authority of state-based actors led to conflicting interests of 
state-based parallel institutions over resource governance. The application of state 
territorial strategy with zoning contradicts the historical role of the state ad1ninistrative 
territory in resource management. 
These theoretical approaches triggered misconception of a failed overlapping state and 
acommunal regimes that led to open access, whilst overlooking the historically 
integrated state and local community pastoral institution. As we will see later in this 
thesis, policy makers faced difficulties in applying exclusive property rights as a means 
of strengthening historical local pastoral institutions. These policy initiatives struggled 
to regulate herders' complex patterns of access to pastureland. This is because the 
perception of open access is misleading. When exploring problems in current 
pastureland use practices, policy-makers compared Mongolian property relations with 
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western and agrarian notions of property relations in order to shift pastoral production 
into market system. Although 1nany have reviewed historical patterns of resource 
management (Upton, 2009, Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Mearns, 2004b, Griffin, 2003, 
Ickowitz, 2003, Sneath, 2003), few have acknowledged the importance of some of the 
funda1nental aspects of historical property relations in current land management (Upton, 
2008, Sneath, 2004). Therefore, the problem is related to both poor policy practices of 
adjusting historical institutional patterns, and the adoption of misleading and 
inappropriate theory in scoping the problem and addressing the historical complexities 
in pastureland management in Mongolia. I review the theories of natural resource 
management in the next chapter. 
The existing literature lacks an understanding of the historical fundamentals of the 
mobile pastoralism in Mongolia, where state and community social and resource 
boundaries have long been set to exercise property rights over pastureland (Vreeland, 
1954, Sneath, 2007, Natsagdorj, 1975, Fernandez-Gimenez, 2006). It is important to 
recognize the strength of this historical fundamentals in land tenure system, which has 
legally maintained the principal structure of a pastoral production system -- the control 
of pastoral production components under dual control -- until its transition in 1990 
-(Mearns, 2004b, Fernandez-Gimenez, 2006). Even after undergoing some changes 
dictated by the new statutory laws, the historical fundamentals of property relations that 
involves the presence of both a state territorial administrative unit and the local herding 
community is still practised in pastureland management. In other words, there is a 
strong sense of ownership over the resources among the local people and local 
administration. 
1.4. Aim, scope & significance 
This thesis examines the problem of disputed use of pasture and overgrazing within the 
framework of historical notions of property relations, in which land tenure was 
regulated under dual control of the management of the production components. The 
thesis addresses the shortcomings of the policy discourses and theoretical concepts by 
examining the herders' patterns of access to pastoral resources using the access 
approach (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). In particular, this thesis seeks to understand why 
recent changes in herders' access to pastureland have led to overgrazing and the 
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disputed use of the pastureland. Therefore, understanding how and why CPR 
management succeeds or fails, particularly in the context of mobile pastoralism, entails 
an exainination of what mechanisms and strategies herders employ to gain access to 
pastoral resources. The first aim of this thesis is thus to explore, theoretically, the 
cultural and institutional aspects of pastoral production and pastureland management in 
Mongolia. It will also explain what policy initiatives need to acknowledge in regulating 
access to pastoral resources in the context of mobile pastoralism in Mongolia. I address 
two linked research questions: why are herders changing how they access (gain, 
maintain and control) 11 seasonal pastures and how do these changes affect pastoral land 
management? These questions are divided into more specific questions: 
How have changes in policy affected the herders' access to pastoral 
resources? 
What conditions and factors have influenced the diversification of their 
access strategies? 
What 1nechanisms 12 are the herders using to obtain access to seasonal 
pastures? 
How and why do these mechanisms affect herders mobility and 
flexibility? 
-
Exploring the patterns adopted by herders' in accessing pastoral resources will extend 
our understanding of the historical role of pastoral production management in sustaining 
the livelihoods of mobile pastoralists who seek to maintain their relationship with the 
surrounding environment. Theoretically, this contributes by explaining the problems of 
adjusting historical or local community institutions, extending theories on CPR 
management and in relation to access to pastoral contexts. In a global market economy, 
the broader literature on natural resource management emphasizes the significance of 
defining property rights in managing pastureland. This analysis will reveal the extent to 
vvhich the different state actors and herders benefit through employing specific 
mechanisms and strategies to gain access to pastoral resources. Practically, this 
11 Gaining access refers to the "more general process by which access is established" (Ribot & Peluso, 
2003 , p 159). Maintenance of access refers to "expending resource or powers to keep a particular sort of 
resource access open" (Berry, 1993 cited in Ribot & Peluso, 2003 , p 159). Control of access refers to "the 
checking and direction of action, the function of power of directing and regulating free action" (Rangan, 
1997 cited in Ribot & Peluso, 2003 , 158). 
12 Ribot and Peluso (2003) used mechanism, which refers to means, process and 
relations, 'because"means" implies agency, whereas access is not always a matter of agency. The 
manifestation of mechanisms in power relations between people in other realms of social interaction may 
have the disciplining effects of controlling someone ' s access to the resources by favoring the access of 
others (Foucault, 1979; Moore, 1993 cited in Ribo & Peluso, 2003). 
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exarnination contributes to clarifying and situating the historical and local notion of 
property relations in its place in Mongolia. 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of nine chapters divided into three sections. In Part I ( Chapter 1 & 
2), I situate the current study within the related literature and set out the research 
methodology. In Chapter 2, I discuss the underlying theoretical issues in CPR 
management. This includes a critical review of the 1najor theoretical concepts and 
fraineworks used in the thesis that are employed to analyse the proble1n of CPR 
manage1nent. In order to understand CPR management in different contexts, this chapter 
essentially argues for a need to investigate resource access patterns, as well as the 
mechanisms and the strategies that different actors employ to control the benefits they 
derive from the exploitation of CPR. Based on this, the most pressing gaps in the 
literature are identified and research questions are posed accordingly. This chapter also 
introduces methodological issues and the research design, justifying the need for a 
qualitative case study approach to examine the problems of pastureland management in 
Mongolia. This also justifies the use of specific research 1nethods for collecting, 
presenting and analysing the data. After introducing the research design, this chapter 
also introduces 1ny case study area along with justification for why this area was 
chosen. 
Part II (Chapters 3 & 4) presents an overview of the historical background to the context 
of pastureland management in Mongolia. Chapter 3 focuses on explaining the principal 
structure: the fundamentals of historical pastoral production in Mongolia, which has 
been developed and pursued during the past 800 years, regardless of changes in the 
socio-political systems. This chapter reviews other literature and highlights that 
nomadic societies historically maintained this principal structure of pastoral production 
to gain political and economic benefits. Chapter 4 extends the analysis of the 
background to the political and economic system in the collective period. The shift from 
a feudal to a socialist system centralized the economy of pastoral production. 
Regardless of this shift, the centralized government maintained the classic principles of 
pastoral production in order to continue to gain the benefits from pastoral production. 
Thus, this chapter emphasizes that different political and economic systems can draw 
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benefits from pastoral production as long as they maintain the principal structures of 
production management. 
In Part III (Chapter 5, 6, 7 & 8), I present my case study and discuss Mongolia herders' 
resource access patterns during the period of transition from a collective to a privatized 
production system. The overall argument here is that the failure of the transition 
policies, in fact, led to growing disputes a1nong herders and actually intensified 
overgrazing. Chapter 5 presents key findings of the investigation into the privatization 
and decentralization policies. This chapter essentially argues that privatization separated 
land from the livestock and labour components of pastoral production management in 
Mongolia. Thus, this chapter assesses the i1npacts of these policies on the herders' 
resource access patterns and local pastureland 1nanagement practices. Overall, it is 
found that privatization resulted in the collapse of formal collective control of 
pastureland. Thus, the state instigated land reform to introduce de jure exclusive 
property rights. Chapter 6 focuses on pastureland regulation under the land law of 1994 
and 2002 and the draft law on pastureland since 2010. In particular, this chapter 
discusses the impact of uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar ezemshil, (legal campsite 
possession), in changing herders' access to pastoral resources and pastureland 
-
1nanagement. This chapter argues that the land law failed to improve pastureland 
management. This is because it dismantled the integrated form of pastureland use, 
decoupling uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar (winter and spring campsite) and be/cheer 
(pasture), and articulated separate tenure arrangements for each. This created conflicting 
institutional arrange1nents, which led to disputes over use between herders and the 
overgrazing of pastureland. Under this arrangement, herders 1naintained de facto control 
over the three production components. Local territorial administration plays a weaker 
role in pastureland manage1nent, yet maintains their benefits by exploiting their official 
positions in controlling the registration of residency and allocation legal campsite 
possession. Responding to this dilemma, international policy initiatives focused on 
replacing the local pastoral institutions with the notion of local herding communities. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the relationship between herders and the local territorial 
ad1ninistration over the control of pastureland under community based natural resource 
management, which weakens co-management ( dual control) over pastureland. It 
discusses the policies that led to the formation of herder groups and self-governing 
institutions that would regulate herders' access to uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar and 
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pastureland under group possession of pastureland, the draft pastureland law of 2010 13 
('Draft law on Pastureland,' 2007, 2010). The new law intended to reflect the historical 
pastoral institution, however, herder group formation faces multiple challenges. I will 
explore why the formation of herder groups has had li1nited success in strengthening 
local community institutions and examine the existing notion of the community pasture 
management on the ground. Answering these questions are important to explain why the 
historically interdependent relationship between state and community still persists and 
why herders change their access mechanis1ns in order to pursue ulamjlalt production 
based on this relationship. I argue that this policy initiative failed due to the fact that it 
created a rigid notion of local 'community'. It overlooked the role of local territorial 
ad1ninistrative units in defining the social and resource boundaries of local communities 
through the mechanisms of residency registration, uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar 
ezems hi! allocation and bag pasture land 1nanagement. In other words, it ignored the 
historical patte-rns of co-management in access to pastoral resources. 
Responding to the little-or-no i1nprovements in supporting herders' livelihood and their 
production, the government re-established the state reserve pasture areas for herders' 
long distance 1novement in emergency weather conditions. Chapter 8 examines the state 
territorial strategy that applied zoning over natural resources, which differed from the 
state's territorial strategy over local administrative units. It focuses on impact of this 
policy on local pastureland management. Although intended to support production of 
the herders', this policy also failed because it contradicted other legislation that 
regulated the herders' access to pastoral resources. Thus, it is argued that state territorial 
strategy over natural resources needs to acknowledge first, local pastoral production 
1nanage1nent, second, locally recognized resource boundaries, and third, addresses the 
interests of local actors in controlling the herders' access to pastoral resources. 
Part IV (Chapter 9) concludes this study and suggests ways forward. Chapter 9 
concludes the whole thesis and the argument I developed in relation to CPR 
management and access theories and presents some insights into future policy options in 
Mongolian CPR management. A lack of understanding of these property relations in 
Mongolia led to defining the pastureland problem as one of open access. This 
misconception led to the application of an alien concept of property, which resulted in 
13 Draft law on pastureland, 2007 & 2010 
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aggravating the problem of overgrazing and the disputes over the use of pastureland. In 
contrast, the thesis affirms the idea proposed by other researchers that Mongolian 
pastoralis1n functions with very complex property relations, which have developed 
historically and still persist. This system is the historical co-management of pastoral 
production. Under this co-management, formal control manages the major three 
components of pastoral production: livestock, labour and pastureland. In other words, 
regulating pastureland involves regulating pastoral production. Re-instating this dual 
production control is essential for natural resource management within a market-based 
econo1ny. In this case, instead of only focusing on market development for land, it is 
important to develop market for pastoral production, including the three components as 
a whole within local jurisdictional boundaries. This is to strengthen formal jurisdictional 
authority and informal herder control and maintain flexibility in movement and camping 
patterns. 
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2 Understanding Common Pool Resource Management 
2.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the background to the research problem which is related 
to statutory policy regulation. The imposition of a model for CPR management on 
Mongolia's pastoral production system, which has been defined as either open access or 
suffering from an absence of property rights (Griffin, 2003, Ickowitz, 2003), has led to 
environmental and agricultural policy practices which applied exclusive property rights 
to land and natural resources. These policies have affected pastoral production and 
resource 1nanagement in pastoral societies in different countries that were transitioning 
to a market econo1ny. These policies reflected theoretical approaches relating to the 
property relations of the community and the institutions that controlled access to natural 
resources. This chapter critically evaluates these approaches and explores the access 
approach to enhance our understanding of property relations, institutions and 
co1nmunity, and the co1nplexity of adjusting the historical pastoral institution in 
Mongolia. This chapter also introduces the qualitative case_ study as an appropriate 
methodological approach for exploring resource access in a pastureland context in 
Mongolia. 
The first section discusses different approaches that have been adopted in regulating 
CPR in general. These approaches will be reviewed in chronological order, reflecting 
the priority of each approach in the different time periods of international development. 
The second section justifies the use of a qualitative case study methodology, and 
clarifies some of the misunderstandings about qualitative case studies in terms of 
contributing to the develop1nent of scientific knowledge. I also describe my research 
design and justify the selection of the case study area, and set out the research methods 
and analytical tools utilized. 
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2.2. Understanding CPR management 
2.2.1. Property regime 
Theories of natural resource management have often focused on how formal regulations 
control users' access to natural resources. Hardin ( 1968) raised concerns that there were 
no specific regulations in the use of natural resources in the 'commons'. What he 
presumed to be the uncontrolled use of natural resources would result in 
overexploitation, leading to a "tragedy" (Hardin, 1968). Thus, he suggested clear 
regulations needed to be placed under a state or private property regime. Yet in practice, 
such privatization or government control has not necessarily avoided tragedy. In fact, 
tragedy can be avoided under community management (National-Research-Council, 
1986, Eerkes et al., 1989, Feeny et al., 1990). The proponents of this latter position 
argued that Hardin did not recognize this community based natural resource 
management (CENRM). He put everything into one package which he called 'the 
commons' without differentiating the nature of the resources (common-pool resources 
(CPR)) from the management system, which exists with or without a property regime. 
They concluded that Hardin's position was referring to open access (failed property 
regi1nes or an absence of property rights) as there were no specific property rights that 
he could discern governing the use of the resources. Open access was, in fact, one of 
four recognized property regimes (state, private, common property and open access), 
under which common-pool resources are managed (Eerkes et al., 1989, Feeny et al., 
1990, Ostrom, 2009, Berkes, 2009). 
According to Ostrom (1990), common pool resources share two characteristics, 
exclusion and subtractability. Exclusion of potential users is costly and difficult, 
particularly given the physical nature of resources which are migratory or which occupy 
vast areas vvith undefined boundaries. The second characteristic, subtractibility, means 
that the exploitation of a CPR by one user reduces the availability of the resource for 
other users (Ostrom et al., 1999, Berkes et al., 1989). In other words, the resource does 
not always provide equal benefits as it is difficult to control equal access given the 
complex nature of different resource types and user groups. 
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CPR theorists revealed examples of the existence of successful communal 1nanagement 
in which local users have self-regulating capabilities within their community rules and 
norms in pursuing exclusion and regulating joint use (Berkes et al., 1989). However, 
so1ne communities failed in these pursuits. Therefore, CPR theorists questions why 
some com1nunal management succeeds, while others fail under changing socio-political 
conditions (Ostrom et al., 1999, Berkes et al., 1989, Basurto and Ostrom, 2009). 
According to these authors, this is related to central state ownership and is detrimental 
to self-governing institutions. Thus, some communities are unable to pursue exclusion 
as they do not have exclusive property rights and fail to avoid open access. As a result, 
they proposed a communal property regime by re-installing historical self-governing 
institutions at the local community level. This requires the state to recognize historical 
and custo1nary self-governing community rules and norms with local CPRs. Then, 
acknowledging the limits of a single property regime, they suggested the possibility of 
co-management, in which overlapping property regimes or a combination of different 
property regimes to govern the resources. This refers to state-based actors enforcing 
state ownership rules and norms, and collaborating with local communities under a 
communal regime (Berkes et al., 1989, Feeny et al., 1990). Understanding CPR 
management under these property regi1nes involves exploration by interests from 
-
interdisciplinary fields of the evolving idea of CPR management, particularly its 
complex adaptive systems (Berkes, 2009). 
2.2.2. Exploring a concept of community 
With regard to the CPR dilemma, another argument draws attention to the capacity of 
the community that is exploiting the resource. McCay and Svein (1998) argued that the 
CPR dile1n1na is not due to an absence of property rights, but is often attributed to the 
capacity of the community which is vulnerable in maintaining social capital. Thus, it 
can fail in its protection due to changes in state policies or arrangements (me1nbers rely 
more on the state than on each other) and market-led socio-economic reforms, where 
economic production is not shaped by members' needs, but by the needs of the 1narket. 
The authors also emphasized the significance of traditional community management, 
particularly custo1nary n1les and regulations, in solving conflicting uses (McCay and 
Acheson, 1987). Thus, they suggest strengthening the community through "co-
management institutions and inclusion of user-knowledge as a way of re-embedding 
management responsibilities within the local community" (McCay and J entoft, 1998 p, 
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26). Their position is significant in terms of emphasizing the role of the co1nmunity as 
an actor in CPR management. They also urged the need to explore the impacts of state 
and market led socio-political changes on the community. Although acknowledged, the 
importance of strengthening community institutions through co-management, McCay 
and Jentoft (1998) re1nained ambivalent regarding the mixed results of delivering this 
agenda through participatory and devolution management schemes due to the fact that 
"co1nmunities are not always well integrated, ho1nogenous, cooperative and equitable in 
their distribution of resources" (McCay and Jentoft, 1998, p 27). Emphasing the 
community's role may limit the image of the community to being an independent, 
protective and benevolent actor rather than as one of the main historical actors who 
exercises certain community rules and norms to maintain benefits from resources. 
Understanding the nature of the community and its resource use patterns is crucial to 
addressing the CPR dile1nma. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) argued that it is misleading 
to see communities as small units that are spatially and socially homogenous, and well-
integrated. The authors argued that traditional communities have not always been 
protectors of nature and should not be assumed as being just friendly to the environment 
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). For instance, the extinction of certain species of wildlife 
in the Arctic occurred during the time of early hunters and gatherers (Lopez, 2001, 
Lopez, 1986). Rather, Agrawal and Gibson (1999) argued, co-mmunities have different 
intentions towards natural resources. Thus, the possibility of the community assuming 
responsibility for resource management as a stakeholder raises questions about power 
relations within the community; whether the community would serve the interests of all, 
or only those who seized the authority, to make the rules (Agrawal, 2003). In other 
words, there is a concern about whether the distribution of community benefits would 
be equal and reach all its members (McCay and Jentoft, 1998, p 27). In particular, 
feminist academics question whether customary communities can guarantee female 
me1nbers equal rights to benefits from resources (Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997). These 
scholars are often critical that strengthened customary tenure is transformed into a 
structure in which most land rights are concentrated in the hands of a minority 
(Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997). Thus, com1nunity-based natural resource management needs 
to address the changing notion of distribution of benefits among its members. 
Agrawal and Gibson (1999) emphasized that communities have a heterogeneous nature 
in terms of social composition, resource type and size of territory, which reflects their 
local political, resource management and broader social dynamics. They argue that 
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community development and community-based conservation rely solely on the perhaps 
rnisleading notions of community social homogeneity, territorial integration and shared 
interests. Instead, it needs to focus on the politics of the conservation process, which is 
embedded in local resource rnanagement. This process requires the acknowledgement of 
different actors, of their involvement in local level conservation processes and the 
strengthening of local resource management institutions. Strengthening weakened local 
institutions reconciles these different actors to the common goal of regulating power 
relations among the actors involved in creating the institution, and structuring their 
interaction towards managing the resources. In this way, formal and informal 
institutions can function effectively, and remain free of a dominating interest (Agrawal 
and Gibson, 1999, p 637). Although significant in addressing diversity in community 
structures and power relation in CPR management, this approach only explains 
community CPR management in terms of conservation of natural resources rather than 
in overall production management, which shapes resource use patterns. Some 
communities, including 1nobile pastoralists in Mongolia, may need to address CPR 
manage1nent in their overall production management. I will elaborate on this point later 
in my discussion on the Herlen Bayan-Ulaan (HBU) case (see Chapter 5-8). 
2.2.3. Design principles for self-governing community institutions 
Strengthening community institutions to conserve natural resources becomes 
particularly important in solving the CPR dilemma. This is mainly based on the 
assumption that state designed resource institutions are mostly unsuccessful, because 
they are often top-down and do not include the involvement of local actors. "Global and 
national environmental policy is ignorant of local and traditional knowledge ... [ and] ... 
leave[ s] local officials and users with insufficient autonomy and understanding to 
design effective institutions" (Dietz et al., 2003, p 1907). Thus, strengthening 
community self-governing institutions is crucial (Ostrom et al., 1999). The co1nmunity' s 
role in natural resource management · is positioned in the context of stakeholder 
collaboration. This raises concerns about power relations and the value of players across 
different levels. Thus, CPR theorists emphasized that no matter whether the rule and 
enforce1nent of resource management is formal or informal, "those who impose must be 
seen as effective and legitimate by resources users" (Dietz et al., 2003 , p 1909). 
However, the strength of community institutions becomes more questionable in the 
context of changing political and economic systems. In this case, failure in community 
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management "merely represents failures in the specific structure of rules that govern a 
collective property, by virtue of increasing scarcity or value of the resource or 
alterations in local structure and culture" (Robbins, 2004 p, 45). Failure in community 
management is not inevitable, but state and traditional community institutions are static 
and inflexible in coping with conflicting conditions during these changes. Thus, 
strengthening self-governing community institutions requires mending deficiencies in 
the old/historical arrangements or crafting newer and better rules (Ostrom, 1990, 
Ostrom et al., 1999, Robbins, 2004). The CPR theorists found that successful CPR 
management a) has clear social and resource boundaries and b) the community enforces 
rules and norms for resource use that match the structure of the resource type (Ostrom, 
2009). However, the rules and norms they found were very diverse in the different 
context (Ostro1n, 2009). Thus, these scholars focus on clarifying institutional 
regularities which were found in long-lasting, successful CPR management, but which 
were missing in some of the failed cases (Ostrom, 2009). Ostrom (1990) emphasized the 
i1nportance of a nested approach involving different layers of enterprises and actors in a 
wider enabling context. 
CPR theorists came up with design principles that rely on eight major variables that 
-
com1nunities need to possess to ensure a successful self-governing community 
institution. The design principles imply a redefinition of local community groups and 
their resource management institutions (Agrawal, 2003). Institutional theorists jointly 
identified 36 variables to Ostrom's original eight (Agrawal, 2001). The following 
variables appear to be crucial to the 'principle of exclusion': a) a well-defined social and 
b) resource boundary of a smaller size group with c) all local members affected by the 
resource regime involved in developing or modifying the rules (Agrawal, 2001, 
Schlager, 2004, Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001, Dietz et al., 2003, Wollenberg et al., 2007, 
Ostrom, 2009). Thus, this principle focuses on "the power to exclude people other than 
members of a defined community" (Ostrom et al., 1999, p 7). Although not a 
prescription for institutional design, community self-governing institutions become an 
alternative to the state-led and market-oriented policies that governed CPR management 
(Agrawal, 2003, Marshall, 2008). Thus, through the application of design principles, 
CPR theorists seek to explore the possibility of universal characteristics of local self-
governing property institutions for CPR management in a market-oriented economy. 
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Several points need to be discussed with regard to the application of these key variables 
in different contexts, where resource type and user groups are 1nainly diverse and 
dynainic (Cleaver and Franks, 2005, Schlager, 2004). First, a design principle is usually 
applied without recognizing the socially constructed values that shape collective action 
(Ruttan 2000 cited in Cleaver and Franks, 2005). Design principles highlight the 
responsibility of rule-making to a 1ninority within a group, those who have the power to 
rule over the 1najority of the members (Cleaver and Franks, 2005). Moreover, locally-
made rules are problematic to enforce as these can be quite abstract in a context of 
shared of CPR without clarifying what types of rules are appropriate to whom and who 
is local among the different com1nunities and different actors (Agrawal, 2007). For 
instance, this rule making may contradict localized ( among different communities) 
patterns of production which have been shaped by specific ecological and political 
factors. Second, a design principle is problematic when it is specifically focused on 
exclusion by drawing clearly defined social and resource boundaries. "Resource 
boundaries rarely match social boundaries, and resources tend to be used by competing 
user-groups, even within the same community" (Eerkes, 2009, p 263). In such cases, a 
community self-governing institution cannot function. However, it is even questionable 
that the effectiveness of a self-governing institution is only measured by exclusion 
-
based on bundle of rights. In the design principles, the resource boundary is discussed 
more in tenns of how property rights shape the outcome of exclusion rather than 
acknowledging how the biophysical or ecological condition affects the outcome 
(Agrawal, 2007). Moreover, CPRs are usually shared among inter and intra groups. 
Thus, the issue of defining a group's social boundary without acknowledging inclusion 
or reciprocity between different groups is highly contested and ambiguous due to the 
different dimensions and effects of heterogeneity in a group's collective action 
(Agrawal, 2007). Thus, facing various outcomes from applying these variables in real 
life contexts, Ostro1n (2009) later acknowledged the i1nportance of going beyond a 
single universal design principle and the need for flexibility in addressing the specific 
social and historical aspects in various CPR governance arrangements in different 
contexts. 
Lastly, it is simplistic and problematic to perceive a community self-governing property 
management institution as independent of, if not only recognized by, the state and the 
main mechanism to control local resource management. Some scholars argue that 
1nultiple actors are involved in resource management, including different community 
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groups and local authorities (Schlager, 2004 ). In particular, local authorities are often 
expected to develop and support these institutions with legal recognition of their 
property rights. This may be because of a perception that traditional or indigenous 
communities often have a non-state, self-governing structure. For instance, Ostro111 
(1999 p 278) assumed that Mongolian pastoral institutions were under traditional group 
manage1nent without specifying what constitutes a traditional group institution. In 
addition, local authorities may shape the boundaries of resource groups or may 
influence the process of establishing groups. For instance, in Inner Asia mobile 
pastoralists were reported to be a "society within, rather than against, the state" (Meeker 
2002 cited in Sneath, 2007, p 191 ). Thus, it is critical to address the nature of the local 
community and its historical relationship to the state-based actors in terms of local 
natural resource management. In circumstances where there are different actors in local 
natural resource management, it is questionable whether a self-governing institutional 
arrangement addresses the interests of these actors in sharing power over regulating 
local resource use. Although located in an asymmetrical position in terms of power 
relations (Agrawal, 2003, p, 63 9), the design principles and its implementation is often 
dependent on local authorities and may not function independently. Then, to what extent 
do these design principles address the historical interactions with different actors and 
-
their interests in sharing and maintaining authority over local CPR management? 
Difficulties in adjusting historical patterns and strengthening community institutions 
implies difficulty in allowing exclusive property rights to communities, which are going 
through a transition from one socio-political and economic system to another. This is 
why it is crucial to examine property relations in the broader historical and socio-
political context. 
2.2.4. Fuzziness in property rights 
The introduction of exclusive property rights has been particularly complicated in post-
socialist transition countries, where property relations were shifted from state ownership 
to market-based property regimes ( exclusive state, private or community group). In this 
transition context, it is difficult to practice exclusive property rights, because property 
relations are "fuzzy" (Sturgeon and Sikor, 2004). That is, it is difficult to exercise the 
bundle of rights attached to exclusive property rights, due to emerging ambiguities in 
' 
the notion of property, which "lack clarity of borders, owners and exclusion" (Sturgeon 
and Sikor, 2004, p 3). This may be because the application of exclusive private property 
23 
rights lacks "routine rules and crystallized practices" (Verdery, 1999, p 5 5). This 
ambiguity in property relations is, in fact, apparent in many societies, particularly those 
which previously experienced colonialism or socialism. This is related to the practices 
of property relations in their previous system. In socialist regi1nes, the state controls all 
natural resources under the concept of public or people's property, eradicating historical 
borders that existed in different natural resources (Verdery, 2004 ). Also, the state 
allocates to other actors like cooperatives or lower level state agents the task of 
regulating access to natural resources. These actors exercise their authority using state 
funding or information technology, but not through exercising exclusive property rights 
to natural resources. Thus, this process led to blurring the boundaries of property, 
owners and exclusion (Verdery, 2004 ). 
In an exclusive state owned resource system, both colonial and socialist states broadly 
employed territorial strategy to organize their different agencies to manage their natural 
resources (Sowerwine, 2004). Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) argued that state 
territorial strategy goes beyond the state territorial approach to its national boundary. 
The state uses spatial organization to assert its authority over citizens' actions with 
respect to resource use within national boundaries. Thus, a territorial strategy was used 
-
for both agricultural and conservation purposes. For instance, the communist Chinese 
government transformed Inner Mongolian grazing land into intensive livestock 
production as it considered this rangeland barren or wasteland and lacking economic 
development (William, 1996). Also, Mongolia's socialist government imposed 
territorial strategy with zoning on Mongolia's rangeland for conservation purposes 
(Bedunah and Schmidt, 2004). Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) argue that the state 
employed a zoning in its territorial strategy. Such creation of abstract space with 
mapping is a strategy e1nployed by modem states (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995), as 
the state widely utilizes "ideology, legiti1nacy, and technology as a means of increasing 
control over both valuable resources and a recalcitrant population" (Sowerwine, 2004, p 
105). 
In the post-socialist context, fuzziness resulted from overlapping property relations; -
customary rights and statutory property regulation were inherited from the different 
historical periods and were defined again in the transition period in relation to 
individuals and groups. For this reason, attempting to apply exclusive property rights 
created ambiguity in the attempts to clarify boundaries for specific natural resources and 
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specific owners. Ambiguous and incompatible rules and regulations in applying 
exclusive property rights have resulted in "contestations over single resources, 
overlapping rights, blurred boundaries between private and public, different meanings 
attributed to resources by different actors and conflicting visions of the landscape" 
(Sturgeon and Sikor, 2004 p, 13). Fuzziness also existed between private and state 
property rights. For instance, in Bulgaria, exclusive private rights are not useful in 
regulating village forest resources, because an individual's ability to invest in forest 
property is limited due to their lack of access to productive resources (Cellarius, 2004). 
Historically, under both pre-socialist and socialist regimes, subsidies from the 
community or the state provided these resources to manage village forests (Cellarius, 
2004). Fuzziness in these situations indicates an inability of exclusive property rights to 
regulate diverse property relations in a uniform manner. 
Moreover, the state has failed to exercise exclusive state ownership in relation to 
resources. According to Vandergeest and Peluso (1995, p. 388), the state employs the 
territorial strategy of drawing boundaries, creating territories, and making claims that 
are enforced by state law with the help of modem technology. However, the state often 
fails to enforce its territorial strategy even when using its coercive power (Vandergeest 
-
and Peluso, 1995). This occurred in Thailand, firstly, because zoning contradicted the 
local patterns of resource boundaries, types and users. Secondly, the failure was also 
due to a conflict a1nong different state agencies implementing contradictory state 
legislation that regulated the same geographical areas. Third, the state's lack of capacity 
to i1nplement its re-settlement policy led to the local people's resistance to zoning and 
their claims over the territory (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995). Similarly, Sowerwine 
(2004) argued that fuzziness in property relations, for instance in highland Vietnam, was 
not necessarily due to territorial based policies, but arose mainly because the policies 
did not reflect the "historical, ecological and institutional particularities of the locale ... " 
(Sowerwine, 2004, p 105). This implies that the rationality of zoning has in these 
instances failed to reflect the interests of the local people regarding the use of their 
territory, which has been maintained from previous political and economic systems. 
Fuzziness in property relations is a useful concept for exploring problems in CPR 
management. In particular, it is useful to explore fuzziness in property relations in the 
post-socialist pastoral context in Mongolia because the Mongolian socialist state used 
territorial strategies for conservation and agricultural production. Later, the post-
socialist state also applied similar strategies for expanding protected areas and reserve 
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pasture areas. These policies produced fuzziness in property relations in terms of the 
legal authority of different actors to regulate access to natural resources. However, 
exploring fuzziness may be limited to investigating the problem within the property 
regimes (overlapping property rights). This may not fully address the complex problems 
in pastureland 1nanagement, which are embedded in historically, ecologically and 
institutionally significant property relations in pastoral production management. In other 
words, it may not explain the problems of pastureland management which were created 
in an attempt to apply exclusive property rights. 
2.2.5. Limitations in understanding property rights 
The difficulties in applying exclusive property rights in developing contexts highlight 
an e1nerging argument which challenges the conventional concept of property. Benda 
Beckman et al. (2006) emphasized that the common understanding of property refers to 
individual or exclusive ownership whose aim is to achieve a desired outcome of 
efficiency and equity. This concept of property is widely used in interpreting and 
i1nposing property regimes in both western and non-western cultures. Beckman et al. 
(2006) argued that application of this concept has often resulted in unintended, but 
deleterious consequences and complications in understanding property relations in non-
western cultures. In these societies, application of exclusively individual based notions 
of property does not match that of western societies, because of both custo1nary and 
statutory property relations that have emerged through unique historical processes. In 
addition, the ways in which individuals claim these rights have now changed under the 
application of exclusive property rights, contributing to a more ambiguous and less clear 
property relationship (Meijl, 2006, Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006). For instance, Benda-
Beckmann et al (2006) argued, "In the category of common or co1nmunal property, 
radically different mixes of rights of individuals, or s1naller and larger social groups are 
thrown together" (p. 24 ). This implies, according the author, that those who promoted 
existing property regimes with their socio-economic agenda of equity and efficiency in 
resource management focus "more on how property regimes should be instead of how 
they are" (Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006 p, 2). The authors argue that the concept of 
property is understood differently in diverse socio-political contexts. For that very 
reason, "property must be viewed in a broader context, including both legal and illegal 
uses of resources, because the determination of what is legal is subject to changing 
politics, variable perspectives, and shifting, though always unequal power relations" 
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(Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006, p 9). They suggest that unpacking the concept of 
property in these contexts reveals a wide variety of arrangements within different levels, 
and across different historical and socio-political settings. The authors identified 
different property relations at de jure and de facto levels, and complex relationships 
between user groups, the property object and their rights and obligations (Benda-
Beckmann et al., 2006). These arrangements differ across developing country contexts. 
Thus, it is insightful to explore local concepts of property relations in order to 
understand its role in CPR management in different context. 
2.2.6. Access 
CPR managernent is not solely based on the pursuit of exclusion using property 
mechanisms. Under changing ecological, socio-political and economic conditions 
scarcity of natural resources emerges, and claims to resources become competitive. 
Scholars question why some people appear to benefit from the exploitation of natural 
resources with or without property rights (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Access mechanisms 
include processes or means of access: rights-based legal and illegal 1nechanisms and 
structural and relational mechanisms ( capital, technology, market, labour opportunities, 
authority, social identity and social relations,) and strategies involved in resource access 
under diverse conditions with various factors focusing on and beyond the property 
rights (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). The access approach proceeds in the following way. It 
is argued by Ribot and Peluso (2003) that, first in property relations, the notion of 
access is limited to a 'right to benefit'. In this case, property rights implies only an 
"enforceable claim, one that is acknowledged and supported by society through laws, 
custo1ns or conventions" (Ribot and Peluso, 2003, 155). Thus, property rights are a 
prescriptive norm or ideal connotation, limited in capacity to benefit from the resources. 
Second, different relations between state and local institution contribute to shaping 
access to resources and property (Sikor et al., 2009). Although the state is authoritative 
in regulation, its authority is manipulated for personal benefit through various 
interpretations of law and regulations. Local officials exploit their positions to gain 
access to resources and disadvantage other people or communities who actually own the 
property but gain limited benefits (Broegaard, 2009, Lund, 2009, Ribot, 2009). 
Moreover, the status of exclusive ownership can be vulnerable in the face of state 
jurisdiction because of the local manipulation of state power. According to Ribot & 
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Peluso (2003) this is because the state laws are ambiguous due to the difficulties in 
applying exclusive property rights, thus creating fuzzy property relations (Benda-
Beckmann et al., 2006, Sikor et al., 2009). This ambiguity affects the interest of 
different actors in benefiting fro1n natural resources. Thus, these actors seek legitimate 
right-based14 or other relational or structural mechanisms15 to gain, maintain and control 
their access. This is why access to natural resources goes beyond bundles of rights 
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003). In fact, users employ different mechanisms to benefit from 
the exploitation of natural resources (Berry, 1993). In this case, CPR management is 
related to the issue of benefiting from the exploitation of natural resources. This is 
because "people, institutions and societies live on and clash and cooperate over them" 
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003p, 155). Thus, a benefit is, in fact, a matter of access to natural 
resources. 
In this case, exclusive property rights are just one mechanism to secure benefits. Access 
therefore does refer to an ability to benefit with or without property rights (Berry, 
1989b, Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Ability in this context represents one's power based on 
one's capacity to influence others' actions (Weber 1978 & Lukes 1986 cited in Ribot 
and Peluso, 2003). This capacity, in tum, involves individuals seeking out access to 
productive resources and to human, financial and material inputs, as well as the 
knowledge and institutional means to use them effectively to gain, maintain and control 
access to the natural resources (Berry, 1989a, Berry, 2009). Different actors are 
involved in seeking to control access. This power relation creates diverse social 
relations and contributes to shaping resource management. Individuals in a group have 
different relations to the resources. Their access to these resources can occur with or 
without control, or through some mix of control and 1naintenance (Ribot, 1998). Thus, 
exan1ining access offers a more detailed scope for explaining CPR management 
problems than the property regime approach. Understanding the process of access 
clarifies who benefits from natural resources and how. Analysing access also involves 
exploring various access mechanisms, that is, the process, the means or the relations 
actors employ to gain, maintain and control access to resources (Ribot and Peluso, 
l
4 Ribot & Peluso, 2003 refer to access mechanisms "sanctioned by law, custom or convention, including 
illegal access (or theft- when benefits are obtained through illegal mechanisms)" (Ribot & Peluso, 2003 , 
p 161). 
15 Structural (technology, capital, markets and knowledge) and relational (social identity, social relations, 
authority) mechanisms refer to the process that one can restrict other ' s benefits from natural resources by 
controlling and maintaining access to these resources (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). 
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2003). In this way, access analysis discloses a range of power relations and examines 
the process involved in extracting benefits. 
An access frainework is also constructive to apply in examining mechanisms which are 
embedded in broader social settings and which shape CPR management. Access is 
mostly explored in 1narket mechanisms through co1nmodity chain analysis (Ribot, 1998, 
Sikor and To, 2011) to understand the benefit distribution. However, access has rarely 
been applied to explore the different mechanisms involved in shaping local level 
resource management. In other words, it can be a useful framework to explore what 
mechanisms are involved in regulating actual users' access and the ways in which these 
mechanisms change the users' resource use patterns. In addition, this analysis is yet to 
be applied in the context of pastureland management. Understanding the problem of 
pastureland manage1nent in Mongolia needs a wider focus which is provided by using 
an access framework, because of the difficulties in applying exclusive individual or 
group property rights to pastureland management. 
2.3. Rangeland management 
In Mongolia, broad social settings including economics and politics in pastureland 
management are closely related to the country's geography and ecology. For this reason, 
the significance of mobile pastoralism in environmental management is increasing, 
because it involves rangeland management (Miller and Sheehy, 2008). Conventional 
rangeland 1nanage1nent has been challenged due to the fact that it is rooted in the 
concept of environmental equilibrium. In this approach, rangeland use is based on 
calculating carrying capacity of the land or the balance between the number of livestock 
and the regenerative capacity of the pasture (Behnke and Scoones, 1993). 
Many development efforts have been criticized because they view all rangelands 
through the equilibrium lens, whereas in many cases, rangelands are inherently unstable 
because of large climatic variations, which affect the growth of the vegetation (Swift 
and Mearns, 1993). One of the rangeland conditions is the ecology of dry-land, which is 
fragile because it is inherently affected by diverse cli1natic factors. Globally, more than 
half ( 60%) of grazing land is dry and has less capacity to regenerate due to two climatic 
factors (Reid et al., 2008). One factor is that the mean annual rainfall is low for keeping 
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pace with the total amount of evaporation back to the atmosphere. Cold climates are 
also a factor because they limit the vegetative growth of pasturelands (Reid et al., 2008). 
In addition, dry-lands vary in terms of the amount of precipitation that falls seasonally 
and inter-annually. This inconsistency in precipitation generates geographical 
variability. It is more closely related to complexity and therefore reduces the possibility 
of calculating carrying capacity or finding a balance between numbers of livestock and 
pasture growth for a range condition. This feature is referred to as disequilibrium 
rangeland system, and results in highly variable and unpredictable primary production 
(Vetter, 2005). This disequilibrium condition complicates the application of exclusive 
property rights, particularly exclusive individual ownership of natural resources. Thus, 
it is necessary in rangeland management to "reconsider dry-land ecology and what it 
means to derive livelihoods from an environment that is intrinsically at disequilibrium" 
(Behnke et al cited in Fratkin, 1997 p, 114 ). 
Over the last decades, mobile pastoralism has been positioned within a new paradigm of 
rangeland management, 'disequilibrium ecology' (Swift and Mearns, 1993, Fratkin, 
1997, Fratkin and Mearns, 2003 ). This is because mobile pastoralism is a more viable 
fonn of production in dry-land environments compared to ranch management (Fratkin, 
1997, Goldstein and Beall, 1994). Mobile pastoral systems are better at responding to 
fluctuating and patchy resources than many sedentary agricultural production ( crop-
growing and ranch) systems. These systems adapt well to a disequilibrium environment 
through high 1nobility, and pursuing wide-ranging, well-coordinated and specialized 
production of diverse species. They are also compatible with technologically advanced 
and profit-oriented economic activities (Goldstein and Beall, 1994, Fratkin, 1997). High 
mobility also involves a pattern of rotational grazing. Rotation follows seasonal 
migration between key pastures while avoiding the harshest climatic conditions. It also 
allows the pasture time to rest for use at another time of the year (Humphrey and 
Sneath, 1999). However, the sequence of rotation and mobility in general can always 
change depending on the extent of the harsh weather (Behnke and Scoones, 1993). 
Herders 1nay need to move many times for pasture throughout a vast area for sufficient 
grazing. This 1neans that herders, in times of crisis, must seek access rights to be able to 
move beyond their normal grazing area. 
Pastoral production is an activity which relies on the coordination of several households 
rather than an individual household. This coordination may also extend to households 
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within and between different villages. Coordination is based on a system of reciprocity. 
A visiting household or a group of households negotiates with the local herders and 
local authorities for access to use an area of pasture for a specific period of time. This 
would be reciprocated in the future if the host faced extreme climatic conditions in their 
area (Humphrey and Sneath, 1999). 
However, these disequilibriu1n conditions have been regulated through market oriented 
land reform policies and practices, regardless of the ecology. Pastoralists have been 
facing barriers in pursuing mobility (Miller and Sheehy, 2008). Mobility has been 
curtailed through alienation of land in order to expand intensive livestock husbandry, 
agriculture, and conservation and game parks (Fratkin and Mearns, 2003). Pastoralists 
in diverse cultures and countries have had various experiences in adapting and coping 
with these changes in terms of gaining access to pastoral resources and maintaining 
livelihoods. However, this thesis addresses the gap in current research understanding 
regarding why herders change how they access resources. These questions have not 
been examined with an access lens (involving wider processes, mechanisms and 
strategies involved in resource access under diverse conditions with various factors). 
Pastoral context is where resource access is strongly contested and management is 
complex due to applying exclusive property rights to the dynamic nature of social and 
resource boundaries. Therefore analysis of access mechanisms in disequilibrium 
ecology can be useful in filling the gaps in previous research on pastoralism using 
approaches such as ToC, property regimes, CBNRM and institutional arrangements 
because access to resources is related to both pastureland and pastoral production 
management. This analysis reveals the limitations of the exclusive property rights 
approach. Such an analysis would contribute to the understanding of why CPR 
1nanage1nent succeeds or fails in some pastoral settings. 
Thus, my research is focused on how access affects pastoral land management in 
Mongolia. Mongolia is one of the few remaining countries in Asia where mobile 
pastoralism is still practised as a dominant food production system. This system is based 
on ulamjlalt patterns of pastureland use in the presence of state and bag level 
community management of pastureland. Yet, changes in socio-political conditions in the 
20-21 st century resulted in dramatic changes in herders ' access to pastoral resources and 
affected pastureland management in Mongolia. My research question is, therefore: "why 
are herders changing how they access (gain, maintain and control) seasonal pastures and 
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how do these changes affect pastoral land management"? To address this question, 1ny 
research aims to explore theoretically and at the policy level which historical, cultural, 
and institutional aspects of pastoral production and pastureland management need to be 
addressed for regulating access to pastoral resources in the context of mobile 
pastoralis1n in Mongolia. 
2.4. Methodology 
In my research, I employed a qualitative case study approach in order to understand 
resource access mechanisms in a pastoral setting, and their impacts on resource use and 
management. This section justifies the selection of this methodology for exam1n1ng 
resource access 1nechanisms in HBU RP A along with the research design. 
2.4.1. Qualitative case study approach 
Case study approach I employed a case study approach to understand a case in a larger 
phenomenon by exploring its complexity (Stake, 1995, Evans et al., 2011, Flyvberg, 
2001 ). A case study is significant because it retains the meaningful characteristics of 
conte1nporary real-life events (Yin, 2009). It provides a holistic view of their processes 
by answering 'how and why' questions and providing detailed observations and insights 
into different aspects of the phenomena using documents and artefacts from the time of 
the event (Yin, 2009, Meyer, 2001, Gerring, 2007). Answering 'how and why' 
questions involves obtaining operational links to an event, rather than mere frequencies 
or incidence (Yin, 2009). The phenomenon in case-study research is defined by its real-
life context. Thus, examining it requires smaller numbers of participants in limited 
contextual boundaries, but allows more freedom in the number of variables, which 
emerge due to the diverse conditions in which the context is composed (Yin, 2009). 
This design helps in investigating the phenomenon in depth, particularly the operation 
of causal 1nechanisms in individual cases. In other words, the case study unpacks the 
complexity of the phenomenon under study by examining a) a large number of 
intervening variables, b) by observing, inductively, any unexpected aspects of the 
operation of a particular causal mechanism, and c) by helping to identify what 
conditions and factors activate the causal mechanism (George and Bennett, 2005). The 
case study method is differentiated from other methods, which ask the same 'how and 
why' questions by the fact that the researcher has less control over the phenomena being 
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studied (Meyer, 2001, Gerring, 2007). Also, case studies can be classified as single or 
collective cases. There are intrinsic ( creating an understanding of a specific case) and 
instrumental (the impact of a case to a general problem) case studies (Stake, 1995). 
Qualitative methodology is suitable for investigating a causal mechanism of a 
conte1nporary phenomenon in a case in depth and within a real-life context. It employs 
direct interpretation of events to understand 'why and how' a complex phenomenon 
exists or emerges (Stake, 1995). Direct interpretation of events requires qualitative 
researchers to be in the field, "making observations and exercising subjective judgment, 
analysing and synthesizing, all the while realizing their own consciousness" (Stake, 
1995, p 41). It involves a series of interpretations coming from both the researcher and 
the researched. Qualitative methods document contextual conditions that shape 
participant perceptions. It is concerned less with the researchers' own beliefs, and offers 
the opportunity to examine the subjects' perspectives and see them as valuable input 
(Stake, 1995, Stake, 2010). Thus, fieldwork acknowledges participant observations and 
understanding events under real-life conditions without creating an external plot to 
obtain data. The fieldwork also complements a researcher's reporting of experiences to 
the reader (Stake, 2010). 
Qualitative case study Some scholars also argue that there are misleading perceptions 
about the case study approach. This includes that it is limited to creating a general 
theory-based context, or to creating the first stage of research to generate a hypothesis 
rather than testing one, or to become subjective, lacking verification and that it is 
difficult to create theoretical knowledge based on a single case study (Flyvberg, 2001, 
Yin, 2009, Stake, 1995). These perceptions overall present a challenge for the 
qualitative case as a valid research method for scientific inquiry (Meyer, 2001, Gerring, 
2007, Kyburz-Graber, 2004). Most of these misleading perceptions are rooted 1n 
comparing its strengths with the generalization process of quantitative inquiry. 
It is crucial to highlight that the process and nature of qualitative case study inquiry 
need to be defined by its own strengths instead of contrasting it to the process of 
quantitative inquiry, which is ultimately different in nature in terms of producing 
knowledge (Stake, 2010). Flyvberg (2001) emphasized that the case study approach is 
more of a basic method rather than inferior in terms of generating inference. In this 
circumstance, the case study generates an inference by discovering and constructing 
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patterns of meaning regarding the basis of a case. This process needs to be differentiated 
from statistical inference (Flyvberg, 2001 ). In terms of a methodological discipline, the 
quantitative case study mainly offers descriptive variables with a set of fixed 
measure1nents. In contrast, the qualitative case study focuses on examining sequences of 
events with its own story (Stake, 1995). Its strength is in generating multiple variables 
to study in detail and reveal the richness of the case (Flyvberg, 2001, Yin, 2009). This is 
not necessarily for validating the general hypothesis, but more for highlighting the 
uniqueness of each case (Flyvberg, 2001 ). Moreover, the strength of the case study rests 
1n ra1s1ng questions about generalization: it does not necessarily generate common 
principles to be tested by transferring to a wider population as a representation 
(Flyvberg, 2001 ). In conventional research, generalization is mainly limited to a 
representative nature, which is composed of general perceptions about phenomena. On 
the other hand, the qualitative case study approach offers the technique of developing a 
'critical case', in which a case embodies the most extreme or core elements of a class of 
a thing. So, through the falsification method, when a case is applied to wider 
phenomena, it either validates or invalidates the hypothesis (Flyvberg, 2001 ). 
At the same time, the qualitative case study has been defined as a valid technique in 
qualitative inquiry (Flyvberg, 2001). Stake (1995) elaborates on the purpose of the 
qualitative case study as a method of creating useful findings. He argues that the case 
study is more for refining and modifying an old generalization, rather than creating a 
new generalization (p 7). In this circumstance, an old generalization is considered more 
as a propositional generalization (Stake, 1995, p 86). Case study is for a naturalistic 
generalization, which is based more on one's personal experience of an event and 
interpretation of a case, rather than an inference already created by others or other cases 
(Stake, 1995, p 87). This is referred to as 'petite generalization' and is mainly the 
purpose of a single case study (Stake, 1995). In other words, the qualitative case study is 
more for illuminating the richness of an event, so the reader is able to judge whether the 
findings can be applied externally to larger phenomena (Flyvberg, 2001 ). So, 
naturalistic generalization expands on the concept, which was limited to validation 
rather than function as modification of an inference. 
Finally, the subjectivity of qualitative research as an advantage to scientific inquiry 
rather than a failure (Stake, 2010). The verification process is not necessarily loose, but 
inherently different to that of quantitative research. Flyvberg (2001) argued that the case 
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study tests the in-depth findings directly in a real-life context when the phenomena are 
unfolding and validity is based on falsification rather than verification. In this condition, 
the case study pursues a strict discipline of validating and triangulating the data based 
on different sources of evidence in order to control the quality of findings. Triangulation 
involves cross-checking the accuracy of findings, using different sources and types of 
data such as notes from participant-observation, interviews and questionnaires, and 
government reports and updated literature (Denzin, 1970). Triangulation protocol is a 
com1non process for testing the validity of inference (Stake, 1995, Yin, 2009). It 
involves several ways of pursuing triangulation (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, Stake, 
1995, Stake, 2010). The first is data source triangulation, in which triangulation is used 
to see whether the case remains the same for other times and locations. Secondly, the 
case or phenomenon is compared with the interpretation of other researchers' work. 
Last is methodological triangulation, in which different methods are used to inquire 
about the same case. These methods include observation, interviews and document 
review. Essentially this is cross-triangulation with interpretation by different subjects in 
a different space and time. Thus, triangulation protocol not only validates a single 
meaning, but also explores the richness in that meaning (Stake, 1995). 
2.4.2. Research design 
In my research, I considered the qualitative case study approach suitable for examining 
1nechanis1ns, which herders employed to gain, maintain and control access to pastoral 
resources in conditions of depleting pastoral resources, which prevail throughout 
Mongolia. In particular, I focus on the complexity of the formal and informal 
1nechanisms and the significance of these diverse mechanisms and strategies in 
pastureland management. I chose Herlen Bayan-Ulaan Reserve Pasture Area (HBU 
RP A) as a single case study. First, it offers an excellent context in which to study the 
pheno1nenon of resource access in Mongolian pastoralism. Second, during times of 
scarce pastoral resources, RP A, which fa located within a jurisdiction or in a level of 
cross-boundary jurisdictions, were important pastoral assets to improve herder access to 
pastoral resources and production under unstable weather conditions (Femandez-
Gimenez et al., 2012, SDC, 2010). Third, HBU RPA provides an unfolding case, where 
herders are developing different access arrangements in a real-life context. Herlen 
Bayan-Ulaan Mountain is well-known for its rich forage and pasture, particularly in the 
winter months. It is a risk management destination as well as an easy market access area 
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for many herders from all over Mongolia. In response to the high demand on reserve 
pastures, the state re-established the HBU RP A in 2007. This increased the value of 
HBU RP A pasture among herders 16, who competed to gain access using different 
mechanisms. 
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Map 2.1: Herlen Bayan-Ulaan, case study area, 2010 
HBU case involves three bags. The first is the Herlen Bayan-Ulaan (HBU) bag, where 
the RP A was established on the territory of HBU bag as shown in Figure 2.1. The HBU 
bag/village is the 6th bag ( smallest administrative unit) in Delgerhaan soum in Hentii 
16 For instance, in the HBU RP A in the winter and spring of 2007-2008, there were 3 51 herding 
households present with 206,829 livestock migrating for otor (long distance movement) from 20 soums 
involving five provinces from central and eastern Mongolia. This increased to 422 households with 
272,082 head of livestock in the winter and spring of 2008-2009. These households stayed in HBU RP A 
for the winter and then some of them camped throughout the neighbouring three soums during other 
seasons on the way out. 
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province. It is located on the eastern side of the Herlen River in Delgerhaan soum in 
Hentii aimag. HBU village contains around 60 households and is located 210km from 
the capital Ulaanbaatar. I also selected Dolood (DD) and Ulaan-Uhaa (UU) bags as part 
of my case study area. As shown in Map 2.1, a) the HBU RP A was established taking 
some territories from other surrounding bags including DD bag and b) these bags are 
the main corridor routes for visiting herders to gain access to HBU RP A and herders 
from these two bags also use HBU RP A extensively for otor. Thus, competition over 
the RP A affected pasture land management in all three bags. These three bags are useful 
for exploring interactions between local and visiting herders who were sharing and 
negotiating access to pastoral resources in the RP A. As shown in Table 2.1, these three 
bags differ in a) their governance of the territorial administrative unit and b) the type of 
resource 1nanagement applied. These differences allowed me to examine the impact of 
HBU RP A on the pasture 1nanagement of the three bags. 
Table 2.1 HBU case study area administrative structure 
Key variables 
Pasture 
Governance 
Purpose 
Pasture use fee 
HBU bag 
Bag territory 
RP A territory 
Bag/village 
government, 
Delgerhaan soum, 
Hentii aimag 
Four season and 
extensive otor pasture 
The ministry charge for 
visiting herders 
DD bag 
Bag territory 
Partial RP A territory 
Bag government, 
Delgerhaan soum 
Hentii aimag 
Four season pasture 
Local administration 
charges occasional 
pasture use fee for 
herders coming on otor 
UU bag 
Bag territory 
Bag government, 
Bayanj argalan soum, Tuv 
azmag 
Four season pasture 
Local administration 
charges occasional 
pasture use fee for 
herders coming on otor 
Finally, I chose HBU RP A, because of its historical significance, to help me understand 
the impact of access on pastureland management. The RP A is the largest in Mongolia 
and is famous, because Chinggis Haan 17 often used it for grazing his livestock in winter 
(Ulziisuren et al., 2010). It is also one of the few RP As, which has experienced a 
succession of 1nanagement patterns under feudal, collective and market-oriented 
economic production systems. Thus, it has witnessed several different historical patterns 
of influx from visiting herders in times of scarce pastoral resources during unstable 
1 7 His name is spelled differently in English, often Genghis Khan 
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weather conditions. Overall, in this case study, I examine whether the process involved 
in gaining access shapes the pattern of local herder resource use and management. 
Examining access mechanisms in a pastoral setting is a new context and a new 
phenomenon for access theory. It will therefore add to the scholarly understanding of 
access and its impact on local resource management in Mongolia. In the future, it can be 
used as an instrumental case to generalize to broader cases. 
Table 2.2 Fieldwork schedule, April to December, 2010 
Activity Stage 1 Stage 2 
1 
2 
2.4.3. 
Familiarization 
Meet officials and 
herders, introduce my 
research (April l 5th-
30th) 
Carry-out face-to-face 
survey (May to June). 
Pri11uu:r data collection 
Interviews and 
observation in HBU bag 
(July to August) 
Interviews and 
observation in 
neighboring bag (August 
to October) 
Data collection procedure 
Stage 3 
Debriefing 
Visit HBU bag 
officials and herders 
(October to 
December) 
Visit officials in 
Ulaanbaatar( October 
to December) 
I designed n1y data collection procedure based on 1ny experience working with herders 
on environmental 1nanagement issues for the past decade. I designed and carried out 
twelve months field work in 2010 in order to observe herders' access patterns in-depth 
for four continuous seasons. The observations began in the spring when herders were in 
either their winter or spring campsites. I chose to begin the study in spring, because 
herders are more settled then, during the livestock birthing season and they are more at 
ease after surviving the winter. I divided my fieldwork into three stages (Table 2.2). The 
main participants in my research were local actors who had lived in the three bags from 
1990 until now and who had experienced differing environmental and land management 
policies. To contribute to the access framework, I needed to understand their changing 
resource use patterns and the negotiation processes followed for resource access in their 
daily practices. I also investigated the relationship between the current ulamjlalt 
mechanisms and strategies that herders employ in accessing resources, and the legal 
mechanis1ns administered by the local government. 
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For data collection, I used participant observation, face-to-face surveys, in-depth 
interviews, and archival material. I used survey techniques to collect household 
information including background, social status and experience related to herding in the 
target area ( questionnaire enclosed). The information gathered in this exercise helped 
me to select participants for conducting interviews. I employed different approaches in 
selecting participants from three different areas. I surveyed a total of 97 households 
from three bags, of which 40 households were from the HBU bag. I did not include all 
the households in each bag, but selected households based on the total number of major 
campsites. A major campsite in this context refers to households that are comprised of 
parents and children who camp together most of the year. I defined this campsite 
structure by comparing lists offered by key informants and local officials. In DD, I 
selected 23 households who spend their winters in HBU Mountain and who legally 
possess winter and spring campsites in the RP A zone. Not all households in DD bag are 
related to HBU RP A in this manner. In UU bag, I selected 34 households who had spent 
the last three years in HBU Mountain for otor. I defined these households with the help 
of the bag governor's list of households. 
The interview is the primary data collection method and is crucial because it creates the 
main bridge of communication and trust between the researcher and the participants 
(Meyer, 2001, p 336). Qualitative interviewing provides the researcher with insights 
into other people's interpretations, generating multiple points of view on an issue (State 
1995). I prepared and utilized an interview guideline (a short list of issue-oriented 
questions enclosed) although I assumed that each participant would have unique 
experiences and stories to tell and provide their individual point of view. Asking 'how 
and why' questions, I explored the causal relationship between current mechanisms and 
strategies herders e1nploy in relation to their exploitation of productive resources and 
the i1npacts of these mechanisms and strategies on herders' patterns of seasonal pasture 
use. 
I conducted interviews with couples 18 in herding households, local officials, staff from 
national and regional level non-governmental organizations and other national level 
officials who deal with issues related to regulation and enforcement over inter-
18 This depended on the availability of husband or wife; I had no specific preference as these days 
herders are much busier than ever as often one of a couple (no preferences) manages herding while the 
other manages other household business elsewhere 
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provincial otor movement, and herders' access to key resources such as pasture, water 
and transportation. I carried out a total of 58 in-depth interviews. As shown in Table 
2.3, I selected 12 households in each bag to represent a group of local and migrant 
households in HBU Mountain with different backgrounds. For herders, instead of using 
the national poverty indicator, I preferred to use the local indicator of wealth, which 
relate to types of livestock and herd size. With the advice of local officials and key 
informants, I classified herd size into three groups: large (approx. more than 800), 
medium (300-700) and small (fewer than 300). 
Table 2.3: Participant selection criteria in each bag 
Herding experience Household led by a Household led by a single 
couple parent 
Herd size 
Lc1rcre c..., Averc1ge Small Lorue b At'eroae t'-, Small 
Collective herder (1958-1992) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
New herder (Since 1992) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Observation was the second major tool used in my field research. There are several 
reasons for using extensive observation. First, I sought to validate data collected from 
the interviews. Secondly, I wished to generate a deeper understanding for myself about 
the process of access. This involved interpretative observation to provide incontestable 
descriptions for 1ny analysis and reporting (Stake, 2010). I was able to participate and 
observe during my participants' daily herding businesses and resource use and 
management. During this time I identified key activities where, when, how and why 
resource access was arranged or discussed or practised, particularly when herders 
arranged or negotiated with each other on a daily basis. 
2.4.4. Triangulation 
I examined whether access mechanisms and strategies remained the same, as well as the 
impacts on the participating herders' daily management of resources during the four 
seasons I spent in three different bags. I focused on households under different living 
conditions, and from different backgrounds, ages, gender and herding experience. This 
enabled me to uncover a complex interrelationship between resource users and 
environmental policy, and to record the diverse patterns of resource access observed. 
Also, I was able to cross-check the interpretation of my findings against other research 
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on the impacts of changing access patterns for herders. Methodologically, I cross-
checked the validity of my data with different sources such as surveys, interviews, 
observations, as well as archival documents to track down historical patterns. Moreover, 
I utilized the interpretation of my research participants for this triangulation. Herders are 
profoundly concerned about their access to seasonal pastures. They continually 
articulate their ongoing observations and interpretations about their resource access 
situations. I triangulated the basic findings with my key informants during the last stage 
of field work. 
2.4.5. Data analysis and interpretation 
In my data analysis, I employ qualitative and case study analytical techniques. First, I 
sought to examine whether policies had any effects on herders' patterns of resource use. 
Thus, I categorized my data into several policy types, sequentially moving from 
privatization, campsite possession, herder group and RP A management. Then, I carried 
out a thematic analysis and searched for different themes to understand how each policy 
affected the herders' resource use patterns. I explored these themes based on the 
historical patterns of production management in different literatures, and I explored the 
variables which have either changed or remained the same. The main theme that 
emerged was the changes in the model of historical production management. In Part III 
of this thesis, Chapter 5 explores these changes in the control of three components of 
production. Chapter 6 discusses the changes that have occurred in the concepts of 
pastureland and campsites. Chapter 7 investigates dual control between local 
administration and herders. Finally, Chapter 8 focuses on the authority of different state 
agencies as a parallel institution over regulating pastoral resources. 
I use the case study analytical technique of interpreting instances of a case in both direct 
and aggregated ways. The qualitative case study uses a naturalistic approach that 
focuses on one instance of phenomenon by analysing and synthesizing it (Stake, 1995). 
A new meaning of a case can be generated by "direct interpretations of the individual 
instances and through aggregation of instances until something can be said about them 
as a class" (Stake, 1995, p 74). In the thesis, I employ interpretations drawn from an 
aggregation of instances with multiple themes in each chapter, drawing on many 
' 
instances and drawing a conclusion about them. This provides a means for 
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understanding the case thoroughly19 . Interpretation from aggregated instances is also 
employed to pose an overall thesis argument and draw conclusions from multiple 
instances around different policies in each chapter20 . I used Excel to organize and 
analyse the quantitative data drawn from my household survey to create migration status 
or campsite possession and correlate some variables, for instance, herd size with 
migration status. 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the major theoretical approaches drawn on to construct the 
potential analytical framework to examine the problems related to pastureland 
management in Mongolia. It critiqued the literature which sought to apply property 
regimes to institutional arrangements for conservation purposes and which perceived the 
state and community as the main, but independent actors. However, in the first place, 
the property regime concept overlooked the fact that state and communal rules and 
norms can be dependent on each other, as in the historical pattern of Mongolian 
pastoralism. This dependency is due to a specific production system, which shapes 
resource use patterns. Second, the imposed property regime o~ly focused on exclusion 
instead of addressing inclusionary property relations. Thus, third, it overlooked the 
notion that the community is very dynamic, because of sharing resources. Fourth, 
design principles such as small well-defined social and resource boundaries often 
overlook CPR 1nanagement involving diverse ecological modes. Fifth, small group 
territorial based exclusion often ignores other production based strategies to pursue 
exclusion and inclusion in CPR management. Thus, this chapter set out to discover a 
more appropriate approach to explore herders' access to pastoral resources. The access 
framework expanded the focus of resource management from efficiency in production 
and sustainable conservation, to the distribution of benefits derived from the control of 
resource access. 
19 For instance, in the first chapter about privatization, many instances occur around livestock or labour or 
land issues. These instances are all aggregated to conclude that privatization does not necessarily lead to 
open access to pastoral resources, but definitely free for all capture of privatization assets. 
2
° For instance, each process of policy implementation led to a de-coupling of the structure of pastoral 
production management, in turn leading to the disintegration of pastoral production management in the 
process of applying exclusive property rights to pastureland management 
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In this chapter, I also discussed the qualitative case study approach that I employed to 
examine the mechanisms involved in controlling access to pastoral resources in 
Mongolia. Using a single case study, I aim to develop an understanding of how 
changing policies led to changing resource access and to what extent these access 
patterns affect local resource management. Understanding the complexities involved in 
this process will contribute to understanding the particular problems facing pastureland 
management. The HBU case (three bags) study provides a real-life context in which to 
study how different access mechanisms are utilized with increasing competition 
between herders to access reserve pasture under conditions of depleting pastoral 
resources. As background to the HBU case, the historical pattern of pastureland 
1nanagement in the feudal period will be discussed in the next chapter. This discussion 
focuses on defining local concepts involved in pastureland management, paying 
particular attention to the regulation of resource access. 
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3 Mobile pastoralism in the pre-collective period 
3.1. Introduction 
The literature review in the previous chapter highlighted challenges involving control of 
access to common-pool resources with regard to CPR management. Some CPR 
management succeeds whilst other types of management fails during changing political 
and economic situations (Ostrom et al., 1999). To understand the CPR dilemma, it is 
important to explore how and why, in each socio-political context, open access is 
created. This can be achieved by examining the outcomes from the practical application 
of different theoretical concepts in CPR management such as property regime, property 
and community, and examining the institutional arrangements in specific socio-political 
contexts. For this reason, this thesis focuses on understanding CPR dilemmas in the 
context of pastureland n1anagement in Mongolia. Mongolia provides an excellent case 
for illustrating both successful and failed attempts at managing CPR during its long 
history of nomadic pastoralism under several significantly different socio-political and 
economic systems. The background chapters (3 & 4) discuss-the successful attempts 
under the pre-collective and collective periods, whereas the data chapters (5-8) analyse 
the dilemma in pastureland 1nanage1nent under the transition period. 
With regard to my research questions, examining herders' changing access to pastoral 
resources involves investigating the temporal changes in the history of pastoralism and 
land tenure at both the global and the national level in Mongolia. This is particularly 
i1nportant for examining problems arising in the current CPR management in Mongolia. 
The state and local community face challenges in managing pastoral CPR through 
various policy alternatives such as property regime, community institutions and state 
te1Titoriality. Thus, this chapter provides historical background to how and why 
Mongolia's pastureland tenure came to face these challenges. The first section defines 
mobile pastoralism and the ways in which this production system has been 
misinterpreted by settled societies on a global level in the context of its role in socio-
political and econo1nic development. The next section discusses the changes that 
occurred in the mobile pastoral production system through several major historical 
periods in pre-collective times. In particular, I examine the changes that occurred in 
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access to pastoral resources during the periods of the Mongol Empire and the Manchu 
Qing Dynasty. This chapter also provides a brief background on the history of the HBU 
case area. This introduction is useful for examining the changes that are currently 
occurring in the regulation of herders' access to pastoral resources. 
3.2. Pastoralism and challenges to global pursuit of mobile pastoralism 
Nomadic pastoralists have experienced changes in exploitation of various CPR 
following shifts in global socio-political and economic structures ( colonization and 
collectivization) over the past millennia. Whilst some adopted alternative modes of 
production (giving up pastoralism), some adjusted (maintaining) their production to new 
global norms of resource management. 
3.2.1. Mobile pastoralism 
First of all, it is important to explore the term 'nomadic pastoralism'. It seems there is a 
vagueness in the terms 'nomadism' and 'pastoralism', and the portmanteau term 
'non1adic pastoralism'. There are two kinds of nomadism: one is the nomad lifestyle, 
independent of its economic function; the other is nomadic extensive pastoralism, which 
is independent of agriculture or dependent on it to a small extent to maintain the 
lifestyle of a group of people (Khazanov, 1994, p 21, Lattimore, 1941). Nomadic 
extensive pastoralism is defined as food producing nomadism with the pursuit of 
mobility and its characteristics, making it different from food-extracting nomads such as 
hunter-gatherers (Khazanov, 1994, p 15). However, nomadism and pastoralism are 
different concepts with different spheres of reference: the former refers to 1novement 
and the latter to a type of subsistence (Barfield, 1993). Nomadic pastoralists pri1narily 
derive economic production from extensive grazing in a pattern of seasonal rotations 
and distance movements in search of pastoral resources, whereas agro-pastoralists gain 
small amounts of production from livestock grazing that supplements their agricultural 
pursuits (Swift, 1988). Moreover, 'nomadic pastoralism' appears to be a broad term 
which does not necessarily define the specific function of the pastoral production 
system. A term 'mobile pastoralism' refers specifically to an extensive pastoral 
production in which the production itself is inherently based on a variety of patterns of 
mobility (Humphrey and Sneath, 1999). Mobile pastoralis1n is also a political economy 
as its production system is "framed and transformed by political power" (Sneath, 2007, 
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p 17). In other words, the mobility of pastoral societies in this category occurs within a 
specific geographical territory, defined by their political structure. Thus, this term is 
more pertinent to the context of Mongolia's pastoral society as it was directly shaped by 
its political structure. Mongolian pastoralis1n is perceived as " ... a mixture of the 
econo1nic survival of the most profitable and the political survival of the fittest" 
(Lattimore, 1941, p 292). Mongolian pastoralism also has a state-centred socio-political 
structure (Sneath, 2007). For this reason, I use the term '1nobile pastoralism' when 
discussing the pastoral lifestyle and livelihood production commonly found in 
Mongolia. 
Mobile pastoralis1n experienced two major historical changes under the colonial and 
post-colonial political systems. Within sedentary colonial rules and modem 
develop1nent discourse, mobile pastoralist societies have often been characterized as 
backward, primitive, stagnant in their evolution, and inefficient for civilized social-
economic development (Humphrey and Sneath, 1999, Barfield, 1993, William, 1996, 
Sneath, 2007). One aspect of 1nobile pastoralism that is often overlooked is that this is 
efficient economic production with regard to balancing geography and climate. First of 
all, because of geographical and climatic conditions, mobile pastoralism was not 
primitive when co1npared to agrarian cultures. In fact, mobile pastoralism appeared later 
than agriculture, having emerged in the middle of the second millennium B.C.E., while 
agriculture had emerged on the Inner Asian steppe by the sixth millennium B.C.E. 
(Sneath, 2007, Natsagdorj, 1975). The emergence of mobile pastoralism points to a 
societal choice between an agrarian and pastoral lifestyle. Under the prevailing 
geographical and cli1natic conditions, "the land could not be used better to feed men 
than to feed ani1nals, and the less successful farmers had the largest number of animals 
at pasture to supplement their inadequate grain crops" (Latti1nore, 1962, p 36). In other 
words, any society in this location would seek out an alternative mode of food 
production, and would choose herding livestock over cultivating land, to evade agrarian 
based poverty. This is why 1nobile pastoralism is described as an economy for gaining 
benefits from the existing ecology for political and economic power rather than just a 
supplemental livelihood survival strategy (Sneath, 2007, Lattimore, 1962). 
Secondly, concerns about its economic inefficiency in the modem era of economic 
growth (Khazanov 1994) seem to be related to the contrasting characteristics of mobile 
pastoral production to the agrarian production. Chinese settled people saw pastoral land 
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as unfit for human habitation, judging it to be a waste, vast, overgrown, untained, 
impoverished and as an emptiness or an absence of domestication and 
civility2L(William, 1996). Thus, they saw pastoral production as the outcome of 
unlaboured land use in a wasteland, which should be opened up to labour oriented 
efficient production (William, 1996, p 672). This way of thinking is also reflected in the 
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist view that pastoral land has no intrinsic value, because it does 
not involve any labour effort (Natsagdorj, 1975, p 2-3). Thus, these agrarian thinking 
strongly assumed that such land could hardly be further degraded no matter what the 
manner of exploitation (William, 1996). In contrast, mobile pastoralists had their own 
position towards pastoralis111 and sedentary agriculture, mainly with regard to the fragile 
condition of the rangelands (Lattimore, 1941, Lattimore, 1962). In the Mongolian 
tradition, opening up wasted land is seen as shattering the land; they prefer instead to let 
the "land lie untilled and be restored to its dignity as steppe" in order to avoid 'hurting 
the earth' (William, 1996, p64 7). Similarly, Pokot pastoralists in Kenya called 
agricultural activities 'scratching the earth' (Osterle, 2008, p 88). This indicates that a 
specific production technology, shaped by geographical and climatic conditions, also 
reflects the protection and management of the land as a production resource. 
Inefficient production technology and its crudeness, in the eyes of agrarian culture, are 
also interpreted through the lens of political structure as a pre-state tribal kinship 
society. This argu111ent persists today among historians as they explain that 'tribal' in 
this context does not necessarily convey an image of savage barbarianism 22, but a 
particular political stn1cture, which is unable to create a complex state polity (Kradin, 
2011 ). This position is heavily influenced by the expansion of European colonialists, 
who considered indigenous societies and their tribal structure dramatically different 
from their own political governance by the state (Sneath, 2007). Several authors argued 
against the 111.isconception that Inner Asian mobile pastoralists in general were perceived 
as traditional kinship-based tribes in their pre-state form (Sneath, 2007, N atsagdorj, 
1972). Particularly, Sneath (2007) explained this misconception that nomads were 
misunderstood as, 
... fluid, rootless, simple and without fixed points .... Free to move as they were, 
nomads would not support a stable hierarchy, and since they had not been 
2 1 See William 1996 for these terms in Chinese 
22 Similar view expressed by Igor de Rachewiltz, a historian and philologist specializing in Mongol 
studies (Personal communication, November, 2012). 
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fundamentally reordered by a state .... their basic organization 1nust have 
remained a variety of kinship society (Sneath, 2007, p 37). 
This was the argument that focused only on the differences of these societies and 
overlooked the si1nilarities (Sneath, 2007). Also, such a focus explained the political 
structure only in terms other than its own, e1nic, terms. The focuses on similarities and 
explaining its political structure in its emic terms are more relevant for analysing current 
1nobile pastoral production institutions, which are inherently embedded in the state 
political and legal structure of modem Mongolia. 
3.2.2. Challenges to the global pursuit of mobile pastoralism 
Nevertheless, sedentary colonial policies forced pastoralists into a sedentary lifestyle to 
some extent due to the demands of agricultural production and development initiatives 
lead by the outside world (Khazanov, 1994). This shift resulted in agrarian people 
searching for more extensive land, which they found in pastoral lands. This also had 
political i1nplications as expansion of agricultural populations were pursued as a 
strategy to impose a colonial power over pastoral societies, for example in the case of 
Tsarist Russia's expansion to the Far East (Khazanov, 1994, Reid, 2003). Moreover, in 
Africa, colonial policy was responsible for not only grabbing rnost of the grazing land, 
but also forbidding Maasai people's movement through resettlement policies 
(Khazanov, 1994, Fratkin, 1997, Barfield, 1993). These changes led not only to the loss 
of grazing territory and production, but also loss of a lifestyle and social stability 
(Khazanov, 1994, Fratkin, 1997). For instance, Bedouin pastoralists in northern Arabia 
faced drainatic changes, witnessed the collapse of their camel markets, and 
consequently had to shift to herding sheep and other petty trading (Barfield, 1993). 
Thus, mobile pastoralism is often infringed on for natural resources, which are then 
used for other economic and political purposes. 
Most colonial or modem development approaches have led to the sedentarization of 
lifestyles that has resulted in changing mobile pastoralists' resource management 
institution. These changes restrict mobility by introducing policies such as indigenous 
reservations, re-settlement, collectivization and privatization as well as protected area 
develop1nent. This is particularly reflective of Hardin's metaphor of the weakness of the 
'commons', which is why a state or private property regime was popular in modem 
development. This resulted in late 20th century modernization in which policies of 
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transforming grazing lands into agrarian farms followed the introduction of private 
property regimes to CPR management under capitalist regimes and state collective 
management under socialist regimes. In the Middle East for instance, Iran and Syria 
pursued land reform which declared pastoral land public property and transformed it 
into agrarian land (Khazanov, 1994 ). In Africa, under post-colonial policies, land was 
declared public. Tanzania introduced the 'ujamaa' system, modelled on Soviet 
collectives, to intensify agricultural production (Meredith, 2005, Fratkin, 1997). In the 
Soviet Union during collectivization, l.5-2million new settlers arrived from the 
European part of the USSR to participate in agricultural development (Khazanov, 
1994 ). In China, a similar policy was pursued under the centralized government that 
settled millions of farmers in Inner Mongolia. Mongolia was the exception in terms of 
destroying mobile pastoral production even with all livestock assets communalized. The 
Mongolian government managed to maintain the principal institution of mobile pastoral 
production in order to avoid mass out-migration after extensive collectivization in 1950 
(Khazanov, 1994). Although a great effort has been made to intensify agricultural 
production at the expense of pastoralism, many pastoral societies have persisted in 
maintaining mobility in order to find pastoral resources (grass, water and others) for 
their livestock (Barfield, 1993, Goldstein and Beall, 1994, Khazanov, 1994). This 
pursuit appears to be a product of the changing socio-political structure of those 
societies. One such case is Mongolia, where land tenure has historically been based on 
the state territorial administration and the geo-political and ecological position of the 
country which favours the continuity of mobile pastoralism. 
3.3. Inner Asian mobile pastoralism 
As a food producing economic system, mobile pastoralism is distinctive in terms of its 
dependency on animal, plants and labour. Differences have also been observed between 
individual mobile pastoral societies. Lattimore ( 1941) noted, 
... Nomadism cannot be uniform. If your tribe holds a more desert orbit of 
migration you have more camels and perhaps more goats. You are certainly not 
so rich in sheep, though sheep you must have, and you probably have few horses 
and perhaps no cows at all. Also, you live widely scattered and move often 
(Latti111ore, 1941, p 246). 
These differences among mobile pastoralist societies relate to the types of livestock and 
grazing land available (Lattimore, 1941, Heather, 2010). For instance, in Inner Asia, 
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diverse mobile pastoralist groups keep different types of livestock. This is suited to the 
needs of a variety of herd animals and the availability of vegetation and water resources 
on an ecologically diverse rangeland which allows for less competition for resources 
among species. This also maintains a risk-mitigation strategy as herd diversity offers 
differing vulnerability levels to environmental stresses such as disease and climate 
severity (Lattimore, 1962, p 48). Herd diversity also offers a greater range of livestock 
products which increases food producing options. Domesticated livestock became 
inherently dependent on pastoralists and became less capable to protect themselves or to 
breed successfully on their own (Barfield, 1993). Mobile pastoralists also control 
( directly or indirectly) production by manipulating the age and sexual composition of 
their livestock herds based on their preference for certain products (Spooner 1973). 
Examples of direct product control are control of unprocessed (raw materials) or 
processed products such as dairy products, carpets and ropes made of raw livestock 
materials. They gain products through the indirect use of marketing (Spooner 1973). 
This is the key distinction between food-producing mobile pastoralists and food-
gathering hunters. Khazanov (1994) emphasized that the latter do not alter the products 
of subsistence hunting whereas domesticated animals tend to give more products than 
their wild counterparts. Such products include meat, milk, and skins, some of which 
they consume and some of which they barter for good grain and other goods (Goldstein 
and Beall, 1994 ). Thus, geographical location, which provides ecological diversity, is a 
significant factor in the nature of mobile pastoralism in Inner Asia. 
·--
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Photo 3 .1: Kids are helping move to another seasonal pasture 
The difference in types of livestock in these geographical conditions (relationship 
between the landscape and climate) also affords a greater supply of labour for herding 
and production. The labour pool includes everyone from small children to elders in a 
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herding household or a collaborative community (Fernandez-Gimenez and Swift, 2003) 
(Photos 3 .1 ). Tending different livestock species involves greater freedom of movement 
to utilize the ecologically diverse rangeland (Lattimore, 1941 ). To exploit the rangeland, 
herders arrange their movements to achieve the sustainable harvest of livestock products 
(Goldstein and Beall, 1994 ). This sustainability depends upon appropriate pasture 
management that ensures a continual supply of these products, through keeping the 
animals healthy and reproducing. To that end, as Goldstein and Beall (1994 p 18) 
articulated, herders "move their animals to exploit the seasonal ebb and flow of 
vegetation and maximize the transfer of energy from vegetation to livestock", for which 
mobility is inherent to the adaptation (Goldstein and Beall, 1994). Such ulamjlalt 
herding practices have also been the key to conserving environmental resources during 
certain times of the year (Fratkin 1997). Therefore, depending on geographical and 
climate distinctions, herder mobility varies from a few miles to hundreds of miles 
annually (Goldstein and Beall, 1994). 
In its function as a food producing economy, mobile pastoralism in Inner Asia has an 
economic characteristic which entails free-range grazing of a herd year-round within 
specific boundaries of nu tag seasonal grazing territories (Larson, 193 0, Vreeland, 19 54, 
Sneath, 2007). Nutag is an emic term, referring to someone belonging to or using a 
specific area of territory, mainly marked by specific geographical land marks and bound 
within a specific administrative territory. Nutag has a much broader 1neaning. Sneath 
(2010) defined nutag as 'local ho1neland' or someone's birth land. It is also used as neg 
nutag usniihan, a group of people linked by some common geographical residence 
depending on the context for social networking functions (Sneath 2007; Sneath 2010). 
Legrain (2009) sees it as "variable geometry, it connects dispersed places" (p, 338) and 
not only a geographical concept but a network of social relationships based on the 
shared experiences of people from the same administrative territory. Murphy (2012) 
used the notions of, both homeland and social networking in his work. The use of this 
word is also quite subjective: one lives in the city and refers to a certain aimag as ones 
birth land. When living in the aimag centre, one refers to a specific soum as their birth 
land. When living in the soum centre, one refers to a bag as ones birth land. When living 
within a bag, one refers to a specific grazing area as ones unasan nutag, the place where 
one was born. This term refers to a community as well. In the past, it was also used by 
the authorities as nutag zaah, sending someone to a different place for exile. Moreover, 
Upton (2009) also used it as ones customary pastureland in pastoralism. In this thesis, 
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nutag refers to the use of belcheeriin nutag) a specific seasonal pasture area. This term 
is related to nutaglah, someone camps seasonally in such a grazing area. Herders move 
and carry out nutag songoh, meaning select a new grazing area, when their former 
pasture is not good. Also, when migrant herders move to a new administrative territory 
and shine nutag songoh meaning select new pasture area. 
Herders' freedom of movement involves a pastoral institution or an organization of 
herders that manages and facilitates community group23 access to pastoral resources. By 
arguing mobile pastoralism is a socio-technical system24, Sneath (2004) put 'property in 
its place': 
Mobile pastoralism techniques can be seen as part of larger socio-technical 
systems and require the integration of complex social and material systems ... 
property can be understood as part of the wider social and material networks that 
generate its value (Sneath, 2004, p 170). 
Lattimore (1962) also noted that settled societies often defined 'nomad' as 'following 
grass and water' and overlooked the "technically skilled division of labour to cover a 
wide spread of activities, close gradation of responsibility and authority, precise legal 
concepts of territory - what land belongs to which tribe" (Lattimore, 1962, p 32). On the 
other hand, in relation to the function of mobility for political and econo1nic purposes, 
.. . there are nonetheless some important features in common, and one of the key 
ones is that nomads do not usually move at random, which is punishing for both 
humans and animals ... as setting off into the wild blue yonder without 
knowledge of a potential destination's carrying capacity or, without equally 
important established rights to graze, would have been to invite economic 
disaster (Heather, 2010, p 211 ). 
The selection of a specific geographically convenient territory is often based on careful 
consideration of economic as well as political benefits. Thus, herders must collaborate 
23 Communal management refers to a situation where rights to use resources are held by a community 
(Ciparisse, 2003, p 8). Community here refers to a social and political organization of a group of herding 
households, who share their production management and all-season pasture within one jurisdiction 
(Natsagdorj 1967). In Mongolia, the community boundary was mainly defined by a major administrative 
unit which controls all-season pasture and the production practices of a group of households. Yet, the use 
of the community is flexible in terms of its social and resource boundary. The extent of common use and 
community management depended on different seasons. Winter and spring pasture was well defined 
among households within the bag and otog. Summer and autumn pasture was more communally shared 
among the hoshuu population as there was less specific delineation between households pasture use 
(Natsagdorj 1967). 
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"A system of activity that links techniques and material objects to the social coordination of 
labour ..... technology and resources are inextricably bound up with social form" creating "efficient 
productive techniques" (Sneath, 2004, p 170) 
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with others from the same jurisdiction or with other jurisdictions to take advantage of 
the available working power, transportation facilities, available pastoral resources and 
the regulation of existing pastoral institutions. Thus, the local jurisdiction existing at 
any point in time strictly regulated herders' access as a pastoral institution to such 
resources within and beyond its boundary. 
The evolution of pastoral resource 1nanagement and its institutions in Inner Asian steppe 
societies historically occurred in tight relationship with their political structures. 
Societies in Inner Asia opted to pursue mobile pastoralism to 1naximize the benefits 
obtained from production by solidifying political and economic power under existing 
geographical and climatic conditions (Sneath, 2007, Lattimore, 1962, Lattimore, 1941, 
N atsagdorj, 1972). This development is essentially based on a 
... wide range of human experience, including the technical constraints on 
production imposed by an environmental extemality be that conceived in 
spiritual or in materialistic terms (Sneath, 2004, p 171 ). 
In mobile pastoralism "the economic possibilities depend upon the nature of the 
property regimes that exist for resources and products and the wide political systems 
that frame the1n" (Sneath, 2007, p 17). A form of production and mobile technology 
adjusted to the existing geographical and climatic conditions were inherently embedded 
in the political structure of these societies for the purpose of controlling access to 
benefits. For instance in Mongolia, the political structure of the institution changed 
significantly during different historical periods due to geo-political conditions. The 
fundainental production institution primarily remained the sa1ne or was adapted to each 
historical period in terms of controlling production components and facilitating 
flexibility and 1nobility in gaining access to resources (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1993). 
However, the changes in the political stn1cture reflected the politically and naturally 
shrinking boundaries of territorial administrative units to regulate herders' access. 
Ultimately, this has created challenges in pursuing flexible seasonal mobility within 
ones jurisdictional nutag and in strengthening local pastoral production and 
environmental management. 
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3.3.1. Mobile pastoralism in pre-collective Mongolia 
Historically, property institutions in Mongolia were much more co1nplex and 
sophisticated than currently perceived. In fact, pastoral production and its institutions 
were managed under a system of state territorial administrations. The Xiongnu25 was the 
first historically recorded state26 polity established in the late fourth century B.C.E and 
controlled the Inner Asian steppes including the current territory of Mongolia. Its 
military administrative syste1n was "a series of decimal27 units that could raise a 
nominal number of horse1nen in times of war" (Di Cosmo, 2002 cited in Sneath, 2007, p 
23 ), whereas its production technology was for producing "large numbers of horsemen 
and mobile food supplies in the form of livestock" to solidify political and economic 
power (Sneath, 2007, p 20). 
Political and economic power seems important for the existence of societies that 
practice mobile pastoralism. Khazanov (1994) argues that it is misleading to interpret 
mobile pastoralism as independent of an agrarian lifestyle. He maintained that mobile 
people, culturally, ideologically as well as economically, are instead dependent on 
sedentary or agrarian lifestyles because of their low technological capacity (Khazanov, 
1994 ). Their co1nmunication and relations with other non-pastoral societies are also well 
observed and documented in early scholars' and travellers' works, which recorded the 
no1nads' constant contact with sedentary societies through warfare and trade (Larson, 
1930, Latti1nore, 1962, Lattimore, 1941). Thus, the power of expansion and the 
annexation of more pastoral territory is considered a marginal interest as they were also 
interested in securing political and economic alliances, by maintaining close proximity 
with other societies in the Roman and Chinese E1npires (Heather, 2010). This type of 
polity was ruled by powerful confederate chieftains28 (Sneath, 2007). 
Several different state polities persisted until the time of the Mongol Empire, which 
strenthened the feudal pastoral production_ systems and established the foundation of the 
25 Referred to as the "Hunnu Empire" in Mongolian historical documents. 
26 The state organization in Inner Asia was an aristocratic order, in which hereditary rulers conveyed 
administrative power over their political subjects in a similar centralized state governance structure 
(Sneath, 2007) 
27 This was a numerical politico-administrative structure of "groups of ten, hundred, thousand and ten 
thousand, with a direct conveyance of orders from above to below" (Bold, 2001, p 84) 
28 Refers to a definition in Gibson (2011 , p 217) "A chiefdom of a confederacy consists of a number of 
genealogically related and unrelated chiefdoms which were unified through coercion or common 
agreement". 
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modem Mongol nation state (Natsagdorj, 1975, Damdinsuren, 1976). Ruling elites 
pursue pastoral production to gain benefits for political29 and economic30 purposes by 
taking advantage of existing geographical and climatic conditions (Sneath, 2007). This 
involves regulating several aspects of pastoral production: a) territorial administration; 
b) a fundamental pastoral production system; c) primary production resources; and d) a 
property relation in pastoral context. I will elaborate on each of these concepts to 
illustrate the historical pattern of pastoral production institutions. 
3.3.2. Pastoral production in the Mongol Empire 
The Mongol Empire established a particular structure of pastoral institutions that still 
functions in the present. This structure prevails in the territorial administrative units that 
define the property regime. A form of the decimal unit31 for territorial administration 
under the Mongol Empire was quite different than those of previous nomadic polities. In 
1206, Chinggis Haan32 broke apart and mixed up the existing segregated populations of 
omog and aimag33 chiefdoms into units of myangat ( one thousand) in the decimal 
system for not only military but civil administrative purposes (Natsagdorj, 1972, 
Natsagdorj, 1975, Bold, 2001). Following this, he also changed the basis of the ruling 
elite, fron1 hereditary nobility, and bestowed titles on his military generals and 
colleagues who were without a noble background (Natsagdorj, 1972, Sneath, 2007). 
Each member of the ruling elite now enjoyed a hereditary title, ruling over subjects of 
mixed groups in addition to re-allocating land for administering the political territory. 
Despite a few feudal elite 1nembers who privately controlled their land, the ruling elites 
did not exclusively and privately own the subjects of the thousandth and their territory 
because they were subject to the Haan's jurisdiction. In this land tenure regime, the 
state was the supreme owner of the land (Natsagdorj, 1967). Under this regime, the 
ruling elites were proprietor-managers of their allocated territory, which their subjects 
shared under the structure of the territorial unit (N atsagdorj, 197 5, p 7). The notion of 
29 Pastoral production supported war campaigns by mobilizing economic resources. 
30 Booming livestock production was directed towards producing large amounts of food and 
transportation resources. 
31 Organizational structure of "groups of ten, hundred, thousand and ten thousand, with a direct 
conveyance of orders from above to below'' (Bold, 2001, p 84). Decimal is used in both military and state 
territorial administrative units (Sneath, 2007, Bold, 2001 ). Decimal unit structure in other forms was also 
used by previous nomadic state polities in Inner Asia well before Mongol Empire (Sneath, 2007). 
32 Haan is translated as King. It is usually spelled as Khan in English 
33 Translated as clans and tribes; this is a topic for major historical debate with regard to differentiating 
the political structures of nomadic societies from tribal structures. 
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property rights was defined by ruling elites allocating and revoking pasture use rights to 
their subjects (Natsagdorj, 1967). The role of the thousandth was to serve the empire 
through the military and postal service34 and to herd livestock for the ruling elite and 
pay livestock tax to the Haan. The significance of this polity structure was not 
necessarily to control the movement of nomadic populations by allocating specific 
territory, but by attaching them to a specific ruler (Natsagdorj, 1972, p 8). Thus, 
Chinggis Haan divided his Empire based on allocating specific populations to his sons 
and generals. After he died, the thousand syste1n became the otog) an ad1ninistrative unit 
in which ruling elites owned their subjects and territory (Natsagdorj, 1972, Bold, 2001). 
The Chinggisid period was the development of the feudal production system. Many 
co1nmentators have argued that the Mongolian pastoral setting experienced no socio-
economic development, and in particular, there was no private property (Natsagdorj, 
1972). However, state and private property overlap in a complex pattern that was 
e1nbedded in the territorial administrative units. Compared to the thousandth, each otog 
governed different numbers of households as the Empire was divided based on 
ownership of subjects (aimag or ethnic groups) rather than territorial ownership 
(Natsagdorj, 1972, Natsagdorj, 1975). 
Since the E1npire was divided among the sons of Chinggis Haan, a concept of private 
land ownership emerged as the sons independently controlled their respective territory 
due to diminishing central control (Natsagdorj, 1972, Natsagdorj, 1975). Although the 
territory and subjects nominally belonged to the Great Haan by virtue of paying tribute 
and fanning 1nilitary alliances (Weatherford, 2004, Lamb, 1927), "their power and 
rights were limited to their own immediate apanages35 " (Natsagdorj, 1967, p 267). 
However, this is not private land ownership, but land use for private purpose. Land was 
used on a con11nunal scale, but aristocratic rulers exercised individual use rights in their 
territory. This authority over land is not in the sense of exclusive marketable private 
property and it "does not equal ownership per se of land" (Endicott, 2012, p 44). Under 
Ogodei' s36 rule, a concept of land management emerged as a land officer called 
nutagchid was assigned to allocate grazing larid to Ogodei' s subjects (N atsagdorj, 1972, 
34 The postal service was newly created under Chinggis. Each thousandth territory had a postal service 
station for resting and exchanging their transportation. Each territorial unit provided horses and food for 
this service free of charge for matters of state. 
35 Inherited subjects and territory 
36 A son of Chinggis Haan 
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p 5 5). Also, the area of pasture land was expanded by the digging of wells throughout 
Mongol territory (Natsagdorj, 1972, Damdinsuren, 1976, p 237). The concept of local 
pasture management emerged alongside the state owned land tenure37 . This land tenure 
was also characterized by communality in land use because of the characteristics of 
pastoral production, which defines the norms of common use and pastoral institutions. 
Thus, the ruling elites were more often seen as 'proprietors', rather than the sole 
beneficiary as they pay services and taxes to Haan (Natsagdorj, 1975, p 7). 
At the same time, a hoshuu, emerged as a military structure attached to an otog 
(Natsagdorj, 1972). The notion of community shifted from the 'thousand' to the otog 
which was based on an administrative unit (Natsagdorj, 1975, p 7). Thus, each 
aristocratic ruler exercised ultimate power in allocating land for specific uses, for 
instance hunting and herding (Bold, 1996, Bold, 2001 ). This pattern was rooted in the 
territorial adrninistrative unit as well as the emergence of a private property regime. It is 
noted that "these ownership conditions did not relate to property in the economic sense, 
but rather to access to pastureland" (Bold, 2001, p 41 ). 
However, entitle1nent to the exclusive rights to control access to resources obviously 
refers to exclusive property rights in an economic sense. Yet, this territorial control is 
not the sa1ne as the western economic sense of entitling a 'bundle of rights' as a pre-
condition for a market based economic system as it is not recorded whether this 
exclusive ownership included alienation38 rights. This may be because rights to 
regulating land use may not have rested directly in the land alone due to the dynamics of 
controlling specific territory as property ( aristocratic rulers were given territory to 
control, but the territorial boundary was often fluid), but allocating a fixed right to use 
pasture to their subjects. In other words, this property right did not conform to land as 
market based economic property. This is because the nobles' ownership over subjects 
and territory was embedded in a framework regulating jurisdictional territory to retain 
political and economic power to exclude and include access to extract pastoral 
resources. This was the fundamental structure of maintaining pastoral production 
management for political and economic power (Sneath, 2007). 
37 The land tenure system in a given jurisdiction compromises the set of possible bases under which land 
may be used. These bases include ownership, tenancy and other arrangements for the use of land 
(Ciparisse 2003). . 
38 
'Bundle of rights' is defined as the right to rent, sell, or give away the rights (Meinzen-Dick & Grigoria 
2004). 
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There has been major debate regarding how to define community structure based on 
different interpretations of mobile pastoralists' socio-political structures. One side of the 
debate regarding its structure questions whether the existing socio-political stn1cture is 
pre-state tribal, where membership was based strictly on lineal descent. Alternatively, in 
Mongolian aristocratic state based on administrative units, jurisdictional rulers had 
common lineal descents, but their members did not necessarily share this lineage with 
their rulers (Sneath, 2007, Sneath, 2010). The latter, particularly, argues that hereditary 
lineal descent was more characteristic of the noble rulers than their subjects in the otog 
as it contained several thousand households, which were mostly non-consanguineous 
(Sneath, 2007, p 97). Although hereditary for nobility, membership was rather loose. 
Membership of the otog was often extended to subjects transferred from other rulers 
(Sneath, 2007, p 97, Damdinsuren, 1976). Vreeland (1954) also noted that the ruling 
princes of hoshuu banner was hereditary from the line of Chinggis. Whereas, even the 
subjects, who had hereditary status to serve their nobles had non-kin relationship 
(Vreeland, 1954, p 12). It was common among nomadic societies that ruling elites and 
their subjects would separate or join one another depending on the recruitment of 
soldiers for war or intermarriage39, creating a mixed membership in each administrative 
unit (Sneath, 2007, Lattimore, 1962). In other words, community collective identity was 
defined by locality rather than by ethnicity (Sneath, 2007, Sneath, 2010). Thus, each 
territorial administration embodied ones nutag and its fluid social boundary (not strictly 
fro1n the same kin lineage). This broadly reflected the state territorial based community 
structure during the past two periods of socio-political structures ( collective and 
transition periods). 
The debate regarding community structure also pertains to the definition of primary 
production units. Under the Chinggisid period, the primary production unit, the huree, 
which consisted of several hundred related 1nembers, changed to horoo. This comprised 
non-related households that camped in a circular formation for defence and had a 
similar mobility pattern (Bold, 1996, Bold, 2001 ). This was considered a collective 
institution for managing the pastureland (Natsagdorj, 1975, p 4). It is also argued that 
the primary production unit may have been a hoton, which is an earlier version of a hot 
ail. This was composed of one to eight gers with a fluid social boundary to manage 
39 Bride joins another group, and is followed by a group of households in her attendance as well. 
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nutag seasonal mobility to ensure production (Sneath, 2007, p 97). However, the hot ail 
may also have emerged at that time, but become an institutionalized production unit 
later in the 19th century (Bold, 2001 p, 68). Both interpretations indicate that the hot ail 
was the primary production unit. Nevertheless, during this period, both the community 
and its pri1nary production unit appeared to show patterns of fluid social boundaries 
with mixed group members. In other words, social boundaries within the community 
and production unit were allowed to be dynamic due to the nature of pastoral 
production, but with strict control by ruling elites. Overall, the political structure under 
the Chinggisid period advanced from the previously existing chiefdoms based on 
territorial administrations to a subject-centred state territorial administration in which 
ruling elites administered mixed membership groups for military and civil matters. 
The HBU case study area in the territory of Delgerhaan soum in Hentii aimag is well-
known. Some sources noted that this was where 'The Secret History of Mongols' was 
completed at 'Ih Huraldai' 40 , while camping between 'Doloon Boldog' and 
'Shilhentseg' at 'Huduu Aral'(Damdinsuren, 1976, p 14). In addition, Chinggis Haan 's 
nutag seasonal residency 'Aurug' was often located in the Huduu aral41 (Damdinsuren, 
1976). The HBU bag territory was renowned as the "Huduu Aral"42 (Map 3.1). DD bag 
was called 'Doloon boldog', which took its name from seven small hills stretching from 
HBU Mountain to the 'Herlen' River at 'Huduu Aral'(Damdinsuren, 1976, p 14-16) 
(Photos 3.2-.3.3). Historically, HBU Mountain was uninhabited but was rich in pasture, 
and was 1nainly used as a reserve pasture by noble families for winter otor in severe 
weather conditions. Chinggis Haan43 for instance, spent several winters in the HBU 
Mountain and his livestock grazed on the mountain. Well-off families who were in need 
moved to the HBU Mountain with their rich herds to escape the harsh winter conditions. 
The HBU Mountain was also well-known as a "rich and fertile grazing land where 
nomadic herders did not experience drought or dzud when using its long developed 
thousand buuts and ten thousand springs" (Ulziisuren et al., 2010, p 64). 
40 Literally means ' Great Gathering ' . 
41 Hentii Encyclopaedia 2010, p.384. 
42 Literally means ' Country Island'. More historical events were to take place here in the future including 
when his son Ugudei reigned as Haan in 1228, this was also where Galdanboshigt of Oirad stayed prior to 
his battle with the Manchus in the 1 ?111 century 
43 Chinggis Haan (1162-1227), founder of the Mongol Empire. 
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3.3.3. Pastoralism under Manchu Qing Dynasty 
Property relations between subjects and ruling elites became much more complex 
during the Manchu Qing Dynasty ( 1691-1911 ). Pastoral production was controlled 
within the jurisdiction of the hoshuu territorial administrative unit. The Manchu Empire 
retained the aimag as the highest territorial unit, dividing Mongolia into four aimags 
44
. 
However, it replaced the otog socio-feudal political structure with hoshiru45 , a military-
feudal territorial structure, in order to utilize Mongolia as military back up for defence 
against the Chinese uprising (Natsagdorj, 1972, p, 24). Hoshuu46 became a territorial 
administrative unit within each aimag, but was also the primary structure for controlling 
pastoral production. For 1nilitary and production purposes, they formalized territorial 
boundaries by mapping the demarcations between hos huu and the existing former 
boundaries designated by landmarks and ovoo47 to control the movement of subjects 
(Vreeland, 1954, p 10). The Manchus maintained the ulamjlalt structure of territorial 
boundaries, which comprised a combination of forest, steppe and gobi zones to 
accom1nodate flexibility for pursuing pastoral production (Natsagdorj, 1972, p 59). In 
Manchu documents, borderlines were clearly drawn, but in reality the boundaries were 
rather fuzzy due to the complex features of herding strategies for pastoral production 
(Lattimore, 1941, p 209). In other words, the Manchu administration adjusted its policy 
in Mongolia to take advantage of the political economy of pastoral production. Thus, 
the Manchus changed the characteristics of Mongol territorial administrative units from 
the previously dynamic territorial boundaries to a system with fixed territorial 
boundaries for military purposes. In other words, administrative units are now defined 
as fixed territory. 
The lord of each hos huu was to be selected from Chinggis Haan' s descendants rather 
than fro1n among his military leaders and colleagues (Natsagdorj, 1975). Although the 
Manchu 1naintained the right of Mongol nobles to control their hoshuu territory and 
subjects, it li1nited their exclusive ownership rights to facilitate Manchu control over the 
benefits derived from taxes and services (N atsagdorj, 1972, Humphrey, 1978). The 
Manchu Emperor and the Mongol Monarchy (Bogd Haan, 1869-1924) did not permit 
the sale of land to outsiders. Small scale land sales occurred for agrarian and mining 
44 Setsen Han , Tusheet Han, Zasagt Han & Sain Noyon Kan Aimags. 
4-) Called 'Banner' as well. 
46 There were about twenty-four hoshuuns in each aimag (Batbayar 1996). For instance, by 1912, there 
were 23 in Setsen Han , 20 in Tusheet Han, 19 in Zasagt Han, 24 in Sain Noyon Han (Vreeland, 1954). 
47 Stone cairns. 
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purposes, but were not on a scale large enough to affect pastoral production (Lattimore, 
1962, Lattimore, 1941 ). In other words, the nobles did not have the right to alienate 
(rent or sell) their land as their territories and subjects were now considered the property 
of the Manchu Qing Dynasty (Natsagdorj, 1972, Natsagdorj, 1975). This was the rule, at 
least in Outer Mongolia until the collapse of the Monarchy in 1921. 
Within the hoshuu, Manchu also introduced the soum, a unit containing 150 
households48 for the purpose of recruiting soldiers (Natsagdorj, 1972). The soum was 
divided into several bags, which contained 5 0 households, and were the smallest 
territorial administrative units (Humphrey, 1978, Natsagdorj, 1955, Bold, 2001, Sneath, 
2007). Moreover, a group aravt, l 0 households, existed (Vreeland, 1954, p 21 ). Except 
for the hoshuu, these smaller units were structured as group households living in close 
proxi1nity to each other (Vainshtein, 1980, p 19) for purposes of tax collection and 
organizing services. Although the ruling nobles maintained the hereditary lineage, these 
units did not have the characteristics of homogenous group memberships as "these were 
subject to periodic reorganization, not by clan or lineage" (Sneath, 2007, p 97). In other 
words, social boundaries were mainly shaped by territorial administrative units rather 
than specific clan lineage. 
There is some debate about whether the primary production resource is the livestock or 
the land (Vainshtein, 1980, N atsagdorj, 1967, Sneath, 2007). In pastoral production, 
exclusive individual property is referred to as livestock ownership. Without livestock 
there is no production, thus land can be considered as a secondary resource for pastoral 
production management (Vainshtein, 1980, p 233). In fact, both constitute the 
fundamentals of production. However, the land should also be considered the primary 
production resource, in accordance with the historical perception, because "a large 
territory is the means of life ... to increase the herds it is necessary to expand the territory 
for ainple 1nigration and grazing" (N atsagdorj, 1967, p 266). That is, without access to 
land no one would be able to pursue pastoral production. This is because much of the 
livestock was in the hands of a few nobles and the monasteries (Humphrey, 1978, 
Vainshtein, 1980, Natsagdorj, 1972). For instance, in 1918 in Outer Mongolia, the 
population was about 647,500 (Humphrey, 1978) and the total livestock number was 
9,645,563. Around 25-30% the livestock belonged to the few noble families and 
' 1nonasteries (Natsagdorj, 1972). Each noble family and religious official owned much 
48 Military service was frequently traded, with a poor man replacing a wealthy one. 
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larger numbers of livestock than the majority of com1noners. For instance, in 1858, 
feudal nobles owned on average 4.3 bod ma!, big livestock livestock per head, officials 
owned on average 1.1 and retainers of noble families owned on average 0.9 in Darhan 
Chin-van Hosuu, Tusheet-Han Aimag (Humphrey, 1978). In 1918, Dorjtseren, a prince 
in Setsen-Han aimag privately owned 15,000 head of livestock (Natsagdorj, 1972). 
Thus it can be seen that those who exercised administrative rule over a territory also 
controlled access to land and pastoral production. This is why there is a focus on 
territorial administration for controlling pastoral production in which land was 
considered the primary production resource. Thus, I argue here that land, if not the 
primary production resource, is one of the primary production resources in addition to 
livestock. 
This is particularly apparent in the parallel state political and economic institutions that 
emerged in Mongolia under Manchu rule. Most 1nonasteries were owned by the banners 
and lamas were subject to the jurisdiction they lived in and were subject to all civil 
matters except 1nilitary service (Vreeland, 1954). Besides the nobility controlling 
hoshuu territory, some higher level Buddhist monasteries also controlled territory called 
Shavi Gazar and acquired separate jurisdictional status with the administration similar 
to the level of hoshuu (Table 3.1) (Natsagdorj, 1972, Natsagdorj, 1975, Natsagdorj, 
1967, Vreeland, 1954). For instance, the HBU case area used to be a part of Bogd's 
Shavi Gazar, in which the monarch's 1nonastery managed his livestock production. 
Property rights between territorial administrative unit and monasteries have similarities 
as well as differences. 
Table 3 .1 Pre-collective governance structure 
Monarchy 
Centralized political & religious government 
Local governance 
------------------- ----------
---------------------------------
Cent r a I governance (approval & enforcement) ! Religious governance (Buddhist Monastery) 
----------~·------------------------------------------------4---------------------------------------------------------------------
A im ag (Country) ! ! Aimag 
-------------+------------------------------------------------.1--------------------------------------------------------------------------· 
Hoshuu (Province) ! Saum (Military unit) . ! Shavi Gazar 
Bag (District) ! ! Buddhist temple ------------- ------------------
----------------------------------
----
Aravt ! ! Aravt 
The Buddhist monastery was a parallel institution to territorial administration. This 
concept of parallel structures in land tenure is noteworthy here, as it becomes 
particularly significant with regard to community based land management alongside the 
state territorial administration of natural resources. The Buddhist Monastery gained 
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property rights to land through political means because Buddhism was such an 
influential political and economic institution (Lattimore, 1941, N atsagdorj, 197 5, 
Fernandez-Gimenez, 2006, Baabar, 2005, Kaplonski, 2010, Vreeland, 1954). The ruling 
nobles allocated the best parts of their territories with their willing subjects49 to 
monastery control in return for spiritual as well as political favours. Shavi Gazar was 
established primarily in the border regions of several hoshuu territories(Vreeland, 1954, 
Natsagdorj, 1972). Thus, this community was also composed of mixed members, who 
were subjects from different hos huus. 
These Buddhist monasteries independently controlled three components of the pastoral 
production: -- separate territories, subjects and livestock --to gain benefits from pastoral 
production under existing climatic conditions. This was called Shab Gazar (monastery 
territory)5°, which also had jurisdictional status parallel to hoshuu within an aimag 
(province) (Vreeland, 1954, Natsagdorj, 1972). Many households preferred to become 
the subjects of a monastery, because monastery subjects were exempt from state 
military service and other compulsory taxes (Natsagdorj, 1972). The transfer of subjects 
was very strict, particularly from a hoshuu to a monastery community, because this 
meant that hoshuu princes were essentially losing subjects who would have paid them 
taxes and provided services (Vreeland, 1954 ). This indicates that community 
membership in each jurisdiction were not necessarily homogenous, but mixed in terms 
of descent through a particular lineage, as argued by Sneath (2007). Property was 
controlled under an institution called jas, meaning monks' 'collective property' 
(Latti1nore, 1962, p 99, Natsagdorj, 1972, p 75) which was different from hoshuu. Thus, 
the monasteries also maintained their production management. 
Control of production increased the significance of a jurisdictional authority. 
Controlling the whole of production under an administrative territorial unit was 
49 Giving up land meant giving up subjects. Some subjects, particularly nobles, rejected their transfer to 
the monastery's jurisdiction. Thus, the territory they were living on was excluded from the grant to the 
monastery (Vreeland, 1954, p 20). Perhaps, they would loose their hereditary noble status for generations 
after becoming a monastery subject (Vreeland, 1954) 
50 Most monasteries were owned by the banners and lamas were subject to the jurisdiction they lived in 
However, some higher level monasteries with huvilgaan or hutagt (higher religious ranks) had their own 
territory and managed to have special jurisdictional status and set up an administrative system similar to 
banners with land stretching approximately around 100 li ( equivalent of about 1/3 of a mile) radius from 
the monastery and had subjects of up to 300 households. However, the size of the territory and the 
number of subjects often increased due to religious and social influences (Vreeland 1954, p 16-17). In 
general, all monastery subjects were subject to all civil matters like hoshuu jurisdiction but with lighter 
taxes. They were also exempt from the military services. 
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primarily, for rulers, to maintain their benefits. Lattimore ( 1941) acknowledged the 
absence of private ownership of land. Neither individuals nor rulers prescribe individual 
ownership as land belongs to the whole tribal community, the understanding of which is 
different from any modem state ownership (Lattimore, 1932, p 48). However, he also 
acknowledged that the aristocratic rulers employed their jurisdictional authority as a 
mechinsm to gain benefits for their private needs. Lattimore (1941) observed Mongolian 
pastoralism as follows: 
There was no private property in land, though there was private property in 
livestock. There is no doubt that this Mongol system was decadent ( corrupt); it 
had become so distorted that by the very fact that there was no property in land 
the great nobles and the great monastic 'corporations' could use their authority 
to get all the profit that they could have had out of ownership of the land, 
without the responsibilities (Lattimore 1941, p 249). 
For instance, by controlling herders' production, the monasteries regulated the herders' 
access to pastoral resources (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002). Although comprising mixed 
membership, community social boundaries became relatively fixed as nobles were 
given the right to administer their own subjects. Although different in terms of function, 
the monasteries remained the same with regard to benefiting from their subjects' labour. 
Hereditary princes restricted the movement of their subjects. At the same time, livestock 
owned by monasteries, which existed in hoshuu territory, could be herded by both 
subjects and commoners in that hoshuu51 for performing religious merit (Natsagdorj , 
1972). However, subjects were not allowed to move anywhere without the permission 
of the nobles or the monasteries. Subjects fleeing from their jurisdiction was common 
due to the heavy burden of taxes, services and conflicts with local nobles and rulers 
(Natsagdorj, 1955). Rulers often organized a Nutag huraihui, a process of gathering up 
subjects who had migrated to another soum or bag in order to maintain its own 
administrative territory and to collect taxes and services from their subjects (N atsagdorj , 
1967, p 269). Thus, the classic mechanism to gain benefits from pastoral production was 
to manage the co1nbination of all the main production resources or components -
livestock, land and labour (Erdenetsogt, 1998, Bazargur, 1998). 
The 1nanagement of production involved control by dual actors. Both the monasteries 
and the hereditary princes had their own administrators who controlled their subjects 
through civil administration and control over production. In this way, subjects were 
51 Each hoshuu also had its own monastery, but livestock was herded on hoshuu territory. 
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entitled to pasture use rights within their territory (Vreeland, 1954 ). Authorities "did not 
assign pasturage rights and did nothing to regulate pasturing techniques" (Vreeland 
1954, p 26). When jurisdictional rulers abuse their authority and allow outsiders, it is 
not "to encroach on its [community] land, but to challenge its [herders'] freedom of 
movement" (Lattimore, 1932, p 49). Thus, herders' informal control was often at play. 
They resisted severely, because they considered that jurisdictional territory was for the 
use of jurisdictional community (Natsagdorj, 1967, Lattimore, 1932). Several sources 
recorded that jurisdictional herders often expressed their concern over unfair acts of 
their lords at formal jurisdictional meetings (Larson, 1930, Natsagdorj, 1972). Some 
even led to changes of lords by the next one in the hereditary line with better public 
acceptance or subjects would desert a lord to join a better lord (Lattimore, 1941, p 317). 
Sneath (2004) argued that this framework of pastoral production system was not 
"merely an instrument of domination; they reflected a much wider range of human 
experience, 'environmental externality-be that conceived in spiritual or in materialistic 
terms ... and this seems to have provided very real benefits for pastoralists (p 171 ). 
Under the flexible arrangement of herders' movement between and within jurisdictional 
territory, this dual control historically witnessed disputed use of pasture and campsites 
regarding the lack of pastoral resources. These disputes were nor an excuse to parcel out 
the land with formal property rights to individuals or group users. Disputes were solved 
by herders or their group leaders or next higher jurisdictional authorities in different 
levels (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Vreeland, 1954, Natsagdorj, 1972, Natsagdorj, 
1967). In general, jurisdictional authorities formally allocated specific areas for public 
services like urtuu (postal) or haruul (border guard) households or grazing area for the 
livestock owned by state or religious elites. They issue decrees indicating exclusive use 
for these certain pastures (Natsagdorj, 1967). For instance, HBU bag locals stated that 
the area vvas mostly used by wealthy hoshuu or monastery herders to help them cope 
with severe winters. If necessary, under the condition of a lack of pastoral resources, 
jurisdictional authority attempted to allocate the right to use specific land, using '15 
1nen' 1neasurement, which may have been legally applicable to mainly ploughing or 
hay-making land. As allocation of specific size of land for herding was impractical, 
subjects mainly crossed jurisdictional boundaries in the search of better resources 
(Natsagdorj, l 967p, 268). This indicates that jurisdictional administration over 
production was an important fundamental structure for state formal management of 
pasture land. 
67 
The hoshuu administration contained five types of settlement groups (herdsmen 
camps52 , relay station, monastery, the authorities headquarter camp and commercial 
centre/town) within the hoshuu (Vreeland, 1954). Simultaneously, it was composed of 
several administrative groupings: an aravt ten-household units, bag group larger than 
ten households led by noble families, a soum a 150 households to provide 150 horsemen 
for 1nilitary service (Humphrey, 1978, Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Vreeland, 1954, 
Bold, 2001 , Sneath, 2007, Natsagdorj, 1972, Natsagdorj, 1967). Without formal control 
over land, these groups only administered civil registration of a group of households, its 
members, their taxable properties ( only livestock53 , occasionally silver), group 
members' civil offences and services and occasionally organizing their social events 
like sacred rituals (Vreeland, 1954, Natsagdorj, 1967). For instance, in Shabi Gazar, 
yaman (main administration) controlled these groups for civil administration, but "did 
not assign pasturage rights and did nothing to regulate pasturing techniques" (Vreeland 
1954, p 26). These smaller administrative groups or individual herding camps had 
locally recognized winter areas, but they shared summer pasture within their jurisdiction 
based on customary use (Natsagdorj, 1967, Vreeland, 1954). Formal control is limited 
to legal mechanisms like civil administration, civil services and taxation over livestock 
to manage the balance between labour, livestock and available pastoral resources within 
jurisdictional territory. 
Generally, in hoshuu territory, mainly su1nmer and autumn pastures, was available to 
com1noners unless nobles selected specific areas for their own use (Natsagdorj, 1967). 
Commoners gained use rights according to their social status. Some herders tended 
livestock for princes (for tax service), or noble1nan or monks, which is called sureg 
tavih, leasing out livestock for herding (Natsagdorj, 1972, Sneath, 2007, Natsagdorj, 
1967). For instance, in 1919, Jun-Van Dorjpalam, a noble in Setsen Han aimag, owned 
8506 livestock and 30 households herded his livestock on his behalf (Natsagdorj , 1972). 
Other herders were independent commoners, who herded their own private livestock 
and paid income taxes. Others were very wealthy commoners but still herded for 
princes, nobleman and monasteries. Noble rulers considered that poor people without 
livestock were too inexperienced to be reliable herders. Thus, they hired wealthy 
52 One or several more households 
53 Comprehensive tax collection system from livestock production existed within each jurisdiction 
(Vreeland 1954). 
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commoners because of their experience. In contrast, the monasteries permitted herders 
to tend livestock regardless of their status (Natsagdorj, 1972, Vreeland, 1954). 
Thus, regardless of social status, property rights ( where to choose campsites) comprised 
informal, locally recognized ulamjlalt use rights to uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazars, 
winter and spring cainpsites and camping areas in the summer and autumn. A definite 
use right was mainly based on the ulamjlalt pastoral use principle of "any place not 
occupied is mine" (Natsagdorj, 1967, p 269). This became the informal use right rule of 
'first co1ne first served' (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Vreeland, 1954, Natsagdorj, 1972, 
Fernandez-Gimenez, 2006), implying that the first to camp would claim the right to use 
the surrounding pastoral resources. This principle was codified as customary law in the 
Manchu period (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2006). The principle rule in legitimizing locally 
recognized use rights was to leave a 1nark at the uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar. If 
there was a land mark then the owner would use it again that season. In stable weather, 
locals stayed in their own recognized nutag seasonal camping areas (Vreeland, 1954). 
During e1nergency weather conditions, herders would abandon their locally recognized 
uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazars for elsewhere. Under these circumstances, they did 
not leave a land mark on their uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar which indicates that the 
owner would not come and use it that year. Consequently, another herder who happened 
upon that uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar may utilize the surrounding pasture and 
water resources for the year (Vreeland, 1954). This would often lead to concentrations 
of households gathering in the best pastoral areas depending on a herd size. In this case, 
households essentially e1nployed haya bagtahaar buuj hamar bagtahaar id which 
1neans 'camp and graze as many as the pasture accommodates54 ', an ulamjlalt principle 
of pasture use (Fernandez-Gi1nenez, 2000). This involves negotiations between visiting 
and hosting rulers and local herders. Distant otor movement was carried out as rulers 
negotiated access rights between the monastery and different hoshuu. Occasionally, 
com1noners presented complaints to hoshuu princes that local noblemen had taken over 
their pastures without consent (Natsagdorj, 1972). This implies that there was a strong 
and locally legitimate informal use right to the land that was recognized by the pastoral 
community at the bag and hoshuu level in Mongolia. 
54 Alternative translation is "occupy the land to the edges of your home and eat as much as the bridge 
allows" (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2000, p 1323) 
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The arrangement of dual control over the pastoral production is illustrated in Figure 3 .1. 
Since pastoral production in Mongolia is mobile, exercising informal use rights (when 
and how often) is n1ainly shaped by ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms. The 
monastery and nobles both complied with ulamjlalt pasture use rules which had evolved 
in response to climatic and geographical conditions. This implies that rulers carried out 
the 1nanagement of herding on the basis of these ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms. 
These rules and norms mainly applied to nutag seasonal mobility and long and short 
distance cross-boundary movements in winter and summer. The decision to abide by 
and apply these rules was mainly shaped by the specific production strategies and 
management dictated by the available livestock, pasture and labour. 
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Figure 3 .1 Dual-control over pastoral production 
Ultimately however, the production strategy was primarily shaped by the climate and 
geographical conditions. Thus, the herders were also involved in making decision about 
their mobility. For instance, poor herders were not obliged to move as they only had 
small numbers of livestock and no access to transport resources to pursue mobility. 
Other households would usually leave these poor herders behind when they moved to 
other nutag seasonal pastures. This was considered normal practice as poor herders 
created fewer adverse impacts on pastures due to having fewer head of livestock. The 
poor herders, who stayed in their own nutag in return, informed those who left for otor 
elsewhere about the good weather conditions in their own jurisdiction, so otor herders 
would return to their territory (Vreeland, 1954, Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Fernandez-
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Gimenez, 2006). This indicates that in Mongolian pastoralism, there is inequality in 
wealth but herders all have equal rights and opportunity to access pasture as long as 
they belong to a jurisdiction and own a certain amount of livestock. How much pasture 
they claim depends on their herd size. Thus, pastoralism is not egalitarian (Sneath, 
2007). This pasture use principle is still practised in order to acco1nmodate flexibility in 
mobility for households with different livestock types. Thus, property rights to pastoral 
resources rely on the ulamjlalt informal customary institution, which is based on herder 
production strategy, and implies the co-existence of both a formal and an informal 
regulatory system to control production (Mearns, 2004b, Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, 
Fernandez-Gimenez, 2006). This i1nplies dual control over pastoral production and 
pastureland manage1nent. Defining the production units in the local context is a 
prerequisite for understanding the pastoralists' production strategies. The production 
levels of the socio-economic institutions in the pastoral context were: ail (a single 
household), hot ail55 (more than two households), saahalt-ail (a group of neighbouring 
households, who herd livestock), and neg nutag usniihan56 (livestock keeping families 
from the same region) (Bold, 1996, p 76). The last is defined as the level that represents 
pasture use institutions. This was perhaps interpreted as shared pastoral resources by 
neighbouring groups of households, thus becoming the basis for herder group 
formation. This was also defined as 'social networking' to accommodate flexibility in 
nu tag seasonal ca1nping and mobility (Sneath, 2007, Sneath, 1993 ). 
The pri1nary production unit hot ail has changed little since the collapse of the huree 
structure. Each hot ail herd contains no more than 1,000 sheep (Vreeland, 1954, p 36). 
Its structure is still primarily based on kinship and local networking. Hot ail is defined 
in terms of its social structure and functionality. On one hand, it is an essential 
production unit, encompassing more than two households in each camp, and in which 
the designated leader essentially 1nanages the pastoral resources (Bold, 1996, p 73-74). 
The differences in the sizes of hot ail depend on differences in ecological zones (Bold, 
1996, p 74). On the other hand, the social structure of the hot ail is defined more 
coherently as a "fluid residential group of about one to eight gers ... that often come 
together temporarily for a season or more, before the constituent households combine 
with others" (Sneath, 2007, p 97). Therefore, the hot ail is not necessarily static as is 
often the case when referring to large groups of households. The fluidity of a hot ail 
55 This is a recent term. It was usually as hoton/hot in early 20th century. 
56 This is an analytical category. This is not a formal or official administrative unit. 
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indicates that it does not have to be a big group to represent a resource management 
institution. Thus, what constitutes a hot ail in each ecological context and how it is 
changing within the transitional period is a question for debate. 
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Figure 3 .2 Pre-collective pastoral production and pastureland management 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter provides background to the notion and nature of mobile pastoralism 1n 
Inner Asia and traces the historical trends of pastoral production and CPR of 
pastureland management in Mongolia. Nomadic pastoralis1n in the context of social-
economic development has long been 1neasured according to the values held by settled 
and agrarian societies. Thus, political and econo1nic policies that advocate sedentary 
regulations for nomadic peoples have often been detrimental, leading to the collapse of 
manage1nent of CPR in these societies. However, Mongolian pastoral production has 
persisted due to its geo-political location and geographical region that favours these 
specific production strategies. 
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The Mongol Empire developed the fundamentals of pastoral production management, 
which evolved under a centralized or headless state, in which rulers of the jurisdiction 
gain both political and econo1nic benefits as shown in Figure 3 .2. Under the Manchu 
Qing Dynasty, this fundamental was developed further into a complex property relation 
with land by state formalizing jurisdictional boundaries and allowing ulamjlalt pasture 
use practices. This involved a type of dual (formal and informal) control of pastoral 
production. Pastoralism is not egalitarian, but provides equal rights and opportunity to 
access pasture57 , which is enabled by herders' residency and herd ownership. Thus, 
pastoral production under formal control was managed and administered by ruling elites 
(princes and the monastery) who controlled subjects and production (land, livestock and 
labour) within territorial administrative units. The administration defined both the social 
and resource boundaries of the community, for local community level property 
management of pastureland. At the same time, the state recognized herders' informal 
control over production and pasture use. This was to allow herders' flexibility in 
movement and to benefit from ulamjlalt pastoral production within each jurisdiction. 
Informal control entailed herders pursuing different types of mobility and decide when, 
where and how often to move to gain access to pastoral resources for production 
depending on their ability to mobilize pastoral resources. This required four-season 
mobility within jurisdictional boundaries and cross territorial mobility under the formal 
control of a jurisdictional ruler. Decisions to pursue seasonal mobility remained 
flexible, and depended on the unstable weather and the disequilibrium ecological 
conditions. The ruling elites mostly complied with pastoralists' decisions to pursue 
nutag seasonal mobility as they had expertise in herding livestock. In this way, nobles 
and religious rulers administered both the territorial administration and its pastoral 
production. Jurisdicitonal boundaries were important to pursue control over production 
and pastureland 1nanagement. Although size of ecologically preferable land was 
reduced during the Manchu and collective periods, and there were problems with 
herders' flexibility in movement, jurisdictional rulers were able to control pastureland 
1nanagement as they continued to control the production within jurisdictional 
boundaries. 
Under this regime, herders gained access to nutag seasonal or cross territorial pastures 
mainly by securing access to uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazars. Access to uvuljuu 
57 This differs from equality in the use of the amount of pasture and water, which is determined by one's 
herd size 
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havarjaanii buuts-gazars was secured through the property mechanism of ' informal 
locally recognized use rights'. Ruling elites controlled their subjects within a 
jurisdictional territory, and selected the best hunting, haymaking or pastoral areas for 
themselves by gaining and maintaining access to uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazars. This 
was due to another ulamjlalt principle of property rights, 'first to camp claims the right 
to use'. This refers to the right to private use, not necessarily exclusive ownership. In 
fact, exclusive ownership of land was prohibited by the Mongol Empire. In the periods 
of the Manchu Qing Dynasty and the Independent Mongol Monarchy, absolute control 
of land rested solely in the hands of the Imperial State, while commoners were allowed 
to use the remaining areas. Informal locally recognized use rights to specific uvuljuu 
havarjaanii buuts-gazars were mainly shaped by the ratio of livestock to the available 
pasture surrounding an uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar. These rights to uvuljuu 
havarjaanii buuts-gazars or nutag grazing areas were often temporary, and during 
periods of severe weather, herders would leave for other areas. 
The availability of uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazars was communicated through the use 
of markers (for example, piled-up reserve dung) which designated whether an 
authorized user would return to utilize the site that season. This shows that there are no 
fixed exclusive ownership rights, but rather user rights to uvulJuu havarjaanii buuts-
gazars. This follows the principle of accommodating flexibility in mobility among 
community herders pursuing pastoral production. In other words, there is a state 
political structure of territorial administration that employs an ulamjlalt pastoral 
production syste1n based on the communal management of pastoral production. This is 
not necessarily an overlapping, but an 'integrated 1 form of management of state and 
communal properties. This indicates that, in pastoral production, both uvuljuu 
havarjaanii buuts-gazars and pasture are interconnected in securing access to pastoral 
resources. The next chapter reviews the modem state's development policy approach to 
pastoral production, which was designed, yet again, to secure political and economic 
benefits. Under the transition to a centrally planned economy, this policy resulted in 
major structural changes which resulted in pastoral production and territorial 
administrations being managed by separate institutions within the same jurisdictional 
territory. This structure succeeded in maintaining ulamjlalt patterns of managing 
pastoral production as it regulated all three production components. This perhaps laid 
the foundation for the future disintegration of the components of pastoral production 
under a market-based economy. 
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4 Mobile Pastoralism in the collective period (1958-1991) 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the complexities in the development of pastoral 
production in Mongolia under the feudal system, when access to pastureland was 
partially regulated through the control of pastoral production. Pastureland, along with 
livestock and labour was one of the key components of pastoral production. A territorial 
administrative unit and the herders controlled these components within their 
jurisdiction. This amounted to dual control because the secular nobility and monasteries 
were in charge of production, while their herders controlled access to pastoral resources 
through the ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms. Thus, in the management of pastoral 
production in that earlier period, both groups of actors were involved in terms of 
decision making over property rights to land. 
In the 20th century, after the revolution in Mongolia, the production system went 
through dramatic changes. Having adopted the Soviet economic model, the socialist 
government of Mongolia declared all natural resources the prop~rty of the state and re-
structured the territorial administrative units. It also communalized all privately owned 
livestock and established the negdel ( a new collective production entity). The state also 
established the aj ahui (state funded production entity) to support the negdel. The 
government thus changed the role of the jurisdictional unit which was previously 
responsible for 1nanaging production. Now, jurisdictional units known as soums ( district 
level territory) controlled the population and the borders. The negdel now controlled 
pastoral production within a soum-level territory and regulated herders' access to 
labour, livestock and land. Some scholars have criticized this re-structuring as 
abolishing private pastoral production and diminishing traditional pastoral production 
and pastureland management (Sokolewitz, 1982 cited in Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, 
Mearns, 1996). However, I argue that, despite the negative influences of the 
collectivization process, it was important that the government managed to maintain the 
principles of the historical production system under the collective system, whilst 
instituting changes in adjusting the pastoral production to suit the existing political and 
economic situation. Although the government separated the economy of pastoral 
production from the political administrative structure, it maintained the dual control 
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(formal and infonnal) of the production components under a single entity, the negdel. 
This was significant in terms of preserving nomadic pastoralism in Mongolia up to the 
21 st century, through maintaining flexibility within the ulamjlalt pastoral production 
system, which was adjusted to the existing prevailing and geographical conditions. 
This chapter co1nprises two main sections. The first section describes the establishment 
of negdel collectives which managed pastoral production. This section discusses the 
ways in which the negdel managed to regulate herders' access to pastoral resources, 
focusing on the mechanisms employed. These include a) changes in the structure and 
responsibilities of local territorial administrations; b) the nature of the negdel production 
entity; and c) the ways in which the negdel controlled pastoral production and the land 
tenure system. This section only focuses on the period from 1958 onward when the 
process of collectivizing private assets was completed. The second section describes the 
establishment of the state aj ahui HBU Reserve Pasture Area (RP A). The state adopted 
similar land tenure and property rights arrangements in regulating state aj ahui 
pastureland. Thus, this section includes details on the land tenure and property rights 
arrangements of the RP A, and the geographical and institutional co-existence and 
collaboration of negdel and aj ahui. 
4.2. Collective production system 
Legibility58 appears to be key issue to controlling benefits from traditional agricultural 
systems for mass production (Scott, 1998). Fallowing its independence in 1921, 
Mongolia followed the model of Soviet Russia in developing the country toward 
socialism. This involved promoting co-operatives to 1nodemize and shift to a sedentary 
rural production system through collectivization. The socialist regime in Mongolia 
recognized the value of pastoral production in dry-land ecology when settling parts of 
the rural population (Humphrey and Sneath, 1999). As Lattimore (1962) noted: 
... Foreign journalists and travellers have made the mistake of assuming that the 
development of agriculture and industry in Mongolia means displacement and 
replacement of the pastoral economy. In other countries, perhaps; not in 
Mongolia (Lattimore, 1962, p 164). 
58 
'Legibility' is a central problem to the statecraft as the pre-modem state is blind and lacks detailed 
records on certain types of information of its people and their livelihood and production systems. This 
legibility problem led the modem states (for instance Soviet Russia) to create a simplified version of the 
agricultural production system to control benefit derived from production on a massive scale. 
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The government retained no1nadic pastoral production as the 1nain agricultural industry 
because the majority of the population, both socially and culturally, still relied on 
no1nadic pastoralism for their livelihoods (Rosenberg, 1981, Lattimore, 1962). Mobile 
pastoralism was not merely "a 'traditional' sector of a national economy; it was the 
national economy" (Humphrey, 1978, p 139). In other words, extensive pastoralism was 
more legible (logical) as a main production system to the state officials with regard to 
the existing ecology and the political stn1cture than replacing it with something else less 
legible to them. Therefore, the Mongolian People's Republic Party collectivized 
extensive livestock husbandry under a new economic development plan with the aid of 
Soviet Russia (Lattimore, 1962, Bradsher, 1972, Khazanov, 1998). The production 
system was heavily dependent on natural conditions and was not market oriented. All 
livestock was under private ownership. Thus, it was difficult for the government to 
control economic development (Bradsher, 1972). Consequently, the government carried 
out major structural reforms in the territorial and administrative units and pastoral 
production 1nanagement in order to abolish the feudal and religious political and 
economic systems. In other words, as Rosenberg (1981) noted, the new policy was a 
response to a 
... drainatically changing social and physical environment _( due to such factors as 
drought, environmental depletion, tribal wars, incursion of government policies 
and authority, the introduction of new technology, reduction in available 
pasturage, and changing market accessibility) (Rosenberg, 1981, p 23). 
These changes led to the adoption of planned collective production as an alternative 
production approach. In doing this, the government aimed at simplifying the extensive 
pastoral system and shifting it to a more sedentary, intensive pastoral system for 
industrial scale production based on Soviet Russia's design for its rural agricultural 
production (Scott, 1998). 
In the 1930s, under the influence of the "Left Deviation" political movement, the state 
abolished the feudal production system · and instituted collectivization (Rosenberg, 
1981 ). This 1novement devastated the national economy. Forced collectivization failed 
due to the mass confiscation of private property from the nobles, commoners and 
monasteries and the communalization of their private livestock assets and their 
redistribution to the poor. Because this economy was heavily based on pastoral 
production at the household level, many herders rejected the idea of collectivization. As 
a result, commoners, both wealthy and poor, followed the nobles or the heads of 
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monasteries (Rosenberg, 1981, Lattimore, 1941, Lattimore, 1962, Fernandez-Gimenez, 
1999a). Many slaughtered their livestock or left the country with their livestock, moving 
to Inner Mongolia to avoid confiscation (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Latti1nore, 1941). 
This greatly damaged the national economy due to declining livestock numbers and 
large population migration (Rosenberg, 1981 ). 
In response, the government eventually changed its approach of collectivization. To 
improve the national economy and motivate interest in increasing livestock numbers, 
the state employed a series of strategies including exemption from paying tax, interest-
free loans, and other moral and material incentives designed to attract the herders 
(Rosenberg, 1981 ). By the mid-l 950s, the state had taken control over co1npleting 
collectivization by communalizing private livestock owners (Bruun, 2006). Collective 
membership eventually became attractive as the process did not alienate or exclude 
herders from gaining access to local pastoral resources. Moreover, it pro1noted 
collective membership by propaganda and material and financial incentives such as gifts 
of household ite1ns and payment of a salary in return for private livestock owners giving 
up their private household production. Many eventually joined collectivization due to 
the heavy tax on private livestock owners (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Rosenberg, 
19 81) and to gain access to better pastoral resources and the massive aid money from 
Soviet Russia that was allocated to negdels (Bruun, 2006, Humphrey, 1978). By 1958-
1960, the state had accomplished complete collectivization throughout the country 
(Rosenberg, 1981, Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). The state, now the ultimate power, 
pursued pastoral production to gain, maintain and control economic benefits from 
pastoral production. 
4.2.1. Changes in the structure of local territorial administrations 
The state was able to pursue pastoral production due to the fact that it maintained the 
key principles of historical pastoral production and social order (Sneath, 2004). 
Replacing the nobility's and monasteries' control over territories and their pastoral 
production, the govern1nent restructured the territorial and administrative units59 . It 
divided the original four aimags into eighteen aimags as the largest/highest territorial 
administrative unit, re-drawing the old feudal boundaries. Once the government 
abolished the hoshuu, it adopted the former 1nilitary soum as the territorial 
59 See detailed structure in Munkh-ochir Dondogjal (2012). 
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administrative unit within each aimag. Overall, the eighty-six hoshuuns were divided 
into 300-304 soums) re-drawing the boundaries on a much s1naller scale (Femandez-
Gimenez, 1999a, Humphrey, 1978). For instance, the HBU case study area went 
through major changes in territorial boundaries and administrative units. Essentially, 
territories of DD and UU bag used to be in Zorigt Zasag Hoshuu, Setsen Han Aimag on 
two sides of the Herlen River (Map 4 1) (Shirendev and Natsagdorj, 1966, GIMAS, 
2009). Then by the 1930s, a new frontier was drawn by the Herlen River separating 
these two bag territories into two different soums and aimags (Maps 4.1-4.2). In the 
1960s, the territorial boundary of Delgerhaan soum shrank as the state created the HBU 
RP A, from the surrounding soums (Map 4.3). The state continued to regulate its 
nomadic citizens through the territorial administrative units, which controlled 
population movements within their jurisdiction. For instance, according to the research 
participants, 'Bayanerhtii' bag (bag 2-4 in 1930 on a Map 4.2) assembled and moved60 
into DD bag, DH soum (Map 4.3). This re-settlement involved around 200 herding 
households and around 200,000 head of livestock (Interview 29). It designated 
responsibility to each soum for administering public services, receiving funds from the 
state and dealing with social and political matters such as population census and 
military service. The soum represented the state and provided these services to the 
negdel (Humphrey, 1978). Thus, the herders' pastoral production was regulated under 
the soum unit as it replaced the hos huu unit. 
The restructuring of territorial administrative units also affected the ways in which 
1nembers of a community in each administrative unit used grazing land. Herders' 
seasonal mobility is restricted within a much smaller soum or brigade (former bag) 
territory than the previously larger hoshuu territory (Map 4.1 - 4.3). This reduced 
ecologically preferable land for grazing. For instance, the seasonal mobility of resettled 
households changed fro1n the right hand side of the river to the left hand side and their 
grazing was limited to only DD territory (Map 4.2). Then the grazing area of fonner DD 
herders was reduced due to the establishment of the RP A and the additional households 
moving fro1n the other side of the river (Map 4.3). Those remaining in UU territory 
could no longer use the river valley as it had been handed over to the Soviet army for 
testing explosives61 and thus they used only the hills for their seasonal mobilisation 
60 Although some stayed, many locals decided to move to the other side of the river as they wished to 
belong to their own former Setsen Han aimag administration or current aimag territory because they 
considered this was their own nutag or haryalal (residency belonging) (Interview 29). 
Gt Locals now call it 'polygon' referring to the explosion area as marked on the map (see Map 4.3) 
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(Map 4.3). This meant that the herders had much less flexibility in mobility over an 
ecologically less diverse terrain, which offered fewer types of forage resources due to 
the shrinking of the territorial boundaries (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). Thus, the 
herders were more vulnerable to risks of severe weather conditions like dzud and gan as 
there were not enough diverse pastoral resources within their jurisdiction. 
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4.2.2. The negdel production entity 
The state developed negdel production plans and infrastructure resources for pastoral 
production within soum territories in an attempt to alleviate the herders' risks which 
arose from the reduction of their grazing territory. The state organized the negdel 
according to the following principles. First, the negdel divided a soum territory into four 
to seven brigades, the smallest production unit (Sneath, 2003, Bruun, 2006, Femandez-
Gimenez, 1999a). A brigade was based on the former bag, the smaller administrative 
unit (Mearns, 1996). Second, it changed the basic production unit from being a kinship 
and neighbourhood-based hot ail to a non-kinship based suuri ail62 . The latter is a camp 
of one to two households for herding specific individual species instead of mixed herds 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Humphrey, 1978). This structure was aimed to 
"rationalize herding so that overall productivity would rise without bringing undue 
benefit or disadvantage to any individual" (Humphrey, 1978, p 142). The negdel 
comprised around 1000 households or employees with a total population of 4000; half 
of these were herding households (Sneath, 2003, Humphrey, 1978). Negdel 
restructuring was crucial to the country's economy (Lattimore, 1962). This was done 
under pressure from the Socialist political and economic development policy to shift 
Inner Asian nomadic pastoral production to a collectivized settled production system. 
The negdel production system comprised 85.2% of the rural economy in 1969 and 
76.1 % in 1975, indicating its continuing major contribution to the national economy 
(Hu1nphrey, 1978). In 1975, there were 259 negdels compared to 36 sangiin aj ahui. 
The 1nain function of sangiin aj ahui was agriculture which involved raising crops, but 
some sangiin aj ahui were involved in pastoral production and cross-breeding. These 
owned much smaller numbers of livestock compared to negdels (Humphrey, 1978, 
Sneath, 2003). These two entities became 1najor pastoral production institutions. 
Despite these changes, what is most important is that the state re-structured pastoral 
production management by retaining the historical dual control. Unlike Soviet Russia, 
the Mongolian modem state was able to retain historical pastoralism as the majority of 
Mongolian officials came directly from and still continued to rely on nomadic pastoral 
production (Lattimore, 1962). This was because, as Lattimore (1962) noted, Mongolians 
led their own government and requested Russian technical advice. Thus, the 
62 The smallest herding unit of a collective, which consists of one/two to four herding households, 
sometimes more in a milking suuri 
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collectivization activities "are traceable to Russian originals, but all have peculiarities 
which derived from Mongolian conditions" (Lattimore, 1962, p 191 ). In contrast, for the 
high-modernist state of Soviet Russia, peasant farming and its historical logic of social 
organization and settlement pattern and land tenure were less legible63 than the 
proletariat as a class (Scott, 1998). Thus, the Socialist govern1nent simplified its 
processes by collectivizing production management in order to gain control over it and 
feed the urban workers of Soviet Russia (Scott, 1998). 
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Figure 4.1 Shift in dual control over pastoral production from pre-collective to collective period64 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the state continued the principle of controlling the components 
of pastoral production under the unified and formal control of negdel or sangiin aj ahui. 
In other words, patterns from the precollective system were still at work with the 
exception of particular aspects that were changed during the collective period. The state 
63 Legible literally means "( of print or handwriting) clear enough to be read easily" (Oxford Advanced 
Learner's Dictionary, 1989, 713). Scott used ' legible ' in a sense that the state has the capacity to 
understand, make use or regulate it, if the state can read it with the help of detailed information about 
certain aspects of any practice is available or well recorded. 
64 The terms in bold signifies the changes in negdel period. Others to the previous system, which were not 
changed, were still at work in negdel period. The arrows signify changes from old to new forms. 
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also formalized the ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms, thus allowing the herders' a 
certain amount of informal control (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). This was significant in 
terms of accommodating the herders' ulamjlalt flexible movement in the unstable 
climatic conditions. The new arrangements applied to all negdels. The negdel 's new 
formal production structure, in fact, had embedded in it many major characteristics of 
ulamjlalt pastoral production. The following subsections explain the negdel 's general 
pattern of controlling the three production components. The sections will focus on 
selected features of the negdel production system for the purpose of this thesis and uses 
examples fro1n the HBU case in order to provide background to my case study. 
Livestock: The negdel as a formal control owned and controlled livestock production by 
1neans of a fonnalized herding strategy. This involved specialization in production, 
which was intended to introduce an industrial-style working process and increased "the 
ad1ninistrative routinization of work and hence the power and knowledge of central 
officials"(Scott, 1998, p 212). Specialized production management involved herding 
individual species instead of mixed species, such as castrated rams or two-year old 
lambs or cross-bred sheep. This strategy was based on a pre-collective pattern of 
specialized herding, which was much more flexible than collective arrangement 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Sneath, 2004). Each suuri would be responsible for 
herding a specific species, sex or age class of livestock. All livestock belonged to the 
collective except for a few private animals. The negdel allowed herders to own a mixed 
species flock for traditional household consumption (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, 
Humphrey, 1978). For instance, each individual herding household was allowed to own 
30-75 head of private livestock in the HBU case area. Again, the negdel assigned one 
suuri to herd private livestock (Humphrey, 1978). The negdels had compulsory 
insurance through the state-owned insurance co1npany65 , which fully covered livestock 
lost from natural disasters (Templer et al., 1993). Herders were responsible for paying 
for other types of loss66 in line with their responsibilities. State insurance rarely covered 
privately owned livestock (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Templer et al., 1993 ). 
65 The state considered animal losses from epizootic disease, natural calamities like dzud and hail storms 
beyond herders' responsibility (Templer, Swift et al.1993). 
66 Accidents like falling off to cliffs, losses due to rivers or wolves (Templer, Swift et al.1993) 
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Labour: The negdel as a formal control also regulated labour resources. The negdel and 
the soum67 had shared the same leader (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). "Known as the 
soum darga (boss), he enjoyed considerable discretionary power within his jurisdiction, 
while being upwardly accountable only to superiors at higher levels in the highly 
centralized state structure" (Mearns, 2004b, p 142). Scott (1998, p 213) compared the 
power and authority of collective officials over collective members in Soviet Russia to 
feudal lords, who legally controlled the movement of its peasants. In other words, in 
Mongolia, the negdel structure in effect almost continued the pre-collective state 
territorial structure, in which a hoshuu noble or a monastery maintained pastoral 
production within a territory under its jurisdiction. The negdel also allocated resources 
for specialized herding organized at the brigade level. Each brigade had a leader who 
led around 100-200 herding households (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). A brigade 
managed a suuri, which was much more fixed than the ulamjlalt fluid hot ail in terms of 
structure (Humphrey, 1978). 
This suuri was intended to pool labour resources. A suuri consisted of more than two 
households assigned by a brigade leader depending on the task. The relationship of 
these households to each other was based on economic production rather than kinship or 
neighbourhood (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Humphrey, 1978). -Yet, in the DD bag in 
the HBU case, a suuri also consisted of one household if they were herding non-milking 
livestock. Thus, under suuri structure, inequalities between the wealthy and the poor 
were replaced by inequality in capacity and willingness to fulfil production plans 
(Humphrey, 1978, p 153). The negdel allocated herders based on their capacity, which 
is depended upon their gender, age or experience, to each suuri. For instance, men 
usually herded more physically challenging animals like horses, whereas women took 
care of baby lambs or 1nilking cows (Humphrey, 1978). Similarly, in the DD bag in the 
HBU case, young and middle aged men mostly herded horses as this involved intense 
physical effort. Eventually, they herded sheep when they got older (Interview 29). Each 
suuri contained a limited nu1nber of livestock which a herding household was 
responsible for; a sheep suuri had around 600 head between two herders, whereas a 
milking suuri had 160 among 10 milkmaids (Humphrey, 1978). The negdel also 
assigned a suuri leader who was responsible for reporting to the brigade leader about 
67 Saum was responsible for administering public services, receiving funds from the state and dealing with 
social and political matters such as population census and military service and represented the state and 
provided these services to the negdel, which was responsible for pastoral production. 
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livestock and machinery. In order to encourage herders to max11n1ze collective 
production at the expense of private livestock, negdels primarily utilized propaganda or 
socialist co1npetition supported by honours and awards. However, due to the limits of 
the economic incentives, herders were often unable to utilize cash as there were few 
consumer goods available to buy. Furthermore, having too many goods hampered 
mobility (Humphrey, 1978). 
Pasture/and: The negdel as a formal control organized pastureland according to the 
following principles. First, the negdel developed wells and transport to efficiently utilize 
pastures in bag jurisdictional territories (Humphrey, 1978, Sneath, 2003). This was to 
compensate for the reduced hoshuu territory, which had been much larger in order to 
rely on the available natural water resources of handmade boreholes and minerals. In the 
s1naller soum territory, the negdels established more of these boreholes and drilled new 
wells with state funding to increase the available pasture. They also delivered large 
tanks of water to remote pasture areas (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Humphrey, 1978). 
The negdels assigned responsibility for the maintenance of these wells to special 
sections of each brigade (Humphrey, 1978). 
Second, the negdels also established more byres or wooden shelters to reduce the risk 
of livestock loss during severe winters instead of relying on natural shelters as herders 
used to do in pre-collective times (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Humphrey, 1978). 
Similarly, these byres were necessary when using the newly expanded pastures, which 
did not have natural shelters for facing severe winters. For instance, in UU bag territory, 
'Shine Amidral' negdel built new winter and spring shelters in the bare UU hills, 
because a Russian military division used the river valley (Map 4.3). In contrast, 
'Bayanbadral' negdel in DD territory did not build many winter shelters. Herders stayed 
in a horoo, a traditionally built wall made of hurzun in the shelter of HBU Mountain 
(Interview 29 & 33). Third, the use of more settled winter and spring byres was 
supported by the production of hay and fodder in large amounts (more than in previous 
times) for an 'emergency fodder fund' (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). Each negdel 
established a haymaking brigade every year to provide for its herders. Negdels also 
provided these through sangiin aj ahui (Humphrey, 1978). These process were similar 
to what Scott (1998, p 217) saw as the state replacing the technically independent 
production syste1n with a type of production that was dependent on advanced 
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technologies provided by the state. In other words, herders became more directly 
dependent on state support for their mobility. 
4.2.3. Negdel land tenure system 
Seasonal mobility: The negdel in general based its land management on the historical 
production management syste1n. The 1971 law on land use granted negdels and sangiin 
aj ahui the right to "free and perpetual use" (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, p 332). This is 
because under socialist regimes, the state owns all productive resources as public 
property. The state allocated administrative duties along different vertical hierarchical 
levels (Sturgeon and Sikor, 2004 ). In a pastoral context, the state-appointed negdels 
assigned the management rights over production and pastoral resources to pastoralists. 
This also resembles the dual control system which had existed in the pre-collective 
period. In other words, for the most part, pasture use rights emerged through a 
co1nbination of formal and informal control, and this is now considered as the de facto 
land tenure (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). The government's atte1npt to si1nplify and 
mechanize pastoral production had failed because it contradicted the existing resource 
use management which was still based on strong ulamjlalt livestock production and 
pasture use rules and norms (Humphrey, 1978, Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Scott, 
1998). 
Under the formal control, the soum/negdel had its own four-season pasture (Humphrey, 
1978). The negdel confirmed the location of each brigade Js nutag seasonal pastures 
(Sneath, 2003). Herders' seasonal mobility was confined to the smaller brigade territory 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). This was certainly the case for all those administrative 
units, including DD bag, which had lost territory to the HBU RP A. Each brigade 
decided on the specific herd species and migration routes that each suuri would follow 
(Humphrey, 1978). This was true in the HBU case area, as one of the UU herders 
explained: "The negdel used to organize everything, and would provide us with shelter 
and everything for winter and spring" (Interview 54). The brigade governor was also in 
charge of the final decisions on the choice of uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar (winter 
and spring cainpsites ). 
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Following the policy of introducing sedentary production management, more intensive 
grazing occurred near population centres in soum territories. This applied particularly to 
dairy farms, which had much less mobility than other suuri (Humphrey, 1978, 
Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). In the HBU case area, a former negdel milkmaid in DD 
bag explained that 
Herding milk cows is very different than herding sheep, especially when the 
pasture is very good. We milk the cows until October. Then we go to the winter 
campsite and then to the spring campsite. Then we deliver baby calves and then 
move to the tasag [ milk camp] in June, so there is not that much to rotate 
(Interview 34). 
In the case of a concentration of sheep suuri, the negdel would also send some suuri to 
distant pastures, regardless of some herders' wish to stay close to the centre (Hu1nphrey, 
1978). The local administrations followed ulamjlalt patterns of pasture use with regard 
to the geographical location of water and mineral resources in planning seasonal 
mobility. 
With regard to herders' informal control, the negdel 's formal decisions about herders' 
movements were based on the herders' own suggestions, because the negdel 's modem 
pasture use rules and norms were based on ulamjlalt rules- and norms to avoid 
overgrazing (Humphrey, 1978, p 146). Thus the herders made independent decisions 
about daily herding management (Humphrey, 1978). For instance, in the HBU case 
area, a former negdel herder in DD and UU explained how they selected where to camp 
seasonally. 
... We would suggest to the negdel that we would like to stay in this and that 
winter or spring campsites (Interview 3 7) . 
... The negdel used to organize everything, but we chose where to stay; the 
negdel would provide us with shelters and everything (Interviewer 45). 
When questioned about whether it was the negdel or the herders who selected the site to 
establish buutsnii-gazar (spot for campsite), fonner negdel herders in DD replied that 
... We chose to stay there. The pasture was really good and there was nothing 
like this was mine or yours etc. So, we were able to choose where to graze our 
livestock (Interview 33). 
. . . Our spring campsite used to be to the south. Then, the negdel head wanted to 
build a spring shelter for us. So, we chose this 'XXX' as our [new] spring 
campsite ... And the negdel allowed another suuri herder to use our old one, 
because they used to stay to the south of DD and wanted to stay on our old site 
(Interview 26). 
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The decisions made by the herders were valuable for negdel land management as 
herders were the 1nain actors, balancing livestock herding with available pasture and 
labour. They based their decisions on the ulamjlalt knowledge of pasture use rules and 
norms they had inherited from the past. The herders' choice was related, first, to the 
type of species they herded. Second, herders' selection of campsites was related to the 
social conditions of the herding households. Although a suuri was not necessarily 
composed of relatives, herders selected their uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar based on 
proximity to relatives. Another herder in DD explained that 
.. .I chose it because it was closer to my relatives. You herded negdel livestock 
and you had your own little kids and there were only two of you. One of you had 
to leave for elsewhere for some business. In this case, I usually stayed at home 
with my kids. So, I could go and ask one of my relatives to come and stay with 
me and take care of the herding (Interview 3 7). 
The selection of uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar in close proximity to parents or 
relatives was quite common. This was mainly to pool resources and to support each 
other's households and herding tasks. This indicates that the negdel allowed some 
extent of infonnal control over production and pastureland management to maximize 
production. 
Setting strict controls over planning, 1nonitoring, managing and appropriating 
production through the hierarchical administrative system was the main 
accomplish1nent of the collective system (Scott, 1998). Although continuing to employ 
ulamjlalt seasonal or cross-boundary 1nobility rules and norms, negdel made mobility 
compulsory for all herders in order to avoid overgrazing. All herders would leave their 
nutag seasonal pasture to go to another. Negdels imposed a penalty of a 30% pay cut for 
breaking collective rules on pasture use and norms (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). The 
negdel accomplished this as all herders continued to have equal opportunity in terms of 
access to pastoral resources (livestock pasture and labour). It also organized mobility by 
providing transportation support (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). This is unlike the pre-
collective pattern of pasture use, where poor herders were allowed to overstay nutag 
seasonal pastures (Vreeland, 1954). For instance, a former negdel herder in UU 
reme1nbered that " ... When we moved, the negdel would send someone to herd our 
livestock and move us and build our ger etc ... There were a lot of supports for herders" 
(Interview 51 ). This indicates that the herders' basic pasture use rules and norms were 
based on ulamjlalt patterns, but the formal pastoral institutions strictly enforced who 
moved and when in the collective period. 
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Cross-boundary mobility: The negdel organized cross-territorial mobility based on 
ulamjlalt patterns, which is still a key production strategy. Within their territory, each 
aimag and soum allocated reserved pastures for emergency use and designed stock 
routes, as well as land for use by the state fodder fund for cutting hay. In the HBU case, 
even with reduced territorial boundaries, negdels managed to reserve some pasture 
within their jurisdictions. Negdels were able to allocate all of their territory for specific 
purposes, because mixed species herding no longer existed (Interview 45). The negdel 
had the ultimate authority to make and enforce decisions on short and long distance otor 
1novement, but this was based on consultation with herders on where and when to move 
with regard to the type and condition of the livestock under the given seasonal climate 
conditions. This is because, regardless of improved infrastructure and expanded pasture, 
the herders' still need ulamjlalt knowledge for coping with variations in terrain and 
climatic conditions to gain access to pastoral resources (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). 
As noted in Fernandez-Gimenez (1999), local leaders often negotiated directly with 
each other to gain reciprocal pasture-use privileges in case of e1nergency. These 
exchanges were then approved by the next-highest level of authority, a soum for a 
brigade or an aimag for a soum. This was a continuation of the historical dual control 
used for gaining access to pastoral resources. For instance, in the HBU case area, by 
August or September, after shearing the livestock, herders would be reminded that they 
should now go on su1nmer otor on the other side of the river in UU bag territory. UU is 
rich in 1ninerals, thus 'Bayanbadral' negdel arranged this exchange with 'Shine 
Amidral' negdel. Negdels used such cross-boundary strategies in order to fatten 
livestock (looking for newer pastures or salty minerals) or to overcome severe weather 
conditions (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). This type of exchange was pro1noted as one of 
the main herding strategies for maxi1nizing production, and it was made compulsory 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Humphrey, 1978). 
Second, the negdel also had authority to regulate disputes arising from grazing land use 
according to the ulamjlal. Similar to pre-collective period, land disputes within or 
between territorial units were settled at the next-highest level of territorial organization 
by the executive administration of the Hural ( council) of people's deputies. Disputes 
between herders of one brigade would be settled by the brigade Hural, between those of 
a soum, at the aimag hural (Butler 1982 cited in Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). However, 
disputes between suuri over the sharing of grazing land were rare during times of 
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controlled pasture use. The brigade clearly defined the boundaries (herders would know 
each other's daily livestock grazing pattern) for each suuri, particularly in winter and 
spring (Humphrey, 1978) because at these times of the year, grass does not grow. For 
instance, in UU bag there was 5km distance between each suuri winter and spring 
campsite, which contained permanent shelters. Herders' use of these shelters resembled 
private property (Bawden 1968 cited in Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). In su1nmer, such 
divisions between the suuri were less formal and clear-cut because grass grew more 
quickly, even after grazing (Humphrey, 1978). The boundary was based on the 
scientific calculation of carrying capacity (Humphrey, 1978). It was also based on 
ulamjlalt ways of approxi1nate esti1nation (Interview 16). 
However, herders had the use right to campsites rather than holding a right of private 
possession. These patterns resemble pre-collective locally recognized use rights, 
because the negdel recognized a herder's rights to a particular uvuijuu havarjaanii 
buuts-gazar (Sneath, 2003). For instance, in the HBU case area, former negdel herders 
in both DD and UU bags would stay on their same uvuijuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar 
during favourable weather conditions. This extended use of the same campsite every 
year was not necessarily a practice invented by the negdel as it had also occurred in pre-
collective times as locally recognized use rights. 
Locally recognized use rights meant herders used the same seasonal pastures every year 
during usual weather conditions. This is related to the herders' strategies for fattening 
livestock by adjusting their herds to the specific terrain. As one of the negdel herders in 
UU bag explained, "It is not your livestock that got used to the area. It is the herder who 
made his livestock used to the area... You rotate around different areas and choose 
where to stay" (Interview 45). This adjustment is necessary, as participants in the HBU 
case area explained, because livestock do not fatten well if they move a lot68 and their 
grazing changes often in terms of geographical condition in different seasonal pasture. 
Earlier, the negdel perhaps used this logic to establish fixed livestock shelters and 
provide extra fodder. This was to replace the flexible camping arrangements that 
previously operated. Under that system, herders selected locally recognized campsites 
with or without shelters, but camped elsewhere temporarily when they needed extra 
68 In summer and autumn otor, herders do rotate a lot for specific vegetations and mineral, but this case he 
selects good pasture for certain period and herd his livestock in stable manner, so the livestock graze well 
and fatten. Then he moves to another patch of grass. 
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forage or under unstable weather conditions. However, negdel herders did not often stay 
in the same campsite and needed to shift to the ulamjlalt strategy during unstable 
climatic conditions. One respondent in HBU bag explained, "If it was snowy and the 
situation was very difficult [ around the campsite], then the herder would move and stay 
somewhere else" (Interview 29). In the HBU case area, herders mainly moved on to 
otor in the HBU Reserve Pasture Area (RP A). 
The negdel structure resulted in some changes in the herders' customary patterns of 
access to pastoral resources. These changes affected the ulamjlalt patterns of social 
networking and herding strategies in pre-collective period (Mearns, 1996 cited in 
Fernandez-Gimenez, 2000). The changes in the grazing patterns of specific species lead 
to overgrazing (Sokolewitz, 1982 cited in Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). These changes 
diminished the practice of ulamjlalt pastoral production and pastureland management by 
placing limits on the herders' traditional patterns of cooperation (Mearns, 1996). It 
became apparent that the herders were losing their skills in keeping mixed herds, skills 
that were well known to most older herders familiar with ulamjlalt herding practices 
(Hu1nphrey, 1978). 
However, negdel also relied on ulamjlalt practices of pastoral production management. 
The changes leading to overgrazing did not necessarily occur on a large scale, but at a 
s1nall local level. The brigade leader counteracted overgrazing by organizing ulamjlalt 
short and long-distance otor (Humphrey, 1978). Herders in general maintained and 
employed much of the ulamjlalt knowledge of pastoral production management and 
1naintained it in the collective period (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Fernandez-Gimenez, 
2000).This was because the negdel 's attempt to introduce modem technology to 
intensify herders' production was not supported by the herders (Humphrey, 1978) for 
several reasons. First, 1nany of the newly drilled wells were not properly constructed or 
suitably located and the knowledge of maintaining the wells was also lacking. Second, 
according to ulamjlalt herding strategies-, permanent shelters can crowd too many 
livestock into one byre and can cause damage to animals or affect the quality of the 
wool (Hu1nphrey, 1978). Also, crowding animals together in permanent shelters can 
create unhygienic conditions which may lead to disease (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). 
In pre-collective times, herders changed uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar often in order 
' 
to ensure good hygiene among their livestock. This was possible through the locally 
recognized use rights. 
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Third, newly established uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar or byres contradicted 
extensive herding because negdel mobility routes were mostly based on pre-collective 
routes, which already provided natural or traditionally built shelters for herding 
(Hu1nphrey, 1978). Therefore, herders made daily decisions on pasture use as most of 
the new infrastructure could not be relied on to avoid risk. Negdel herders even coined 
the saying: Mal mallahaa Marxismaar zaalgahgui ('we herders would not be taught by 
Marxism how to herd our livestock' 69). As a result, the negdel succeeded in 1naximizing 
production, despite pressure to use new techniques of herding. In particular, herders 
were able to win prizes in "socialist competitions", for their livestock products as a 
result of employing traditional techniques (Humphrey, 1978). In this way, the state 
maintained integrated management that allowed formal negdel control over production 
and herders' infonnal control over pasture use practices. Pasture use was thus 
incorporated into production management. The state took into account local patterns by 
assigning herding tasks and supporting mobility with infrastructure, whereas herders 
decided on pasture use based on ulamjlalt patterns. 
4.3. HBU RPA 
This section discusses the sangiin aj ahui, a state funded and managed production entity 
that supports negdel production. Some literature exists on agrarian sangiin aj ahui: 
agrarian production for supplying forage, hay and grain at the national level. There is 
limited literature on otriin aj ahui, a business entity covering the reserve pasture area 
(RP A). The agrarian sangiin aj ahui had jurisdiction over much larger agricultural 
activities than the collectives (Humphrey, 1978). Differing from the agrarian aj ahui, 
otriin aj ahui was involved in pastoralis1n and cross-breeding. It provided natural 
grazing area, and supplied hay and forage for any negdels which needed state 
intervention to arrange inter-aimag RP A; thus, all collectives could use it without any 
disputes, particularly under the state induced production plan. This was the state-funded 
Inter-Aimag Cross-territorial Reserve pasture area (RP A). The state assigned 
management authority to the ministry of Food and Agriculture (MF A). The MF A along 
with the Supreme Council of Negdels was in charge of all policies and planning with 
regard to agricultural land use (Mearns, 2004b ). The ministry also regulated 
manage1nent of the production and pastureland of the RP A. Thus, this section explains 
69 Later this phrase was used in a poem "Herder" by the poet Chimiddorj 
94 
the function of the HBU RP A, the largest otriin aj ahui, which the state established 
during the collective period. With regard to the thesis, it will focus on the features of the 
HBU RP A pertaining to pastoral production and pastureland management as well as its 
relationship with neighbouring negdels in terms of organizing otor. The sources for this 
information are the scant literature on sangiin aj ahui, archival materials from the 
collective period and interviews with my research participants. 
4.3.1. HBU RP AA establishment 
Although the state controlled everything, territorial issues were sensitive as territorial 
units including their herders were concerned about losing their nu tag (pastoral areas) as 
had occurred in the pre-collective period. Five years into collectivization, the negdels' 
intensive pastoral production lacked the full capacity to function on their own, 
particularly in terms of taking care of newborn livestock during the severe winters 
which occurred in the 1960s (Templer et al., 1993 ). In 1962, the government established 
the HBU Mountain as Otar Tejeeliin Station (HBU Station for Pasture Fodder 
Production for Otar) 70 . This organisation essentially replaced the monastery as a 
parallel production institution. The government strategically targeted the HBU 
Mountain because of the area's history and reputation as 'a thousand buuts/hond'71 for 
winter. The Delgerhaan soum governor changed the initial suggestion of the state, and 
re-located the RP A centre from the Delgerhaan soum centre to the HBU bag centre. 
This was to avoid losing territory, and consequently control of their historical nutag to 
the RP A and the ministry (Interview 29). The HBU RP A covered an area of 122 sq. km 
which included territories from Jargalthaan, Delgerhaan and Tsenhermandal (Map 4.3). 
Although not ceding its whole territory, Delgerhaan lost a large amount of its nutag 
seasonal pasture around the mountain. Unlike HBU Mountain, which was mostly used 
during winter by households from neighbouring soums, these newly-added buffer areas 
were used by many DD households. These households joined their own bags and their 
grazing land diminished even further. Now, it belonged to the state under the 
jurisdiction of the MF AM. The establishment of the HBU RP A in its present form did 
not provoke much resistance, as outlined in Chapter eight, because the state was able to 
maintain the historical production management in each negdel and aj ahui institution. 
70 September 1, 1962 with decree No 470 of the Minister ' s Committee of People ' s Republic of Mongolia. 
In 1965 , this was expanded from HBU Station to HBU Reserve Pasture Area. 
7 1 This was a metaphor. In fact, the buuts were around 700-800 and HBU RP A was easily able to host 
3 00-400 households on otor at a time. 
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As parallel institutions, each independently controlled its own three components of 
production. The state had the capacity to provide these enterprises with much financial 
and technical support. 
4.3.2. Administrative structure and labour component 
Under the state controlled population movement, the ministry was able to mobilize 
migrants fro1n all over Mongolia as the labour component of the HBU RP A. These 
migrants were to work with the newly acquired farm machinery; an ad1ninistration 
centre with a school, hospital and kindergarten was built for the employees of the 
enterprise. The state tightly controlled the inter-provincial migration. For instance, when 
someone migrated, the host territorial administrative government presented an official 
letter indicating that the local government had the capacity ( employment) to accept this 
individual as a resident (Interview 11 ). To avoid unemployment and population 
concentration, the state distributed and allocated migrants with regard to the capacity of 
each town, city or territorial administration. Sangiin aj ahui had around 500 workers, 
1nuch smaller than the negdel 's 1000 workers (Humphrey, 1978). In 1972, the HBU 
Mountain became Otar tejeeliin aj ahu/2 (Reserve Pasture and Fodder Enterprise). The 
enterprise ad1ninistration (RP AA) had approximately 300 employees excluding the 
enterprise herders, which numbered around nine at the beginning. By 1975, 270-280 
households were based at the HBU RP A enterprise centre (Interview 4 ). At some point 
the enterprise population reached 2800, which was larger than the soum population 
(Interview 21 ). As a result, the HBU RP A centre became a horoo 73, an administrative 
unit in a settled area, which is the equivalent of a rural soum administration. 
The Horoo was in charge of the residential area including the HBU RP A herders' 
seasonal pasture. However, its territory was much smaller than the RP AA territory. The 
HBU RP AA was in charge of all of the RP A as well as production. In other words, the 
HBU RP AA was the equivalent of a production entity like a negdel. Similar to a negdel, 
the HBU entity and the HBU Horoo were governed by the same official, who was in 
charge of production, finances and property issues. The HBU Horoo secretary 
represented the local government and was in charge of overseeing population 
72 This also functioned as the State Emergency Fodder Fund (Templer, Swift et al.1993). 
73 In accordance with decree No 204, Sep July 27, 1974, approved by 'Ardiin 1h Hurliin Terguulegchdiin 
Huraldaan', People ' s Great Gathering Representative Meeting of the People ' s Republic of Mongolia at 
the national level. 
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demography and statistics. "The Horoo had independent decision making power 
regarding who was in charge of what" (Interview 24). The ministry also established a 
committee called Aimag dundiin otriin zuvlul, the Interprovincial RP A Committee 
(hereafter called 'the Committee') under its jurisdiction. The committee was run by the 
vice minister and the secretary of the HBU RP AA. Other members included the 
governors of any visiting otor aimags and soums. Thus, different state-based actors 
were involved in decision making regarding the use of PRA. 
Unlike negdels, the HBU RP A was state property. The state fully funded and provided 
loans to the HBU RP A. The RP A was supposed to finance its hay selling activity in 
order to fund the otor service. The original purpose was to provide emergency fodder, 
but it eventually beca1ne the regular supplier of cheap fodder and resources to negdels 
(Templer et al., 1993 ). This was supposed to be a business entity financing itself from 
sales; however, its financial management failed. HBU RP A history also reflected what 
Templer, Swift et al. (1993) described for state emergency fodder fund. This also 
experienced management problems such as "high cost, poor quality of the supplements 
it provided, high levels of wastage, disincentive effects to local feed supplement 
production, and the market distortions it produced" (Templer et al., 1993, p 111 ). It lost 
more than it gained, as there was no payment imposed for hosting otor. A former 
official stated, "allowing that many livestock [were] here for grazing and providing the 
suuri with all sorts of services including hospital, vets, schools, wells and hay bales 
reserved for them. It used to be a big burden and there was no benefit for us" (Interview 
11 ). Thus, the RP A only survived with loans from the state. 
4.3.3. HBU RP A as an production entity 
In contrast to the negdel system, the ministry designed the HBU RP A to provide grazing 
areas, produce hay and forage, develop uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar with shelters, 
build deep-engineered wells, and supply hay and fodder to households on otor from 
collectives and farms in Tuv, Domo-Govi and Hentii provinces. Thus, the RP AA 
function was divided into fields of management of livestock production, reserve area 
management and hay and forage production. 
Livestock First, the HBU RP A controlled the livestock component of production. The 
HBU horoo managed the RP A private livestock owned by employees as well as the 
97 
RP A livestock belonging to the aj ahui. The aj ahui 1s livestock fluctuated between 
10,000-14,000 head. Each individual household was allowed 16 head of livestock, 
which was almost half the amount allowed in the negdel. This was because most of the 
households co1nprised non-herding employees. In 1985, the RP A also established a 
dairy fann with 400 specially bred cows to provide milk and dairy products to settled 
areas like 'Baganuur' and 'Bor-Undur'. The enterprise also employed around 100 
herders and about 20 suuri74 . By 1990, the horoo owned 26 sheep herding suuri and 10 
small cow suuri75. Each bag1 a small livestock suuri, had around 500 sheep and goats. 
These herders would volunteer to work for the horoo1 and would receive a 50% 
discount on livestock. This included one horse for riding, one pregnant cow and five 
two-year-old female sheep 76. 
The horoo assigned administrative responsibilities, rather than imposing exclusive 
property rights. First, it e1nployed negdel land tenure and property rights mechanisms 
for regulating pastureland management. The horoo managed production on horoo nutag 
seasonal pastures, which were around HBU Mountain. It allocated its herders all the 
four-season pastures between HBU Mountain and the Herlen River, and established 
uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar. Unlike the negdel, the horoo assigned a brigade to 
define specific locations and was responsible for the quality of construction of livestock 
shelters. This was because there were no local herders to suggest camp and shelter 
locations. The RP AA decreed that, 
... When defining locations for uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar, consider areas 
with abundant pasture to graze livestock in winter and spring, which are well 
protected from cold winters and storms, and which is adequate for livestock in 
. d . n winter an spnng . 
This indicates that ca1npsite selection was based on ulamjlalt herding strategies, but 
with the addition of more modem management practices. The horoo organized meetings 
with its herders on herding strategies including who would do what and how. The horoo 
74 Decree by Ardiin Deputatuudiin Hura!June 23, 1976XN81, DNo, XHNol 14, HBU Horoo, Hentii 
aimag Archive. 
75 XN81, DNo, XHNol 13, HBU Horoo Emergency Meeting Minute, December 11, 1990, HBU Horoo, 
MF A, Hentii aimag Archive. 
76 Decree of 1989, by HBU Otor and forage enterprise (HBU OTFE) secretary, XN104, DNol, 
XHNo313, HBU OFE, MF A, Hentii aimag Archive. At this decree, the enterprise allocated one horse for 
riding, one pregnant cow and 5 two year old female sheep to each voluntary herder. 
77 Decree by Ardiin Deputatuudiin Hural, April 3, 1976, XN81, DNo, XHNo6, HBU Horoo, MFA, Hentii 
aimag archive. 
98 
then finalized decisions on allocating certain individuals to a suuri and assigned who 
would be responsible for livestock delivery78 . 
Second, in the same way as negdels, the horoo allocated specific grazing land for dairy 
farms and set up boundaries 79 . It strictly controlled the use of this area, removing 
existing private and horoo livestock from grazing and camping. It also prohibited all 
local livestock and households from entering this designated area 80 . This is because 
dairy cows were a special breed and were vulnerable to livestock diseases. In 
emergency situations, the horoo would organize quarantine zones and restrict mobility. 
For instance, in cases where cows were suspected to have an infectious disease, the 
horoo quarantined the area. It forbade all others from grazing their livestock around the 
area and quarantined the suuri within a certain pasture. It also allocated only particular 
wells for use, so as to not mix with other suuri81 , thus creating a very complex care 
syste1n. Unlike visiting otor herders, horoo herders resided in the HBU RP A through all 
four seasons. However, they ca1nped outside HBU Mountain most of the year because 
the mountain was specifically reserved for visiting otor herders. 
4.3.4. Reserve pasture management 
Since the state had historically maintained the production management under the negdel 
or aj ahui, the HBU RP A succeeded in the management of the RP A for organizing otor. 
At an annual meeting the Committee made decisions with regard to organizing otor in 
the HBU RP A. Prior to the meeting, the Committee members would tour around the 
HBU RP A, inspecting and defining pasture conditions and capacity for hosting otor. 
This definition was based on: a) the number of livestock with regard to the number of 
buuts; and b) the type of livestock to graze. Each suuri herded 500 head of livestock 
with regard to capacity of the buuts and its pasture in certain terrain. Each head of 
collective presented the number of suuri herders that should come on otor. Calculating 
these two factors, the committee would decide the number of suuri and the livestock 
fro1n each negdel that the HBU aj ahui would host on otor. The aj ahui hosted on 
78 Meeting minutes on Feb 26, 1985, XN 104, DNol , XHNo38, HBUOFE, Hentii aimag Archive, 
National Archive. 
79 Decree by Ardiin Deputatuudiin Hural, August 6, 1985, CP N81 , DNo, XHNo55 , HBU Horoo , MFA, 
Hentii aimag Archive. 
80 Decree by Ardiin Deputatuudiin Hural, September 9, 1974, XN81 , DNo, XHNol , HBU Horoo, MFA, 
Hentii aimag Archive. 
81 Decree by Ardiin Deputatuudiin Hural, September, 17, 1976, XN81 , DNo, XHNo, HBU Horoo, MFA, 
Hentii aimag Archive. 
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average 100-200 suuri with 400,000-500,000 head of livestock annually. The aj ahui 
would be in charge of enforcing and monitoring the Com1nittee rules for all the suuri. 
The enterprise secretary would be in charge of implementation. The aj ahui would be 
prepared to host otor herders with the following services. 
Pastureland and its tenure: The state's financial support for the development of the 
RP A contributed to the effectiveness of the institution in providing services to gain 
access to the RP A. The HBU Mountain was rich in old buuts. Some of these had hurzun 
or rock walls as shelters. Using these buuts, the aj ahui then built 178 big solid wooden 
shelters with roofs with capacity for 500-1000 head of livestock (Photo 4.1). The aj ahui 
was responsible for the maintenance of the livestock shelters and its hygiene. It also 
created around 22 deep engineered wells. Similar to the negdels, they also delivered 
tanks full of water and firewood on tractors to remote valleys with no water or wood 
resources. Mechanic brigades carried out the maintenance of the wells. During the 
spring to autumn off-season, a guard was installed at the entrance to each mountain 
valley to protect these livestock shelters and wells. The aj ahui also provided otor 
services including veterinary services to maintain livestock hygiene in the HBU RP A. 
Photo 4.1 A buuts with rock wall, outskirt of the HBU Mountain (left). A winter buuts with an old 
wooden shelter in the mountain (right), 2010 
Since the aj ahui controlled the pastoral resources, it also organized a temporary tenure 
system for visiting otor herders. The aj ahui organized otor between November and the 
Tsagaan Sar holiday in February, from 10th to 20th82 . This is because, first, when winter 
temperatures increase, it would be too hot for adult livestock to stay in the mountain. 
Second, the mountain valleys cannot avoid the spring winds and livestock is often 
82 According to locals, this was related to weather changes and because spring comes earlier now than in 
the collective period. Nowadays, spring usually comes in March or April. 
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driven by these stonns. Third, wind causes difficulties for young animals, causing 
diarrhoea and increasing mortality. During collective times, new born livestock were 
usually born earlier in early spring, and herders would return to assist with delivery. 
This arrangement was based on ulamjlalt strategies of pursuing otor in the HBU 
Mountain. 
Visiting negdels organized the mobility of their herders. They would leave the herders 
behind with camel caravans for them to herd the livestock in and out of the HBU RP A. 
They would also assign herders to assist them. At the same tiine, it would send trucks to 
move herders' gers and other household goods in and out of the HBU RP A. During 
heavy snow, the aj ahui would clear roads and make trails for the herders to follow. In 
this way, inability could be carried out within one day without affecting the horoo 
uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-gazar or pastures. Otar herders would enter the RP A 
following the instructions of the Committee. Negdels would vaccinate all their livestock 
prior to otor mobilisation. The aj ahui vet would check the herders' livestock inspection 
records for infectious disease at the river bridges, en route to the RP A. Once inside, the 
otor coinplied with the aj ahui pasture allocation. 
Table 4.1 1983-1984 Schedule assigned for officials from provinces on otor in HBU RP A approved by 
Party Committee, HBU Horoo 
Aimag 
Tuv 
Responsible 
individual 
Seterhaan 
Soum 
Sergelen 
Bayan 
Bayandelger 
Responsible 
individual 
Seterhaan 
Mamerbek 
Baranchuluun 
Bayanjargalan (case study area) Purevjav 
Bayantsagaan Suhbaatar 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------· Dundgovi Dorjgotov.T Tsagaandelger Narangerel 
Deren Battulga 
------------------------------------------------------------------ ·--------------------------------------· Domogovi Jamyanhorloo Airag Jamyanhorloo 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration of Hasbazar National Army Hasbazar 
the Ministry of Defence 
Hentii Tserenj av .L Delgerhaan ( case study area) 
Bayanmunh 
Darhan 
J argal thaan 
Tsenhermandal 
Saindemberel 
Baljir 
Tserenjav 
Tsogtoo 
Lhagvadash 
Source: XN81, DNo, XHNo48, HBU Horoo, MFA, Hentii aimag Archive, Feb 14, 1983 
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The aj ahui i1nplemented the Committee decisions to organize and control pasture use 
in HBU Mountain for otor households. It allocated a single valley for all otor herders 
from the same negdel fro1n same aimag, deep in the mountain away from the local HBU 
RP A seasonal pastures. For instance, to accommodate herders from neighbouring bags 
and their ulamjlalt use patterns on the mountain, the Committee mainly sent Dundgovi 
aimag into the Delgerhundii valley in Zuun Bayanbulag and Govisumer aimag into the 
Burgaltai valley and Bayandelger soum fro1n Tuv aimag to the Huhtii valley. The HBU 
H oroo would allocate certain staff from each aimag to be in charge of their otor herders 
from their provincial soums (Table 4.1 ). 
Each aimag would send a 1nanagement unit called otriin shtab83, a temporary otor 
headquarters, (TOH) to organize herders. The TOH collaborated with the RP AA in 
enforcing rules and norms. The TOH from each aimag established gers in the valley 
allocated to them. It would be co1nposed of a vet, a doctor and a local livestock 
husbandry officer, who were from the same aimag. One of these would be a leader 
responsible for their herders. They would listen to issues regarding otor from their 
herders and communicate this to the aimag via radio-communication for instructions to 
avoid disputes among herders staying in the same valley. Campsite allocation was 
arranged by the TOH and was based on herders' suggestions with regard to the number 
and type of livestock of each suuri. The TOH would divide the valley into five parts to 
accom1nodate the herders fro1n different negdels. Occasionally, otor households could 
stay close to local households since the boundaries between valleys are quite imprecise. 
Each aimag or negdel would camp in the sa1ne valley year after year, thus their valley 
and uvuljuu buutsnii-gazar would be well-preserved for their return next time. The 
HBU RP A was mainly for grazing sheep and goats, not for horses. Horses were sent to 
the steppe area or elsewhere for winter otor which was well protected, particularly from 
horses from neighbouring bags. 
Hay and forage production: The RP A also produced hay and forage. Initially, by the 
1960s, it was cultivating 1300-1306 ha of land with wheat and oats as livestock fodder 
near the horoo centre. This land proved unsuitable for cultivation as it lacked an 
effective irrigation system and the earth was rocky. Thus, the RP A abandoned 
cultivation for a while. When dairy farming was introduced, the state funded millions of 
83 A Russian word for headquarters 
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tugrugs 84 for the irrigation system for the farm. The aj ahui planted small amounts of 
root vegetables along with uhriin darsh 85, silage for the cattle in winter. The aj ahui also 
had six haymaking brigades with 120 tractors and 40 trucks harvesting 20,000 tonnes of 
grass annually. They also gathered hay from remote parts of the eastern aimags such as 
the Suhbaatar and Hentii areas, where no one stayed in the winter for grazing86. The 
HBU Mountain was rich in grass as tall as 40-S0cm. According to the locals, 'when you 
lie down to shoot a 1narmot, you cannot see the marmot' (Interview 4). The aj ahui sold 
the hay to negdels from DornoGovi, Dundgovi and UmnuGovi. 
4.4. Conclusion 
Under the socialist regime, Mongolia focused on shifting the earlier extensive pastoral 
production to an intensive sedentary production system with the intention of increasing 
efficiency in livestock production. Benda-Beckmann (2006) argued that regulating the 
use of natural resources through property relation needs to be considered to understand 
the local concepts of property relations, which is shaped by historical processes. As 
Sneath (2004) argued, pastoralism was developed as part of a larger socio-political 
system. Thus, the Mongolian government maintained nomadic pastoralism by retaining 
key aspects of the ulamjlalt production management system as it embedded the 
historical property relations in pastureland. In other words, the state succeeded in 
managing the state ownership of land management by controlling both production and 
the land. 
Although the state uncoupled production from territorial administration, it retained 
control of pastoral production components under unified institution such as negdel or aj 
ahui. This enabled the negdels to control production within a soum jurisdictional 
boundary. With regard to the sangiin aj ahui, the ministry was able to control the land 
and production of otriin aj ahui, because it controlled all three components of pastoral 
production. Also, the state relied heavily on integrated management. It combined the 
methods of intensive livestock husbandry with a simplified version of the ulamjlalt 
patterns of pastoral production and pastureland management, because some mechanized 
aspects of the intensive production system for industrial scale were too simplistic for 
84 Currency of Mongolia; it was strong in the collective period. 
85 The plant is harvested when it is very green and then pickled for feeding cattle in winter. 
86 Specifically, HBU Mt, Huree Mt, Gutliin Mt and east Henui Mt, One Thousand Sheep Mt in Batshireed 
and Bayanadarga Hentii aimag. 
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extensive livestock husbandry (Humphrey, 1978, Scott, 1998). The state also employed 
ulamjlalt pasture use rules of seasonal and cross-territorial mobility. Its formal 
institutions allowed herders to select seasonal nutag and uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts-
gazar and other pastoral resources with regard to type and species of livestock. 
Moreover, the state was able to gain benefits from pastoral production by planning the 
production and imposing strict production rules and norms. Formal pastoral institutions 
imposed on the herders a compulsory seasonal or otor mobility in order to avoid 
overgrazing of land with reduced ecological diversity in soum territory. Also, it 
subsidized infrastructure and technology to support herder mobility. Although these 
disciplined pasture use rules contributed to the negdels ' increased control of production, 
the state's direct control over the benefits from the production diminished individual 
control over the production, leading to individual herders' dependency on the state with 
regard to their mobility and gaining access to pastoral resources. The next chapter 
discusses how this dependency would contribute to weakening the integrated 
manage1nent of the pastoral production and land management, when the state lost its 
political and economic power over production under the market economy system. 
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5 Mobile pastoralism during the transition to a market economy 
5.1. Introduction 
One of the most important observations made in the previous chapter was that herders 
experienced dramatic changes in their access to pastoral resources and in their pasture-
use practices under the collective production system. A negdel collective business-type 
unit was set up to 1nanage pastoral production within soum-level territory and regulated 
the production co1nponents (labour, livestock and land). By placing the management of 
these three production co1nponents under negdel control, the state was able to continue 
to derive benefits from pastoralism. However, the collapse of Soviet Russia led to the 
collapse of the centralized economy in Mongolia. The government dismantled its 
management of the pastoral production components. This resulted yet again in changes 
to the ways in which herders gained, maintained and controlled their access to pastoral 
resources (pastureland and water) and their resource management practices. 
In this chapter, I explore the impact of this privatization on local pastureland 
1nanagement. In particular, I examine: a) how the state's legal (formal) and the herders' 
informal control of pastoral production management adjusted to the new market-based 
governance; and b) how and why this adjustment changed the ways in which herders 
accessed pastoral resources. These questions are important in identifying the underlying 
causes of the proble1n of pastureland CPR management in Mongolia. Most scholars 
examine the proble1ns that have occurred in pastureland management ( overgrazing and 
disputed use of pasture) within the framework of the property rights concept. They 
conclude that 'open access', an absence of property rights, has been occurring due to the 
collapse of the formal negdel institution ( Griffin, 2003, Ickowitz, 2003, Mearns, 2004b ). 
However, in this chapter, I argue that the problem is not necessarily due to open access 
but mainly to the current market-based transition policies, which ignore and conflict in 
large part with existing principles of ulamjlalt pastoral production management and 
long-established pastureland use practices. 
This chapter consists of two sections. In the first section I discuss the implications of 
privatization for Mongolia as a country 'in transition'. This section reviews Mongolia ' s 
privatization processes and their impacts on herders' mobility in order to provide 
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background to my case study analysis 87 . Next, I analyse the HBU case in relation to the 
findings in the previous section. In this section I examine how the privatization of 
negdels and HBU RP A aj ahui differs in terms of its impact on herders' access to 
resources. Examining this difference is crucial, because gaining access to reserve 
pasture is still one of the key strategies that herders use in maintaining their production. 
There are abundant studies of the privatization of former negdels, but few on the 
privatization of aj ahui, former state-owned enterprises and its impacts on reserve 
pastureland management. The analysis of both of these and their differences contributes 
to defining the problems occurring in pastureland 1nanagement in Mongolia. 
5.2. Privatization of pastoral production in Mongolia 
In 1991, Mongolia witnessed a major shift in its socio-economic and political system 
that would result in utterly different agricultural and environmental policy practices 
from the previous system. Following the collapse of the Soviet-Union, and the loss of 
its political alliance and economic support, Mongolia joined other former satellite 
countries in reforming its political and economic system from an inefficient and 
moribund centrally-planned socialist system to a free market democratic system 
(Sneath, 2006, Mearns, 2004a). A newly formed government led by the fonner 
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) (Korsun and Murrel, 1995), 
introduced a structural adjustment Program (SAP) following the advice of the IMF and 
the World Bank (Sneath, 2006). The aim of the program was to 'emancipate' the 
economy from its political structure, and allow it to assume its latent 'natural form', 
composed of private property and the market (Sneath, 2006, p 149). One of the 
activities of the SAP along with other fiscal reforms was the privatization of public 
assets (Sneath, 2006). The objectives of privatization were mainly to promote private 
property ownership, a move that the World Bank saw was important for joining a free-
market economy and to create an effective distribution system through "compensation, 
entitle1nent and equity in the transfer of property" (Korsun and Murrel, 1995, p 474). 
87 It is important to note that I refer to the key conceptual debates instead of referring to specific scholars' 
arguments. This is because these scholars provide similar descriptions of the process and the outcome, but 
do not necessarily come to the same conclusions with respect to defining the underlying problem. Some 
assume that the problem is open access condition, thus introducing exclusive property rights is a 
necessary step to adjust to a market economy (Griffin 2003, Ickovitz 2003, Mearns 2004b), whereas 
others are wary of the impact of exclusive property rights on weakening insecurity in ulamjlalt property 
rights to pastoral resources, pasture use pattern and pastoral production (Sneath 2003, Upton 2005, Upton 
2008, Upton 2009). The conclusion arrived at in defining the problem as open access only leads to 
market-based land policy initiatives, which as we will see does not necessarily address the problems. 
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According to this scenario, SAP would enable Mongolia to interact with the global 
market economy with hope for potential economic growth. 
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Figure 5 .1 Dismantling pastoral production components during transition 88 
5.2.1. Privatization design 
In 1991, the Mongolian government began pursuing privatization of the pastoral 
production sector. Figure 5 .1 illustrates the process of dismantling the management of 
the three components of pastoral production. Many aspects were changed from the 
previous system. In terms of livestock, the negdel (the formal collective institution) and 
sangzzn aj ahui, (state-ovvned enterprises), privatized livestock, livestock shelters, 
storage buildings and machinery by allocating free privatization shares to their 
employees, with the exception of pastureland and water (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001, 
Fratkin, 1997, Sneath, 2003)89. These assets would be sold to someone who possessed a 
certain value in shares of privatized assets through the stock exchange system (Korsun 
88 The tem1s highlighted in bold refer to the changes in negdel period. Terms that are not highlighted 
represent continuations of the previous system, which were not changed, and remained in operation 
during the transition period. The arrows signifies the changes from old to new forms 
89 Privatization proceeded in two stages. Stage one was large-scale privatization, in which collective and 
state farms and enterprise assets were privatized. The second was small-scale privatization, in which 
livestock was privatized. Every citizen was to be allocated a set of ten privatization shares worth 
10,000mnt (three red shares, each worth l ,000mnt (in 1994, 400MNT=US1)) for small privatization and 
one blue share worth of 7,000mnt for big privatization), which were sold for a nominal fee (Korsun & 
Murrell 1995, Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001 , Nixson and Walters 2006) 
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and Murrel, 1995). The privatization of negdel and sangiin aj ahui assets triggered mass 
unemployment. Thus, the govern1nent liberalized the labour market through a 
constitutional amendment90 in 1992 and allowed all citizens of Mongolia to live and 
travel wherever they chose within the national territory. This allowed migration within 
the country without state control over the labour 1narket. 
Table 5 .1 Structure of the governance of administrative & territorial units after transition 
Constitution 
Ih Hural Parliament 
----------------------------
National government 
Local governance 
Central governance (approval & enforcement) Self-governance (formulating proposal & decision-
making) 
---------~---------------------------------------------------------------
Urban ! Rural ! Civil Representative Hural (Assembly) (CRH) 
----------+---------------------------------------------;--' ---------------------
Niis le l (Capital city) ! Aimag (province) ! Civil Representative Hural (capital/province) 
----------·---------------------------------------------+-' -------------------
Duureg ( district) ! Saum ( district) ! Civil Representative Hural ( district) 
----------· -----------------------------------+-' --------------------
Horoo (micro-district) ! Bag (micro-district) ! Public Hural (PM) (micro-district) 
I I 
Source: Environmental Challenges of Urban Development, The World Bank document, 2004 
The land and its resources, flora and fauna stays under the ard tumnii medel (public' or 
people's power or authority) with the protection of the state in a form of state 
ownership91 . After the transition, the government implemented a decentralization 
policy, the process of transferring state power over resources from the state level 
ad1ninistration to lower level political-administrative units and the territorial hierarchy, 
which became accountable for local populations (Ribot et al., 2006). The state allowed 
local-level government to inherit the state's significant legal power in managing 
com1nunal use of pastureland, but no longer the production (Mearns, 2004b ). This led to 
the state restructuring local governance with a self-governing institution (SDC, 2010). 
Reflecting historical dual control under the framework of state territorial units, these 
resources were to be regulated by combined formal govemance92 of state territorial 
administrations of a bag and soum, aimag representing central government and their 
hurals ( bag residents' meeting and soum, aimag residents' representative meeting) 
representing self-governance. Central governance was organized into three hierarchical 
units for central territorial administration: aimag93, soum and bag. At the same time, 
90 Article 6.3 Constitution, 1992 
91 Article 6.1 & 6.2, Constitution, 1992 
92 Article 59 .1 , Constitution, 1992 
93 Aimags have a population of around 75 ,000, soum around 5,000 and bags fewer than 1,000. 
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each unit was combined with a self-governing local institution, an asse1nbly called 
hural94 , which involves representatives of local herders95(Table 5 .1 ). 
Among these, soum and bag governors and hural heads of these units were directly in 
charge of regulating their level of pastoral resources. Under their respective laws, soums 
and their hural were responsible for the resolution of disputes and allocation of 
cainpsites and pasture reserves. Bag governors, with the support of its hural, are 
authorized to regulate communal use of seasonal pasture, its rehabilitation and the 
possession of pastoral resources within their jurisdictional boundary (Fernandez-
Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004, Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001, Sneath, 2003). This was in 
accordance with the law96 on territorial administration ('Law of Mongolia on 
Ad1ninistrative and Territorial Units and their Governance,' 1993), the land law97 ('Law 
of Mongolia on Land,' 1994), and the environmental law98 ('Law of Mongolia on 
Environmental Protection,' 1995) for pasture management and improvement. 
94 This Irgediin Niitiin Hural, (Civil Repres~ntative Meeting) was called "Ardijn Depytatyydiin Hural" in 
the socialist government. 
95 This is a renewed version of Ardiin Depytatyydin Hural (Public Delegate's Meeting) in socialist 
period. Hural would be led by governors for each level of territorial administration, who are nominated 
by this Hural and approved by a senior at the next-higher level. Exception is bag hural, which is not a 
formal territorial and budget entity. Bag hural is composed of herders and would have representatives 
from herders and nominate its own head. Saum hural are represented by heads of bag hurals and aimag 
hural are represented by saum governors and hural heads (Mearns 2004b ). 
96 Law of Mongolia on Administrative and Territorial Units and their Governance 1993: Article, 18.1.2 k, 
Saum hural "develop and approve integrated program for use, rehabilitation and protection of saum 
territorial land". 
Article, 29 .1.3 b, Saum governor, present a proposal of program on to saum hural and organize 
implementing the program on sustainable use .... protection of natural environment 
Article, 17. l .8 , Bag hural "discuss and present the proposal to saum hural on local cooperative, 
organization and group on a use, protection and possession of specific natural resources in their territory". 
Article 28.1.2, Bag governor organizing preparation for winter by haymaking, forage making and atar 
movement etc ... 
Article, 28.1.13, Bag governor's role on monitor on resource use management in their territory 
Article, 28.1.16, Bag governor receives local 's complaints and comments and solve it in terms of his 
duties and responsibilities and present these to relevant legal authorities and organizations. 
Article, 28.1.18, Bag governor monitor its permanent and temporary residents complying their citizen's 
duties 
97 Law of Mongolia on land 1994: Article 51.2, Saum governor in collaboration with relevant state 
institute enforce land use and management of pastureland for protection and its capacity 
Article 51.3, When using and managing pastureland, refer to traditional land use division such as winter, 
spring, summer and autumn pasture. Summer and autumn pasture and atar reserve pasture will be 
communally used within bag hot ails. 
98 Law of Mongolia on Environmental Protection 1995: Article 18.1.1, Bag Hural "develop and 
administer schedules for protection and use of hayfields, pasture and water sources no designated for 
possession or use by others", Article 18 .1.1, Bag Hural, "supervise the protection and use of natural 
resources in common use" 
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These laws stipulate that the local territorial administrations comply with the ulamjlalt 
or local resource use patterns99 . This was to a certain extent a continuation of the state 
practice of ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms for bag community access (Spoor, 
2009). At the same time, as practiced in previous systems, these sub-national 
governments still administered the territorial population's socio-political matters such as 
elections, army recruiting and population census and taxes 100 . This signifies that the 
pastoral production system was dismantled as livestock and herders (labour) were left to 
deal with the market system on their own and pastureland remained under state control, 
thus there was no longer any form of specific pastoral production institution being in 
charge of these con1ponents. 
5.2.2. Process and outcome of privatizing pastoral production components 
In the pastoral sector, the privatization process resulted in major changes, which 
ultimately re-shaped the local practices of pasture resource management. 
Livestock: Political power of various interest groups was involved in shaping the 
privatization of negdel assets, including livestock, in order to secure benefits. Pastoral 
production comprised the 1nain economic activities 101 and this was going to be an 
i1nportant safety net for many people (Mearns, 2004a, Griffin,- 2003, Sneath, 2006, 
Mearns, 2004b ). Thus, privatization of the pastoral sector became a mechanism for 
rapid economic benefits under the condition of an exhausted economy, in which it is 
difficult to provide general benefits (Nixson and Walters, 2006). Korsun and Murrel 
( 199 5 p 4 77) noted that "responding to political power of the agricultural section, the Ih 
hural102 gave the negdels control over their own privatization" thus allowing each 
collective to make its own decisions on privatization procedures at collective meetings 
(Korsun and Murrel, 1995). Consequently, the government was not totally responsible 
for controlling the process of privatization of state and collective assets, but maintained 
general records of the details of allocations (Nixson and Walters, 2006). Although the 
Union of i\gricultural Cooperatives, representing all negdels, issued guidelines for 
privatization methods to help negdels control their own process of privatization, this 
guideline was ambiguous (Korsun and Murrel, 1995, p 481). As a result, the 
99 Article 28.1.2 of Law on administrative and territorial units and their governancel993/2006 and Article 
51.3, Land law 1994 
too Amendment 2006, Law on administrative and territorial units and their governancel993/2006 
to t By 1989, pastoral production accounted for 70.1 % of the total agricultural output, which is 15.5% 
(GDP) (Griffin, p6 l) 
to2 New parliament 
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privatization process of negdels was not carried out under the same design and differed 
markedly among the negdels (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001). Thus, it is difficult to 
generalize about the direct impacts of privatization on social inequity and its 
environmental outcomes (Nixson and Walters, 2006). 
Nevertheless, there were some similarities among the privatization processes adopted 
for the negdels. In general, a negdel distributed its assets based on the principle of 
prioritizing 'those whose property had been collectivized and who were still working on 
the cooperative', in regards to their number of years in the negdel (Korsun and Murrel, 
1995, p 481 ). Moreover, remnants of cooperative assets were to be retained intact in 
order to sustain infrastructure, organization and trade services and were bought with 
larger shares by those who established newly constituted limited companies and 
horshoo 103 (Mearns, 2004a, Potanski, 1993, Nixson and Walters, 2006, Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2001, Sneath, 2006). 
The similarities in the patterns of the privatization process allow us to identify general 
social and environmental outcomes. Privatized livestock production management 
resulted in a significant decline in livestock herding mobility (Sneath, 2003, Fernandez-
Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004, Mearns, 2004a). Reduced 1nobility is related to the shift 
that occurred in the pri1nary production unit. The dismantling of negdel and state aj ahui 
led to changing the pri1nary production unit from suuri to a re-emergence of the hot ail 
(Mearns, 2004b, p 140). Unlike, suuri, hot ail is mainly composed of households who 
voluntarily camp together based on their connection through kinship and friendship 
(Sneath, 1993). The re-emergence of hot ail mainly refers to the 'individual ownership 
of livestock' (Bold, 1996, p 75) by these households, which implies individual 
production management. The reduced mobility of the hot ail had several negative social 
outcomes. 
Privatization widened the gap between wealthy and poor households. Socially, poverty 
was inherently absent in the fom1er system (Mearns, 2004a, Griffin, 2003). The 
do1ninance of the local elites who controlled the privatization process let to unequal 
distribution of privatized assets. The general distribution criteria were the number of 
household members, the herders' experience and prior status in the negdel period, as 
103 Small scale voluntary cooperatives mainly focused on trade rather than land management. Literally, 
horshoo means 'to collaborate or combine an effort ' 
111 
well as claims to negdel assets by non-men1bers from urban areas (Fernandez-Gimenez, 
2001). However, a process known as 'underground' privatization, in which a few 
former officials had control over the allocation and selection of the best assets, took 
place (Nixson and Walters, 2006). Those who used to be soum or negdel officials, and 
others, who had connections with them as well as wealth and status, had the advantage 
of profiting fro1n purchases of livestock and acquiring some of the remaining collective 
assets for establishing co-operatives or companies. In that way they maintained their 
status in controlling access to some of the best seasonal pasture and livestock shelters 
(Mearns, 2004b ). This pattern of opportunism affected those who were less 
opportunistic and who had no connections with officials. This mainly affected those 
households with 1nore than four children, the unemployed, small scale-herders in remote 
areas, female-headed households, the elderly without family support, handicapped 
people and orphans (Bruun et al., 1999). They received fewer head of livestock or 
missed out entirely on their shares under the privatization process 104 . Thus, these 
households were less able to maintain viable numbers of livestock105 , particularly when 
they sold off their already few head of livestock in order to survive under the rapid 
inflation which characterized the early 1990s (Namkhainyambuu, 2000, Mearns, 
2004a). As a result, these households lost their access to key resources, leading to less 
1nobility (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002). This gap in herders' wealth had implications for 
their 1nobility patterns. 
Labour: The collapse of state factories in urban areas and of the negdel and aj ahui in 
rural centres led to n1ajor unemployment. Following the collapse of these entities, 
control over labour markets collapsed due to the constitutional amendment of 1992. 
This led to massive urban to rural migration. Former employees had to rely mainly on 
herding as the only livelihood option. Livestock was the only capital available for 
1naking an independent living, particularly when it was privatized. Herders began to rely 
more on livestock than cash during times of higher inflation (Sneath, 2006, p 152). This 
is because of the continuation of the ulamjlalt practice of keeping livestock as 'money' 
(Latti1nore, 1962, Lattimore, 1941 ). The number of people relying on livestock herding 
increased from 135,420 (20% of the total working population) in 1989 to 414,433 in 
to4 This was quite popular among several poor and wealthier households I met during this fieldwork and 
other fieldwork as well (2005). Mainly female-headed households emphasized that they were not able to 
receive their share due to the lack of adult male labour support to go and collect their shares. 
105 The viable number fluctuates. After privatization, the viable number was 100-125 according to 
authorities in the rural areas (Namkhainyambuu, 2000). This rose to 200 head of livestock by the late 
1990s (Mearns 2004a). 
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1998, which is 50% of the total working population (Sneath, 2003p, 442). This was due 
to collective assets being claimed by former collective herders as well as former state 
employees of the soums (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001 ). Many of these migrants were 
called 'new herders'. This process also led to de-urbanization as city dwellers returned 
to pastoralism (Sneath, 2006). This migration, without specific control over regulating 
the labour aspect of pastoral production, eventually resulted in increasing numbers of 
livestock. The total number of livestock increased from 26 1nillion in 1989 to almost 34 
million by 1999 (Mearns, 2004a, p 112). 
Pasture/and: Its 1nanagement was related to the 1nanagement of the other two 
co1nponents. Although livestock numbers generally increased, poverty also was a result 
of the decline in the efficiency of pastoral production (Nixson and Walters, 2006). 
Pastoral production was dependent on the negdel 's infrastructure for mobility and water 
supplies. The negdels' technological support and service delivery for public goods 
played a significant role in supporting herders' mobility, which was important for 
accessing more pastoral resources (Mearns, 2004a). Yet, the negdel 's once integrated 
pastoral sector was atomized and de-mechanized, because of the unavailability of cheap 
fuel resources fro1n Russia (Sneath, 2006). Provisioning of oil was mainly regulated by 
the government and was always dependent on national economic conditions. The lack 
of oil supply ended the maintenance of negdel support for organized mobility, 
mechanized water, forage supplies and veterinary services (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001). 
Since a negdel could not support itself, the state decided to privatize negdel assets. In 
turn, the privatization process resulted in the collapse of the negdel 's institution of 
1nanagement of pastoral production, its support 1nechanism and marketing. During the 
'underground' privatization process, a few former officials seized control over the 
allocation and selection of the best assets such as trucks and transportation, resulting in 
the total collapse of the negdel infrastructure. 
A collapse of this infrastructure also occurred in the management of water resources. 
The state retained responsibility over all water resources, but no-one was specifically 
responsible for water resources such as engineering wells. This led to individuals 
looting the main parts or the wooden covering of the engineering wells and selling them 
for cash 106 . Thus, 1nany wells, which had been capable of providing abundant amounts 
106 This led to a so-called ' iron rush' , in which the Chinese were paying a higher market price for iron 
following their industrial development. 
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of water and access to expansive pasture, broke down (Sneath, 2003, Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2001 ). Eighty percent of the usable engineering wells and 
approximatelyl 5,000 usable hand wells became unusable between 1990-2000 (Tanaka 
et al 2005 cited in Sternberg, 2008). Thus, the lack of mechanical support for pastoral 
production resulted in the depletion of pastoral resources. Herders were no longer able 
to gain access to the once-available pastoral resources surrounding these wells within 
their bag jurisdictional boundary. The absence of a formal institution for monitoring 
pastoral production units and their use of pastureland led to a reduction of pastoral 
resources and a decline in pastoral production. 
Pasture/and tenure: The decentralization process failed to improve local pasture 
management. According to Mearns (2004b ), the process was incomplete in terms of 
delivering legal and fiscal power107 down to the local government level. A complete 
transfer of power did not occur due to the emergence of contested power among state 
agencies and the corrupt process of electing local officials (Mearns, 2004b ). These 
problems mainly emerged due to lack of an integrated legal mechanism to regulate 
pastureland management. 
At the central level, a major restructuring of all agencies led to -contested authority in 
controlling CPR. The Ministry of Food Agriculture (MFA) was formerly responsible for 
issues relating to agricultural land and pastoral production management. Fallowing the 
de-coupling of production co1nponents, now, the state assigned the responsibility for 
land issues along with other natural resources to the Ministry of Nature and 
Environment's (MNE) jurisdiction in order to conform to a more 'western notion of 
environmental management'. The 1ninistry acts in accordance with several different 
environmental protection laws (Mearns, 2004b, p 142). No separate law was 
pron1ulgated on pastureland. The MF A attempted to recapture its former influence over 
pastureland management through the unsuccessful drafting of a separate law on 
pastureland (Mearns, 2004b )108 . This is because, under the constitutional provision for 
state protection of livestock security, the MF A is still responsible for pastoral 
production management, organizing preparation for dzud emergencies, hay supplies, 
107 Power in this thesis refers to "the capacity of some actors to affect the practices and ideas of others" 
(Weber 1978 and Luke 1986 cited in Ribot and Peluso, 2003, p 156) 
108 The ministry and other donor agencies are currently actively attempting to pass the revised drafts. 
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disease control and winter preparation in rural areas. Thus, two different ministries were 
now involved in pastoral production issues, with two different purposes. 
At the local level, the soum territorial administration exercised a largely corrupt 
administrative process to gain benefits from the control of pastureland 109. The soum 
represented the central government and the different ministries assigned power to the 
soum to enforce their policies. In other words, it still played a significant role, inheriting 
the authority previously exercised by negdel in regulating pastureland management. 
However, mainly former soum or negdel bureaucrats were re-worked as soum or bag 
governors, and they exploited this authority over regulating pastureland management 
(Mearns, 2004b ). The opportunity to exploit their authority is mainly related to the fact 
that the local administration was absent or was ineffective in addressing local 
pastureland issues (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001 ). According to the law, local bag 
administration regulates bag members' use of bag pastureland following ulamjlalt 
pasture use rules and norms. However, the herders were now in control of the 
production and its risk management following the privatization of livestock (Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2002). Consequently, the herders made decisions themselves on the use of 
pastureland. Thus, soum and bag allowed herders to select their own seasonal nutag or 
cainpsites within their own jurisdictional boundaries as long -as the herders were 
residents of that jurisdiction (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002). 
Less control over herders' land use by soum and bag led many so-called 'new herders' 
(from migration) to claim their uvug deedsees ulamjilj irsen nutag (ancestral grazing 
area). In addition, they stayed close by their relatives or friends in order to gain access 
to campsites and pasture. Increasing numbers of herders beca1ne concentrated in smaller 
areas, selecting their nutag (grazing areas) near larger settlements with market access 
and with the best water and pasture resources (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001, Mearns, 
2004a). In the absence of negdel support, camping closer to a large settlement was an 
effective strategy for herders to reduce ·transaction costs for marketing livestock 
products and other goods (Griffin, 2003, Sneath, 2006). Thus, access to these 
convenient pastoral resources become highly competitive among herders. The 
concentration of herding households on the rapidly-depleting seasonal pastures within 
109 This is because the influence of the local administration is reducing as they have less to control over 
the production. Under socialism, the local administrations used to collect all the taxes and fees and 
receive a bigger budget from the state, if their annual budget was deficient. 
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their bag jurisdictional boundary often led to disputes over pasture use and overgrazing. 
Local officials often turned a blind eye to disputes among herders with lower status, less 
wealth or background. They often favored those whose relationships they could benefit 
from, in terms of maintaining access to better pastoral resources. This was particularly 
apparent in one case of cross-territorial access to pastoral resources, in which visiting 
herders needed a substantial connection to locals in the host area (Mearns, 2004b ). 
The competition over access to pastoral resources led to pasture degradation near the 
larger settlement areas (Mearns, 2004a, Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001, Griffin, 2003, 
Sneath, 2006). Sneath (2003) explained that preferring to camp closer to a larger 
settlement can be attributed to the e1nerging pattern of seasonal herding, to 1naintain 
access to pastoral resources. Mostly the new herders stayed near areas with public 
services during the summer and withdrew from herding during winter, leaving their 
livestock with full-time herder relatives in the country. Also, herders overstayed their 
time on the seasonal pasture for fear of losing it to others. This indicates insecurity over 
property rights (Sneath, 2003). These strategies were common particularly among new 
herders, because they had less ecological awareness, little social support and unequal 
asset holdings and appeared to have abandoned the old ulamjlalt norms that regulated 
the use of pasture (Mearns, 2004a, Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004, Nixson 
and Walters, 2006). These strategies led to reduced mobility and a certain degree of 
sedentary pastoralism (Sneath, 2006, Griffin, 2003). Reduced mobility led to increasing 
pressures on the small grazing area, a condition from which pastures cannot recover 
(Ickowitz, 2003, Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001, Lattimore, 1941, Lattimore, 1962). 
However, the pressure from overgrazing was not necessarily 'uniform' on all 
pastureland as herding households' concentration on grazing land often changed under 
climatic conditions, and the availability of water, transport and labour resources 
(Griffin, 2003, p 65). 
5.2.3. Defining the problem of pastureland management 
Privatization along with decentralization caused a dilemma in pastureland management, 
increasing pressure on pastureland and increasing disputes over pastoral resources 
(Mearns, 2004a, Mearns, 2004b ). A majority of the scholars in this field have defined 
the problem as open access to' pastoral resources (Griffin, 2003, Ickowitz, 2003, 
Mearns, 2004b ). The increasing numbers of households and livestock depending on 
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fewer pastoral resources reduced the herders' mobility and led to overgrazing (Mearns, 
2004b, Griffin, 2003, Ickowitz, 2003). However, the problem was not primarily due to 
the increase in livestock or numbers of households. Overgrazing was also a matter of 
uneven distribution of herding households and livestock populations (Fratkin, 1997). 
Griffin (2003) argued that "overgrazing has nothing to do with herd size exceeding the 
'carrying capacity of the land' in general, it is a response to specific economic 
incentives and institutional weakness" (Griffin, 2003, p 65). In other words, at the heart 
of the problem is the loss of the pastoral institutions that regulated pastureland use. 
Thus, several authors 110 concluded that open access emerged due to the failure of 
overlapping of state and communal property regimes (Mearns, 2004a, Griffin, 2003). 
The concept of regime overlap is rooted in the historical pattern of dual control over 
production. The state managed production with an integrated formal enforcement 
regime regulated by informal communal co-ordination norms; this arrangement is 
inherent in ulamjlalt practices of seasonal and rotational pastureland use (Mearns, 
2004b, Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001). Thus, these scholars consider that privatization 
resulted in shifting this dual control over production which resulted in overlapping state 
legal and herders' informal institutions over land. Thus, the question that needs to be 
addressed is how this overlapping control failed and led to open access to pastoral 
resources. 
The first question here is whether the failure of informal control rested with the bag 
level community herders, who failed to comply with ulamjlalt rules and norms. As 
discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2), the community institution failed to cope 
with socio econo1nic and political transition and protect its social capital (McCay and 
J entoft, 1998). According to the CPR theorists, it is related to increasing heterogeneity 
which " ... should lead to increasingly different interests among herders and a breakdown 
in the ability to self-regulate pasture use" (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001, p 53). In 
Mongolia, herders still follow ulamjlalt norms in using pasture as these are inherent in 
110 Open access in Mongolia is also defined as: "No one in Mongolia owns the vast grassland of the 
steppe: no one regulates the use of land. Anyone may graze their livestock on this common land and 
everyone is free to graze as many animals as they wish" (Griffin, 2003, p 67). This implies an absence of 
both state and communal control, constituting an open-access ' institutional vacuum' (Mearns, 2004b, p 
146) which can be interpreted as Hardin's absence of property rights. This type of open access is often 
criticized for overlooking local rules and nonns under communal management (Feeny, Eerkes et al. 
(1990). However, local rules and norms in Mongolia are also seen as 'traditional open-access property 
rights' , which would lead to a 'Tragedy of the Commons' under an incentive oriented market system 
(Ickowitz2003, p97). As described in Hardin's metaphor, these two positions portray the outcome of an 
absolute absence of property institutions. 
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pursuing pastoral production under the mainly non-equilibrium climatic conditions 
(Sneath, 2003, Ickowitz, 2003, Fernandez-Gimenez and Allen-Diaz, 1999). 
However, the herding community at the bag level experienced heterogeneity in wealth 
(herd size) and herding background as a result of the increase in the number of 
households and livestock (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001, Griffin, 2003, Mearns, 2004a). 
Those who define Mongolia as 'open access' often argue that this rising heterogeneity 
within a herding community has led to a "weakening in the observance of customary 
norms surrounding pasture use" (Mearns, 2004a, p 116) . However, Fernandez-Gimenez 
(2001) argued that herders' pasture use patterns remain homogenous in terms of their 
adherence to the norms of 1nobility. The herders' mobility and flexibility have been 
obstructed, not necessarily by the emerging heterogeneity, but mainly the lack of 
mobility of resources such as labour, transportation and livestock (Fernandez-Gimenez, 
2001, p 63). Thus the absence of support for herders' mobility has led to not necessarily 
weakening of informal practices, but reduced mobility. This implies that informal 
control of pastoral production and pastureland management still existed up until right 
after the transition. Thus, it is debatable whether the collapse of the negdel institution 
led to the com1nunity heterogeneity in pursuing seasonal mobility or rotational 
1novement. 
A second question is whether or not state legal control is effective in regulating herders' 
access to pastoral resources. In Mongolia, open-access arguably prevailed due to the 
absence of a formal institution that regulated pastoral resources (Griffin, 2003, Mearns, 
2004b ). This is because the i1nposed de-centralization process failed to replace the local 
formal pastoral institution with local administration. Local administration appears 
ineffective in that it is controlling land use only. The state is no longer able to arrange 
inter and intra-bag soum and aimag level mobility among the different levels of local 
territorial administration (Mearns, 2004b, Griffin, 2003). The power of soums and bags 
has also been restricted by the enforcement · of laws 111 intended to reduce the incidence 
of free-riding or trespassing (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001, Griffin, 2003). However, this 
legislation did not necessarily equip the local administrations with an adequate tool (nor 
capacity) for resolving the disputes regarding seasonal use patterns, allocating reserve 
l tl At this stage, the land law essentially articulated the responsibility of the local administration for 
replacing the collective institution, but only for land management. Campsite possession has been effective 
since 1998, thus, its impact is not clear at this stage. 
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pasture, or individual and communal pasture (Tumenbayar, 2000, Fernandez-Gimenez 
and Batbuyan, 2004, Griffin, 2003). This is because these laws, particularly the land 
law, were primarily conservation-oriented, focusing rather on natural resource 
protection than being production-oriented as it used to be in the collective time (Mearns, 
2004b, p 142). This implies that formal state control is absent in terms of regulating 
pastoral production and is ineffective in land management. Thus, some forms of 
sanctions deriving from informal community control regulating access to pastoral 
resources are still operating, even if they do not arise from the state based actors. 
5.3. Privatization of pastoral production in the HBU case area 
The HBU case illustrates how the privatization process affected negdel and otriin aj 
ahui and de1nonstrates implications of this process for environmental outcomes in three 
bags. The findings from this section will illustrate: a) how and why the local 
administration struggles to regulate herders' access to pastoral resources; and b) the 
ways in which herders, not only in former negdel areas but former HBU aj ahui as well, 
adjust their access to resources and their mobility even within the failed state legal 
environ1nent to regulate their access to pastureland. As elsewhere, the process of 
dismantling occurred in a similar fashion among the negdels and otriin aj ahui. 
5.3.1. Livestock 
The state privatization of the livestock component without concern for distributional 
justice also led to disparities in wealth among herders in all three bags, but with some 
differences. In a top-down privatization process, herders had less control over selection, 
but accepted what was allocated to them based on the size of their household, negdel 
membership status and type of animal each member herded during the collective period. 
In terms of negdels, 'Bayanbadral' (current Delgerhaan soum) and 'Shine Amidral' 
( current Bayanj argal soum) controlled their own privatization process, because they 
distributed their communalized assets back to their 1nembers. However, the distribution 
process was based more on current negdel membership than on the herders' initial 
contribution to negdels as members. Herders had held conflicting ideas about negdel 
membership, because the distribution process based on membership was less than fair. 
This was because, first, negdels excluded those who had been members of a negdel at 
the early stage of its establishment by communalizing their private livestock (Nixson 
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and Walters, 2006). For instance, a former negdel member, who became a city dweller 
later due to this state assignment, stated that "I thought I was supposed to get assets 
from a collective privatization .... But at the time, the law was privatizing collective 
assets for current herders ... " (Interview 18). In contrast, those who became members of 
a collective later in the 1960s after completing professional school in Ulaanbaatar 
received an allocation of shares regardless of their contribution to the starting-up of the 
negdel (Interview 11 ). Thus, it was necessary to maintain their membership in a negdel 
by the time it collapsed. Second, those who were given shares did not receive as many 
livestock as they had contributed at the beginning of collectivization in the 1950s. This 
indicates that the negdels were inconsistent in their distributional arrangements, leading 
to unequal allocation of negdel assets. 
In the case of HBU aj ahui, distributional justice was poorly maintained compared to 
that of the negdels due to its institutional difference from negdels. First, unlike negdels, 
all aj ahui assets belonged to the state, because the state established and managed it with 
its credit funding. The ministry appeared to allocate shares for small privatization, 
which was worth 3,000mnt, to its employees 112 , because it privatized only three fourths 
of its 14,000 livestock (Interview 4 ). Number of livestock each employee was able to 
buy with their small amount of share was much smaller than for collective members, 
who received all ten set of shares. Secondly, in constrast to members of the collective, 
employees did not receive an equitable allocation of shares as the allocation was not 
based on the number of family members, but per household. For instance, a family with 
7-8 members was allocated 10 sheep and one cow or per household was given 10-16 
small livestock (Interview 11 & 12). 
Third, aj ahui workers were disadvantaged by the ambiguity in the privatization 
arrange1nent. Although an employee may have been a herder, some were told to claim 
their shares not from the aj ahui, but from their former collectives, where they used to 
be members. This resulted in the pursuit of an alternative strategy113 to benefit from 
112 The state was not privatizing HBU aj ahui assets to its employees. However, the former aj ahui 
employees argued that they would be unemployed and disadvantaged due to the collapse of otriin aj ahui 
without receiving any privatized assets (Interview 11& 12). The state decided to pursue privatization of 
otriin aj ahui, but only to a limited extent. The government assigned the MF A to directly control both the 
design and process of HBU aj ahui privatization. The vice minister led the privatization push. It aimed to 
retain most of the assets in order to maintain its function as state enterprise under joint companies or 
horshoo (p 8). 
113 Strategy here refers to "a plan, method, or series of manoeuvres or stratagems for obtaining a specific 
goal or result" http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/strategy 
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privatization. For instance, by personal arrangement, one participant's parents, who 
were members of other collectives at the same time, included their children, who were 
aj ahui employees, in their family members to claim a few livestock, regardless of the 
children's work and locality (Interview 13). These patterns led to an unequal 
distribution of livestock assets among aj ahui employees in comparison to negdel 
members. 
Although differing in the amount of shares allocated for privatization of assets, the 
privatization process of these two entities resulted in a similar outcome, that is, the 
unequal distribution of pastoral assets. Households in both DD and UU had a herd size 
which was viable to begin herding, as the negdel had distributed all its livestock among 
all its 1nembers, regardless of their herding background. In contrast, very few 
households managed to build up a viable herd size in HBU bag. The difference in herd 
size between different bags indicates that not all herding households owned large 
numbers of livestock. 
Both negdels and aj ahui also privatized livestock shelters. Besides the criteria 
discussed above for distribution of livestock, this distribution followed patterns that 
were based on the different localized contexts of livestock production in the three bags. 
The first pattern was based on the type of livestock negdel members or aj ahui 
employees had herded before the privatization. Those who herded horses were less able 
to clai1n livestock shelters compared to those who herded small livestock which 
required shelters. This indicates that a herder's experience and background as a negdel 
or aj ahui herder shaped his access to privatization assets. A second pattern depended 
on the difference in the terrain of the bags. UU winter shelters were on UU hill away 
from HBU RP A (see Chapter 4). Thus, UU herders were able to obtain both winter and 
spring shelters (Interview 45). In contrast, herders in HBU and DD bags were only able 
to purchase spring shelters, because HBU and DD bags 114 had their winter camping area 
in the HBU Mountain, in which all shelters belonged to the aj ahui. Thus, the difference 
in terrain shaped the production management of the different bags. A third pattern was 
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'Hurzun horoo' was more popular as DD used the mountain for winter camping 114 . The only shelters 
available were eight milk farm winter shelters or those built by HBU RP A in DD territory. The latter were 
supposed to be given to Delgerhaan, which is to say, DD. However, it appeared that the local people did 
not receive any of these 114 . 'HBU [bag] got all of those shelters and ruined them' (Interview 29). The 
fonner, the milk farming shelters, were divided and allocated among several individual households, who 
were mostly relatives 114 . "There used to be eight big winter shelters. So, we divided these shelters among 
us four, between me and my sister" (Interview 34). In this way, only a few were able to get what they had 
had in the collective time. 
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based on differences in the entities themselves. Unlike negdels, HBU aj ahui employees 
were not able to obtain winter shelters, which were state property. The ministry 
privatized spring shelters (which were used only by local herders) to only a few of the 
employees 115 . These patterns of privatization of livestock shelters had further 
implications for herders' selection of their nutag, grazing areas as well as further 
implications for increasing disputes over future use of winter campsites in the HBU 
Mountain. 
5.3.2. Labour 
Three bags also witnessed large migration movements, but experienced different trends 
due to the differences in the privatization of negdel and aj ahui. Since negdel members 
received a viable number of livestock for herding, they were able to become herders. As 
a result, in DD and UU bags, there were increasing numbers of migrants from the urban 
to rural areas. This trend later ceased as many new migrant herders left the area, because 
of the dzud in 2000. Former negdel herders in DD and UU described this time: 
... Since 2000 dzud, households all left and moved away. Before that there were 
many of them around here ... It was perhaps many of them lost their livestock 
and 1noved away to the city" (Interview 49). 
... Well, in 1990s, the number of household was many more than this time. Then, 
people moved elsewhere for school and other purposes ... When pasture is not 
good anymore people are likely to leave this place" (Interview 29). 
Thus, the number of DD and UU herders reduced dramatically. In addition, numbers of 
the current herding households in these bags had not necessarily increased from 
migration by the beginning of 2000 116 . With no major migration movement since 2000, 
Table 5.2 Migration status of each bags herders 
Three bags Migration trend by % 
1958-1990 1991-1994 1995-1999 2000~ 
HBU bag (n=40) 40 18 18 25 
DD bag (n=23) 95 0 0 4 
UU bag (n=34) 100 0 0 0 
115 Spring shelter was worth 21,000mnt.' The employees were unable to afford this with the small amount 
of shares they were allocated 115 . The enterprise reduced the price to 3,000mnt and privatized only those 
few spring shelters to those who used to herd for the aj ahui (Interview 13). 
l L
6 1990-2000 migration data in these bags and soums were unavailable at the local soum administration. 
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it is possible to look at the current herders' background in order to ascertain their 
migration status. Table 5 .2 shows that almost all of the participants from DD and UU 
bags were born in these bags. They were f onner negdel herders in these areas or their 
offspring, all of whom had lived in these bags before 1990. 
In contrast, majority of the participants from the HBU bag came from elsewhere. Since 
1990, migration slowly increased the number of households in HBU bag. This occurred 
because the collapse of aj ahui led to de-urbanization of the HBU horoo due to the aj 
ahui employees' inability to pursue herding with the less viable numbers of livestock117 . 
As was common elsewhere in Mongolia118 , they mainly consumed the few head of 
livestock they had received from the privatization exercise or had sold them to buy 
food. They also unpacked and sold livestock shelters and storage buildings and other 
machinery for cash. They returned to where they had come from prior to the enterprise 
or joined their relatives elsewhere or in urban areas 119. The number of households in 
HBU bag fell from 270 to fewer than 100 following privatization (Interview 3 & 23). 
Very few 120 in the HBU bag who worked for the aj ahui managed to build a viable herd 
size by purchasing stock from others and stayed in herding as they had nowhere else to 
go. These were mainly people who had lived nearby the HBU Mountain at the time of 
the establishment of the aj ahui. Table 5 .2 shows that fewer than-half of the HBU bag 
participants and their offspring had been living in HBU RP A before the 1990s. In other 
words, most of those who migrated out had arrived in HBU bag during the aj ahui, 
whereas those who stayed behind had come mainly from HBU area prior to the aj ahui 
establishment. This de-urbanization in HBU bag attracted 1nore incoming migration. 
L t
7 Most of them received fewer than 100 livestock, which herders in HBU bag considered insufficient to 
make a living. This is because, as one remaining herder in HBU bag explained, "If you had 15 small 
livestock, 7-8 of them would give birth to babies each year for 10 years and it would make up to 70 
livestock. This was not really enough, especially if you consume some of these for food every year. What 
you keep as an asset was not so much" (Interview 11 ). In other words, the number of livestock HBU aj 
ahui employees received was much lower than the nationally-recognized average minimum viable herd 
number (p 9, chapter 5). In addition, the unequal distribution among the HBU aj ahui employees 
contributed to their inability to create viable herd sizes Thus, most employees were unable to make a 
living out of herding in HBU bag and gradually left HBU bag. 
t i s Namkhainyambuu (2000, pl9) also wrote that herders in Zavkhan aimag in the western part of 
Mongolia had to slaughter these for food if they had fewer than 75 head of livestock, thus they were 
unable to increase numbers of livestock for viable herding. 
ll
9 There is a large suburb full of former HBU bag migrants in Baganuur city, 80km away from HBU 
bag. They began migrating to bigger cities like Ulaanbaatar and Baganuur in the mid-1990s. 
120 These people essentially remained herders for the new companies' livestock. Herding for the company 
was beneficial for increasing their own small numbers of livestock. As they were herding 252 head of 
sheep or cattle and breeding them, 70% of these herders were able to keep the remaining 30% of the 
livestock as a bonus. After the company collapsed, they began herding privately (Interview 13). 
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Second, the constitutional provision of freedom to live anywhere triggered migration 
and became a useful mechanism for herders to gain access to better pastoral resources 
under unstable climatic conditions. After the 1990s, only a few individual households 
arrived in HBU bag as they had obtained viable numbers of stock for their herds and 
these migrants did not have any connection with the HBU bag residents who remained. 
Following these 1nigrations, the HBU bag population increased particularly after the 
2000 dzud121 due to HBU bag's proximity to market and pastoral resources. One herder 
who had remained in HBU bag after the privatization described the increase as follows: 
"There were only a few HBU [ bag] households; not like these many households from 
all western aimags such as Govi-Altai and Zavhan etc" (Interview 12). A former negdel 
herder in DD, who live in the nearby HBU bag boundary, shared a similar observation 
"There are very few of them native to the area .. .In HBU [bag], not so many of them are 
local; perhaps around 15 of them could be local. Others are all from outside (Interview 
26). As Table 5 .2 showed, more than half of the HBU bag participants had migrated 
from elsewhere since 1990. Thus, the initial migration trend in all three bags was related 
to a factor of one's birth place, which becomes a relational mechanis1n for migrant 
herders to gain access to pastureland in former negdel areas. In other words, in former 
negdel areas, 1nigrants arrived because they had been born there. In HBU bag, migrants 
left the area, because they were born elsewhere. Later, this factor of place of birth 
changed, and negotiation with local officials to obtain access to pastureland became 
paramount, particularly in HBU bag. Thus, the mechanism for gaining access to 
pastoral resources differed between former negdel and aj ahui areas. This difference had 
crucial implications in the future with regard to the heterogeneity of bag membership 
and the role of informal and formal control over access to the pastureland. 
5.3.3. Pastureland 
The collapse of the negdel and aj ahui also led to a depletion of pastoral resources 
reducing ecologically preferable grazing land. This deterioration in both quantity and 
quality of pasture resources needs to be discussed as a major factor in the changes in the 
herders pasture use patterns. In the HBU case, the depletion also occurred due to the 
121 The period 1999-2003 saw much migration from the western to the central area due to the loss of 
livestock in dzuds (Sneath, 2003, Batbayar 2007). Livestock insurance is no longer compulsory after 
1991 , but voluntary includes loss of livestock to wolves (Templer, Swift et al.1993). After the dzud, rural 
migrant herders from other parts of Mongolia, particularly from western aimags, looked for abundant 
pastoral resources, which were closer to urban markets during 1995-2000 (Meanrs a 2004, Solongo, A 
2007). 
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failed infrastn1cture of transportation, livestock shelter and engineering wells of both 
negdel and aj ahui which had helped to maintain access to pasture land 122 . The state 
considered otor as necessary for herders' production even in the transition period. Thus, 
the state did not privatize the RP A winter livestock shelters and wells in the mountain 
for future use of the RP A, regardless of the collapse of the aj ahui. Since herders were 
now responsible for their own production management within their jurisdiction, the 
ministry transferred the 1nanagement responsibility of these assets to soum 
ad1ninistrations, which used to visit HBU RP A on otor in the negdel period. The idea 
was that these visiting territorial administrations should maintain the otor service with 
the collaboration of the HBU bag local territorial administration (Interview 11) 
following the arrangement they followed in the collective period 123 . 
_:._n ... _. __ 
' ... 
·. ~,;r-•;;- :·. ·t--·-:..~-::. 
'- . ;•., .l'~·• ;i,; 1:-J •. ~, 
' ' L~X. rJ·~~,1 ,, ~ ' ..... ~ ~-,:--~ 
.. ' - - ,_ ' 
-: -~ ,, ' .'~ /_.-_ .. --.-- .. _ .. ·- . .__ ·: _·· '. : --:- ' 'W:~~ ~-~: .  
~
- ( ··-- · ;_~ ( c ·_· --. --- : - -~, .. -:-·-~ --J~·_·-:__::;~ ":....-· ~ - ~ -- :-::-~ ....._ -_-•:~ _- - ~:-
...: ·- - . - ... .. -- - ' -~-,....___ J ~- '7'-~ - - -~ 
....... ..,,__ ' ' - . --·, ........ ...... ' ..,,.._---::._ . ~ 
_... ~ ...:::-- ... .. -- -.. ----:-- ______ ...,.:--- . ---=-=----- --
.. ·-·· ..... - - " .......... ~~- -· ::- •. -•- 'l' ~---1;. ,.. -,...:~ 
... ;r,, - ' ............ .,. -- . ...___ • _!__ . - , ---..,;,;._ -~  ' ___ ,.,.. 
' ~ ~'-~..... ------- -......,;::::,--~-x..-..... ...,..~-... -, 
.,, .. ~ -: .. --. • - _...__ - .:. . ., . . ~~--:-=---•-•W't •·••~••"-•-jO,.,,fllf\'t.~""'-"""" 
- - ... -----
Photo 5 .1: Storage houses from the HBU RP A, half looted and used by other individual households 
However, the 1ninistry failed to transfer responsibility for maintaining otor assets to 
different soum administrations (Photo 5 .1 ). The main reason for this was the lack of an 
122 Under the 'underground' privatization process, local administrations lost the capacity to take care of 
these state-owned assets. Individual's captured and looted these negdel and aj ahui owned assets. As a 
result, many wells broke down in DD and UU bag. In HBU bag, this free right to capture assets occurred 
widely, destroying all aj ahui owned winter shelters and engineering wells. 
123 For instance, Dundgovi 'aimag ' would be responsible for maintaining shelters and wells in a valley 
which they used to use in the negdel period. The same idea was also applied to soums surrounding HBU 
bag. These soum administrations were supposed to be responsible for all winter shelters, storage houses 
and wells established in their territory by the ministry during the aj ahui period. For instance, Delgerhaan 
soum would be responsible for all the assets established by the ministry in their territory (Interview 39). 
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arrangement that suited the existing conditions. Right after the privatization, it was 
nearly impossible for officials and herders from other soums to travel this far to take 
care of or to go on otor to use these assets without the necessary transportation. Most 
negdels privatized all their transportation arrangements and assets to individuals. The 
surrounding soums reported that they had privatized these otor assets to their herders. In 
fact, herders in HBU and DD bags claimed that many of these shelters and storage 
houses along with the wells were essentially ruined. Within a few months of 
privatization, those who could afford to came from other soumsJ unpacked these shelters 
and looted the i1nportant parts of the engineering wells (Interview 11 ). Thus, in the 
transition period, the depletion of resources occurred not necessarily due to a historical 
pattern of change in the boundaries of territorial units, but was mainly due to the 
collapse of the negdel and aj ahui infrastructure. 
Table 5.3 Change in the territorial administrative and production management units in three bags 
Three bags I Collective period : Transition period 
-i ~~~it~~i~i --------------:- -P~~-ci~-~t-i~-~ -~~-it---T i~~-~it~-;i~f ----------: -T~~~-;;iii~g~-------
administrative unit : : administrative unit : centre 
I I 
HBU HBU horoo : HBU aj ahui : HBU bag, : HBU village-bag 
: : Delgerhaan soum : centre 
I I I 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _,_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -:. - - - - - .J - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DD Delgerhaan soum DD Brigade, : DD bag, Delgerhaan : Bag centre 
'Bayanbadral' : soum 
: negdel : : 
uu -B-~y~~ a~g~(i~ -;;;{~ -----:- -Bay~~~~htii --------_:_ UU _b;g,---------------: -B~i ;~~t~~- ---------
: brigade, Shine : Bayanjargalan soum : 
: Amidral' negdel j _ _ _ _____ : 
5.3.4. Pastureland tenure 
Depleting pastoral resources in the presence of increasing numbers of households led to 
changes in pasture use and management in all three bags and soum levels. Dergerlhaan 
and Bayanjargal soum administrations and their Hural, was given authority124 over the 
management of pastoral resources by adopting ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms as 
it was done in the negdel period. In the HBU bag, the former HBU horoo territory 
became HBU bag, l st bag of Delgerhaan soum 125 , Hentii aimag as shown in Table 5.3. 
The former horoo 126 centre became the bag and village centre, in line with its former 
124 In accordance with the laws on administrative and territorial units and the law on land 
tr ) There are four bags; HBU, DD, Avarga and soum centre bag. 
t
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'Horoo' is an urban settlement equivalent of 'soum'. HBU bag's collective time administrative status, 
because it had more than 500 households. 
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settlement status with more than 500 residents 127 . In other words, the former horoo 
became a 'village' 128 on a bag territory, which is under the jurisdiction of the 
Delgerhaan soum administration. Both village and bag were governed by the saine 
administration. Overall, in all three areas, bag governors along with their hurals 
enforced their soum government and soum hural Js decisions and enforced the herders' 
pursuit of seasonal 1nobility and long/short distance cross-boundary mobility under the 
authority of the soum administration. At the same time, the ministry transferred 
responsibility for managing incoming otor households to the HBU bag and village 
government. Thus, the HBU bag/village inherited the authority over the former HBU 
horoo and its seasonal pasture and the reserve pasture area. However, as elsewhere, the 
inability of local soum and bag administration to control the herders' access to pastoral 
resources resulted in the concentration of herding households in smaller pasture areas 
around the village centre. This was due to two factors, which the bag and soum officials 
were unable to control: 1nigration (labour) and production (livestock) management. 
The soum and bag governors were powerless to control migration 129, because, first, 
according to the law, migrants registered at the inter-aimag level only for residency, but 
not for employment. Once registered, the lower level soum and bag administrations had 
to accept them as residents. They claimed that their action to control migration was 
illegal and may even get into trouble by infringing someone's constitutional rights to 
live in the place of their choice. Herders' migration was influenced strongly by the 
relationship between unstable weather conditions and pastoral resources. For instance, 
dzud in 2000 led to an opposite direction of migration to former negdel and aj ahui 
areas. 
Migration can be seen as a 1nechanism that mutually benefits HBU bag/village 
administration and visiting herders, in controlling and maintaining their access to 
pastoral resources. A HBU bag/village governor enjoys as much power as a Delgerhaan 
soum governor on HBU bag territory. The governor administers the state budget 
127 This was because the law on territorial and administrative units articulated that the rural territory of 
Mongolia will be divided into the hierarchical administrative units of bag, soum and aimag and allowed 
village or town centre on these rural territories. Provision 1, Article 3 in the law on administrative and 
territorial units and their governance, 2006. 
128 Provision 1, Article 5 in the law on town and village administration, 1993. 
129 In 1990s, Delgerhaan soum administ'ration made an effort to control migration as it did in the negdel 
period. For instance, the soum administration monitored migrants' permission of movement and 
employment and fined those who came without any official transfer of residency (XN46, DNo, 
XHNo125, ArdiinHuralExecutive Administration, HBU Horoo , MFA, Hentii Aimag Archive) 
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allocated for village administration. Controlling the state budget independent of the 
soum administration is a crucial factor in controlling access to pastoral resources 130 . A 
reduction in the number of residents would have threatened the status of the HBU 
village 131 and responsibility for otor management would have been lost. In other words, 
HBU bag officials would have lost control over the village budget and consequently 
would have lost control over the herders' access to reserve pastures. Thus, the HBU bag 
officials favoured incoming migrants from outside to increase its population. At the 
same tin1e, as elsewhere, bag officials' were unable to control the land use of the 
increasing number of herders, because herders were the ones who controlled the 
production. Herders, particularly local herders, then had much more control over access 
to pastoral resources than the local administration. Thus, bag officials allowed the 
herders to retain control over: a) selecting their nu tag ( seasonal pastures); b) deciding 
when and where to move seasonally; and c) gaining access to reserve pasture. 
Control over selection of nutag: Nevertheless, bag officials' inability to control 
herders' land use did not necessarily lead to a condition of open access. The land law 
( 1994) allowed individual households to possess residential plots 132 . This section 
discusses how herders' selected their campsites prior to 1998 in the period before the 
1994 law was enforced. In all three bags, herders limited their seasonal camping strictly 
within their own bag territory. The selection pattern was different in the former negdel 
and aj ahui area due to differences in migration trends, which resulted from the 
difference in privatization of the livestock. Herders in all three bags have equal 
opportunity to access pastoral resources through their residency, but differences in herd 
size shaped their access to pastoral resources. In each bag, selection pattern was 
controlled by several factors related to herder production. First, in former negdel areas 
13
° Controlling herders' access to pasture land is a significant role for local officials, one which maintains 
their authority over the pastoral resources. The influence of the local administration is reducing as they 
have less to control. Under socialism, the aimag used to collect all the taxes and fees and receive a bigger 
budget from the state, if their annual budget was deficient. Thus, aimag and aimag capitals as a city used 
to be rich and powerful. However, now, the new law on turiin udirdlaga and sanhuujilt (state governance 
and finance) 2002 centralized the entire state budget from taxation, thus local aimag and soum levels had 
less financial power and less to benefit from its governance. The aimag and soum only collect fees, but 
not taxes; that is why some aimag administrations, for instance, in the Gobi, have become rich from the 
fees from mining. So, areas, in which there is no mining do not receive sufficient in their budgets to be 
powerful, because they only collect fees such as for logging and their annual budget does not enable them 
to become powerful. The idea of centralizing state taxation is to make things all accountable and clear 
that any tender or business measurement would pass by the ministry and ministry would organize the 
funding and budget. However, the problem is that it gives less power to the local administration such as 
sown and aimag. Second, they no longer' control herders' production, but only pastureland. 
131 According to the law regulating towns and villages, the settlement status of a village requires it to be 
populated by at least 500 residents. 
132 Article 3 0 .1 the Law on land, 1994 
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Map 5 .1 Territory of the three bags after 1992 
like DD and UU bags, the main factor was migrant connections to local herders. Former 
negdel herders or local herders, particularly wealthy ones had much more claim over 
1.,3 key .) pasture than new herders. New herders' selected nutag where locals had found 
the best pastoral resources, because their access to pastoral resources was mainly 
dependent on their connection to the local herders. New migrant herders without a local 
connection also stayed close to locals following good pasture. This pattern of nutag 
selection resulted in the concentration of herding households in the Herlen river valley 
in DD and UU bags (Map 5.1). 
133 In terms of selection of nu tag, the primary season was spring pasture for herders' production in all 
three bags. Herders were keen to establish, first, their spring campsites with livestock shelter in order to 
deliver baby livestock. Herders selected valleys between the Herlen River and the HEU Mountain. As 
shown in Figure 5 .1, this valley also contains summer . and autumn pastures. The river valley was 
considered import seasonal pasture because of its proximity to abundant water resources, particularly in 
the condition of depleting pastoral resources. 
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The second factor which contributed to concentrations of herders on better pastures was 
the type of livestock owned by the herders. In both DD and UU, herders who 
predominantly owned sheep defined the river valley as their grazing area for three 
seasons. This was in contrast to some UU households which had more horses, and 
which consequently selected drier open steppe areas on the southwest of UU bag, which 
offers more potential grazing area for their mixed herds of sheep and horses. Describing 
the reason for this, one UU participant explained, 
... This area is great in winter to leave your horses and other livestock on otor. 
That's why we chose to come here. The old area [in negdel period] was not 
really appropriate especially in winter, when livestock was likely to get lost 
following winter storms. But here, the pasture was much more expansive 
(Interview 45). 
Third, ancestral claims over pastoral resources and pastoral production contributed to 
concentrations of herders in DD and UU. Herders stated that they were following their 
ancestors' pre-negdel pastoral areas. For instance, one DD herder acknowledged that 
changes in mobility and campsite locations had occurred, but were not necessarily in the 
general pasture area or jurisdiction. "Ah, this was my husband's ancestral place. His 
ancestors stayed around here in the old time" (Interview 26). Ancestral claims over 
grazing land were mainly due to following the specific types of livestock herded by the 
ancestors. Particularly in UU, many herders went back to the river valleys, regardless of 
what they herded in the negdel, because their ancestors used to herd sheep in these river 
valleys ( see Chapter 4 ). These factors indicate that herders selected their nutag based 
more on their connections to local people, on the types of livestock herded and on their 
relation to ancestral nutag than on the condition of open access. 
In the former aj ahui area, different factors also shaped local and migrant herders' 
selection of nutag, instead of open access condition. First, the timing of de-urbanization 
allowed local HBU bag herders to claim all the key and best pastoral areas with spring 
shelters. Later, migrant households were not able to select nutag in these pastoral areas, 
regardless of their livestock wealth 134 . They had no choice but to go to other available 
pastoral areas suited to their style of livestock herding. For instance, those who came 
from the west settled in the northern mountainous part of the HBU bag, because they 
were used to herding in mountainous areas 135 . Those who came from the Gobi region 
134 Usually, those who are wealthier were able to migrate as they could afford the cost of such an 
enterprise. 
135 Western aimags like Uvs and Zavhan has high mountain terrains. 
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settled in the southern steppe part of the HBU bag, as they were used to herding in a 
steppe and desert environment. Thus, a variety of factors limited any powerful interests 
in HBU case claiming any pasture they wanted. These factors were local status, 
connection with local herders or officials and their production strategy and herding style 
in specific terrains. 
Control over seasonal mobility: Heterogeneity in bag me1nbers' wealth (livestock, 
tractors or trucks), social status and herding background (former collective or new 
herders) did not necessarily lead to heterogeneity in herders' mobility patterns. Herders 
continued to comply with ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms. For example, one 
newly migrated herder136 in HBU bag was successful in increasing the size of his small, 
but viable herds by following ulamjlalt seasonal mobility along with those who were 
former negdel herders (Interview 18). This was also the case for the remaining aj ahui 
employees who were able to increase their livestock numbers in HBU bag. At the same 
time, in former negdel areas, a former experienced negdel herder tried non-compliance 
with the pasture use rule by staying all year round in winter pasture (Interview 29)1 37 . 
When asked why he stopped this, he answered, 'First, everybody complained that we 
were overgrazing their winter pasture .... ' (Interview 29). This indicates that non-
compliance with pasture use n1les were not strictly limited to or1ly new herders. The 
reason was not necessarily that they lacked ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms, but 
was mainly due to shortage of pastoral areas in the river valley (Interview 29). In fact, 
heterogeneity in bag members' s wealth, social status and herding background did not 
necessarily affect the i1nposition of informal sanctions by the bag community. 
Thus, bag inability to control herders' access to seasonal pasture did not necessarily 
lead to an open access condition, but it did reduce their mobility. Although all three 
bags formalized ulamjlalt seasonal mobility in their rules, local administration also had 
to co1nply with the herders' decisions on when and how often to pursue mobility, 
because they controlled production. In all three bags, herders spent three seasons, 
136 He was a city dweller (not a herder) in the negdel period, and came to HBU bag after privatization 
137 He acknowledged, "We got many livestock from privatization as we had luck to have many children. 
We all got livestock and livestock shelters ..... after privatization; I used to stay near my winter campsite in 
[the mountain] for all spring, summer and autumn" (Interview 29). His reason was that the river valley 
was much more crowded than it was in the negdel period. Thus, he chose to stay in the mountains where 
it was much more spacious for his comparatively large number of livestock, whilst others rotate for other 
seasonal pasture. 
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except for winter, in the river valley138 . Former negdel and aj abui herders 
acknowledged that their pattern of using seasonal pastures had changed less. Their 
current pattern was the ulamjlalt pattern of seasonal camping, which they used in either 
the pre-negdel period or the negdel period, except for UU bag where herders pre-
collective seasonal camps moved from the river valley to the UU hills 139 . The difference 
in the three areas was reduced seasonal mobility within a s1naller radius due to the 
depletion of the pastoral resources. 
Even though they were limited in terms of distance, the herders in all three bags were 
still able to pursue the old pattern of mobility frequency. They were still able to rotate 
livestock on the different pastures. This is because, right after the privatization, 
livestock numbers did not increase but in fact reduced in some areas due to the 
inexperience of new herders (Humphrey, 1999, Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002). Thus, a 
majority of the households owned small-size herds (fewer than 200 head) (Griffin 2001 
cited in Nixson and Walters, 2006). A participant from UU also commented on the 
numbers of households in relation to the numbers of livestock right after privatization: 
"There were 1nany more households, but there were not that many livestock" (Interview 
48). According to a participant from DD bag, "If there are 500 livestock [in each camp], 
then it is possible to rotate and graze without any problem" (Questionnaire 52). Thus, 
they had 1nore options to rotate within a quite small radius in sum1ner and autu1nn in the 
river valley (Interview 20). The herders moved by a camel caravan or by tractors 
obtained through privatization (Interview 49). Thus, heterogeneity in membership 
resulted in a reduction in the distance travelled during seasonal mobility, but did not 
necessarily curtail seasonal rotation. 
Winter ca1npsite selection and mobility were also shaped more by the management of 
production based on weather conditions and the availability of pasture and livestock 
shelters than on open access. Winter camping patterns also changed, but these were 
quite different from those of other seasons· in all three bags. Herders travelled much 
shorter distances in winter than they had in the negdel period. As herders were now 
controlling their own production, they no longer selected winter campsites deep in the 
138 Spring campsites are on den}, dry slope area along the ders, broom grass between the mountain and the 
river grass. Summer camping usually fluctuates between the river grass and denj areas, depending on the 
weather because of several rotations occurring there during the summer. Autumn camping is often 
between the den} and the bottom of the mountain, away from the summer and spring pasture . 
l ~9 
.J See chapter 3 & 4 
132 
HBU Mountain in anticipation of dzud conditions 140 . One factor considered in deciding 
whether to use the same winter campsite depended on access to livestock shelters. 
The few local households with established locally recognized winter campsites and 
shelters were located close to the village centre and other seasonal pastures in HBU bag. 
Those without established campsites were primarily the new migrant households which 
used temporary wooden fences to contain the livestock. They changed location each 
year for several years as they were working out which mountain valleys had potential 
for establishing locally recognized winter campsites (Interview 8). They were able to do 
so as the mountain offered abundant buuts. 
This winter camping pattern was flexible for all and their camping location differed 
every year141 , when they would decide where and when to move depending on the 
prevailing weather conditions. Thus, their reduced mobility was related not only to the 
availability of pasture, but to the favourable weather conditions which continued until 
the winter of 1999/2000. In UU and DD, households in the river valley were more likely 
to remain around their spring shelters, along the river among the broom grasses. If 
necessary, they would move to HBU Mountain and camp in the valley that they had 
used in negdel times142 . This flexibility reflected the pre-collective winter mobility 
pattern. 
Overall, after privatization, the concentration of households and the lack of formal 
control did not necessarily lead to overgrazing or disputed pasture use even though the 
pastoral resources were depleted. Participants from all three bags widely reported that 
the pasture was richer and grazing conditions were much better before 2000. Moreover, 
herders continued to control access to pastoral resources following ulamjlalt seasonal 
n1obility, but over much reduced distances. Reduced seasonal mobility was related to 
140 This trend is more apparent among herders in HBU, DD & the hillside of UU bags, because of their 
close proximity and easy access to the mountains and hills. In particular, the DD and HBU bag herders 
assumed they could go deep into the mountains as there were plenty of unoccupied campsites with warm 
buuts. 
141 Herders from these three bags freely selected winter buuts in the mountain close to their spring sites, 
but without wooden shelters as the mountain offers abundant valleys sheltered by mountains and hills. 
Herders claiming ulamjlalt grazing land occurred more in DD and UU area than HBU bag where the 
majority of the households were migrants, and had no such claims. When claiming ulamjlalt pastoral 
areas, it was not necessarily specific campsites, but rather general geographically distinct areas such as 
dry hills or river valleys. For instance, many UU households moved to the river as their pre-collective 
ancestors had stayed along the river, whereas some of the UU households moved to the dry hill areas as 
their ancestors had herded in the hills. 
142 Allocation of valleys for UU herders in the mountain in the collective time was generally based on 
their pre-collective ancestral camping areas in the mountains. In other words, the choice of valleys in the 
mountain was similar. 
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factors like a) individual herding households owning smaller herds, which use smaller 
pasture; b) the concentration of herding households on depleted pastoral resources; and 
c) favourable weather conditions, all of which contributed to the herders' reduced 
mobility and sustained adequate pasture conditions. For those reasons the herders did 
1 d. b d 143 not pursue ong 1stance cross- oun ary otor movement . 
5.4. Absence of a property institution? 
Many scholars identified the problem ( overgrazing and disputed use of pasture) of 
pasture land management as open access due to failed overlapping ( separate state and 
communal property) regimes. I argue that in the HBU case area, the collapse of formal 
institutions did not necessarily lead to open access, but it did lead to reduced mobility of 
herders. Reduced mobility resulted from the changed nature of dual (formal (state-based 
local government) and herders' (local residents) informal control integrated in terms of 
property relation) control over production. The dual control over pastoral production 
shifted to state legal exclusive property ownership, under which herders exercised 
informal control over land when the privatization process separated the land component 
of production from the livestock and labour components. The state exercised formal 
control by regulating the pastoral resources through statutory laws ( which formalized 
ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms) and herders exercised informal control by 
managing the production and de facto exercising ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms. 
Thus, the 1nain reason for reduced mobility was the dismantling of the control of the 
pastoral production system, which conflicted with the earlier established principles of 
pastoral production management. 
The presence of formal and informal control over land indicates that there are still some 
forms of sanctions exerted by the bag level community in regulating access to pastoral 
143 Local administrations also did not have much presence in regulating cross-territorial mobility. Until 
1999, the number of otor households from distant provinces was particularly low. This was due to the fact 
that only a few herders were able to afford transportation to pursue long distance otor mobility as a result 
of the collapse of mechanized support of negdel institutions. Also, moderate weather conditions were a 
factor and herders from other provinces had no significant reason to pursue long distance otor mobility. 
Thus, all three areas experienced minimal need for arranging otor. The exception was a few herders from 
the area around the HBU bag who stayed at HBU Mountain following the ulamjlalt pattern of winter 
camping for a few cold winters. They essentially went in and out without any formal control, following 
their seasonal pattern of winter camping from November till January (see Chapter 4). The local HBU bag 
administration was largely absent in regulating their use, also a reflection of the pre-negdel pattern of 
reserve pasture use. 
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resources. Then the important question is whether or not these formal and informal 
sanctions failed. 
Formal control: The state intended to 1naintain fonnal authority and control of pastoral 
resources during the transition to a market economy. Scholars argue that open access to 
pastoral resources was mainly due to the collapse of the formal negdel institution. The 
HBU case reveals that the collapse of the negdel and aj ahui did not necessarily lead to 
open access to pastoral resources. This led to a shift in control over production, from the 
formal pastoral institution to the individual herding household. In an atte1npt to retain its 
formal control over pastureland, the state transferred its authority over pasture, wells 
and the HBU RP A shelters to the bag and soum administration as a support mechanism 
for pastoral production within their jurisdictional boundary. 
However, this transfer was impractical due to the default privatization process. Local 
ad1ninistrations lost control over iinportant pastoral assets such as shelters and wells. 
They did not take responsibility for maintaining these pastoral assets seriously as the 
transfer process lacked clearly designed rules and responsibilities. This created an 
opportunity for individuals to capture these assets, which led to the depletion of pastoral 
resources in all three bags. In addition, the HBU case revealed that the shift in emphasis 
from production to land affected the state's control over land, and can be considered 
unsuccessful. Historically the soum and bag, with its authority, was able to regulate 
herders' access to pastoral resources ( expansive administrative territory or mechanised 
production support in reduced administrative territory). Now, in the presence of 
depleted pastoral resources, they were no longer able to regulate access to these 
resources during seasonal 1nobility and cross-territorial mobility (Mearns, 2004b, 
Griffin, 2003). 
Moreover, the legislation did not necessarily equip local ad1ninistrations with adequate 
control mechanisms for regulating access. According to the law, the local administration 
regulates land use based on local or ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms and solves 
disputes such as free-riding or trespassing. However, the local administrations were no 
longer able to enforce ulamjlalt rules as a control mechanism over herders' land use, 
because they no longer controlled the production and had lost the pastoral assets which 
controlled the herders' mobility. In this case, Mearns' (2004b) argument is valid, that 
local administration as a law enforcement body was mainly focused on protecting land 
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with ulamjlalt rules, instead of regulating herders' production with this rule. In contrast, 
the historical practice of ulamjlalt rules and norms are focused on regulating not only 
land use, but the whole of the production process. 
These are the main reasons why, in the HBU case area, state control over land, in fact, 
shifted to the herders as herders managed the labour and livestock components. In terms 
of livestock, herders needed to decide on a suitable production strategy for their 
livestock herding. In terms of labour, the local administration also no longer controlled 
the labour component of production due to the freedo1n of population movement under 
the new constitution. Migration was controlled more by weather conditions than 
formally controlled by local administration, whose role was limited to registration of 
migrants. The registration was mainly for updating information on migration 
1novements and a record of livestock numbers for the sake of the census rather than a 
1nechanism to regulate labour markets and access to pastoral resources as occurred in 
the past. There is no correlation between the registration of residency at aimag level and 
the flow of livestock following migrants. In other words, the legislation on registering 
population 1novements did not reflect its impacts on local pastoral production and 
resource manage1nent. Thus, in DD and UU bag, formal control was much weaker than 
informal control as migrant herders relied on local herders to gain access to pastoral 
resources. Overall, local administration in all three bags allowed herders to select their 
nutag and make decisions about their seasonal 1nobility in order to comply with the 
ulamjlalt production principle of 'those who control the production regulate the land' 
( Chapter 3-4). 
However, local administration as a state-based actor made the most of its opportunities 
under the new land regime and this affected pasture use patterns. The local 
administration's inability to control access to pastoral resources and migration created a 
fuzziness in the roles and responsibilities of different actors (Sturgeon and Sikor, 2004, 
Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Mearns (2004b) argued that local officials exploited their state 
administrative positions to secure control over access to pastoral resources for personal 
gain by inheriting official positions from the previous system. Although this argument 
explains one of the reasons for ineffective formal control, it is limited when the problem 
is examined only within the issue of land, rather than the whole production 
management. The local administrations, in fact, took advantage of a gap in the 
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legislations in order to compensate for its loss of control over production (livestock and 
labour) and access to pastoral resources. 
Local adn1inistrations control resources through exerc1s1ng state territorial authority. 
Taking advantage of their authority is a crucial mechanism to control access (Sikor and 
Lund, 2009). In HBU bag, the local ad1ninistration encouraged migrant households to 
legiti1nize their residency only with formal registration, diminishing HBU bag herders' 
informal control over access to land. The authority in HBU bag is, in fact, quite 
contradictory, because the HBU bag territory is now dependent on the jurisdiction of 
Delgerhaan soum. However, the soum administration was not assigned to be responsible 
for otor movement. This condition led HBU bag/village administration to exploit its 
authority over the RP A area. Access to former reserve pasture in the HBU Mountain 
was, in fact, outside the informal control of the HBU herders, because they controlled 
only a s1nall portion of the HBU bag seasonal pasture area. In other words, now, HBU 
bag administration had 1nore formal authority over controlling pastureland in HBU bag 
as it retained its authority over the village, bag and RP A territory. Thus, for migrant 
herders in HBU bag, fonnal control became more legitimate than the herders' informal 
control over pastureland, leading to benefits for the HBU bag/village administration. 
Nevertheless, pasture land management entitlement shifted in terms of who had access 
and how they gained access. In all three bags, entitlement to regulate access to pastoral 
resources shifted from the local administration to individual herding households. 
Herders controlled access to pastureland. This condition created patron-client 
relationships in which herders utilized their wealth and social status as a strategy to 
maintain their access to the best pasture resources with the approval of state-based local 
actors over their actions (Verdery, 1999, Sikor and Lund, 2009). In return, local officials 
used their official positions to maintain their authority to control access to resources and 
gain benefits, given that they could not gain any benefit from regulating herders' access. 
Informal control: The inability of local administration control over pastoral resources 
did not necessarily lead to open access to pastoral resources. Based on my findings I 
support the argument that informal control remained in place (Fernandez-Gimenez, 
2001 ). Herders' reduced mobility did not necessarily lead to overgrazing as the 
ulamjlalt rules and norms and the weather conditions prevailed, which sustained pasture 
growth. The migration process shaped the ways · in which herders controlled access to 
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pastoral resources in each bag. Regardless of the heterogeneity in bag membership, the 
extent to which herders practised informal control was different in the three bags due to 
the privatization process, which led to different migration patterns in former negdel and 
aj ahui areas. 
Herders' control over access to pastoral resources in each bag was influenced, first, by 
how herders, particularly migrants, legitimized their access to pastoral resources in each 
bag. In DD and UU bags, the affinnation from local herders (infonnal) was more 
important than from the local administration ( formal), because there were enough local 
herders to control the production process. Migrant herders were more able to gain 
access to pastoral resources through some degree of relationship to local herders. They 
1naintained this access through gaining residency status, which was legitimized more 
strongly by ancestral or birth place, a com1non relational mechanism (Mearns, 2004a, 
Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001). This strategy secured their membership in the bag 
co1nmunity144 . Unlike in the pre-collective and collective period, this informal control 
was practised by individual herding households without the integrated formal bag 
control. In contrast, in HBU bag, registration by the local administration was more 
important than affirmation from the local herders in HBU bag. Having fewer 
connections to local people, migrant herders legitimized their residency only with the 
local ad1ninistration' s registration as a formal control. They took advantage of the gap in 
the law, under which local ad1ninistration had an obligation to accept migration. 
Overall, in both former negdel and aj ahui areas, migrant herders employed migration 
and residency as legal 1nechanisms to gain and maintain access to pastoral resources, 
but relied on one specific form of control (fonnal or informal) in legitimizing their 
access instead of dealing with dual control in each area. 
Second, herders' ulamjlalt way of selecting nutag does conform less to the concept of 
open access. Access to pastoral resources without fonnal control was not necessarily 
under open-access, in which anyone camps -anytime and anywhere (Griffin, 2003). In 
fact, Upton (2005) argued that interpreting herders pasture use pattern in this period as 
free-for-all or open access misunderstands the "complex system of rights, norms, and 
rules that inform practice on Mongolia's herding commons (Upton, 2005, p 589). As 
144 This is usually in a situation where there is less tension over competing for pastoral resources. Once a 
person is a member of a community, the traditional rule of 'camp and graze as many as fit' is employed or 
respected. 
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shown in the HBU case, herders complied with ulamjlalt ways of selecting nutag. A key 
factor in enabling ones clai1n of access to the best pastoral resources was timing. Local 
herders in the three bags were able to claim the best pastoral resources in their bags 
before migrants. Instead of referring to it as 'open access', they followed the ulamjlalt 
concept of use rights, 'first to land claims the right to pasture' 145 . In these ways, local 
herders shaped the migrant herders' access to pastoral resources in the three bags. Status 
due to wealth may not be the strongest factor in HBU bag. A few local households, both 
well-to-do and poor in terms of their pastoral assets, claimed the best pastoral resources 
and, in fact, shaped the access of the mostly well-off migrant households to pastoral 
resources. 
Although herders relied on one form of control in each area, both local and migrant 
herders selected their seasonal pastures solely based on ulamjlalt production 
management and pasture use rules and norms. This depended on the type of livestock 
being herded and on herding experience, which was shaped by their ancestral style of 
herding livestock in particular terrain. For instance, new migrant households mostly 
camped in river valleys in UU and DD because most of them came with sheep and goats 
acquired through the privatization exercise. In addition, connections with former negdel 
herders shaped migrant herders' access to pastoral resources. In contrast, in HBU bag, 
migrant herders selected their seasonal pasture depending on the type of terrain they had 
previously used to herd livestock. These kinds of traditional patterns were common 
elsewhere (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001, Mearns, 2004a). The re-emergence of the 
ulamjlalt production unit and its mobility pattern may have been interpreted as a type of 
open access according to the property regime approach, because individual herding 
households independently selected their own pasture without formal control. However, 
herders had selected their camping areas even in the collective period. Negdels 
consulted with herders on where they should ca1np and who should use these camping 
areas. This was not a case of selecting anywhere there is pasture and excluding anyone 
they wanted. Selecting nutag is more based on the timing of the available pastoral 
resources in a specific terrain and the type of livestock the herders own due to the 
herders' production strategy (use right) than claiming any available territory for 
exclusive ownership. In other words, pastoral production management shapes the 
foundation for informal control. 
145 See chapter 3. 
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Third, heterogeneity in community membership (wealth, social status and background) 
did not necessarily lead to non-compliance with ulamjlalt seasonal mobility rules. As 
Fernandez-Gimenez (2001) argued, even with this change, bag members' pasture use 
patterns remained homogenous as they complied with seasonal mobility. Strong 
sanctions were imposed by the bag community, which prevented people from infringing 
ulamjlalt rules and norms. New herders adopted seasonal mobility in order to increase 
their livestock; fonner negdel herders responded to others' demands to comply with 
ulamjlalt seasonal mobility. Thus, herders still pursued informal pasture use rules and 
norms as these were inherent in pursuing pastoral production under mainly non-
equilibrium climatic conditions in Mongolia (Sneath, 2003, Ickowitz, 2003, Fernandez-
Gimenez and Allen-Diaz, 1999). 
However, herders moved in reduced distance in three seasons. A similar change in the 
distance of mobility was commonly observed as well (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001, 
Sneath, 2003, Mearns, 2004b ). As Fernandez-Gimenez and Sneath argued, the herders' 
reduced mobility and flexibility were obstructed not necessarily by the emerging 
heterogeneity, but mainly by the lack of resources such as labour and transportation. In 
the HBU case, this was also due to the increasing numbers of households gaining access 
to the depleted pastoral resources and the stable weather conditions. As elsewhere 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001, p 57), in the absence of the former negdel mechanised 
mobility support, herders maintained their short distance mobility with camel caravans 
or tractors. In addition, herders moved in reduced distance, because they 1nostly owned 
small nu1nbers of livestock during moderate weather conditions until 1999. A similar 
trend was observed in Bayanhongor right after privatization, of no dramatic livestock 
increase and this did not necessarily contribute to herders' changing mobility 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002). Thus, the distance in herders' seasonal movement 
depended more on their production strategy (herd size) and weather conditions than on 
the heterogeneity of the herders' background, wealth and social status. In other words, 
the heterogeneity in wealth, social status and background is not necessarily a 
determining factor in non-compliance with the ulamjlalt rules and norms. This type of 
heterogeneity existed in the pre-collective period, when the ulamjlalt rules and norms 
were the core of the production. This type of heterogeneity may look like a determining 
factor when compared to the collective period, when all herders were in an equal 
position, but co1npliance came about through the negdels enforcement of seasonal 
mobility with support from its infrastructure. 
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Overall, the property regime concept focuses on the property rights attached to any CPR 
and defines the problem by measuring an actor's ability to exercise these rights, rather 
than understanding how the actor's ability to exercise this right is shaped by the 
production system. In the example of mobile pastoralism in the HBU case area, property 
relations were more embedded in the production system, and consequently, the ability to 
exercise the rights attached to pastureland was shaped by the ability to control the 
production and the availability of the production co1nponents. Thus, exploring the 
nature of property relations beyond the rights attached to the resource in question is 
important when examining the problem of open access. 
The prevalence of an open access regime is dependent on the nature of property 
relations, which is attributed to a specific production system. It was not open access 
which prevailed in the HBU case, but the change in dual control over production. In the 
HBU case, herders did not gain access to pastoral resources under dual control, but 
under either formal or informal control depending on the context of former negdel or aj 
ahui area. However, pasture use was under the informal control that was practised 
within a bag. As a result, the impact of 1nigration on overgrazing and disputes over 
pastoral resources was comparatively s1nall at that time in all three areas. Thus, it is 
debatable whether the collapse of the formal collective institution resulted in 
community heterogeneity in pursuing the informal pastoral norms of 'seasonal 
mobility'. The failure of formal control over pasture use cannot be specifically 
attributed to the capacity of the state or local government, but was mainly due to the 
1nisguided approach towards regulating pastureland by dismantling the management of 
the production co1nponents. This indicates that in mobile pastoralism in Mongolia, 
prope1iy relations are 1nuch more based on the historical patterns of pastoral production 
than on a market based property regime or the exclusive property rights attributed to 
pastureland. In other words, as long as herders are involved in pastoral production in the 
condition of an unstable climate, they need to conform to the ulamjlalt pasture use rules 
and norms of rotation and movements, regardless of the heterogeneity of community 
membership. 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the notion of an open-access regime, a construct which is 
often utilized in the literature to examine the CPR dilemma which arose in Mongolia 
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after privatization. Concerning the research question, transition policies resulted in 
herders' reduced mobility pattern. The collapse of state enterprises and collectives 
resulted in the loss of much of the infrastructure including mechanized support and 
other services in addition to the failure to upkeep wells. Also, liberalizing the rules for 
labour led to increasing migration. These factors contributed to reducing the radius of 
the available pastoral areas and affected the capacity of herders to engage in frequent 
distance herding. Thus, herders mostly crowded in places where there were enough 
resources for each season. This situation was tolerable for herders in all three bags at the 
beginning. This can be explained in relation to the homogeneity in bag community 
pasture use rules and norms. 
The increasing variability in bag herders' wealth, status and background that had 
resulted fro1n migration are often cited as the key factors in creating open access. 
However, my research findings indicate the contrary. Open access was apparent during 
the privatization process of collective assets such as livestock shelters and wells, but this 
was not necessarily the case in the pastoral resources as herders continued using 
ulamjlalt rules and nonns for gaining and maintaining access to pastoral resources. 
Heterogeneity certainly affects herders' dynamics of sharing pasture. However, herders 
confonning to ulamjlalt rules and norms are more influenced by the production system 
than by changes in bag herders' wealth, status and background, because such 
heterogeneity reflects the pattern of non-egalitarian pastoralsim in the pre-collective 
period. Herder's access mechanisms changed from being part of a formal negdel 
pastoral institution to mostly an informal pastoral institution. Although travelling 
shorter distances, herders were still able to pursue their usual seasonal mobility due to 
small herd size and convenient weather conditions. Those who did not conform to 
seasonal mobility were put under pressure from local herders to stop their practices. 
Thus, in terms of local pastoral institutions, the resource management regime was not 
entirely open-access. Herders' reduced mobility and repeated use of seasonal pastures 
under stable weather condition certainly set the pre-conditions for future overgrazing of 
bag pasture under unstable weather conditions. In the next chapter, I discussed how 
policy changes affected ulamjlalt production management, which led to heterogeneity in 
com1nunity members' compliance with ulamjlalt rules and norms. 
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6 Land reform in pastureland management 
6.1. Introduction 
In earlier chapters I showed how, under the pre-collective and collective production 
systems, the n1ling elites and the negdel regulated herders' access to pastoral resources 
within a hoshuu or soum/bag jurisdictional boundary through a mechanism that 
involved dual control of the major components of pastoral production: land, labour and 
livestock. However, during the transition period, the state changed this mechanism by 
dismantling controls over the pastoral production components. Local soum and bag 
territorial administrative units were ineffective in regulating land use by adopting the 
ulamjlalt pasture-use rules and norms. Herders' independently regulated their pastoral 
production based on the pre-collective ulamjlalt rules and norms of regulating pastoral 
resources. Local ad1ninistration allowed herders de facto control of access to pastoral 
resources. However, develop1nent advisors interpreted these de facto controls as open 
access, an absence of formal control over access to pastoral resources. As a response, 
the Mongolian government introduced exclusive individual property rights to uvuljuu 
(winter) and havarjaanii ( spring) buuts gazar (campsite) or just uvuljuu havarjaa 
(winter and spring campsite) 1461 by ezemshil (legal possession of winter and spnng 
campsites) in the pastoral context under a new land reform program 147 . 
This chapter focuses on the herders' uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi! (legal possession of 
winter and spring cainpsite) and local pastureland management. I explore ways in which 
the land law affected both formal and informal control over pastureland and how it 
affected herders' access to pastoral resources and as a result, local pastureland 
management. This is i1nportant because the land refonn policy not only failed to solve 
the CPR dile1nma in Mongolia but also exacerbated the social and environmental 
i1npacts of the transition policies. National and international commentators have 
attributed the problem to incomplete and ambiguous land management legislation. 
However, the argument in this chapter is that land reform policy has also failed due to a 
shift in the way herders legitimise their access to pastureland. The land reform policy: a) 
146 Herders pay 10% of the tax for campsite land according to Article 8.2, 'Law of Mongolia on Land Fee' 
(1997). This law exempts 90% of property tax from a household residential plot of 0.07hectare. Herders 
pay no fees for the herding household's use of pastureland and hay making area, Article, 8.1. 
147 Article 54.7 (English translation) or Article 52.9 (in Mongolian) of the Land law, 2002 
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de-coupled the concept of pastureland from uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts gazar (winter and 
spring campsites), the campsite, although they are actually inseparable aspects of 
pastureland management; and b) this consequently affected the dual control over 
pastureland by overlooking the herders' informal role in controlling access to 
pastureland. 
The first section of this chapter reviews the literature on the implementation of land 
reform, particularly the provision of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil, in Mongolia to provide 
background to the case study analysis. Next, I specifically examine the HBU case, 
employing an access framework (Ribot and Peluso, 2003) for exploring the role of each 
actor in control over access to pastoral resources. This section emphasizes the differing 
outcome each bag experienced, depending on its previous status as a collective or a 
state enterprise. 
6.2. Land reform in Mongolia 
The government of Mongolia introduced land reform by passing new laws on land in 
1994, which 1nade provision for exclusive individual private property rights. The Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) argued that the existing property regi1ne over land in 
Mongolia lacked exclusive private ownership, which it assumed would boost the 
efficiency of market-based land management (Sneath, 2003, Tumenbayar, 2000, 
Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004). Thus, the policy implication of the land law 
was to introduce de jure secure tenure to land. The law provided for three types of rights 
to land: ownership, ezemshil (possession/lease) and use (Fernandez-Gimenez and 
Batbuyan, 2004 ). The state incorporated legislation for pastureland in the law. The 
legislation ''aims to provide positive incentives to herders, farmers and others to 
1naximize production and to protect land fro1n damage or degradation" (Sneath, 2003p, 
443). This policy appeared to be particularly useful in solving overgrazing and disputed 
use of resources among herders (Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004). However, 
the law allowed individuals and enterprises to possess land 148 , without a clear 
distinction regarding whether pastureland as a CPR can be possessed for pastoral 
production purposes (Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004). Thus, it created 
ambiguities in who de facto controls what on the ground. Within the law, there are two 
148 Article 30.1 the Law on land, 1994. 
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drastically different regulations referring to pastureland. The first regulation refers to 
uvuljuu havarjaanii ezemshil. In 1994, the new law articulated that citizens possess their 
residential plot for their household use149 . However, there was no specific provision for 
a herder ' s right to possess residential land, except that citizens are allowed to pursue 
gardening within their private uvuljuu havarjaa150 . Then, the amendment to the land law 
('Law of Mongolia on Land,' 2002) clearly stated that "a citizen hot ail 
together/commonly/ may possess land under winter and spring campsites" 151 . The 
second regulation refers to the pastureland surrounding the uvuljuu and havarjaanii 
buuts gazar. The state assigned responsibility for pastureland management to local soum 
and bag territorial administrative units152 . Under this provision, summer and autumn 
pastures would be used communally153 . However there was no specific provision for 
winter and spring pasture, nor any guidance on whether these were for communal use or 
possession of a group or individuals (Tumenbayar, 2000). Then, the 2002 amendments 
specifically exempted pastureland from ezemshil (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2008). 
Nonetheless, local implementation of pastureland ezemshil was not popular in reality 
except for a few attempts by experimental projects on herder groups' exclusive use right 
to pastureland 154 (Tumenbayar, 2000, Sneath, 2003, Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 
2004). Thus, this chapter focuses only on the i1nplementation of uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil (legal land possession) and the use of local pastureland (land use). 
6.2.1. Implementation of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil and pastureland 
Uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil: The implementation of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 1s 
merely to ensure herders' rights to land as exclusive private property. By 1998, the 
government issued possession certificate to individual or groups of herding households 
as hot ail uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts gazar (winter and spring campsites), as these were 
considered herders' residential plots in the 1994 provision (Fernandez-Gimenez and 
Batbuyan, 2004 ). My translation of this provision is "a citizen hot ail 
together/com1nonly may possess land under winter and spring campsites". This means a 
citizen leading an individual household, or several of the1n together as a hot ail may 
149 Article 29 .1 the Law on land, 1994. 
150 Article 53.4 the Law on land, 1994. 
151 Article 52.7 (in Mongolian) of the Land law, 2002 "Uvuljuu havarjaanii doorhi gazriig Mongol Ulsiin 
irgen hot ailaar dundaa hamtran ezemshij bolno" 
152 Article 51 the Law on land, 1994. 
153 Article 51.3 the Law on land, 1994. 
154 Article 6.2 the Law on land, 2002. Experimental group use has been conducted by donor projects. This 
will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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possesss winter and spring ca1npsites. The possession right to a citizen or hot ail 
certificates in the version of 2002 reflects the 1994 interpretation of possession rights to 
individual households. Article 54.7 or 52.7 on different English versions of the land 
laws are confusing as it made a speculative translation as "citizens of Mongolia may 
jointly possess land under winter and spring settlements through their hot ail 
com1nunities". This translation made the emphasis only on hot ail communities, 
creating the confusion that it did not refer to an individual household. In contrast, the 
original version refers both to a citizen or group of them as a hot ail. The use of 'hot ail' 
pertains to pastoral contexts. Indeed, the meaning of' hot ail' is contextual given that the 
structure of a hot ail ranges from several individual households to a single household in 
different parts of Mongolia. In places, where there are several households in one camp, 
the campsite for possession consists of several smaller campsites. Although they share 
the same camping spot, each individual household has buuts to shelter their own 
livestock. Thus, local administrations allocate one possession certificate among several 
households, listing the names of the heads of these households on the back of the 
certificate. Then each can claim their small campsites, through one certificate. In places, 
where there is one household in a camp, then, the local administration allocates one 
possession certificate in the name of that household (Undargaa, 2006). In this sense, 
under this land possession right, an individual herding household- is allowed a 15-60 
year lease (with another 40 year extension) on uvuljuu and havarjaa areas of 0.07ha 
(Photo 6.1) under a ezemshliin gerchilgee (possession certificate) (Fernandez-Gimenez, 
2002, Tumenbayar, 2000). Now, with their ezemshliin gerchilgee, herders can exercise 
exclusive individual rights to 1nanage this land, which is limited to small plots. This 
includes a camping spot and a nearby area that contains livestock shelter, ger and horse 
posts (Fernandez-Gimenez & Batbuyan 2004). This exclusive right refers to a bundle of 
rights (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004), which includes use rights and decision making 
rights, except for alienation right 155 . 
However, uvuljuu havarjaa are 1nore important than a plot of land. They are location 
points for shelters and other production resources such as thick layers of livestock dung 
accumulated over time and used for livestock shelter and as a fuel resource (Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2002,p 61 ). Moreover, "these are point locations rather than swathes of land, 
but they entail an implicit right to pasture of several kilometres radius around the site" 
1~5 ) Article 3 5 .1 of the Land law, 2002 
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(Sneath, 2003, p 445). Thus, the uvuljuu havarjaa are strategically important assets for 
pastoral production. 
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Herders' uvidjuu havarjaa ezems hi! is limited within their bag territory of residence. 
The bag governor is responsible for registering a herder's application for uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil, because soum and bag central and self-governing bodies have been 
given legal control over access to pastureland 156 . Then it submits it to the soum land 
officer. The soum-level land office designs and carries out the annual soum level land 
management planning. It includes the land for uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. The soum 
land officer processes the applications 157 and verifies that the applicant's request for a 
uvuljuu havarjaa does not overlap with someone else's request for the same land15 8 . 
Then, the land officer submits it to the soum hural and the soum governor for approval. 
Saum hurals are responsible for approving applications for uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 
by individual households 159 from an area designed for ezemshil in the annual soum land 
management plan 160 . Then the soum governor formalizes the decisions made over 
uvuljuu havarjaa issues discussed at soum hurals. 
156 Article 52.1 of the Land law, 2002 
157 Article 23 .2.13 of the Land law, 2002 
158 Article 31.3 of the Land law, 2002 
159 Article 29 .4, 31.2 and 33 .1 of the Land law, 2002 
160 Article 33 .4 of the Land law, 2002 
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However, local administrations are de facto not in control of decisions over the 
allocation of uvuljuu havarjaa. In practice, herders often apply for a uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshlliin gerchilgee (certificate) after having already established a uvuljuu havarjaa 
without the permission or approval of the local administration (Upton, 2005). In some 
cases, local administrations encouraged this pattern of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 
(Undargaa, 2006). Consequently, the local administration allowed herders to select their 
own uvuljuu havarjaa locations. 
Pasture/and: The implementation of the land law was unsuccessful in terms of 
in1proving pasture n1anagement. Pastureland is de jure controlled by the state, but de 
facto managed as common property (Upton, 2005, p 586). The land law entitled soum 
and bag central and self-governing bodies to regulate local pastureland management161 
along with the allocation of uvuljuu havarjaa under the authority vested in them as 
territorial ad1ninistrations of Mongolia. In practice, local administrations found it 
difficult to enforce pasture use rules of seasonal 1nobility and rotation (Upton, 2009, 
Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004). On the one hand, some herders 
acknowledged the need for more involvement from local ad1ninistration (Upton, 2009). 
On the other hand, some herders perceived the management of seasonal pasture as more 
a matter for individual herding households than formal institutions (Undargaa, 2006, 
Upton, 2005). This is because herders have been responsible for their pastoral 
production since the transition. 
6.2.2. Land reform outcome 
The land refonn led to a range of social and environmental impacts. In terms of social 
outco1nes, the concern over herders' diminishing security of access to pasture under the 
land reform was articulated during the parliamentary discussion of the land law. Sneath 
(2003) noted that some politicians were cautious about the influence of international 
financial organizations with their promise -of aid funding. This was because these 
organizations promoted the market-based land policy approaches as a solution to the 
problem without taking into account the potential outcome of unequal opportunity to 
161 Article 52.10 of the Land law, 2002, says that local soum administration and its hural should manage 
the pastureland by, first, employing traditional pasture use rules and norms; second, classifying soum 
seasonal pasture into winter, spring, sunnner, autumn; and third, classifying reserve pasture for 
sustainable use and conservation. A bag hural would be in charge of enforcing a soum governor's 
decision on bag pastureland management and would also resolve any disputed use of pastoral resources. 
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gain access to pastureland land use, particularly for herders in different living conditions 
(Sneath 2003, p445). Land reform secured only individual access at the expense of bag 
community. As a result, herders, particularly the poorer ones, could potentially lose 
their former access to pastoral resources (Sneath, 2003 p, 454). 
Uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil led to changes in the ulamjlalt way of gaining access to 
pastoral resources.· One change was that those who owned livestock shelters and who 
legally possessed the uvuljuu havarjaa de facto claimed right to use the winter and 
spring pastures around their camps (Sneath, 2003, Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 
2004 ). Others who lacked livestock shelters and campsites were only able to make a few 
claims to pasture, contributing to growing inequalities among herders (Fernandez-
Gimenez & Batbuyan, 2004; Tumenbayar, 2000). For instance, in Jinst and Bayan-
Ovoo soums, in Bayanhongor aimag, most poor households did not possess uvuljuu 
havarjaa because they did not have viable numbers of livestock (Fernandez-Gimenez 
and Batbuyan, 2004). This unequal opportunity to gain access to pasture was a result of 
a common confusion throughout Mongolia over whether legal uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezems hi! refers to a camping spot or to the surrounding pasture land (Fernandez-
Gin1enez and Batbuyan, 2004, Upton, 2005, Undargaa, 2006). For instance, in 
Bayandalai soum, Umnugovi, local officials interpreted the law to mean that those who 
did not own livestock shelters could not legally possess uvuljuu havarjaa (Undargaa, 
2006, p 57). Those who lost informal use right to a campsite would also lose their 
access to pastoral resources. In other words, herders' uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 
legitimized their use-rights to pastureland (Sneath, 2003). Second, herders employed 
legal uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil as a mechanism to gain and maintain access to more 
pastoral resources. By a family-splitting strategy, wealthy herders were able to control 
more pasture by setting up several uvuljuu havarjaa near poor households with less 
livestock (Mearns, 2004a, Undargaa, 2006). This process diminished the poor herders' 
informal rights to uvuljuu havarjaa, leading to their exclusion from gaining access to 
pasture. 
Consequently, many poor herders have diversified their strategies for accessing 
pastureland. Prior to the implementation of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil, hot ail 
customary institution supported poor herders in gaining access to pastoral resources as 
they stayed with wealthier kin or neighbours (Mearns, 2004a, Fernandez-Gimenez, 
2002, Cooper, 1993 ). However, this strategy became less available to poor herders as 
149 
"kin-based and other social-networks have begun to shift towards semi-commercial 
fonns" (Mearns, 2004a, p 128). In other words, poor herders have narrow opportunities 
for gaining access to pastoral resources under the legal uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. In 
response, some herders have turned to herding for wages as a strategy to gain access to 
pastoral resources. Some choose to carry out fewer movements, staying longer on their 
campsites and leading an almost sedentary lifestyle in order to protect the pasture 
around the ca1npsite (Mearns, 2004a). Some appear to be more mobile, in their attempt 
to gain access to available pasture because they have no secure rights through uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil to maintain their access to pasture (Fernandez-Gimenez and 
Batbuyan, 2004). Nevertheless, these actions only guarantee temporary access to 
pasture, but do not secure access to quality pasture, which is crucial in herders' 
production. 
This is because securing access to uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil does not secure exclusive 
1nanage1nent rights to pasture, because individual exclusive tenure of this nature 
conflicts with ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms. Uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil is only 
one of the many ways to gain access to pastureland. Thus, herders with legal uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil in general may be able to pursue exclusion, because "the sphere of 
influence over pasture is greatest close to the campsite and diminishes with distance ... " 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002, p 62). However, even they were able to access campsite 
possession, these poor herders were unable to exclude and are vulnerable to others' 
trespassing (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002). This is because the herders' control of pasture 
depends on all their wealth (herd size) and their ability to mobilize other resources 
(networking, transportation labour). Large herd size uses more pasture than small herd 
size. These resource factors impact on herders' decision to claim legal campsite 
possession as well as whether one can claim more pasture around a campsite. Therefore, 
the campsite is 1nore a part of pasture resources rather than a "common substance that 
can be owned or possessed" (Sneath, 2004, p 170). 
Moreover, the reason why a herder's wealth or ability matters in claiming the use of 
certain amount of pasture around the campsite ( after they found nu tag by gaining the 
access through uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil or through other strategy) is because the 
sphere of influence of over pasture around the cainpsite is "a matter of contention" 
(Upton, 2009, p 5). This is because "inclusive and exclusive paradigms co-exist 
concerning pasture rights" (Upton, 2005, p 589). In other words, with only a legal title, 
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herders in general cannot exclude others from sharing pasture around their uvuljuu 
havarjaa. This is because of the significance of the common strategy of 'reciprocity', 
which provides for inclusion and exclusion within the principle of pasture use (Upton, 
2005). This reciprocity is inherent in ulamjlalt pasture use. The evidence suggests that 
reciprocity mainly occurs in relation to off-seasonal use of pasture or 'trespassing'. 
Trespassing is often judged as not ideal, but a regular process "justified by necessity, or 
so infrequent as to be of little real concern with respect to both local culprits and otor 
fainilies" (Upton, 2005, p 595). Thus, local herders from different regions of Mongolia 
do not necessarily perceive trespassing as a source of conflict, because these incidents 
are usually temporary and solved by negotiation and mutual compromise and 
reciprocity162 (Upton, 2005). Therefore, despite the fact that herders employ uvuljuu 
havargaa ezemshil to gain access to pasture when used in stable weather condition, the 
idea of pursuing exclusion over pasture only through the formal, legal uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil is a contestable assumption. 
Second, uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil may guarantee access to the land around it, but not 
often the use of the land, because the quality of the pasture around uvuljuu havarjaa 
depends on the weather conditions. In severe weather, pasture around uvuljuu havarjaa 
is not accessible, thus herders do not employ uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil as a mechanism 
to protect their seasonal pasture. For instance, prior to the winter dzud of 2000, Upton 
(2005, p 599) reported that "herders grazed their winter pastures in early autumn with 
the expectation that they will go on otor, hence rendering the reservation of winter 
pasture unnecessary". This indicates that herders' security of tenure is embedded in the 
ulamjlalt strategy of short and long distance otor movement rather than exclusive rights 
attached to a fixed plot with uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. 
In terms of environ1nental outcomes, the land law resulted in overgrazing. Fernandez-
Gimenez (2004) argued that, in the pastoral context, uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil is 
against herders' constitutional right to camp and reside wherever they can (Fernandez-
Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004). In other words, this provision blocked the herders' 
freedom of movement, which is necessary for them to carry out the ulamjlalt pasture 
management of rotation and rehabilitation. It disrupts the ulamjlalt pasture use rules and 
norms, which allow herders to leave their locally recognized campsite for flexible 
162 Common practice is by-passing each other when grazing their livestock on same pasture closer to their 
campsites. 
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camping arrangement in different locations in order to pursue their production strategy 
(Chapter 3). There is a trend of using seasonal pastures in the off-season or over time by 
establishing fixed uvuljuu havarjaa. Research in Bayanhongor revealed that uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil works as an incentive for wealthier herders to become sedentary. 
They use their uvuljuu havarjaa "repeatedly to protect improvements and pastures by 
staying in the area" (Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004, p 162). The same 
practice was revealed in the case of Bulgan soum, Umnugovi (Upton, 2005, p 596). In 
addition, with regard to overuse or off-seasonal use of pasture, herders face considerable 
challenges to find locations to establish camps as seasonal pastures become scarce and 
livestock nu1nbers increase. For instance, a Umnugovi case reveals that uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil by wealthy herders extended into summer and autumn pastures 
(Undargaa, 2006). Uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil reportedly hinders herders' flexibility and 
1nobility by limiting them to using the same uvuljuu havarjaa every year (Undargaa, 
2006, p 68). Thus, the repeated use of seasonal pasture or expansion of uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezems hil into other seasonal pasture leads to overgrazing. 
6.2.3. Defining the problem 
The key reason for these outcomes of Mongolia's land reform is related mainly to the 
mechanism of shifting access to pastoral resources: from an infonnal right to use 
campsite to a statutory legal exclusive individual right to possess a campsite. In the 
previous chapter (5), it was shown how scholars agree on the ineffectiveness of local 
administration enforcing ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms: these scholars see it as a 
result of an absence of formal control. Also, in the same chapter, some scholars 
disagreed that herders' pursuit of informal rules and norms in their use of pasture was 
no longer effective in terms of coping with the increasing heterogeneity in bag 
members. However, since the land reform, most scholars have agreed on the position 
that informal institution no longer works as herders did not comply with the ulamjlalt 
rules and norms of pursuing seasonal 1nobility or at least, the ulamjlalt rules and norms 
are contested (various authors cited in Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2008, p 12-13, Upton, 
2009). So1ne scholars predicted the failure of informal control in relation to the land 
law. For example, Sneath (2003) argued that exclusive property rights may hinder the 
existing "skills, techniques, institutions and co-ordination" that herders continue to 
pursue in their pastoral production (Sneath, 2003, p 454). In other words, the land 
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reform legislation would diminish herders' ulamjlalt way accessing to pastoral 
resources. 
In relation to herders' property rights over the pastoral resources, others relate the 
problem to the gap in the current land law. In one way, Tumenbayar (2000) argued that 
the law distinguished pastoral resources as state property. However, it limited herders' 
rights to campsites only, but did not protect their rights to pastoral resources 
(Tumenbayar, 2000). On the other hand, Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan (2004) argued 
that the law protects herders' access to pastoral resources under shared use among the bag 
me1nbers, "but by 1nandating that these re1nain open to all", the Law potentially undermines 
initiatives to grant exclusive tenure over large areas to herding associations or groups to 
1nanage for their collective use ..... 1nake it difficult to implement rangeland co-manage1nent 
schemes that aim to provide secure tenure over large areas of land to 1nanage use among 
their me1nbership" (p 146 & p 163). In other words, the problem is that the law 
acknowledges bag community access, but does not acknowledge the existence of locally 
recognized informal use rights. These arguments focus on how herders, particularly 
poor herders, are losing their locally recognized use rights to pastoral resources 
(Mearns, 2004b, Fernandez-Gi1nenez and Batbuyan, 2004). This occurs particularly 
when local administration neglects to address changes in the herders' access to pastoral 
resources with regard to wealth and local status (Mearns, 2004b ). Thus, the last two 
positions perceive the CPR dilemma in Mongolia as open access condition, which is 
related to the failure of both fonnal and informal control to regulate herders' pasture 
use. 
6.3. Land reform in the HBU case area 
6.3.1. Implementation of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 
Formal control: In the implementation of uvuljuu havarhaa ezemshil, the local bag and 
soum administration has no control over the allocation of uvuljuu havarjaa. In the first 
place, the bag was unable to control the number of livestock and households ( see 
Chapter 5). Following the benign policy on personal income tax for herders' 
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livestock163 , all three bags witnessed a steady increase in livestock numbers 164 as it 
occurred elsewhere (Tumenbayar, 2000). In DD and UU, this growth was a more 
natural growth of livestock under stable weather conditions after the 2000 dzud. At the 
same time, the nu1nber of local households increased not necessarily from migration, 
but from local herders' children forming their own independent herding households 
(Chapter 5). A UU herder explained the increase in herding households: 
A's children (four) have been all married and all B's children [six] got married 
and separated as independent households. They all have their own livestock. In 
the 1900s, they all belonged to one single household" (Interview 4 7). 
Ahnost all participants in DD and UU are locals (Table 6.1) and their children fro1n the 
collective period (Table 6.2), indicating that all migrant herders after 1991-1999 had left 
these bags. This indicates that in DD and UU bags, local official were unable to control 
the natural growth of either livestock or population. 
In contrast, in HBU bag, the government's inability to control migration numbers led to 
an artificial groYvth in livestock numbers of households as a result of the 2000 dzud. 
HBU bag witnessed a steady increase in migrant households with their large herd sizes 
coining to HBU bag. A HBU bag local herder made this observation on the outcome of 
this 1nigration: 
... HBU [ bag] used to be the enterprise with the least number of livestock, but 
now it is the bag with the largest number of livestock and the largest number of 
households with 'one thousand head of livestock'. The reason is that those 
households with a thousand head of livestock came from other areas and 
managed to become residents here (Interview 25). 
Table 6.1 illustrates that 60% of HBU bag respondents had migrated to HBU bag since 
1991. The 1nigrants' movement had become much 1nore dynamic by 2000. In Table 6.2, 
l
63 Herders do not pay a grazing fee, but only maliin huliin tatvar (a tax on livestock). After privatization 
the government adopted a more benign tax policy in order to avoid imposing an excessive tax burden on 
herders, and levied a special reduced income tax on herders. Thus, herders paid only 50MNT ( 4 cents by 
2000) per sheep unit with 100% exemption of tax from a 20 sheep unit per family member for the purpose 
of risk management during severe weather conditions (The law on personal income tax, 1993 ). However, 
under the 2006 law, the amount of tax was increased and fluctuated between 50-1 00MNT per sheep unit 
depending on the province, with fewer and fewer exemptions being allowed. Under this law, they also 
obtain a discount on their tax for creating wells and for paying tuition fees for their children attending 
university (The law on personal income tax, 2006). However, in 2009, the government exempted herders 
from tax on livestock, due to the heavy losses of livestock herders faced during the 2009 dzud (Article 16, 
law on personal income tax 2009 amendments, SDC, 2010). Livestock tax does not earn a significant 
amount of revenue for the central government as it only covers 2% of the national budget, but it is 
important for the revenue of soum governments (SDC 2010). 
164 According to Bruce and Mearns (2002), herders increased the numbers of their livestock rather than 
selling due to the unfavorable market price after the privatization. 
154 
it can be seen that the majority of these migrant herders in HBU bag had been herding 
elsewhere since 1991 165 , indicating their herding background and therefore their need to 
pursue otor in HBU bag. 
Table .6.1 Migration status by bags 
Inward migration 
by 2010 
Before 1990 
1991-1994 
1995-1999 
Since 2000 
Total (n=97) 
Participating households by 
bae (by%) 
HBU DD UU 
40 96 100 
18 0 0 
18 0 0 
25 4 0 
40 23 34 
Table 6.2 Herding experience by bag 
Herding Experience 
Collective herders since 1958 
Transition herders since 1991 
New herders since 2005 
Total l n 
Participating 
households by bag 
(by%) 
HBU DD UU 
10 52 18 
75 43 68 
15 4 15 
40 23 34 
Local officials were unable to control migration, because the migrant herders employed 
certain mechanisms when accessing pastoral resources. First, they employ otor as an 
ulamjlalt 1nechanis1n to gain access to pastoral resources. A HBU bag official described 
the migrant herders' strategy as follows: "They would go on otor for two or three years, 
and perhaps after staying one year here, they would apply for a certificate [ of uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil]" (Interview 14). In addition, the migrant herders use legal migration 
to legiti1nize their access to pastoral resources as local herders (see Chapter 5). After 
they gained access to the pastoral resources through otor, they employ uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil to legally maintain their access. Thus the increase in livestock and population 
i1nplies an increasing de1nand for uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. 
Secondly, the local administration lacks an effective residential registration system, 
which diminished their capacity to control the allocation of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. 
Although authorized to do so, the local administration has limited authority to control 
the process of campsite allocation for the increasing number of households. Their role in 
t
65 This includes children of collective herders. 
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regulating access to uvuljuu havarjaa is lin1ited to the bag governors registering the 
application. In this registration, a bag governor first ensures the application is from a 
resident of the bag (including migrant herders, who became residents) and that they are 
in the 'A' list, which is a soum list made up from the livestock census. The local 
administration registers a family member who is at least 18 years old and married or 
separated from their parents. This list confirms that the member is from an independent, 
livestock-owning household (Interview 14). Although a valid criterion for claiming 
residency registration, membership of the 'A list' is problematic for local authorities in 
controlling access to uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. In HBU bag there are many young 
households that are considered independent herding households and whose livestock is 
counted separately fro1n that of their parents. However, in all three bags, it was not 
unusual for these young families stay with their parents or stay on the same uvuljuu 
havarjaa despite legally owning their separate campsites. Moreover, the 'A list' 
apparently includes those who own the livestock, and also includes those who reside in 
the village or soum centre and are not full-time herders. According to a UU official, 
"Campsite possession is allowed for 'citizens who own livestock'. This is, even I 
possess 1ny own winter and spring campsites ... They can be there or they can allow 
their herders to stay there" (Interview 54). Thus, in all three bags, it was a very common 
strategy for anyone on the 'A list' to claim uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshilJ thereby 
increasing the demand for uvuljuu havarjaa. 
However, bag officials exercise particular control over access to uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil by providing clearance/reference letters. In all three bags, this bureaucratic 
process establishes the power of bag governors. The extent of exercising this power 
differs in the three bags due to the differences in their institutional backgrounds. In DD 
and UU, the implementation remained a1nbiguous and chaotic at the beginning. For 
instance, one of the UU officials recalled that 
... When uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi! was allowed at the beginning, the process 
was perhaps quite messy, there was no· specific land planning ... , it was approved 
either by land officer or bag governor. So anybody who thought he had the legal 
authority approved it; that is why there are many disputes like 'this is mine or 
this is yours' (Interview 5 6) 
Currently, this process is being straightened out in UU and DD bags, because the bag 
governors now compile the application documents directly for the soum level 
government land office, which processes the application form for the soum governor's 
approval. 
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However, the bag official still exercises certain control in the HBU bag. This procedural 
bureaucratic process advantages HBU bag officials, who enjoy the status of governing 
the village and the former territory of the reserve pasture area (RP A). Their legal status 
as a village allows the HBU bag governor to head its own land office separate from the 
soum. A HBU bag/village official described their involvement in uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil as " ... we [HBU bag administration] have a role in passing all documents 
[between local soum governor and herders], because we are a bag" (Interview 21). 
However, instead of the soum land officer, the HBU bag land officer processes 
application requests for uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil, checking, for example, whether the 
requested uvuljuu havarjaa has been claimed by others. Then, the HBU bag/village 
governor essentially approves it by issuing a clearance document for the soum 
governor's signature 166 . This indicates that the HBU bag/village administration plays a 
significant role in approving ones uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. 
HBU bag officials exercise their power over uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil to protect their 
interest (see Chapter 5). Migration provides them with an opportunity to maintain the 
village population by allowing the migrant herders to claim uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. 
A local HBU bag herder reported the bag official's position on migration: " ... If we 
allow this many households, then we would qualify as a village, with our own 
independence" (Interview 20). A HBU bag official also affirms this: "Yes, they 
[migrant herders] would be included, that's how we reached a population of 500 or 
more and became a village]" (Interview 21 ). Maintaining their village status and 
governing independent state budget increases their importance when dealing with the 
ministry and with n1igrant and otor herders to access to uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil in 
HBU RP A, even if there is no capacity for other seasonal pasture. For that reason, to 
legiti1nize their access, migrant herders deal with HBU bag officials rather than HBU 
bag herders or Delgerhaan soum officials. 
Local HBU bag herders complained that HBU bag officials did not do anything to stop 
the migration, because migration was useful for them in governing the scarce reserve 
pasture. One of the participants articulated his perception of HBU bag officials conduct 
166 As a result, the HBU bag governor by early 2000 was acting as the legitimate authority issuing more 
campsites in DD territory. This led to disputed claims among HBU and DD bag households over the same 
campsites, which will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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as follows: "This is very different in the HBU bag territory, because this is RP A. This is 
sort of an unofficial statement by locals; people are allowed to becorne residents there 
with some sort of bribe" (Interview 25). This concern resonated from several other 
participants from all three bags including UU, because migrant herders claimed RP A 
winter pasture in valleys, which UU households use historically for otor movement. In 
fact, the HBU bag officials' perception of the bag capacity for seasonal pasture is 
contradictory. Some migrant herders cannot claim havarjaa ezemshil as well as summer 
and auturnn pasture in the river valley. Although aware of the shortage of seasonal 
pasture for migrant households, HBU bag officials have left the matter to the herders to 
resolve. According to one of the officials, 
... Once they come, then I will decide to [ register them as resident] and allow 
them to possess a winter uvuljuu havarjaa, because we have plenty of winter 
uvuljuu sites ... About havarjaa, we tell them to arrange spring camping by 
themselves. We have nowhere else to send them for camping (Interview 23 ). 
Thus, regardless of the local capacity to host migrant herders, local officials exercise 
their power to maintain the bag population for their own benefit. 
Although bag officials allow migrant herders to claim uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil, it is 
questionable whether bag officials are effective in controlling the allocation of the 
uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi! for improving local pasture management. The officials in all 
three bags de facto allow herders to select their uvuljuu havarjaa before any formal 
application process due to the herders' independent control over production. According 
to one HBU bag official: "Herders decide; that's actually easier for us, because we can 
say that 'this was your decision [to 1nake your uvitjluu javarjaa ezemshil here]" 
(Interview 25). Bag officials were aware that herders' selection of uvuljuu havarjaa 
means selection of nutag, their pasture area, which is an important concern for their 
production. Thus, they turned a blind eye to the different strategies exercised by the 
herders' with regard to gaining access to uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. 
Informal control over uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil: Herders' selection of their uvuljuu 
havarjaa is based on careful production strategies, particularly in a situation of depleted 
pastoral resources (see Chapter 5). A local HBU bag herder explained the de facto 
process of possessing campsite in all three bags: "We select a place and then inform the 
local administration where we want our winter place to be established" (Interview 8). 
Since herders control the production, as had occurred elsewhere, they employ uvuljuu 
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havarjaa ezems hil as a legal mechanism to gain and maintain access to their new nu tag, 
local pastoral resources 167 . Thus, local herders carefully consider their selection of 
uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil as it was to become their legal property168 . Whilst their 
residency has been transferred, migrant households also go through the process of 
selecting buuts which is dependent on their type of production 169 . As a result, the 
increasing number of herding households selecting their uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 
based on their production leads to competition for best pastoral areas in their choice of 
nutag. 
As elsewhere, herders employed family splitting strategies to be able to utilize uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil as a legal mechanism to clai1n more pastoral resources. The HBU 
case reveals that this strategy is usually to their advantage, but depends on their status as 
a local or 1nigrant herder. There are overlapping forms of this strategy. One form was 
for the local herders in three bags to use a connection with local officials. A migrant 
herder shared this observation: 
.. .If you were working in or had a history of working for the local administration 
at an earlier ti1ne, then they were very good at this kind of strategy. They 
registered several uvuljuu havarjaa that they wanted under their children's 
na1nes, when they were powerful. Now they are all retired and managing those 
uvuljuu havarjaa ... This kind of strategy was often employed by those who 
worked at the local administration. Otherwise, not all households would be able 
to do such things (Interview 7). 
It is popular strategy in Mongolia for households to claim uvuljuu havarjaa in close 
proxi1nity in order to control access to larger pastoral areas. Thus, a second form was 
for herders to involve extended family members to expand claims over pasture. For 
migrant households, this form involves their relatives. A local HBU bag herder 
observed that: 
167 This is not for excluding others from sharing the pasture around thier campsite (seep 152, chapter 6). 168 As discussed in Chapter 5, in all three bags, spring pasture was a strategically important seasonal 
pasture for production. Most herders in all three bags legally possessed their havarjaa along the river 
since they had livestock shelters there (see previous chapter 5). In terms of winter uvuljuu, it has to be a 
spot where thick buuts has already accumulated, in a location which receives less snowfall and provides 
more protection from the wind for accessing winter grass. In the HBU and DD bag cases, local herders 
and early migrants mainly claimed old buuts or hond on HBU Mountain, but these were usually close to 
their havarjaa and village. Simultaneously, herders also continued to use other un-owned buuts as they 
were nnecessary for their production strategy. This is because of the abundant availability of other buuts 
in the area. This indicates that uvuljuu ezemshil had not become the main legal mechanism to gain access 
to pastoral resources in HBU bag. 
169 As discussed in Chapter 5, the herding patterns of migrant households differ from those of local 
herders and shape their selection of uvuljuu havarjaa. Similar to the patterns adopted by earlier migrant, 
new migrants sought mountainous or steppe terrain which they were used to for herding livestock. 
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... his wife is related to those households, who came from [ western aimags]. 
Through her, over 10 households arrived in the HBU [bag]. Then another 
household[X] also brought many households from a [ western aimag] and 
elsewhere. They are all his relatives (Interview 18). 
Local herders reported that this manner of expansion also affected the locals' spnng 
pasture as they were neighbours. This indicates that migrant herders are expanding their 
claim of pasture by establishing more campsites. A third form, in all three bags, 
involves herders' non-herding family members in A list to claim more pasture. A local 
HBU bag herder shared this observation: 
... They do get more uvuljuu havarjaa because of their relatives who live in the 
village, eg, a son who lives in the village centre. They would have/possess all 
the buuts around their own uvuljuu havarjaa in their relatives' names and 
prevent others/outsider households from camping around them. For instance, 
most households own around 500 livestock. Then if one household has five 
members who are all adults, then they would all possess uvuljuu havarjaa (Interview 7) 
Migrant herders also use the identities of their family members elsewhere. They obtain 
legal residency for these family 1nembers. Regardless of these absent members' status 
as herders, they legitimize their claims over uvuljuu havarjaa. A local HBU bag herder 
explained this strategy as follows: 
... They would belong to the HBU bag at the beginning and get their uvuljuu and 
then later those family members would transfer their residency to Baganuur or 
to the city [Ulaanbaatar]. Meanwhile, household members who stayed behind 
[here] would keep those uvuljuu havarjaa certificates that had been given to 
other 1nembers of the household and had already left for other areas. It actually 
is a rule that the local administration is supposed to take your name off the 
residency list of the HBU bag if you move or transfer your residency elsewhere. 
But it does not happen (Intervievv 7). 
These forms show how the fainily splitting strategy often involves the authority of the 
local administration to legitimize other members' claim' to pastoral resources 170 . 
Moreover, this family splitting strategy challenges the legal notions of the individual 
household or family as more often uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil is likely to be granted to 
individuals rather than to a household vvith several family members. One of the officials 
raised his concern, 
This situation requires state policy [ of clarification]; a household is something 
like a married couple separated from their parents with their own private assets 
170 Herders are able to employ the family splitting strategy because of the use of the 'A list', which acts 
as an ineffective formal control over the migration mechanism, for their own advantage and split their family to claim more pasture. 
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and property. These days, one senior lady would separate from her adult son and 
then she would be considered as a single household. Then the meaning of a 
household is sort of lost. It is more likely that there are two or three households 
in one ger (Interview 24). 
Thus, besides the problematic 'A' list (Chapter 6), herders also reworked the ambiguous 
notion of the individual household in order to gain access to productive resources like 
legal campsite possession or project aid 171 as these are granted to an individual 
household. Although it may seem that open access prevails in the selection of uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil, to some extent both informal and formal control still prevail over 
access to uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. In particular, individual herding households have 
more informal control than the local administration. A migrant herder in the HBU bag 
shared his experience of claiming uvuljuu havarjaa as follows: 
... Well, it was difficult at the beginning [to settle]. Locals are fro1n here, that's 
why their attitude towards ezemshil was quite different; they would claim 'this is 
mine or that is mine' etc they would come and show their temper or tell us off (Interview 23 ). 
This indicates that herders employ the legal uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil also for 
controlling someone gaining access to pastoral resources through legal possession of 
campsites. 
However, legal campsite possession becomes a mechanism for herders to gain access to 
pasture rather than to exclusively manage pastoral resources. As elsewhere, legal 
possession of a campsite does not refer to excluding others from sharing the pasture 
between their campsites. A DD herder explained the reason: 
... since there is no exact definition, it does not matter whose livestock it is. Even [if] my livestock is out near that household, they would not chase ours away. 
They would pass their livestock by ours avoiding mixture .. .It is better not to 
define the boundary of pasture, in general. We always 1nanage to pass our herds 
by others depending on the possibility ... If we define the boundary, it will make 
things worse, causing local conflict (Interview 26). 
The distance between flocks observed by herders in grazing and sharing pasture around 
their cainpsites depends on specific terrain 172 , which shapes herders' decisions on where 
to build camp and thus, the distance between campsites. Otherwise, as another 
participant in DD explained, " ... there is not an exact definite radius, which indicates 
171 This problematic notion of household also artificially inflates the number of poor households and both herders and local officials take advantage of it to distribute or receive aid (Interview 24 ). 172 Who uses how much depends on herd size 
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'you can or cannot go further than this"' (Interview 29). Thus, the herders still confonn 
to zuruulj ideh (passing by) (Interview 8, 26 & 40), the ulamjlalt ways of sharing 
pasture in acknowledgement of the diversity in terrain 173 . 
Despite the fact that local herders are aware of who uses which campsites in an informal 
manner, formal control (if they cannot control where and how 1nany campsites are built) 
also plays a role as herders often legitimize their ezemshil by obtaining a possession 
certificate from the local administration. A local HBU bag herder explained other 
herders' claims over uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil: 
When we go and try to claim a uvuljuu havarjaa, because we basically know 
who camps on which uvuljuu havarjaa all the time, one of the locals would 
clai1n that this was their camp and they already possessed the one we were trying 
to get. Then I would say 'what do you mean, your uvuljuu havarjaa is that one (meaning another different uvuljuu havarjaa)', then he would say 'this belongs 
to our son'. But then the son would be staying in the city or elsewhere ... Even 
we can claim uvuljuu havarjaa in that way ... But, then everybody is aware of 
who uses which one (Interview 7). 
Thus, both bag (clearance) and soum officials ( approval) exercise a certain amount of 
power over the herders' ability to control access, because of their legal authority to 
approve permits for uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. 
Table 6.3 Seasonal uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil by bag 
Uvuljuu havarjaa Bag households (by %) Total 
Ezemshil HBU 17-t DD11s uu116 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Winter 97 ') 96 4 81 19 .) 
Sering 65 35 83 17 78 22 
Total ill_) 37 23 32 92 
173 Ulamjlalt management pattern includes rehabilitation through seasonal movements and rotations 174 In 2004, there were 30 households who legally possessed uvuljuu havarjaanii buutsnii gazar (Interview 14). Now, since 2009, several new households reside in the HBU bag. Since 2009 17 new 
winter and 13 new spring uvuljuu hava,jaanii buutsnii gazar certificates have been issued in 2011-2-15-
decree 16 of soum governor. These applications for uvuljuu havarjaanii buutsnii gazar were all from 
HBU bag. In 2011- 2012 no outsiders came to the HBU bag as residents (Interview 25). By 2010, there 
were 209 winter uvuljuu havarjaanii buutsnii gazar registered and herders ( overlapping) registered to 
possess (not clear whether de jure or de facto) 101 of these uvuljuu havarjaanii buutsnii gazar (HBU bag 
document, 2010.03.12). There are 32 herders registered as HBU bag herders and 31 registered as households with livestock (HBU bag document 2010.01.18). 
175 In DD, according to a bag document, 78 herding households possess winter and spring uvuljuu havarjaanii buutsnii gazar. However, 7-8 households in the bag do not possess a uvuljuu havarjaanii buutsnii gazar . 
176 In UU, according to a soum document, 93 winter uvuljuu havarjaanii buutsnii gazar and 83 spring 
uvuljuu havarjaanii buutsnii gazar are owned by residents (Interview 42). 
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Nevertheless, these patterns of exerc1s1ng both informal and formal control over 
selecting uvuljuu havarjaa and nutag have resulted in the concentration 177 of uvuljuu 
havarjaa. Over 95% (n=97) of all participants legally possess either uvuljuu or havarjaa 
or both in all three areas. However, the concentration of seasonal uvuljuu havarjaa 
differs due to the differences in the terrain of the bags. As shown in Table 6.3, in HBU 
bag, the majority of those who possess uvuljuu havarjaa have legally clai1ned more 
uvuljuu than havarjaa ezemshil. In general, HBU herders were able to clai1n more 
uvuljuu ezems hi! due to the abundance of winter pastureland in the unoccupied former 
HBU RP A. In terms of havarjaa ezemshil, mainly local households claimed all 
available havarjaa in the spring pastureland in the central and northern HBU bag 
territory. Thus, the migrant herders were less able to claim havarjaa ezemshil, because 
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Figure 6.1 HBU bag participants' migration status by herd size 
they owned a herd larger than that of the local herders (Figure 6.1 ). In other words, 
having a large herd shapes ones ability to access pastoral resources depending on the 
context. Such ownership enables access for local herders and complicates the process 
for migrant herders in trying to find seasonal nutag in a crowded area 178 . 
The lack of access by herders to valuable havarjaa had implications for pasture 
management in the HBU case area. The scarcity of spring pasture led to a changing 
trend in seasonal pasture use in the HBU bag. First, the number of uvuljuu ezemshil 
increased in the mountains. Most migrant households from western aimags knew that 
the HBU bag lacked spring pasture, from their experience of doing otor. However, they 
in It is impossible to calculate the range of the distances travelled between seasonal mobility in all three 
areas. This is because the three areas differ immensely between and within each other due to differences 
in terrain, thus the availability of seasonal pasture. 
l ?S A migrant herder in the HBU bag shared his experience of finding a havarjaa: "The households who 
lived here before [us] got their [ spring] uvuljuu havarjaa earlier at the beginning [ of the privatization] in 
the river area for spring, summer and autumn (Interview 21) ... We do not have havarjaa ... So it looks 
like it is quite hard to find spring pasture" (Interview 23). They were not even able to employ havarjaa 
ezemshil as a mechanism to gain access to seasonal pasture due to the lack of spring pastoral resources in 
HBU bag territory. Otherwise, once found a nutag and campsite, then large herd uses more pasture 
around the campsite, depending on the available pasture around the campsite. 
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claimed uvuljuu ezemshil in the HBU Mountain for grazing in both the winter and 
spring seasons. This led to them over-staying on winter pasture. Second, 1nigrants from 
the Gobi established increasing numbers of havarjaa ezemshil on the south-eastern 
steppe of the HBU bag. However, they also expanded their establishment to the summer 
and autu1nn pasture in the river valley. Thus, these two trends resulted in changes in the 
herders' off-season pasture use practices as havarjaa establishment expanded to winter 
or summer/autumn pastures in the HBU bag. Unlike in the HBU bag, the 1najority of 
DD and UU households were able to secure access to spring pastoral resources by using 
this family splitting strategy. 
6.3.2. Implementation of pastureland management 
The state needs to focus on herders' production management in order to regulate 
pastureland. The local administration's lack of involvement in controlling the important 
production components diminishes its ability to exercise formal control over access to 
both uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi! and pasture land at the same time. This has occurred 
because, firstly, the lack of a strict tax system on livestock affects pasture management 
in all three bags. The increasing number of migrant households with large numbers of 
-livestock has led to establishing more uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil, because the capacity 
for each campsite is limited to 1000 livestock. One of the participants who were 
concerned about the lack of a 1nechanism to control the number of livestock in a 
condition of depleted pastoral resources co1nmented that: " .... There should be a tax on 
those who have 1000 livestock. This way, there will be a limit on the increasing 
nu1nbers of livestock. The pasture is getting worse, due to the increasing nu1nbers of 
livestock and 1nining" (Questionnaire 49). This indicates that herders were able to 
increase their livestock under the extren1ely benign tax policy. 
Secondly, besides controlling pastoral production with a livestock tax 179, the state needs 
to put in place less ambiguous legal mechanisms to control access to pastoral resources. 
Currently, the land law is full of contradictory provisions for local administrations to 
regulate access to campsites and pastureland. State regulation of pastureland involves 
not only bag governors processing uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil applications, but also the 
bag hural, which is authorized to regulate the use and protection of communal use of 
179 SDC (2010) argued that controlling herd size with tax alone does not necessarily change herders ' 
behaviour towards the sustainable use of pasture and may contribute to exacerbating poverty. They 
assume "neither tax nor subsidies alone cannot solve open access problem" (SDC 2010, p 3). 
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pastoral resources at bag level 180 . Under these provisions, bag officials have attempted 
to address the impact of HBU bag migration on pasture management in all three bags. 
They agree that they have no power to say 'no' to migration because of the migrant's 
constitutional rights (Interview 14, 24 ). Yet, they have interpreted their legal power 
under the constitution and the land law differently and defend their own interests in 
regulating access to pastureland. DD bag officials perceive herders' migration as purely 
a policy matter, which can be resolved at the bag Hural. 
... We used to allow them [migrants] to apply for uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. 
These days, we have no place to give them uvuljuu havarjaa" (Interview 24) 
... Regarding conditions that there are too many livestock and not enough 
capacity of pastureland, we [ bag hural] passed a decree saying that we cannot 
allow migration of citizens with livestock within our bag territory (Interview 
36). 
The HBU bag officials disagree with this position of DD bag, arguing that this decree 
impedes human ( constitutional) rights (Interview 21 & 36). HBU bag officials perceive 
that bag Hural power is limited in making such decisions: 
... We are not supposed to intervene so much in the issue of uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil. The bag Hural should only discuss and decide whether we support an 
entity that wants to possess land or carry out a business activity ... We [ bag 
Hural] can issue a decree, but not in serious matters that would break laws or 
abuse power (Interview 22). 
Although there is no clear evidence of misconduct by local officials in their processing 
of application of the carnpsite possession, they maintain contradictory positions about 
their legal authority. This indicates that bag officials' interpretation of their legal power 
over uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil is contested. 
This contestation is related to the ambiguities in the land law in articulating the 
authority of soum and bag governors as well as soum and bag Hurals in regulating 
access to uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil and pastureland. First, bag and soum hural land 
management planning is supposed to shape allocation of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. The 
legal interpretation of this process is similar in both Bayanjargalan and Delgerhaan 
soums. As stated by one soum official: 
... The soum administration is supposed to approve the soum annual land 
management plan, which is based on each bag Hural defining its territorial 
180 Article 22.2.2, Land law, 2002 
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pastoral capacity, and indicating 'in our bag there is capacity for uvuljuu or how 
many winter or havarjaa we can allow for ezemshil' (Interview 25). 
On the ground, bag and soum governors and Hurals cannot control herders' de facto 
selection of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. They already have limited legal authority to 
object to an individual ' s right to uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. Also, herders select their 
ca1npsites based on their production. 
However, local officials interpret this gap in control according to the local capacity of 
the pastoral resources. DD officials attempt to control by limiting uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil to local herders only. It perceives that it has no capacity for more migrant 
households claiming uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil to select their nutag seasonal pasture 
with their large numbers of livestock. Local households have already claimed all 
available spots for uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil splitting their herds into smaller sizes for 
better production outcomes. Assuming all DD and UU households are local herders, 
fewer households with 700 livestock in DD use HBU Mountain than those in HBU bag 
(Figure 6.2). In other words, fewer households need 1nore campsites through family 
splitting as families have already split, and own smaller herds. UU bag has more 
households with more than 700 livestock, but it has a much larger seasonal territory 
than HBU and DD bags. In contrast, the HBU bag officials perceive they cannot 
exercise control, because HBU Mountain has the capacity of the abundant old RP A 
buuts 18 1. This perception attracts migrant herders to try to secure access to pastoral 
resources only by uvuljuu ezemshil. 
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Figure 6.2 Participants ' herd size by bag 
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ts t About 60% of the DD winter pasture area is included in the RP A (Interview 24). That is why many DD households possess winter uvuljuu havarjaanii buutsnii gazar in the RP A. The DD spring area is not included in the RP A, but it is heavily used by otor households from the Gobi, because it is the corridor to the HBURPA. 
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A second gap is that the bag Hural exercises more de facto authority on the ground in 
regulating pastureland than the soum 's de jure authority. The bag governor has the legal 
authority to ensure the implementation of decrees issued by bag and soum Hurals on 
pastoral issues 182 . At the same time, the bag Hural has legal discretion over decrees and 
1 1 . 183 d d. 184 h. h b d b .d ' proposa s on pastora issues an 1sputes , w 1c are ase on ag res1 ents 
com1nents and requests, for the soum Hural 's approval 185 . DD bag Hural therefore 
argues that it has the authority by law to issue a decree limiting the arrival of migrant 
households. In contrast, the HBU bag Hural perceives that it is illegal for HBU bag to 
forbid migrant households to claim uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. Meanwhile, the soum 
Hural also experiences ambiguity in its authority. The soum hural and the government 
are authorized to approve uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil regarding an individual's 
constitutional rights. At the same time, it is also authorized to approve bag Hural 
decrees regarding pastoral issues based on soum hural decisions. However, the soum 's 
approval of these two resources ( campsites and pasture issue) is supposed to be based 
on the bag Hural 's land management planning186 and its decrees on pasture 
1nanagement. Thus the soum Hural faces a dilemma in making decisions over 
pastureland management vs. migration as soum Hural members including bag Hural 
heads, who are from different bags, are often defending their own interests. 
Officials in both the HBU and DD bags use these gaps as an opportunity to solidify 
their authority and maintain control over pastoral resources in the RP A for their own 
benefit187 . On one hand, HBU bag officials employ their authority to maintain their 
village status and gain personal benefit by helping migrant herders gain and maintain 
access to pastoral resources 188 . Participants 189 from all three bags challenged HBU bag 
182 It appears that during the peak migration period there was no clarification by earlier soum and bag 
officials regarding speedy migration. 
183 Article 22.1.1, Land law 2002 
184 Article 52.10, Land law, 2002 
185 Article 52.2, Land law, 2002 
186 Article 7.1.3-7.1.5, Methodology for soum annual land management plan, Agency for Land affairs, 
Geodesy and Cartography, Ulaanbaatar (2006) 
187 Exercising control over herders' access to pastureland is a significant role for local officials to 
maintain their authority over the pastoral resources. The influence of local administration is reducing as 
they have less to control over taxes (see Chapter 5). 
188 Saum has no legal authority to say 'no' to uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil, once it is de facto allowed at the 
bag level. As a result of these gaps, since 2009 the Delgerhaan soum administration has allowed 1 7 new 
winter and 13 new havarjaa under the decree of 2011-2-15, following the migration trend. Yet, these 
uvuljuu havarjaa applications were all from HBU bag (Interview 25). 189 There are many such quotes from herders from all three areas regarding the increasing number of 
migrant households taking over RP A sites for otor. This is also a serious matter for DD herders, whose 
winter uvuljuu havarjaanii buutsnii gazar are in the RP A, thus otor and migrant herders are expanding to 
DD winter pasture areas and competing with locals. 
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officials' position on migration, as a few officials control the HBU bag Hural and 
influence its policy. For instance, herders from HBU bag perceive that the HBU bag 
Hural reflects more the opinion of the officials than that of its herders 190 . On the other 
hand, DD bag officials employ their authority to reduce the impact of migration on their 
pastoral resources. HBU bag officials also criticized DD officials' concerns as coming 
only from a few wealthy herders, who are in the bag Hural and are trying to control the 
pastoral resources in the RP A (Interview 22). However, the evidence suggests that the 
position of the DD bag also represents its bag residents' interests. Regardless of wealth, 
DD participants, whose winter pasture was located in the RP A, shared their concerns 
that their seasonal pasture was being affected by otor and migrant households 
(Interview 24, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36 & 37). 
6.3.3. Outcomes of the implementation of the uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 
Several important institutional, social and environmental outcomes arise from the 
implementation of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. 
Institutional outcomes: In the HBU case area, certain changes occurred in the informal 
practices of pasture use rules. The ineffectiveness of the local administration led to 
individual herding households controlling access to pastoral resources as they control 
the livestock. As shown in Table 6.4, 1nore than half of the respondents are content with 
the herders' making decisions on daily pasture management given the current 
circumstances ( climatic, socio-economic and legal) of regulating pasture use 191 . This 
reflects the historical pattern of 'those who control the production manage the pasture 
use' 
192
. However, herders are still concerned about the impact on their pasture of 
migration and disputes over its use. They consider that the local administration needs to 
address these issues since it has the legal authority to regulate jurisdictional land use. 
The dile1nma is that the state created a legal environment in which neither the state nor 
19
° Fewer people in fact attend the meeting. Those, who do attend are usually bound to officials for guidance in making policy. 
191 This is because local officials cannot decide even in the case of disputes between different applicants 
over the same uvuljuu havarjaa. For instance in UU bag, the local officials ' role is limited to mediating 
the matter for negotiation among the claimants (Interview 40 & 50). Also, herders are reluctant to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the current law, or its capacity to regulate pastoral resources as herders 
own their private livestock. 
192 In this time of independent herding management, herders are aware that their access strategy to pastoral resources is after all shaped by their production. A UU herder explained: "Well, it depends on how many livestock they have and how long they would stay around here etc ... Usually, households with 
many livestock do not come and stay around here, because they also need to look at the availability of the pasture ... " (Interview 48). 
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an individual or a group herding households have a formal institution 193 to control the 
labour component of production. 
Table 6.4 Most practically involved actors in regulating daily pasture use and the satisfaction 194 
_ActoEs (n-=2_7) _______ _ 
Daily pasture management 
(multiple choices allowed) 
Scale 
- -- ---------Satisfaction 
Herders 
99 
Satisfied 
52 
By percentage 
Neutral 
31 
Local administration 
12 
Dissatisfied 
18 
Second, the herders' changing mobility patterns differ among the local and migrant 
herders. As shown in Table 6.5, local herders in all three bags pursue the off-seasonal 
use of autumn and summer pastures. Local herders were interested in maintaining 
access to more pastoral resources within their jurisdiction due to the increasing de1nand 
for pasture resources and concerns over possible legislation of pasture ezemshil 
(Interview 48). This access maintenance would compensate the herders for the fixed 
Table 6.5 Impact of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil on changing pasture use rules and norms 
Actors Institutional Change Reason - Mechanism 
background Purpose Factors 
(Local herders) Bag/village & Control 
HBU RPA Off-season use of other's Weather Legal 
summer & ability to Need for uvuljuu 
autumn pasture gam recompensmg havarjaa DD&UU Bag access to flexibility in ezemshil 
more seasonal 
seasonal movement 
----
pasture 
-
-HBU Overstaying on Legal 
migrant herders) spring pasture 11.) uvuljuu ;..... 
;::i 
havarjaa >-, ....... Ul ....... ro . ....... 
ezemshil - 0.. ........ 
..D 
-Summer & 0 ro Informal s s::::: autumn seasonal 0 long-
-
Ul ro ro 
mobility outside s::::: 11.) distance 0 Ul 
of the Ul 4-, ro 0 cross-11.) 
~ jurisdictional if] C) territorial 
territory ro ~ otor 
movement 
193 Local jurisdiction used to control migration movements, but now it only registers them. Informally, herders balanced labour through production under jurisdictional control, but since this type of jurisdiction has no control over migration, this informal practice has weakened. 194 This survey was conducted in May 2010 when herders were in their spring camps. Some of the 
respondents were in their winter pasture in the mountains as they either had no spring place or their spring place was not good pasture. 
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uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil and offer more flexibility for their alternative camping in 
unstable weather conditions 195 . Thus, herders expanded their legal havarjaa ezemshil to 
summer and autumn pasture even though they are not allowed to possess summer 
cainping areas (Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6 Seasonal mobility patterns of the local households with uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 
Seasons Seasonal Duration Camping Territory 
mobility (flexible) Locations 
Winter Winter November-April In the mountain or the lower HBU, DD, UU 
mountain slopes between the 
mountain/hill and river 
Spring Spring April-June In the lower mountain slopes HBU,DD, UU 
between the mountain/hill and river 
Summer Summer June-September Along the river grass HBU, DD, UU 
Autumn Autumn September- In the lower mountain slopes HBU, DD, UU 
November between the mountain/hill and river 
For instance, HBU bag herders build new havarjaa near the spacious su1nmer pastures. 
This has occurred si1nilarly in DD and UU (Photo 6.2). A local UU herder observed 
that: 
... The herders behind us, X, built a shelter, but another herder S claims that this 
was his havarjaa buuts. So, essentially, there are more havarjaa being built 
along the river. .. [These are actually summer pasture], Yes [now it is given for 
havarjaa]" (Interview 48). 
Local herders are under the impression that they need to utilize uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil as the 1nechanism to legitimize via legal means their user rights of other 
seasonal pastures. This condition invites herders to stay on their uvuljuu havarjaa off-
season. 
195 In 2010, HBU, UU and DD bags were seriously affected by drought as summer began with rain in 
June and the green grass had completely dried up due to heat over 40C degrees with no more rain. This 
continued until late September, and then cold rain fell and damaged the last remaining river grass for 
fattening the livestock before the cold winter. Grazing conditions were quite bad, particularly because the drought was followed by a serious dzud in 2009, when otor herders filled HBU Mountain and grazed over 
all the pasture in the winter and spring of 2009 and 2010. 
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HBU bag migrant herders pursue off-seasonal winter pasture use in the mountain due to 
lack of spring and other seasonal pasture in the river valley. A 1nigrant HBU bag herder 
explaining his strategy for this as follows: 
... We stay there in the open [mountain] in order to deliver our baby livestock. 
We do not have a havarjaa. Those, who came to the HBU [bag] a long ti1ne ago 
already, have places. So, it looks like it is quite hard to find a spring place ... We 
move often [for other season] and for greater distances . When we move from X 
to here, it took us 4-5 days. That is around 200km (Interview 23) 196 . 
Photo 6.2: Spring campsite next to the river. 
In other words, for half the year they overstay in HBU Mountain to pursue winter and 
spring mobility. Moreover, as shown in Table 6. 7, they also pursue seasonal mobility 
outside of their jurisdiction. Since they have no access to a specific spring campsite, 
they have no access to sum1ner and autumn pasture. Thus, they employ the ulamjlalt 
mobility rule of long distance cross-territorial otor movement to gain access to seasonal 
pasture elsewhere197 when they face a shortage of pasture in their jurisdictional territory. 
196 Twice, I drove 200km one way to another aimag and soum territory to pursue one of the migrant 
household for an interview during the summer and autumn. I missed him both times, only to meet his 
wife in the HBU RP A the following winter. 
197 These households seek out access to pasture not just anywhere they prefer, but available spacious 
pastoral areas elsewhere and gain access through local connections. The area they spend summer and 
autumn was available as it was less crowded due to the absence of some local households, many of whom 
had lost their livestock and migrated to urban areas. Thus, these herders went there to rely on relatives, 
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This signifies changes have occurred in the informal control over access to pastoral 
resources. 
Table 6.7 Seasonal mobility patterns of the migrant households without havarjaa ezemshil 
Seasons Seasonal Duration Camping Territory 
campmg (flexible) Locations 
Winter Winter November-April In the mountain HBU 
Spring Spring April-June In the mountain HBU 
Summer Summer June-September X Elsewhere outside of HBU 
Autumn Autumn September-November X Elsewhere outside ofHBU 
Environmental outcomes: In all three bags, changes occurred in the herders' seasonal 
mobility which resulted in a reduction of the distances between campsites and the use of 
different seasonal pastures. As a result, first, the concentration of uvuljuu havarjaa 
increases the grazing pressure from livestock between campsites. A local UU herder 
shared her concern: "In the river valley, other households built their shelters close to 
existing spring shelters and it affects those who already possess havarjaa nearby; in 
terms of pasture, these are too close, less than 500m sometimes" (Interview 49). 
Second, the expansion of havarjaa to other seasonal pastures leads to crowding. In DD, 
a local herder noted that "The havarjaa increased and there are no more reserve pastures 
[in the bag] anymore. This has resulted in the shortage of pastur:_eland" (Interview36). 
Table .6.8 The participants' perception of challenges to pursuing mobile pastoralism 
Challenging issues Bag households (multiple 
choices allowed) (by %) 
HBU DD uu 
Public services ,..., 0 ,..., _J _J 
Water 10 13 6 
Overgrazing 60 43 38 
Livestock thievery 50 57 32 
Mining 0 ,..., 18 _J 
Other 53 22 68 
Total {Q2 40 23 34 
This indicates reduced mobility distance within and between seasonal pastures, which 
leads to constant grazing pressure. A local UU herder said that: "Local households are 
too crowded, the pasture is becoming worse. The grass does not really grow well these 
days, so local households are getting crowded wherever there is a little pasture ... " 
who were married to locals. I limited my inquiry here, but they must have negotiations with local officials 
as well, because there were several migrant households with more than a thousand livestock each. 
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(Questionnaire 50). Consequently, as Table 6.8 illustrates, participants identified 
overgrazing as one of the key challenges along with climate change (as 'other' in the 
table) in their pursuit of pastoralism in 2010 198. This is particularly among the HBU bag 
participants, and especially regarding its relationship to migration 199 . The concentration 
of havarjaa ezemshil in the spring becomes a primary factor shaping the availability of 
other pastoral resources such as water and services in the HBU case area. 
Photo 6.3: HBU (left) and elsewhere (right) in the same Herlen River terrain in July, 2010 
Social outcome: Uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil also affects herders' property rights over 
pastureland and private pastoral production assets. This is apparent from the herders 
e1nploying any available mechanisms to gain access to pastureland200 . First, uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezems hi! does not necessarily secure herders' gaining and maintaining access 
to quality pastoral resources when the herders are confronted by the lack of pasture or 
water around their campsites. They need to seek out alternative camping areas following 
the norm of ulamjlaz2°1. This norm involves relying on an informal rule of capture. 
198 After a severe winter in 2009, HBU case area (all three bags) was also affected by a bad drought and a 
stormy spring and summer. A small amount of rain fell in early May and then no rain at all until late August, 2010 (Photo 6.3). 
199 This is because of higher concerns with livestock thievery resulting from outsiders in and out of the 
HBU RP A area. Also, they identified climate change as a challenge in all three bags. They used to 
experience dzud once every decade. It was also recorded that dzud occurred once in 14 years in eastern 
aimags during negdel period (Templer, Swift et al.1993). Now, they experience more dzud in periods 
shorter than 10 years. 
200 Right after the transition, herders returned to the informal mechanism of locally recognized use rights 
to campsite. Then under the land reform, they turned to a uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil to secure their rights 
to pastureland. Currently, herders face the dilemma of employing both (legal campsite possession and 
ulamjlalt rules and norms) as a mechanism, which I discuss in this section. 201 The concentration of uvuljuu havarjaa under unstable climate conditions or overgrazing has led to pasture degradation, particularly over the last five years. Thus, the research participants " ... move 
wherever there is grass and water", using this principle widely to cope with drought in 2010. However, 
this principle does not lead to open access as herders confront the many limitations to gaining access to pastoral resources elsewhere. 
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When asked about whether herders ever used other's uvuljuu havarjaa in their local 
area (Questionnaire 43), a UU herder explained the local herders' strategy: 
. . .If this is owned by someone, ask 'if you do not stay, can we stay?' The owners 
anyway, must be staying on another's uvuljuu havarjaa, too. This is how people 
find uvuljuu havarjaa following the available pasture. If they possess an uvuljuu 
havarjaa and the grass around the uvuljuu havarjaa does not grow, they will 
chase after a better pasture ... We know this household will not come, so we do 
not have to ask for permission. They will not mind about it (Questionnaire 71 ) . 
This indicates that herders have returned to a local practice to deal with uncertainty, and 
the need for flexibility in mobility. 
Second, uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi! is an inadequate means of securing herders' private 
pastoral assets on their campsites whilst herders are on the move202 . The local 
administration claims no responsibility for herders' private assets. Having nobody 
responsible for taking care of the herders' uvuljuu havarjaa leads to the free-for-all 
capture of herders' private pastoral assets. Thus, the herders shift toward ulamjlalt 
structure of uvuljuu havarjaa. Instead of using built livestock shelter on a fixed location, 
they are inclined to use mobile iron-fence or natural shelters in the mountains. For 
instance, a UU respondent shared his concern on this issue: "The grandpa gave us his 
shelter materials for us to build the winter campsite. But whife we are thinking about 
building one, there is no grass growing. Also, there is robbery or thievery on the spring 
shelters" (Interview 55). As a result, not using a fixed livestock shelter enables herders 
to claim alternative different buuts through both legal uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 
without a livestock shelter or informal use rights. 
Herders combine both informal and formal mechanisms to campsites in order to 
increase their ability to gain access to pastoral resources203 . Research participants stated 
that local people hardly stay on their campsites, but camp and graze their livestock 
nearby. In particular, wealthy herders204 move more often at increasing distances. They 
mainly seek out any available pasture, which is near herders with an average or small 
herd size. As one of the UU participants described: "those who are wealthy and 
powerful would grab the best pasture and those who are not wealthy and are powerless 
202 Herders from three bags often lose their livestock shelters and their argal hurzun fuel resources due to 
looting while they are on the move. 
203 This is particularly under the condition of depleted pastoral resources, where herders compete for any 
available buuts and its surrounding pasture 
204 Bayanjargalan soum, where UU bag is located, has the largest number of herders with one thousand livestock in the Tuv province. 
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end up having nothing" (Questionnaire 82). Wealthier herders (that is, those with 800-
1000 head of livestock) explain it by referring to historically popular practices, claiming 
that their grazing does not affect poor herders with small numbers of livestock, which 
do not require as much pasture as large herds need (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, 
Fernandez-Gimenez, 2006). The wealthier herders justify it as an ulamjlalt norm to 
share pasture based on the principle, haya bagtahaar buitj hamar bagtahaar id, 'camp 
and graze as many as the pasture allows' (Chapter 3). They also confront those who also 
attempt to exclude others from sharing pasture via legal uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi! 
regardless of wealth (Interview 47 & 55). Although based on wealth, this is not strictly a 
case of class distinction. Poor herders also gain access to pasture by working with 
herders with larger or average size herds. 
The collision of these two mechanisms led to a greater incidence of disputes over 
pasture use and a possible open access condition in the HBU case. Herders begaun to 
make many claims of uvuljuu ezemshil as there is no shelter to landmark ones 
possession. Disputes over uvuljuu become much more complex in the context of otor 
1novement, according to herders, who experienced the problem during 2009 dzud; 
It is ok; we are doing fine, free in our soum roaming anywhere we want without 
being controlled by our possessed buuts. In other soum, it is hard ... 
(Questionnaire 96). 
The worst thing is that when we go to HBU Mountain for otor, the available 
buutses are all possessed by someone, who says this is mine or yours etc 
(Questionnaire 68) 
The dispute over uvuljuu was a 1najor problem among visiting otor herders from UU 
and hosting herders fro1n HBU and DD bags. On one hand, local herders de facto 
claimed mountain buuts as their uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil as there are no livestock 
shelters to distinguish among them. According to a UU respondent: 
.... HBU Mountain is filled with households fro1n western aimags calling 
themselves 'locals'. They perhaps bribe the local officials. The place called 
J aran is all claimed by these households. There is no place for otor households 
in that area (Questionnaire49). 
On the other hand, UU herders argued that the HBU Mountain was RP A area for otor 
herders, thus they employ an ulamjlalt mechanism of otor. However, this mechanism 
often fails, according to another UU respondent. "If we stay here and build an extra ger 
on a closer buuts, then HBU bag households will come and pack it away. Those who are 
staying closer would be able to do so" (Interview 55). This indicates that the legitimacy 
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of both ulamjlalt use rights and the statutory possession right was contested in the HBU 
case area. 
6.4. Questioning "the problem of the open access condition" 
Many scholars and policy makers see the CPR dilemma in Mongolia as one of "open 
access" due to the lack of involvement by local administrations and the weakening of 
the informal rules and norms of pasture use. They argue that the land law is full of gaps 
and ambiguities that it did not protect the statutory herders' rights (Tumenbayar, 2000, 
Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004). Another position focuses more on the land 
law which gives exclusive (possession205) property rights to pastoral resources, which 
may hinder the herders' ability to gain access to pastoral resources using ulamjlalt 
pasture use rules and norms (Sneath, 2003). My findings in the HBU case support the 
last argument, on the herders' changing ability to pursue ulamjlalt pasture use rules and 
norms. I argue that recognizing the herders' statutory property rights to land does not by 
itself secure their ability to gain access to pastureland. 
Thus, the land reform policy needs to acknowledge the importance of historical dual 
control over the production and the pastureland. First I argue that the land law needs to 
acknowledge that the notion of uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts gazar is inseparable from 
pastureland in tenns of property rights attached to them and that both need to be 
regulated under the same use rights. The land law granted legal uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil, a form of campsite possession that allowed an owner an exclusive 
management right, mostly because of the status of the campsite as residential land. This 
exclusive individual land titling devalued the significance of uvuljuu havarjaanii buuts 
gazar by allocating the possession right exclusively to the buuts gazar, while 
maintaining the use (access) right to the pasture surrounding it. Uvuljuu havarjaanii 
buuts gazar is an i1nportant pastoral resource, a location point to access pastoral 
resources. Uvuljuu havarjaa "entails an implicit right to pasture of several kilometers' 
radius around the site206" (Sneath, 2003, p 445). Thus, the role of uvuljuu havarjaa goes 
beyond that of a residential plot, as historically there has been only use right, to both 
buuts and the area of available pasture around it. In other words, in the historical 
205 Possession/lease as exclusive management rights, otherwise, pastoral resources are all property of the 
state. 
206 This is implicit because the radius differs from 500m to several km these days depending on the 
terrain. 
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pastoral context, the herders' use rights go beyond these campsites, because they are the 
ones who control production. 
State 
Central i ;cu 
government 
( 199-t-) 
Control of 
Jurisdictional 
umt 
Production 
management 
Pasture use 
rule/norms 
Property rights to 
pastureland/uvuljuu 
== == == _ == == __ =- havarjaa _ ~ _ >-
So111n & hug 
go\ ernrnent, 
their local 
f-/uruls 
Subject 
Territory 
Pasture land 
I' 
Indi\ iclual 
hcrdincr 0 
household 
>-. 
-' .-::::: / 
::'-:-::/ 
--=./..D jE, C 
/ ~ ;::: 
_, -
L
.. / !,:: -
ivestocl· / .._ c:::: ,,,,,,, r' ·-
Labolll· / ~ 23 7 '.F....., .,, :-::: . ;-
/ 0 C Cf) "..) 
I...,~ 
/ 
~ Jj 
C er.. ~ p 
P C asture ----------------
I ~"'Campsite 
(clcpcnclcnt on 
\\ eather & 
water) 
lndivid ual household 
" exclusive right to manage 
Bag Community 
Informal locally 
recognized use right 
Those who control pastoral production management control access to pastoral resources 
Figure 6.3 De-coupling pastureland management under the land reform 
I also argue that the land law needs to acknowledge that herders pursue ulamjlalt 
pasture use rules and norms for the purpose of managing both pastureland and 
production. Some scholars argue that the land law did not protect the herders' rights to 
manage pastureland, leaving access open to anyone (Tumenbayar, 2000, Fernandez-
Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004, Ickowitz, 2003, Mearns, 2004b ). However, I argue that 
by separating campsites from pasture, the land law diminished herders' ability to 
conform to the informal rule and norms. The state granted the herders a statutory legal 
exclusive individual right to manage only their campsites. At the same time, the state 
transferred the authority to enforce the ulamjlalt pasture use rule and norms from the 
local herders to the local administrations as the 'legitimate body to control pastoral 
resources' (Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004). As shown in Figure 6.3, this was 
partly based on the historical pattern, which acknowledged the authority of the local 
administration but at the same time overlooked the herders' role in pasture land 
management. In other words, the law essentially hinders the capacity of bag community 
pasture management by diminishing the herders' informal responsibility for enforcing 
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the informal rules and nonns. This loss of informal responsibility is perhaps what most 
scholars have explained as no protection of herders' legal rights to pastureland. 
However, a problem arises not only in defining the herders' statutory legal rights to 
pasture, whilst contesting the role of the state-based actors in regulating access to 
pastoral resources. Another problem is whether the land reform policy recognizes the 
importance of ulamjlalt pastoral production management, which involves dual control 
over both the production and the pastureland. As Sneath (2003) argued, the land law 
diminished the herders' ulamjlalt way of accessing and using pastoral resources. 
Consequently, the law limited the legal use of ulamjlalt rules and norms only in the 
management of pastureland, but not in the production. Thus, a lack of understanding of 
the principle of dual control over the elements of pastoral production contributed to 
changing the nature of control over pastureland and the nature of historical property 
relations. 
6.4.1. Change in access to pastoral resources 
The land law has failed because it overlooked this changing nature of the relationship 
between the local administration (formal control) and the herders (informal control) in 
managing pastoral resources within the transition period. In the first place, migration 
was the key factor for changing dual control, because it is the labour aspect of pastoral 
production. Migration shaped the impact of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil on pastureland 
management. Legally, local administration is powerless to control migration, only by 
registering herders in the 'A list' 207 , which in effect allows anybody who owns livestock 
to apply for uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. Local administration is also de facto powerless 
to control pastureland use, because it can only register the herders' selection of uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil, since the herders control the management of production. This 
practice differs from the law which allows the soum to approve uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil in an area designated as available for uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil (Upton, 2009). 
The local authority's inability to regulate the labour component resulted in an increase 
in the numbers of herding households with increased numbers of livestock and a 
consequent de1nand for more pasture and uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 208(Tumenbayar, 
207 The 'A' list does not differentiate herders ' from those who own livestock and live in settled areas. 208 For instance, in the HBU case area, both natural and artificial increase in livestock numbers led to 
more demand for uvuijuu havarjaa. 
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2000, Undargaa, 2006). As a result, control over access to pasture shifted from the local 
administration to the herders, since they controlled the production. 
Second, limiting herders' legal rights to uvuljuu havarjaa led them to change their 
pattern of resource access. Under normal weather conditions, herders can gain access to 
more pasture through taking up more uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. This is because 
herders' seasonal movements have been restricted within their bag jurisdictional 
boundary due to their residency status. In all three bags, herders have employed family 
splitting strategies to claim more uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil in order to to gain and 
maintain access to more pastoral resources. The family splitting strategy replaces once 
legitimate locally recognized informal use rights for gaining access to alternative 
ca1npsites. Local actors are all involved in reinventing and reworking ambiguous legal 
notions of residency registration, household and the A lists. However, one's ability to 
employ this strategy depends on herders' migrant status and the bag's institutional 
background209 . Despite using the family splitting strategy for uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil, herders migrating to HBU bag were not able to gain access to summer and 
autumn pasture due to the lack of access to spring pasture within their jurisdiction. 
Therefore, they e1nployed informal cross-territorial otor movements for regular su1nmer 
and autumn seasonal mobility. 
The extent to which one could claim more pastoral resources also depended on ones 
wealth, particularly in unstable weather conditions. Local and migrant herders in HBU 
bag employed the family splitting strategy and uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil to control 
both locals' and outsiders gaining access to pastoral resources. Asset-rich herders found 
it an effective strategy to claim additional uvuljuu havarjaa, but this caused other 
herders to lose their former ability to access pastoral resources (Sneath, 2003)2 10 . For 
instance, otor herders from UU bag faced greater challenges in gaining access to buuts 
for short periods to cope with the extreme weather conditions. Thus, the changing 
209 Local herders in all three areas used the family splitting strategy to gain control over more seasonal 
pasture, expanding to summer and autumn pasture with uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil, even though these are 
not allowed to be individually owned. The HBU bag's lack of seasonal pasture led migrant herders to use 
uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil through the family splitting strategy in order to pursue their regular seasonal 
mobility. They maintained their usual access to winter pasture and gained access to spring pasture in the HBU Mountain. 
210 This suggests that uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil as a statutory law has become a mechanism to subtract 
the availability of pasture for others' use, instead of sharing pasture through ulamjlalt locally recognized 
use right to campsite. Thus, exclusive property rights to specific pastoral resource do not necessarily solve 
the problem of subtractibility, but may exacerbate it. 
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nature of access to pastoral resources also diminished the herders' ulamjlalt pattern in 
accessing cross-territorial mobility. 
Third, the land law overlooking the herders' informal control of pasture forced herders 
to employ uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil as the only legitimate mechanism to access the 
necessary pastoral resources. Uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil legitimized herders' claims on 
more seasonal pasture they obtained through family splitting strategy. This 
legitimization process involves the local authority since only the local administration 
can grant legal permits. Legitimacy gained only through the new statutory entitlements 
system led to a loss of local endowments (informal control). It failed to acknowledge 
the local people's knowledge of who uses which uvuljuu havarjaa. For instance, 
migrant herders in HBU bag in particular, often seek legitimacy from the local 
administration instead of from local herders in order to secure access to pastoral 
resource. Although migrant herders' residency status is legally approved by the aimag 
administration, this is secured on the ground only by the approval of the local 
administration of their claim to uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi!. This is because, in the 
pastoral context, once an actor gains a legitimate right to pastoral resources they became 
a 'local'. In tum, the authority of legitimacy served as a best strategy for the HBU bag 
local officials to extract benefits through controlling access- to pastoral resources. 
Therefore, the uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil has contributed to increasing the authority of 
formal control, whilst reducing the significance of locally recognized informal use 
rights which offered much more flexibility in gaining access to alternative buuts. 
6.4.2. Change in pasture use rules and norms 
Changes in the herders' access pattern due to the policy of uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi! 
resulted in changes in some ulamjlalt rules and norms of pasture use. As discussed in 
this chapter, increasing uvuljuu havarjaa in the HBU case area has resulted in less 
availability of pasture and a reduction in the herders' distance of mobility between fixed 
campsites and seasonal pasture. This reduced 1nobility between campsites has 
diminished the herders' freedom of movement (rotation or seasonal mobility) in 
alternative locations, an important strategy for maintaining pastoral production211 . Thus, 
the herders ulamjlalt seasonal mobility patterns have changed, through diversifying 
211 In other words, in the HBU case, the flexibility embedded in the ulamjlalt locally recognized use 
rights, is now restricted under the current regulatory environment, leading herders to rely on legal uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil to gain, maintain and control access to pastoral resources. 
180 
their camping arrangements in order to regain their freedom of movement (for 
maintaining production), which is still very 1nuch significant in managing rangeland 
ecosystem (Miller and Sheehy, 2008). For instance, herders' extension of ti1ne in their 
spring campsites has affected their rotation for rehabilitation of other pastures in those 
seasons. Also, the migrant herders' seasonal 1nobility is no longer restricted to their 
jurisdictional boundaries as migrant herders pursue cross-territorial mobility to 
recompense for their summer and autumn seasonal mobility. This is possible because 
summer and autumn pasture is more loosely coordinated as locally recognized use rights 
(Sneath, 2003, Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002). This suggests that the informal cross-
territorial otor mobility has shifted, from being a strategy to survive severe winter 
conditions to becoming a strategy to pursue regular seasonal mobility. These changes in 
pasture use rules and norms have often led to overgrazing and disputes over use in both 
HBU case area and other jurisdiction's territory. The nature of these problems will be 
discussed specifically in chapter 8. 
A dilemma has arisen from the changes in rules and norms, because uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil cannot alone secure the herders' property rights to private assets and secure 
their access to pastoral resources212 . As shown in the HBU case, the absence of a 
specific legal actor to claim responsibility led to the capture by others of the herders' 
important production assets such as livestock shelters and fire fuel in their absence. This 
reduced the herder's attachment to fixed uvuljuu havarjaa. Herders sought more 
mobility using the ulamjlalt strategy of camping where there were natural shelters. 
Moreover, uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil does not secure herders' access to pastoral 
resources in fixed locations, because the condition of the pasture changes following 
unstable weather conditions as it is a migratory resources (Feeny et al., 1990). 
Fernandez-Gimenez (2004) argued that, in the pastoral context, uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil is against a herders' constitutional right to camp and reside wherever they can 
(Fernandez-Gi1nenez and Batbuyan, 2004). In other words, uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 
cannot constitute the key asset in pastoral production for pursuing flexibility in 
mobility. Due to increasing number of campsites under land reform process, herders lost 
the ability to exercise their informal use rights (locally recognized use rights to 
cainpsites) that used to enable them to rotate and rehabilitate seasonal pasture and adapt 
their resource access pattern using freedom of movement and flexible camping 
?[? d d - - Water does not alone shape access to pasture. Access to pasture depends also on weather. Her ers ha 
to leave Herlen river area and move elsewhere in autumn because of the draught and lack of grass. 
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practices. Even the strategy of family splitting to claim more fixed campsites has limited 
use in securing the herder's access to alternative pastoral resources. This strategy only 
serves for gaining access to 111.ore land around the uvuljuu havarjaa in different 
locations, but still guarantees no quality pasture under unstable weather condition. Thus, 
with less faith in the regulatory power of these legislations under unstable weather 
condition, herders now returned to practice ulamjlalt locally recognized use rights 
(temporarily leaving their campsites if necessary) and ulamjlalt pasture use rules and 
norms ( any place not occupied is mine, small herd uses smaller pasture or camp and 
graze as many as the pasture accom1nodates) for alternative pasture areas when they 
need to adjust to unstable local climatic conditions. 
6.4.3. Dilemma in access to pasture 
The contradiction between the two different mechanisms led to a dilemma when several 
herders want to access the same pastoral resource. Scholars have questioned whether the 
herders' legal right to control uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil provides them the right to 
exercise exclusion and avoid trespassing (Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004, 
Upton, 2009)2 13. The HBU case showed a complex picture in a condition of depleted 
pastoral resources. As Fernandez-Gimenez (2004) argued it could; herders employ their 
uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil as a mechanism to protect the pasture right around their 
campsites. It 111.ay be true in the HBU case that some poor herders, who do not move 
often within the HBU case area, employ this legal mechanism. However, this legal 
mechanism diminishes herders' right to exercise the ulamjlalt rule of sharing. As Upton 
(2009) argued, herders practise both exclusive and inclusive pasture rights in line with 
the principle of reciprocity. In the HBU case, during unstable weather conditions, 
herders do use ulamjlalt reciprocal use rights to access pasture (the wealthy rely on poor 
herders due to difference in herd size and vice versa). Furthermore, herders, regardless 
of wealth, employ both mechanisms whenever it suits their purpose of gaining access to 
pasture. This dilemma has led to conflicting use as well as an open access condition and 
overgrazing in limited contexts214 . Although de facto uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil shapes 
herders' access to pasture, herders find it hard to exclude others or control over pasture 
between their cainpsites. Thus, it is questionable whether herders in general are meant 
213 This supports the argument that the difficulty in managing CPRs, due in part to their migratory nature, 
poses a challenge to control access and exclusion, particularly in the case of defining social and resource boundaries (see Feeny D, F.Berjes et al 1990). 
214 This, overall, works against herders' production regardless of their wealth and local status. 
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to pursue exclusion by legal uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil, regarding ulamjlalt patterns of 
sharing pasture between their campsites. 
This discussion raises the question whether conditions in Mongolia are really open-
access and whether this is due to the failed overlapping ( state and communal) property 
regimes. Defining a regime as open-access or, one that resulted fro1n a failure of 
overlapping regimes, is essentially related to how community rights are recognized ( or 
not) by the state (Feeny et al 1990). However, in Mongolia, the property regime is one 
that is dual. This is due to the reality that state-based local government's formal control 
and herders' (local residents) informal control were integrated in building a property 
and production 1nanagement system within a territorial unit. Dual actors refers to the 
state or state-based actors such as the local soum, bag government (officials) and self-
governing community actors like soum hural (officials and bag representatives 
including herders), bag hural (members mostly herders). This is why state territorial 
units atte1npt to maintain their territorial boundaries for formal control in order to 
maintain the flexibility of herder movement within their jurisdiction. This is not a 
separate property regime, that it is neither a fonn of exclusive state ownership of natural 
resources nor is a system where a group of herders formally 1nanage a territory smaller 
than a state territorial unit through exclusive legal possession rights to pasture. The state 
legally recognized the concept of ( or at some point formalized a few possible aspects of) 
historical ulamjlalt production and pasture use rules and norms. By recognizing, but not 
formalizing all the specifics of ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms, the state 
maintained herders use rights while allowing for flexibility of movment in order to 
continue to benefit from pastoral production. Instead of regulating pasture with herders' 
exclusive property rights, the state regulated it through controlling land, livestock and 
labour within a jurisdiction. A community of herders/residents within each territorial 
unit shared the pastoral resources making use of use rights legitimized by the state 
authority for ecological reasons. For this reason they controlled the micro management 
of pasture use through ulamjlalt rules and norms, and this is recognized by the state. 
Thus, the problem is not necessarily an absence of legally recognized property rights. 
Instead, it is more a question of historical pluralism in pastoral institutions, a system 
that embeds both state and herders for pastoral production management. 
Herders' expanding to other seasonal pasture, where they build uvuljuu havarjaa, shows 
off-seasonal pasture use and signifies a change in the informal institution. However, this 
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step is to maintain their mobility for production. In other words, as long as herders' 
access to seasonal pasture is based on production, the concept of seasonal mobility still 
persists. This is hardly a case of 'open access', in which herders take over someone 
else's pasture area, which has been noted as 'predatory pastoralism' (SDC, 2010, Upton, 
2009). Under the condition of increasing population, herders in the HBU case area did 
not go everywhere they wanted. They relied either on local herders or the local 
administration to legitimize their access to pastoral resources via campsite possession. 
However, the occasional collision of formal and infonnal mechanisms created disputed 
use as both 1nechanisms are advantageous to some and disadvantageous to the others in 
terms of securing their access to pastoral resources. 
As the HBU case illustrates, land reform in Mongolia has resulted in outcomes which 
are the opposite of achieving sustainable land management. I have argued in this chapter 
that legal uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi! has led to a CPR dilemma by exacerbating conflict 
between formal and informal control over access to pastureland. The government's land 
reform has thus failed in the context of 1nobile pastoralism due to the existence of 
another level of the decoupling process in pastoral production management -- the legal 
separation of uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi! from pasture land and the herders' diminishing 
role in pastureland management. The problem is that national and international policy 
advisors examine the CPR dile1nma only within the western oriented exclusive property 
rights concept215 . As argued in Sneath (2003 p 454 ), the property rights approach often 
carries the risk of shaping a policy narrative that supports a push for imposing exclusive 
property rights. National and international policy advisors see the inability of the local 
administrations to regulate pastoral resources as an absence of formal pastoral 
institution, which leads to open access. This gap has led to a further push to define 
property rights for pastureland management, instead of understanding the historical 
property relationship in the pastoral context in Mongolia. 
2 15 This is mainly for the purpose of ~ntegrating the land tenure to the current market system. However, 
the problem is that current economic policies designed to boost the market economy are not free of fault 
in their predictions. Enormous problems have been encountered in introducing exclusive individual 
property rights even in agrarian contexts, where the land tenure system requires less flexibility and 
mobility in comparison to the pastoral context. 
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6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the impact of uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hil on pasture 
1nanagement in the HBU case study area. Under the land reform, herders changed their 
means of access to pastoral resources from relying on informal pastoral institutions to 
now conforming to the formal uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hil at least at the beginning. This 
is because the herders' informal locally recognized use rights to uvuljuu havarjaa have 
been legally replaced by the formal uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. This legislation 
com1nitted herders to a fixed uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil, blocking their freedom of 
movement. Thus, they needed to claim more pasture in order to enable their freedom of 
movement and to ensure they retained flexible camping arrangements for alternative 
pasture in order to be able to pursue ulamjlalt production. At the same time, local 
officials were ineffective in enforcing informal use rights to pastureland among bag 
1nembers. Thus, uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil became the herders' only legal mechanism 
to de facto gain access to the pastoral resources vvhich were becoming scarce. To gain 
and maintain access to additional, alternative pastures, herders employed different forms 
of family splitting strategies. This was possible due to the ineffective policies of 
registration of residency and formal registration of livestock census, and the ambiguous 
notion of herding households that also included absentee herder_s. These are mechanism 
that so1ne actors also employ to benefit from natural resources without claiming 
exclusive right to pastoral resources; rather, they do so by controlling other productive 
resources such as livestock and information while making use of their social status. 
This change in herders' mechanisms affected their flexibility of mobility. Family 
splitting strategies led to an increasing number of campsites in winter and spring 
pastures. Herders also expanded campsite possession to summer and autumn pasture. 
This resulted in a reduction in the radius of pasture available for rotation between 
campsites, leading to less incentive to rehabilitate their seasonal pasture and to 
overgrazing. 
However, uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil does not secure the herders' overall property 
rights. First, by the legal clai1ns of the campsites, herders' de facto select nutag and gain 
access to land around the campsite, depending on the availability of pasture under stable 
weather condition. However, herders cannot exclude others from using the pasture 
around their campsites as their exclusive claim to a campsite does not include the 
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pasture, according to the law. The impact of the heterogeneity in wealth, status and 
background on shaping the herders' access to pastoral resources depends on a specific 
context. Migration background, besides wealth, contributes to ones ability to gain access 
to campsites. Once maintained access to pastoral resources through campsites, wealth 
becomes an essential factor in claiming who uses how much of the pasture available 
between the campsites and control others gaining access to campsites. Second, the fixed 
camping patterns were proven to be less useful in securing herders' access to quality 
pastoral resources under severe weather conditions. Third, uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 
does not protect herders' private pastoral assets from looting. Thus, the herders have 
returned to the ulamjlalt locally recognized use right to campsite and ulamjlalt pasture 
use rules and norms in order to regain their freedom of movement. 
However, their ability to exercise informal pasture use rules and norms has become 
more complicated. S01ne herders' ability to pursue informal use rights collides with the 
formal uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil, by which other herders attempt to control access to 
pastoral resources. Herders now employ both of these mechanisms, depending on a) 
whether they are visiting on otor or are local claimant herders in the host area; and b) 
whether herders have large herd size looking for more pasture or small herd size so you 
do not need to move often. Thus, land reform contributes to increasing the proble1ns in 
CPR as herders employ both formal and informal mechanisms to access pasture and 
maintain their production. 
The next chapter focuses on a policy initiative for establishing herder groups based on 
the international development discourse of community based conservation. As a 
continuation of an attempt to re-define the absence of property rights, policy advocates 
have proposed the legislation of group possession of pastureland. Based on the HBU 
case, I analyse the local administration and herders' responses to this policy initiative in 
relation to implementation of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. 
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7 Community-based natural resource management 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I discussed how changes in historical pastoral institutions were 
effective in managing pasture and pastoral production in Mongolia. In the feudal and 
collective periods, the ruling elites and the state maintained dual control (formal and 
informal) over pastoral production, in all its three components. However, during the 
transition period from a centralized to a market economy, the state dismantled this 
production system by uncoupling control of the three components and separated the 
control over uvuljuu havarjaa (spring and vvinter campsites) from pastureland, 
regulating these separately under different legislation. However, these policies 
exacerbated the CPR dilemma. They reduced the authority of local administration, 
while at the same time herders gained de facto autonomy over pastureland management 
because they controlled production. As a response, international development 
organizations employed a self-governing institutional approach to develop community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM). Referring to Ostrom's design 
principles, (Ostrom, 1990, Wollenberg et al., 2007) they inslituted territorial based 
herder groups with small social and resource boundaries in order to define the herders' 
property entitlements and achieve exclusion. However, this policy initiative did not 
resolve the CPR dilemma in Mongolia. 
Thus, in this chapter, I explore why the formation of herder groups had such limited 
success in strengthening local community institutions. I also examine what is the 
existing notion of community pasture 1nanagement on the ground. Addressing these 
issues is important to explain why the historical interdependent relationship between 
state and co1n1nunity still persists and why herders changed their access mechanisms in 
order to pursue ulamjlalt production based on this relationship. National and 
international advocates have often argued that the problem is related to the lack of 
capacity in the state and local administrations to support the herder groups. However, I 
argue that this is due to the design principles adopted in this policy. A herder group 's 
restricted geographical territory and its members ' weak social ties cannot result in 
building an institution as everyone in the community needs to be included in order to 
comply with community rules and norms. A second weakness is that, although 
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supporting herders' property rights to land, CBNRM has overlooked the historical role 
of the local administrations in defining the membership and property entitlement of the 
community. Furthermore, the CBNRM experience in Mongolia challenges the historical 
authority of the state and the local administration in their formal control over 
pastureland. 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section reviews the literature on 
i1nplementation of and challenges met in establishing herder groups in Mongolia in 
order to provide background to my case study analysis. Then, based on the HBU case, I 
explore the local concepts of community and pastoral institutions for regulating herders' 
access to pastoral resources. This analysis will contribute to understanding why this 
policy initiative has faced formidable challenges in providing herders with exclusive 
property rights to control access to pastoral resources within group level territorial 
management. 
7.2. Herder group formation and its challenges in Mongolia 
The formation of formal pastoral institution as a key actor in local level resource 
manage1nent involves (i) the hoshuu (banner) level by recreating its expansive 
jurisdictional boundary; (ii) the bag or soum level using its current jurisdictional 
boundaries; and (iii) a smaller self-governing group level based on the concept of neg 
nutag usniihan, a group of households that share the sa1ne pastoral resources 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002, Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a). International advocates of 
com1nunity development supported the last approach in order to develop CBNRM216 . 
Responding to a contradictory legal environment217, some scholars suggested 
216 This was based on a theoretical argument regarding community and its role in improving resource 
management that involved strengthening communities and bringing their expertise into co-management (McCay and Svein, 1998 p, 7; SDC 2010). This concept has received growing international development 
support. Another emphasis in the development literature is on indigenous or traditional communities as 
the first custodians of pastoral resources (Chatty and Colchester, 2002; Ickowitz, 2003). This idea is also 
reflected in the development agenda of an international UN umbrella organization to protect mobile 
pastoralists ' right to practise their nomadic lifestyle and their custodian rights to their customary lands (Schmidt 2004). During this period, the World Bank also shifted its environmental stewardship policy 
from exclusive individual property ownership to community-based natural resource management (Fratkin 
and Mearns 2003). 
2 17 Both laws relating to land and environmental protection stress state ovv11ership of all natural resources. 
All pastoral resources including land, water and saltlick will only be publicly/communally (Article 6.2, 
the Law on land, 2002) used. The bag and soum hurals shall ensure protection and utilization of these 
resources in corm11on use. (Article 18.1.2, the Law on environmental protection, 2002). At the same time, 
these were ambiguous in terms of herders' rights and roles in pastureland management (see Chapter 6). 
188 
establishing herder groups and defining their statutory property rights to pastoral 
resources for pursuing exclusion and replacing formal pastoral institutions with 
CBNRM (Mearns, 2004b, Griffin, 2003, Ickowitz, 2003, Tu1nenbayar, 2000, 
Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004). 
7.2.1. Herder group formation and different approaches 
Many advocates and practitioners focused on developing the herder group as an 
autonomous property institution to exercise exclusive group possession rights to 
pasture, in accordance with Ostrom's concepts of institutional design principles (SDC, 
2010 p, 33). The right of herder groups to possess pastureland differs from the past 
rights set out by local administrations regulating bag herders' use rights to bag pasture. 
As a pioneer, a GTZ218 program emphasized that group fonnation was not explicitly 
designed to establish externally conceived 'institution building' and rather it was 
si1npler to "enforce this manifestation of traditional pasture management" and 
traditional collective action (Schmidt, 2004, p 21 ). The emphasis on traditional 
collective action on pastureland management was also intended to correct the 
misleading perception that there was an absence of community among herders 
(Schmidt, 2004). However, they adopted an approach more or less to mend the 
traditional institutions. In doing so, first, they re-organized individual herding 
households into herder groups called a 'community organization. Second, herder group 
formation required that local herders define their specific social and resource boundaries 
to be credited as a community. Attempting to draw on historical patterns of collective 
action, they defined the group territory based on the concept of neg nutag 
usniihanlamniihan219 ('people of one well or valley'). This refers to a neighbourhood of 
herding households that use pastureland around their uvuljuu havarjaa to address the 
principle of flexible 1nobility and to collaborate on pastoral production (Schmidt, 2004, 
Upton, 2008, SDC, 2010). Third, sharing the same pastoral resources they could 
develop their own pasture rules and form an institution if given legal property rights to 
their pastoral resources (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002, Griffin, 1995). Fourth, herders' 
selected their own leaders and committees in a democratic participatory manner 
218 GTZ' s programs are: "Nature Conservation and Buffer Zone Development", 1995-2002, and 
"Conservation and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources - Gobi Component" 2002-2006), 
currently implemented by the "Initiative for People Centred Conservation" (IPECON) of the "New 
Zealand Nature Institute" (NZNI). 
219 This also refers to neg hudgiinhan, usniihan or jalgiinhan (people of same well, river, or valley) 
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(Schmidt, 2004). Fifth, these actors enforced and 1nonitored the group practices of more 
fixed routines under ulamjlalt pasture rules and norms. These principles essentially 
served to exclude non-members or trespassers from the local bag or outside (Upton, 
2008, Undargaa et al., 2007). Regarding this capacity of exclusion, many national and 
international advocates proposed to allow group possession of pastureland under the 
newly drafted law on pastureland220 . Thus, it is critical to understand the implications of 
the formation of the herder group exercising exclusive possession rights to pasture for 
future local pasture manage1nent. 
In scaling up the number of herder groups, donor programs used different approaches to 
define the concept of neg nutag usniihan and set up the social and resource boundaries 
of a group. GTZ supported the formation of a volunteer unit of 10-20 households based 
on kin, as well as neighbourhood relationships (Schmidt 2006, p 21; Upton 2007; SDC 
2010). Their social and resource boundary was mainly confined to their four-season 
pastureland within their bag or to the water sources shared between different 
jurisdictional territories, indicating that their social and resource boundaries went 
beyond jurisdictional boundaries. Second, UNDP projects were based on those 
households that were formed through kin relationships and the shared use of key 
seasonal pasture such as winter uvuljuu havarjaa or wells. However, this approach 
presented difficulties in matching a group's social and spatial boundaries for better 
institutional outcomes, because member households are often spatially mixed with non-
220 Herder groups were formed to manage pastureland on an experimental scale (Fernandez-Gimenez 
2002; Mearns 2004b; Fernandez-Gimenez, Akira et al., 2008). Earlier accomplishments of GTZ projects 
in group formation and increasing incomes from alternative income generation activities led to other 
donor programs establishing more herder groups all over Mongolia (Schmidt 2004; Undargaa 2006). 
Twelve different donor and NGO supported programs including GTZ, IPECON-Mongolia, UNDP, IFAD, 
Swiss Development Agency, and USAID have been operating in Mongolia since 2000. Scaling up the 
number of herder groups was the main agenda of donor support to the rural poor. For instance, during 
1995-2004, 70 community organizations were formed and were active under the GTZ supported 
Conservation and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources-Gobi Component (Schmidt 2004). 
According to project documents, from 2003-2006, 1,957 herder groups were formed with the support of 
donor programs (Undargaa, 2006). These were mainly on paper as few were considered active (see Mau 
and Chantsallkham2006; Undargaa, Tungalagtuya et al.2008). The increasing number of herder groups 
eventually led to land and environmental laws articulated the 'Use right to a group over natural 
resources'. Also, national and international advocates presented new designs for a law on pastureland. 1. 
"Concepts of the law on pastureland", Unofficial version of Draft Law on Pasture Land developed and 
revised by a team of lawyers from the Mongolian Society for Rangeland Management and Green Gold (SDC), Zuunii Medee newspaper, 2009.11.4 N2 258 (3330), 2. Law on pastureland, law of Mongolia, 
Draft, 2008.03.27, UNDP MON/08/301,3. These versions are updated in two drafts: one by the 
Government of Mongolia in 2010.08.09 and one by MSRM in 2010.10.05, "Comparison of the drafts on 
law on pastureland" MSRM document. 4. Law on pastureland, law of Mongolia, No 187 (3577), Daily 
News 2010.08.09. These drafts articulated ezemshil erh (possession right) of pasture to herder groups. 
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member households (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2008). This indicates the difficulties 
encountered in defining neg nutag usniihan. 
Third, the World Bank funded the Sustainable Livelihood Program (SLP) which shifted 
the approach of defining the herder group to one based on jurisdictional boundaries. 
This innovation aimed to reflect historical pasture 1nanagement practices embedded in 
local administrative structures. Local soum and bag administrations divided an entire 
bag into explicitly mapped and delineated group territories (Upton 2009; SDC 2010). 
The project staff acknowledged that delineating group territory in this way was not 
specifically for allocating exclusive rights to a particular group; thus, if needed, 
members can use another group's territory (Upton 2009, p8). Fourth, the Green Gold 
program supported by the Swiss Develop1nent Cooperation (SDC-GG) changed the 
approach to the compulsory formation of a pasture-user group (PUG) in larger areas 
within an entire soum territory with larger numbers of households ( 40-100) (Femandez-
Gi1nenez et al., 2008, SDC, 2010). Unlike SLP, the social and resource boundaries 
would be confined to the soum level jurisdictional boundary. In other words, the 
strength of delineating territory within soum level is that "group 1nembership is defined 
by locality and resource use, facilitating a match between spatial and social boundaries 
of pasture user groups and unit" (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2008, p42). Thus, similar to the 
GTZ and UNDP groups, the social and resource boundary of each group may lie outside 
their bag boundary, combining members and territories from two different bags 
(Interview 57). In the future, if the social and resource boundaries of herder groups are 
smaller or larger than the bag, it raises a question about the legal recognition of a 
group's exclusive management right221 to its territories. 
22 1 GTZ experimented with legal recognition of a few groups, setting up a binding tripartite contract 
between herder groups, the local administration and the buffer zone committee under the provision of 
group right to use pastoral resources under the laws (Schmidt 2004; Upton, 2009) . The content of this 
contract is overtly exclusionary with clear size and boundary of the community managed area (CMA) 
with the intent of excluding any non-member households from other areas. However, this type of group 
territory is uncom1non among other groups due to the locals ', including officials' , inability to define 
particular group territory (Undargaa 2006b ). SLP advanced their legal standing by registering the groups 
as an NGO to comply with the land use provisions in the Land Law (Upton, 2009, p 9). This was for the 
purpose of future institutional development and its authority, which will rest on the Association of herder 
groups ' network or PUG (APUG) for higher level pasture management coordination with the support of 
local administrations (Schmidt 2004; Fernandez-Gimenez, Akira et al. 2008; SDC 2010). Essentially, this 
is a major shift, in which the formation of a group, with its clear social and resource boundaries, is legally 
recognized for exercising exclusive property rights in land tenure (Upton 2009). 
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7.2.2. Social and environmental outcomes of group formation 
The increase in the number of herder groups leads to the question of translating these 
processes into actual improvements in social and environ1nental outcomes. In terms of 
social outcomes, the projects' approaches to defining group social boundaries 
exacerbated imbalances in power relations. Under the donors' approach, bag households 
are likely to be classified into specific groups based on their living conditions, in order 
to achieve a balance in power relations, which is important for strengthening local 
community institutions (Agrawal, 2003, Dietz et al., 2003). In most cases, the initial 
project implementation led to benefits from donor support for group formation going to 
those who were more opportunistic and in a better socio-economic position to take 
advantage of such support (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2008, Undargaa, 2006, Upton, 
2008). Regardless of whether they were a member or non-member, the older, poor or 
female-headed households were at some point excluded from participating in group 
activities due to their geographical isolation, less mobile capacity and/or because they 
had fewer kin or social networking support. The groups and some of their members 
tended to accuse them of being lazy or reluctant to collaborate (Undargaa, 2006, 
Fernandez-Gi1nenez et al., 2008, Upton, 2008). 
-Later in 2006, donors advocated herder group formation in ways that were inclusive of 
poor households at their workshops. This resulted in an emerging trend of groups being 
mainly co1nposed of average to poor households. This is also related to the fact that 
fixed group boundaries were less likely to correlate with different herd sizes of all 
me1nbers'. In some parts of the SDC-GG program, wealthy herders with many livestock 
either avoided joining a PUG or were not accepted in a PUG because of their large 
herds(SDC, 2010). Similarly, in the UNDP project, those poorer people with fewer 
livestock were able to remain within a group territory, whereas wealthier herders with 
1nore livestock needed to go beyond the group territory for seasonal mobility, because 
of the s1nall group territory and the depleting pastoral resources (Interview 5 8). In this 
case, not everyone recognizes and respects the group's exclusive rights , as all herders 
have legal claim to pastoral resources by uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hil under the 
jurisdiction of their bag territory. In other words, groups face challenges in delineating 
their social and resource boundaries between member and non-member households with 
regard to dynamic movement patterns in times of unstable weather conditions. This is 
why, among groups supported by GTZ and SLP, some members were unaware of their 
membership. Also, non-members were reluctant to acknowledge the pasture use rules 
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established by these groups (Undargaa et al., 2007). Thus, in drawing group boundaries, 
classifying herders into a specific group based on their living condition affected group 
collective action and the group's pastureland management coordination. 
Second, concluding that group formation lead to better pasture management is a 
complex issue, and is too simplistic. Research carried out among experimental herder 
groups found the 11 % more bio-mass was generated in group areas than in non-group 
areas due to the pasture management by the group (Leisher et al., 2012). At the same 
time, there was no statistically significant difference between group members' and non-
members' households in terms of herd size, the level of collaboration with local 
administrations, and in the occurrence of disputes over [pastoral resources] (Leisher et 
al., 2012, p 6). These findings seem to be contradictory. Group pasture management 
should have resulted in differences between member and non-member households in 
terms of these criteria, as these are supposed to indicate group collective action on 
pasture manage1nent. In other words, group members' pasture use pattern is supposed to 
be different from non-members' in contribution to the generation of bio-mass. 
At the same ti1ne, other research in the same area revealed the opposite. This is related 
to the s1nall group territory, which raises questions of how to- balance the control of 
production components among group members. Fernandez-Gimenez et al., (2008) 
highlighted that "some [herder group members] clearly expressed the idea that total 
number of livestock within the group's territory would ultimately be limited" 
(Fernandez-Gi1nenez et al., 2008, p 35). Then the question is open ended as to whether 
group 1nembers prefer voluntary reduction in livestock numbers222 . With all the 
different project support, group members were expected to increase their household 
income from project supported alternative income generating activities (Mau and 
Chantsallkham, 2006). Members were expected to collectively and voluntarily reduce 
their livestock numbers and lessen the pressure on their seasonal pasture. However, 
there was almost no voluntary livestock reduction among member households even with 
increased income. In fact, 44% of research participants claimed they used concession 
222 The projects and herders support the idea of improving the quality of their livestock, which is helpful 
for pasture use and avoids the burden of herding a large number of inferior livestock, given that they lack 
supporting labour. Although, traditionally this has been a much preferred pattern, herders' choosing to 
increase their herd size is shaped more by current market value and market driven wealth measurements, 
which focus on numbers rather than quality. Small quality herd size may work when pastoral production 
is for survival only; however, herders pursue pastoral production for more than survival. They exchange it 
for other necessary goods and public services for their households as well. 
193 
credit from the project for purchasing more livestock. Thus, the authors concluded that 
with regard to alternative livelihood options, the "underlying philosophy is unrealistic, 
and may even be counterproductive"223 (Mau and Chantsallkham, 2006, p 15 & 23 ). 
The decision to increase herd size is shaped more by current market value rather than 
willingness to reduce herd size for quality. In other words, the idea of group pasture 
management overlooks the importance of understanding pastoral production within 
larger social and economic conditions. 
Moreover, Fernandez-Gimenez and Akira et al. (2008) also argued that group ezemshil 
of pasture, a formalized grazing management, is not necessarily the key to collective 
action on improving pasture management. This is because herders' grazing strategies 
and pasture rehabilitation depend on the weather, which shapes their herding strategy 
and conditions of access to other production resources to pursue mobility (Fernandez-
Gimenez et al., 2008, p 45). Thus, the ways in which group social and resource 
boundaries are defined shape group effectiveness in collective action and improvements 
in pastureland management. 
7.2.3. Challenges to herder group pasture managem~nt 
The social and environmental outcomes of group formation reveal three main 
challenges for herder group pasture management. The first is a herder group's ability to 
pursue collective action. Successful herder group formation appears to be heavily 
dependent on group leadership and support from the state-based actors (Mau and 
Chantsallkham, 2006, SDC, 2010, Batkhishig et al., 2012, Undargaa et al., 2007, 
Schmidt, 2004). Schmidt (2004) argued that leadership skill contributes to good 
governance of a group by making sure that all activities are transparent, joint decision-
making involves all members and that accountability is assured for the use of communal 
funds. Although donors approached collective action by addressing imbalances in 
power relations, whether group leadership balances power relations and accomplishes 
collective action among group members remains questionable. This is related to the 
ways in which a group's social and resource boundary is defined by the involvement of 
a third party as it is a popular notion that third party involvement leads to success 
(Batkhishig et al., 2012). Sneath (1993) argued that the herder group is an externally 
223 Despite donor intervention ofUS$77.47 million, the rural sector continues to under-perform (Mau & Chantsallkham 2006). 
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constructed social group and that it cannot be a pastoral institution. As Upton (2008) 
argued, the herders' possibility of joining a group or its collective action is mainly 
shaped by the ti1ne they have available to take part in the labour required for organized 
collective action, the financial constraints, group size and/or their geographical distance 
from the majority of members. Thus, a successful group is particularly dependent on the 
involvement of the project team facilitating the members in fostering the "growth of 
interpersonal trust and cooperation"(Upton, 2008, p 175). However, even the 
involvement of a third party does not often lead to successful collaboration. For 
instance, empirical research on group evaluation (Undargaa et al., 2007) revealed that 
out of 12 communities, which were facilitated and considered successful by the project 
team, respondents from only three com1nunity stressed the existence of collaboration 
among the members. Also, respondents raised concerns over group leaders' preference 
for capable members to be involved in group activities for the sake of the success of the 
group (Undargaa et al., 2007). 
Second, if a group's formation is based on neg nutag usniihan, it is challenging for the 
group to accom1nodate the flexible movement of its members, that is, the principle of 
"freedom of movement" (Lattimore, 1941, p 207). The project design emphasized that 
"the approach to institution was not strategic and not based on a thorough prior 
analysis", whilst recognizing the existence of local power relations and heterogeneity 
within the herding community (Schmidt, 2004, p 20). For this reason, the social and 
resource boundary of a herder group was based on the territory of a neg nutag usniihan 
rather than on a jurisdictional bag territory. However, Upton (2008) argued that this 
approach to institution building was not necessarily based on the notion of a herding 
co1nmunity as it once existed in its historical, socio-political and ecological context. Its 
social and resource boundary is much smaller than bag and soum jurisdictional 
boundaries, in which herders' movement was confined in the past (Mau and 
Chantsallkham, 2006, Sneath, 2003, Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a, Lattimore, 1941 ). This 
is why some programs experimenting with herder group pasture management have 
already acknowledged the difficulties of pursuing exclusion and reciprocity under this 
arrangement for the possession of pasture by herder groups (Interview 57 and 58). In 
fact, neg nutag usniihan does not necessarily perform a crucial function as a production 
unit (Bold, 1996, p 76). It is more a social network organization that enables 
' 
collaboration on co1nplex seasonal mobility and camping flexibility rather than a 
territorially fixed group (Sneath, 1993). Thus, the herder group's effort to pursue 
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exclusion raises particular concerns over maintaining the fluid nature of social and 
resource boundaries of groups and their relationship to non-group areas (Upton 2008; 
Fernandez-Gimenez et al, 2008). 
Third, the herder group as a formal institution raises the question of sharing power with 
local administrations. Herders who control production perhaps led some advocates to 
assume that herder groups would play a leading role in pasture management, but they 
often fail due to lack of skill in organizing themselves (Chantsallkham, 2009). 
According to some advocates and to particular scholars, their failure is mainly related to 
the lack of support from the local administration in understanding the significance of the 
herder group and supporting the groups to continue their collaboration at the completion 
of the project funding (Batkhishig et al., 2012, SDC, 2010). Successful cases of local 
pasture management involve both herder group making and enforcing the rule, which is 
legitimized by the re-enforce1nent of the local administration (Fernandez-Gimenez et 
al., 2008). With regard to different legal actors sharing authority over pasture 
1nanage1nent, Schmidt (2004) raised the important question of "whether a parallel 
structure to the territorial administrative (government) structure has been developed 
through donor support; and if local government sees community organizations as a 
threat" (Schmidt, 2004, p 27). Schmidt reported that local administrations accept group 
formation as a positive contribution to strengthening local pastoral governance 
institutions. This is because herder groups were envisioned as reducing the workload 
and alleviating the financial constraints of local administrations in governing the 
herders' movements (Schmidt, 2004, Mau and Chantsallkham, 2006). 
However, in reality, it is now quite co1nplicated for a herder group to exercise exclusive 
group possession rights for pasture management. This is connected to why local 
ad1ninistrations lack incentive for supporting herder groups. The GG project case 
reveals conflicting interests among herder groups and local administrations over who 
should claim benefits from visiting herders' use of local pastures (Interview 57). Also, 
group politics with local administrations are mainly shaped by group leadership 
(Schmidt, 2004, SDC, 2010, Mau and Chantsallkham, 2006). Group pasture 
management is therefore dependent on group collaboration as well as on collaboration 
with local administrations, which have a bigger management role than just formalizing 
' group pasture use rules for legitimacy. In fact, Fernandez-Gimenez et al., (2008) found 
that herders were the main actors (70%) in regulating seasonal pasture use, but the 
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majority of research respondents "supported joint regulation or co-management by 
herders and local administration" (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2008, p 34). Fernandez-
Gimenez et al., (2012) further emphasized an existing lack of collaboration between the 
donor projects, local administration and the herder groups in local pasture management 
and emphasized neither of these actors "can alone effectively manage pasture or 
respond to disasters such as dzud' (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012, p 848). These 
challenges indicate that in forming herder groups, factors which are beyond the concept 
of setting social and resource boundaries within a small group of herders need to be 
considered within the larger socio-political and economic conditions for resource 
management. 
7.3. Herder groups and challenges in the HBU case area 
This section examines the complexity of controlling the benefits from governing natural 
resources in the HBU case area, where the SLP project has implemented herder group 
fonnation. 
7.3.1. Group formation 
In the HBU case study areas, the SLP project employed a top-down approach with a 
very ambiguous design principle to form a group. They assigned bag governors and 
soum SLP project extension officers to facilitate group formation for delivering aid-
based activities to local communities, instead of working with single households 
(Intervievv 12 & 41). The project, first, encouraged herders' to volunteer to form small 
size groups in all three bags. However, in the HBU bag, 'volunteering' was interpreted 
as group membership was voluntary, but no herder would remain without belonging to a 
group (Interview12). In DD bag officials registered whoever decided to form a group. 
In UU, group fonnation was in the early stages. Second, in their design principle, the 
method of setting up the social and resource boundaries was not clear. In Delgerhaan 
(HBU & DD bags) and Bayanjargalan (UU bag) soums, local officials were reluctant to 
define a specific group territory. In terms of social boundaries, they divided herders into 
the aravt, a group of ten households, which was used for administrative purpose in the 
past. 
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However, a dilemma arose in their use of the concept of neg nutag usniihan that was 
based on herders' key pastoral resources to improve their pasture management 
(protecting wells and springs) and pastoral production (pasture fencing for baby 
livestock, protection against theft of livestock) (Interview 39). As elsewhere, each bag 
divided all households into several groups based on the geographical proximity of 
spring pasture without any specific group territory being delineated. As a key resource, 
spring pasture shapes access to other seasonal pastures and herders' de jure havarjaa 
ezemshil, keeping the group of herders together most of the year as neg nutag usniihan. 
Winter camping was not included for setting up territorial resource boundaries as group 
1nembers' winter camping was spread across HBU Mountain. This indicates that group 
pastureland management does not necessarily include winter pasture, which is a key 
resource for pastoral production. This top-down approach only had reality on paper. 
Herder group 
Formation 
Yes 
No 
Total (n=97) 
HBU 
3 
98 
40 
Table 7 .1 Herder group formation by bag 
Bag households (by % ) 
DD UU 
22 12 
78 88 
23 34 
Total 
10 
90 
De facto, very few herder groups constituted in this way were set up in the case study 
areas. Table 7 .1 shows that the majority of total participants stated 'no' that they are not 
a member and that they had never heard of such herder groups in their locality. The 
remaining participants mainly referred to the failed attempts by local soum officials to 
establish herder groups. For instance, in HBU bag, the local official claimed there was 
an active herder group in their area (Interview 15), but this group exists only on paper as 
its no1ninal 1nembers confirmed that there was no such group (Questionnaire-3-6). In 
DD, a voluntarily established group based on relatives also nominally existed 
(Questionnaire-62). In UU, according to one participant, "the soum organized it top 
down dividing households into groups; there are none active" (Questionnaire-83). These 
responses strongly indicate that herder group formation was merely an externally 
constructed process of group formation, and that no groups actually existed. 
The formation of groups according to social boundaries failed for several reasons. First, 
this was an attempt to impose an assignment, without taking into account herders' 
membership in different jurisdiction. One UU respondent, who claimed that their group 
was to be an NGO, explained, 
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... The group used to be the neighbouring four households from UU and X bag. 
The local administration suggested we fonn a group to possess a well ... We grew 
vegetables, then we all did not have time; we dispersed and moved away from 
each other to follow pasture (Questionnaire 95). 
This quote i1nplies that herder collaboration depended on their pasture use pattern, 
which is confined within their jurisdictional boundary. Second, herder groups were 
mainly attracted by incentives offered them such as micro-credit and project support 
(Interview 24 ). Instead of collaborating on pasture and livestock 1nanagement and 
preventing livestock theft, these incentives were used by opportunistic members to 
obtain cash benefits. Third, members of such artificially-constituted groups had no 
interests in common: such interests appear even among relatives. For instance, in DD, a 
nominally existing herder group member explained these problems as follows: 
.. . There were 10 households who joined from our soum centre, all relatives. 
However, the households were not involved in any [ shared] activities anymore. 
We were supposed to 1nend this hand-well, but haven't done it yet. We were 
given a tractor to use for making hay and for moving between seasonal pastures . 
My son-in-law drives the tractor, but he lives in the soum centre now. He 
cultivates agricultural land for others. An elder called Baatar and his children 
and me and my children from the soum centre decided to establish this group. 
We actually mended one well before. We wanted to improve it but nobody is 
coming to do it anymore. Right now, there is no one, who supports it. 
(Questionnaire 52). 
Thus, incentives for establishing herder groups did not reflect in maintaining group 
collective action as envisioned by the project. This indicates that power relations 
remained a challenge to group collaboration. 
7.3.2. Group collaboration and pasture management 
In fact, the idea of herder group pasture management conflicts with the norms and 
practices of the local people, in several respects. First, herders maintain their social 
capital by collaborating informally on their production activities within their informal 
networks, in spite of the failed attempts to strengthen herders' externally constructed 
social capital by setting social boundaries. None of the participants mentioned formal 
group collaboration and pasture management224 . In the HBU case area, 63 % of the total 
participants (n=97) manage their herding independently. They supplement extra labour 
224 Other donor projects mainly refer to maintaining wells, fixing roads and agreeing to use pastures 
seasonally on fixed dates, which is essentially traditional, but de jure formalized pasture use rules are 
limited to group members being involved in herder group pasture management. 
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by hiring from households with small herds or from those with no livestock. 3 7% of the 
respondents(n=97) said they had collaborated infonnally with their neighbours or 
relatives in pursuing long distance otor, preparing winter food, cleaning and fixing their 
uvuljuu havarjaa or milking mares. 
Second, the local herders' initiatives in pasture management differed from those set 
down by the project. Development projects allocated funding for pasture 1nanage1nent 
including establishing reserve pasture or hay making areas as a major policy discourse 
of group pasture management (SDA 201 0; Schmidt 2006). However, the top down 
approach espoused for forming groups did not address the herders' need to improve 
their pastoral resources. For example, at the 2010 autumn bag meeting225 in UU, herders 
did not vote for the project proposal for fencing small patches of pasture in their winter 
and spring or hay1naking areas as these initiatives would mainly serve individual 
interests and gave no clear indication of who would be responsible for what and how it 
would be done. They 1nainly voted to protect saltlicks, springs and muddy areas, and 
opted for improving their quality of livestock with a breeding program (Photo 7 .1 ). In 
response, the SLP required the herders to form a group to pursue these activities and 
Photo 7 .1: At the UU bag meeting, herders were concerned about pollution on the saltlake 226 
herders would contribute 10% of the cost of these activities. This is because SLP 
funding is designed for group activities in order to deliver their aid to responsible local 
actors. According to a project officer: 
225 Field note, August 15 , 2010, Ulaan Uhaa bag meeting, Shiveet MT. 226 This pollution is nearby their spring campsites and is caused by outsiders with their trucks loaded with 
heavy rocks, bricks and rubbish to weigh their light weight Korean trucks down, so, they are able to drive 
in the snow. These outsiders then dump the rubbish at the lake and fill their trucks with salt for the return 
Journey. 
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.. .If these initiatives really need to be done, then there is a need for establishing a 
herder group to be responsible for possession [having exclusive title to] this area 
of land. It cannot be [held in] dundiin (among a bag community in this context), 
and then nobody can take responsibility over it. If herders want to do it, then I 
will make those who wanted to be responsible for it establish a herder group and 
include this proposal in the 2011 plan (Interview 41 ). 
Interestingly, none of the local officials offered any suggestions about how to help the 
herders protect these CPR, which are shared among both local and neighbouring bag 
and soums. This points to the SLP project agenda as having very rigid conditions for 
involving herders in pasture management which are incapable of responding to herders' 
initiatives. 
Conflicting interests among stakeholders contributes to conflicting ideas on local 
pasture management. Addressing the herders' needs through project funding is 
controversial. In one of the bags, tensions arose over control of the SLP project funding 
between soum Hural and soum level in the SLP com1nittee227 .The soum Hural criticized 
the project committee for prioritizing fencing of pasture areas for the sake of the project, 
although it was not of any benefit to the herders. However, the project officer blamed 
the Hural for overlooking the herders' need by installing a livestock bath in the soum 
centre, too far from the herders' nu tag. These argu1nents resuJted in the herders not 
voting for either of these proposals (Interview 41 ). Thus, conflicting stakeholder 
interests also contributed to the failure of group formation as herders' interests in 
i1nproving their pastoral resource and production management were not taken into 
account. 
7.3.3. Understanding community social boundaries 
Several factors that shape community social boundaries 1n pursuing pasture 
1nanagement affected the ability of the CBNRM project to exclude actors. First, neg 
nutag usniihan is more a social networking228 mechanism than a designation of 
227 The SLP committee is composed of various soum officials along with a project officer. It has the 
power to select a project proposal to get funding. It can approve what it considers is the best proposal 
based on prioritization. It then sends it to the aimag SLP committee for approval, which allows funding to 
be obtained from the city SLP project. 
228 Strong social networking among herders from same nutag because of the pastoral production strategy 
is even mentioned in a well-known 1980s poem "Huduugiin aranshin" by Choinom. It literally goes 
" .. .in the city, people do not know each other, even if they have been neighbours for ten twenty years, 
whereas in the country, herders get to know each other following pasture and water, even though they live 
far from each other, and get to distinguish each others' every single foal or calf and get to know each 
other by inviting in those travelling away or passing by ... " 
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geographical proximity in defining a herder group's social boundaries. In a pastoral 
context, neg nutag usniihan is a term used to identify those who are from the same 
jurisdiction229 . This 1nechanism involves all actors, from relatives and neighbours to all 
levels of local officials and political representatives. Thus, the social boundary of neg 
nutag usniihan is fluid horizontally and vertically and goes well beyond small herder 
group members. Herders in the HBU case area employ the notion of neg nutag usniihan 
as a networking 1nechanism for collaboration on their production and pasture 
management. In DD, without formal group formation, bag herders230 from the affected 
area approached their bag hural. They collaborated with the bag hural (which includes 
bag herder representatives) and with the support of the local soum administration and 
the acting parliament member in halting the operation of a mining exploration company, 
in order to protect their pasture and water resources (Interview 24, 25 & Q50). In UU, in 
contrast, herders were not able to collaborate with their soum and political members to 
stop similar activities in their area, due to the lack of support from the local 
administration and political representatives (Questionnaire84). One UU herder, whose 
pasture was affected by mining exploration, stated that "Our soum [officials] does not 
oppose these mining people, whereas Delgerhaan does always, particularly two years 
ago" (Questionnaire 85). Thus herders from different localities have varying degrees of 
ability to e1nploy neg nutag usniihan as a social networking 1necnanism. 
Migration also shapes the ability of herders in the same bag to network as neg nutag 
usniihan and to collaborate on pasture management. In HBU bag, herders have weaker 
social ties through neg nutag usniihan because their networking pattern is based more 
on their migration status. Migrants fro1n western aimags emerged as neg nutag usniihan 
depending on where they used to live in the past. They took part in less networking with 
locals. They never met each other whilst sharing the same jurisdiction or they dispute 
over pasture with neighbouring local households (Interview 7). In contrast, in DD and 
229 It is rather segregated according to level. For instance, those who come from the same bag would refer 
to each other as neg nutag usniihan in front of those who are from other bags at the bigger soum level. 
However, those who come from same soum define themselves as neg nutag usniihan at the bigger aimag 
level. Those who are from the same aimag define themselves as neg nutag usniihan at the national level. 
At the national level, this concept has more social and political influence in terms of offering favours to 
each other229 . This concept of neg nutag usniihan is very powerful and provides a strong networking 
strategy that can benefit all levels in Mongolia. 
230 In the decree approved by the representative herders of the Dolood bag Hural and Delgerhaan soum 
Hural in Hentii Aimag, 2009-04-19, they demanded the mining company stop its operations and noted 
that bag members have a common understanding of the issue and signed the attachment to the decree. It 
continues: "If our proposal is not considered, we will take measures in the next level to fight for our gazar (territorial land) and nutag (home pastureland)" 
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UU bags, networking based on social ties and trust is stronger among the local herders 
due to their sharing of pastoral resources in the same jurisdictional area for several 
generations (Photo 7 .2). Herding households, which may be unrelated by kinship, camp 
Photo 7 .2: Locals milking mares for their friends, who were absent (Left). Siblings who herd seperately 
milk jointly due to scarce pasture and livestock thievery (Right). 
as neighbours in three successive seasonal pastures and support each other on herding or 
production when necessary. These local households consider themselves as neg nutag 
usniihan (Interviews 26, 33, 43 & 48). For instance, a UU herder explained this as an 
' informal networking mechanism' that is used for otor purpose~. "We can go with our 
nutagiinhan, local friends and neighbours and stay closer to each other in order to take 
care of all our horses etc. This is because, in HBU Mountain, you are likely to lose your 
horses to livestock theft" (Interview 43). Thus, neg nutagiinhan231 is a mechanism 
e1nployed by a group of herders linked by some common geographical residence 
depending on context when necessary, rather than using the concept to define a specific 
group social boundary. 
Second, herders' collaboration as neg nu tag usniihan is a dynamic relationship shaped 
by their production strategies. Herders decide on their production procedure and 
activities based on the size of the herd owned by each household and on the amount of 
pasture available. The relationship between herd size and collective action needs to be 
explored within the changing hot ail structure, which limits the possibilities of herders 
collaborating on their production and pasture management. In the HBU case area, 
currently, a hot ail is mostly composed of single ail232 (a household) with more than two 
231 Another way of saying neg nutag usniihan r? 
.,_ See Chapter 3 
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gers ( extra kitchen or storage gers ), due to the increasing numbers of livestock 
depending on depleting pastoral resources between the camping grounds. This is 
because, as a historical pattern, each hot ail has been limited to a maximum of a 
thousand head of livestock according to the capacity of uvuljuu havarjaa233 and 
surrounding pasture (Interview 4, Questionnaire 33). For instance, one UU respondent 
made a decision about their camping structure on otor based on their herd size, as 
follows: 
... Last year, we kept my brothers' livestock. But this year, we may herd only our 
own, because we both have many livestock and there is not enough pasture 
capacity for staying in one place all together (Interview 48). 
In HBU and UU bags, most households stay as a single household in their hot all year 
around. This is because, as shown in Figure 7 .2, a majority of participating households 
15 14 
10 -+-------~ ------r.------------1 
5 
0 .+----J- - - L--....,------
50-99 100-250 251-399 400-699 
9 
5 
700-999 1000:S 
livestock 
number 
Figure 7 .1 Range of livestock ownership by household per bag 
■ HBU household 
■ DD household 
■ UU household 
in HBU and UU234 bags have larger than average herd sizes. In particular, those who 
own more than 700 head of livestock are unable to camp with even poor households in 
order to pool labour. Households, regardless of their kinship relationship, manage their 
labour-intensive jobs on their own, unless they have time to help each other (Photo 7 .3). 
In DD, in contrast, more than two households at a time are able to camp together on a 
seasonal basis. The households stay together through autumn and winter (Interview 26 
& 52). This is to pool labour for seasonal tasks such as milking, slaughtering, or herding 
livestock and pursuing seasonal or otor movements (Bold, 1996, p 69). They are able to 
camp together because the majority of respondents of DD have small size herds. Thus, 
233 It is hard to keep more than 1000 head of livestock in each uvuljuu havarjaa, because of the need for 
cleaning the bedding area, and keeping it free of wet dung, particularly in winter. 234 Bayanjargal soum contains the highest number of households with 1000 head of livestock in Tuv 
aimag (Interview 51 & 55). 
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households with an average herd size are able to find other households with a smaller 
herd size and create a hot ail with the two households keeping their combined herd size 
below one thousand head. However, with regard to pasture, herders in all the different 
living conditions encountered in this research said they preferred camping alone to 
secure production due to the reduced distance between uvuljuu havarjaas. On the one 
hand, herders wish to camp with poor herders with good herding experience. On other 
hand, some local poor households, who own their own uvuljuu havarjaas, prefer to 
remain on their own, particularly in spring as a strategy to increase the numbers of their 
livestock. 
Photo 7 .3: Everyone in the family is prepared to contribute to household production 
Third, the hot ail structure with its single household expands the bag herders' social 
boundaries as they obtain extra labour resource outside of their bag. The local 
administration maintains the dynamic social boundary of a community at the bag level 
through the principle of residency. In the HBU case area, wealthy herders hire a wage 
herder who comes fro1n elsewhere and who owns almost no livestock in order to control 
the nu1nber of livestock in a hot ail. This wage herder stays with the host family or they 
camp together as two gers to earn a living rather than pooling their labour. This 
changing hot ail structure indicates the dynamism of the social boundaries of a bag 
com1nunity, which are changing more than ever. Often, wage herders begin with a 
contract for a one year trial period although they are not recognized as local residents 
due to their non-resident status. Eventually, for gaining access to uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil and other productive resources, they become registered as residents, and are 
legitimized by the bag and soum administrations. Thus, compensating labour demands 
by drawing on external sources· has implications for shaping local community social 
boundaries. 
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Moreover, seasonal or absentee herding also contributes to changing the social 
boundaries of a bag community as discussed elsewhere (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002, 
Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999b ). In the HBU case area, the labour and herd size of each 
household often fluctuate through the different seasons. In some seasons, regardless of 
the living conditions, the herders are occupied with trading, school children or teaching 
or with elders staying in urban settled areas. Then they might leave their livestock with 
relatives or hire wage herders to tend their livestock, thus becoming absentee herders 
(Sneath 2003; Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999). For instance, a UU respondent described 
their strategy as an absentee/seasonal herder: 
... Wage herders stay at my ger and use everything like family members. They do 
not have to have their own livestock. They herd for us for three seasons. We 
constantly come back and forth. He stays alone at our place. Sometimes, we hire 
an assistant for him (Questionnaire 72) 
Although absentee seasonal herders are mostly local residents, their occasional presence 
in herding also changes community social boundaries and affects the local people's 
pasture management. For instance, one HBU bag herder shared her observations on his 
seasonal neighbours: 
... We usually camp in summer between that X and Y. But now, there is someone 
staying on that area ... That household is from outside, from a city or province 
centre. They are a relative of 'A', who works in the village. 'A' allowed them 
stay there. 'A' camped near our spring camping spot ... That's why we moved to 
Z area (Interview 13) 
For these reasons seasonal herding has become a challenge for not just the group, but 
also for bag pasture management (Photo 7.4). In fact, it raises the question of "who is a 
herder", the response to which has implications for defining the social boundaries of any 
community and of their pasture 1nanagement. Thus, absentee herding is one among 
many exa1nples, in which different actors benefit from natural resources by controlling 
other productive resources such as livestock without clain1ing exclusive property rights 
to land. 
Fourth, uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil becomes a factor contributing to changing social 
boundaries and a conflicting factor in local pasture management. In the HBU bag, 
herders with an average size herd attract visiting otor herders with their uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil, as de facto th~y gain access to the surrounding pasture. They rent out 
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their uvuljuu havarjaa235 in exchange for 2-3 sheep if this is compatible with their herd 
size and production strategy (Interview 3 7). This shows how the nature of reciprocity is 
changing, from mutual assistance to looking for economic incentives to gain access to 
pastoral (uvuljuu havarjaa, pasture) and production (labour) resources. This latter type 
of reciprocity leads to disputable use and overgrazing in scarce pastoral areas. 
Photo 7.4: Occasionally some herders claim pasture around their locally recegnized summer camping 
spot by leaving a landmark. However, they needed to camp elsewhere when other seasonal herders are 
camping nearby. 
Neighbours of those who are renting are forced to share their small pasture with rather 
larger numbers of visiting livestock than in the past (Interview 3). An experimental 
herder group in another project experienced similar incidents when a member of their 
group rented their uvuljuu havarjaa to outsiders. In another incident, more uvuljuu 
havarjaa were built in a group's territorial area. Also, otor households moved into their 
area (Interview 57). In these cases, even the local authorities have legitimized the influx 
in co1nmunity membership, and are incapable of solving such disputes due to the 
incompatible legal authorities ( see Chapter 6). Consequently, setting specific social 
boundaries for group herders is difficult when access to pastoral resources by local 
235 This indicates that uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil essentially encourages herders to exploit any available 
pasture as the demand for uvuljuu havcz.rjaa increases. In a pastoral context, ascribing economic value to 
land increases the incentive to exploit the pasture more instead of managing it properly. Thus, instead of 
investing in the land for better management, exclusive property rights to campsites has been encouraging 
herders to focus on gaining economic benefits. This is because this exclusive right to a campsite does not 
secure herders access to better pasture and does not secure their production. 
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herders is legitimized by uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. The difficulty in setting group 
social boundary also translates into difficulty in defining group resource boundaries. 
7.3.4. Understanding community resource boundaries 
The CBNRM project overlooked several factors that shape community resource 
boundaries and affect herder group's ability to exclude other actors. Herders' seasonal 
movement shapes the bag community resource boundaries, which embed fluidity to 
facilitate 'freedom of 1novement' within the bag jurisdictional boundaries or crossing 
jurisdictional boundaries of different levels. This freedom of movement refers to the 
annual seasonal rotations or summer and winter otor move1nents in seasonally and 
geographically specific terrain. Four-season mobility is a basic strategy for herders' 
production under stable weather conditions. In terms of the number of annual 
movements in a HBU case area, the groups' resource boundaries on paper were drawn 
through their three seasonal pastures. Even within this basic pattern, participants in each 
bag carry out different nu1nbers of seasonal movements. Figure 7 .2 shows that in DD 
and UU bags, households on average move four or more times236 , whereas HBU bag 
households move between three and four times per year. The number of seasonal 
movements depends on the weather-based production strategy with regard to the 
household's herd size and the available pastoral resources. 
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Also, the herders' seasonal movements are dynamic as they are based more on the 
quantity of available pasture within the jurisdiction than on herd size. Figure 7 .3 shows 
that the majority of HBU bag respondents, regardless of herd size, move 3-4 times, 
which only indicate a basic seasonal mobility. A lack of seasonal pasture within the 
bag 's territory reduced mosts herders' possibility of pursuing summer otor to improve 
236 4< refers to number of movements, which can be 4 to 10 times a year including short summer otor 
movements or any other season when not securing access to a convenient camping spot. 
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the quality of their livestock. This also lead to fewer households, of those who owned 
more than 1000 head of livestock, moving more than four times a year within or 
crossing the bag boundary. Some of these are herders, who use the mountain in spring, 
have to leave the HBU bag territory for other seasons. This indicates that the HBU bag 
households' resource boundaries extend beyond the HBU bag jurisdictional boundary. 
In contrast, as shown in Figures 7 .4 & 7 .5, UU and DD participants, regardless of herd 
size, are able to pursue more summer and autumn otor within their own territory, 
because these bags have larger territory outside of the RP A. 
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Figure 7 .5 Ulaan Uhaa participants' movement frequency by livestock number 
Moreover, resource boundaries become much more dynamic during unstable weather, 
which changes the characteristics of the herders' usual seasonal pasture. The herders' 
freedom of movement in search of pasture for seasonal mobility goes beyond their 
jurisdictional boundary. This process can be a long or short distance otor movement. In 
the HBU case area, as shown in Figure 7.6, the respondents in HBU and DD bags have 
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a limited tendency to pursue cross-territorial otor movements, because the HBU 
Mountain, as an historical RP A, is located in their jurisdictional territory. In contrast, 
UU herders pursue more cross-territorial otor, because their UU uvuljuu that are located 
outside of the 1nountain offer limited natural shelter or pasture. 
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Figure 7 .6 Otor frequencies by households in different bags 
At the sa1ne time, herders who share the same seasonal pasture pursue different camping 
patterns, depending on herd size, species herded and labour demand for this type of 
herding. In winter237, if a severe snow storm covers all available pasture, the herders are 
ready to move elsewhere for better pasture, regardless of their winter uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil. This reflects an ulamjlalt pasture use pattern in which herders leave their 
locally recognized uvuljuu havarjaa, whilst others can use this area if necessary. In 
particular, the movement of poor herders becomes quite unpredictable when they herd 
for different households every year, depending on their herd size, in order to gain access 
to uvuljuu. For instance, a DD wage herder described his winter pattern, which is 
dependent on his employer's pattern: 
... This household would usually go and stay close to the soum centre. They came 
from the soum centre and came here on otor. The year before last we got their 
livestock and stayed at their winter uvuljuu. Then we spent spring near the soum 
centre at his havarjaa. Then we came here [to our own place] (Interview 30). 
Herders who follow an unstable camping pattern include those who rent their uvuljuu as 
they either stay with an otor household or stay elsewhere beyond their bag jurisdictional 
boundary if herding for someone else from a neighbouring bag. Households with large 
and average nu1nbers of livestock also separate their family or bag members to take care 
of specific species in different areas, because each species has different strengths to 
cope with severe winter conditions. For instance, it is a common strategy in all three 
237 The aim of winter mobility is to gain access to sufficient water and pasture resources in sheltered 
terrain to cope with the harsh winter conditions. Reflecting on conditions from previous seasons, herders 
prepare well ahead for winter. 
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bags that parents stay behind at their havarjaa or uvuljuu ezemshil even if it is covered 
with snow to take care of the cattle with fodder, whilst the children go on otor to the 
mountain taking the sheep, goats and horses. 
Furthermore, under unstable weather conditions, the herders' ability to use the same 
seasonal pasture is dependent on their seasonal herding strategy and their ability to 
pursue mobility. In spring238, it is common in all three bags for participants to be unable 
to reach their havarjaa, because they are stuck in the snow or their havarjaa did not 
have sufficient pasture. In these conditions, those with large numbers of livestock 
replace their spring livestock shelter with the mountain pasture as it offers abundant 
alternative buuts. This strategy was found to be popular among HBU bag migrant 
herders who did not possess havarjaa. Spring camping for poor households also 
changes as they follow their employer. In contrast, households with average herds 
mainly aim to reach their havarjaa or anywhere in the local broom grass area (photo 
7 .5). They have greater stability when they stay in a familiar area, though in different 
;, 
Photo 7 .5: Broom grass area, where local herders spend spring in UU 
havarjaa, 1nade available by herders who are elsewhere with their large or small size of 
herds (Interview 6 & 48, Questionnaire 92). They avoid the risk of losing livestock 
238 Spring mobility is all about saving new livestock or helping weak ones that have survived the winter at 
their established havarjaa in livestock shelters. 
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whilst exploring alternative camping. Unlike households with large herds, they will not 
have enough livestock to face this risk (Interview 30). 
Another factor contributing to the dynamics of the resource boundary is the issue of the 
depleting seasonal pasture. In summer239 , the lack of seasonal pasture in each area leads 
to increasing mobility in terms of distance and frequency. As shown earlier in Figure 
7.4, 7.5 & 7.6, in HBU and DD bags, participants with large or average size herds 
pursue summer otor in other localities. A HBU bag migrant household shared his 
expenence, 
... We usually go and stay in [X area away from HBU bag] for most of the 
summer ... It is better there, because we do not have a place for spring and 
summer here. Our livestock does not fit in this area. About the river area, locals 
would complain and claim the river area. Instead of causing trouble, we go 
elsewhere (Interview 23). 
In this case, the ulamjlalt pasture use principle haya bagtahaar idej hamar bagtahaar 
buuna, (camp and graze as many as the area will allow) implies less an 'open access' to 
pasture, but sets the limit for gaining access to pastoral resources. Herders go beyond 
their recognized area within the bag for distance summer rotation, but stay within their 
jurisdictional soum boundary due to its legitimacy. A DD herder described his summer 
rotation: "I do go around the soum a bit. Well, within the soum territory, there is less 
trouble from local people saying 'you have to move now' as long as you do not stay 
near someone's havarjaa" (Interview 35). Saum herders employ neg nutag usniihan to 
reciprocate by sharing pasture with households with fewer livestock. Thus it is 
inevitable that herders' camping patterns are often composed of those households that 
have different herd sizes within each jurisdiction. This indicates that the soum 
jurisdictional boundary denotes a more legitimate exclusionary mechanism. These cases 
indicate that exclusion is not purely a matter of social sanctions dependent on who 
complies with rules , but is due to production factors such as a co1nbination of herd size 
and availability of the pastoral resources. For instance, in UU and DD bags, those with 
large herds vvere unable to camp where they could gain access to river grass in their own 
jurisdiction for summer rotation as all participants were concentrated along the river due 
to a drought. These wealthy herders were able to pursue bag cross-boundary otor as 
they could afford a wider network of connections with herders in other areas. 
239 Summer movement is for fattening weak livestock left over from winter and spring. Thus, herders 
pursue summer otor, which are small rotations on available grassy areas in their jurisdictional territory. 
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In addition, the herders' need to adopt specific herding strategies based on the season, 
which shapes their resource boundary. First, in autumn240, in all three bags, herders with 
different numbers of livestock negotiate with each other in pooling labour and selecting 
areas with sufficient pasture, water and conditioning their herds for winter. Migrant 
households with large herds also return to the HBU bag to condition their livestock for 
winter. Negotiations mainly occur between households with small and average size 
herds as they are able to create a hot with more than two households and fewer than 
1000 livestock. Second, in autumn, herders feed their herds with saltlicks to maintain 
the strength of the herd. Some HBU bag herders with large herds visit UU territory to 
access its abundant salty lake during summer and autumn (Interview 18). Thus, changes 
in the resource boundary occur due to a shortage of natural saltlicks in other 
jurisdictional territory. 
7.4. The limitation in group pasture management 
As in different project areas elsewhere in Mongolia, the HBU case also demonstrates 
the complexity involved in setting up herder groups based on social and resource 
-boundaries within a bag and between two different jurisdictional boundaries due to the 
following reasons. In terms of group collective action, community pasture manage1nent 
needs to go beyond herder group. Projects need to recognize the existing structure of the 
bag com1nunity and understand the dynamics of its social and resource boundaries for 
triggering successful group collective action. It is reported that successful groups owed 
their collective action directly to the support given by a third party and to the group 
leadership (Schmidt, 2004, Mau and Chantsallkham, 2006, Upton, 2008). Success may 
occur when the community has clearly defined and fixed social and resource 
boundaries. HBU case revealed neither the effectiveness of third party involvement nor 
any group leadership: the project failed in its attempt to form herder groups in all three 
bags. This process led to the project benefits being captured by the unbalanced power 
relations among me1nbers due to gender and age differences and even among relatives. 
It was co1nmon elsewhere that these actors responded to incentives to capture aid and 
project support rather than to intentions to address the real challenges through collective 
action and improving local pasture management (Mau and Chantsallkham, 2006, Upton, 
240 The function of autumn mobility are maintaining and solidifying summer fattening and conditioning of 
both herders' camping and livestock for winter. 
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2009, Undargaa et al., 2007). Without volunteer group formation, local officials divided 
the bag herders into groups using the notion of neg nutag usniihan. 
Neg nutag usniihan is a social networking mechanism that underpins collective action 
rather than a mechanism that defines a group's social and resource boundaries. 
However, using neg nutag usniihan to define a pastoral institution is only one of the 
conditions for shaping community collective action in relation to their production 
n1anagement. In the HBU case, herders collaborated as neg nutag usniihan with each 
other and other actors when necessary or when they carry out an otor movement or in 
order to protect their resources. Neg nutag usniihan is stronger as social networking as 
argued elsewhere for accom1nodating flexibility in mobility and camping (Sneath, 2007, 
Sneath, 1993 ). Thus, it is clear that herders still collaborate informally, regardless of 
third party involve1nent in attempting to strengthen group social capital. However, 
herders possess different abilities to work as neg nutag usniihan among themselves due 
to factors like differences in migration status, production strategy and political interests. 
In HBU bag, the difficulty to work as neg nutag usniihan was due to the different levels 
of social ties existing among the migrant and local herders over a short period of sharing 
the same pastoral resources. In DD and UU bags, the herders' ability to work with 
officials and politicians also differed in their actions towards resisting mining operation. 
Projects also face challenges in trying to build herders' pastoral institutions based on 
grouping herders defined by neg nutag usniihan. Grouping herders within a bag or 
brigade jurisdiction was broadly used for administrative purposes for collecting taxes, 
announcing news or assigning production tasks (Vreeland, 1954, Humphrey, 1978). It 
was not used for pursuing exclusive territoriality for group pasture management. 
However, the project employed an approach of pasture user group (PUG) as an ideal 
collective pasture management institution. PUG is based on: 
... territorial boundaries, which are defined in a deliberative process involving the 
concerned herders and are validated by the soum government. ... PU Gs ... are 
autonomous organizations aimed at jointly developing, enforcing and 
monitoring PMP [Pasture Management Plans] (SDC, 2010, p 11 ). 
SDC (2010) also acknowledged the difficulties in running PUG based on this category 
due to the diverse factors related to the difference in ecological zones (SDC, 2010) . In 
the HBU case, using the concept of neg nutag usniihan based on the herders ' spring 
camping for defining group territory conflicts with ideal social and resource boundary 
of a group when they pursue seasonal movement. Group 's social and resource 
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boundaries change because they have winter campsites in different locations in the 
mountain. Also, group members have different camping arrangements in other seasons 
due to their seasonal production and herding strategies based on herd size, the 
availability of pasture and the labour each household can afford. Everyone in that 
community grazes within the bag and its buffer territory, and their rights and access to 
pastoral resources are legitimized by their residency in that bag as a state territorial unit. 
This indicates that the local community structure is more confined to the bag in defining 
community social and resource boundaries. 
Another reason for the difficulty in forming a group is having a small territory and weak 
social ties among group members, which cannot result in building a successful 
institution in which everyone in the community is included in order to comply with 
community rules and norms. Similar to what Sneath (1996) reported, the HBU case also 
revealed that the herder group was more an externally constructed social group than a 
real institution. The project was unsuccessful in creating the herder group institution 
although it followed the external design principle of a well-defined group with small 
size. The herder group is much smaller than the bag community for pursuing collective 
pasture management. Defning resource boundaries based on four season mobility in 
fixed pastures in stable weather conditions241 is a simplification process to adjust 
herders' co1nplex mobility patterns into a standardized model for small territory based 
group pasture management. In the HBU case, the challenge in defining the social 
boundaries also led to challenge in drawing the resource boundaries as this process 
necessarily has fluidity embedded in it to ensure 'freedom of move1nent', which was 
retained within or across bag and soum jurisdictional boundaries. Due to the lack of 
pastoral resources and unstable climatic conditions242 , herders' seasonal rotation is no 
longer restricted to a fixed number of 1novements, nor are they tied to locally 
recognized pastoral resources nor de jure uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil within the bag 
territory. Instead, seasonal pasture is defined more by specific terrain which offers the 
recognized characteristics of seasonal -pasture under different weather related 
conditions. Depending on their herd size, the availability of labour and pastoral 
resources, the herders select the specific pastoral resources offered by each terrain that 
241 Stable weather conditions refer to instances where herders are able to pursue seasonal mobility in their 
own locality and do not need to pursue long distance mobility elsewhere outside of their locality. 242 There are concerns that climate conditions have become more unstable and unpredictable in terms of 
rain and snowfall; the HBU case area was hit particularly hard by a severe drought in 2010 after a harsh 
winter in 2009. 
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will accommodate their needs for seasonal camping and grazing. As a result, herders 
from the same geographical area often do not pursue similar mobility patterns. These 
dynamics in the herders' social and resource boundaries challenge their abilities to 
pursue pasture management as a group. These dynamics need to be understood in terms 
of the structure of the primary production unit, hot ail, in their pastoral pursuits. 
The difficulty we see in group formation is that the hot ail functions more for 
production than social grouping. Scholars and advocates set up the theoretical basis for 
group formation based on the collaboration of hot ails, because they assumed the hot ail 
to be more a collaborative production unit for managing pastoral resources (Ickowitz, 
2003, Tumenbayar, 2000, Fernandez-Gimenez, 2006, Fernandez-Gimenez and 
Batbuyan, 2004, Mearns, 2004b ). Hot ail is a production unit composed of more than 
two households camping together to manage production and the pastoral resources 
surrounding their uvuljuu havarjaa (Bold, 1996, Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001). A single 
household ail with a larger size herd, often has a poor household camping with them to 
provide labour support (Bold, 1996). Nevertheless, hot ail structure witnessed a shift to 
a single ail due to the privatization of livestock (Bold, 1996, p 7 5). Some scholars have 
interpreted this single ail independently managing its production as being problematic 
because it is neither a formal nor an informal institution, and 111ay thus point to the 
existence of an ' open access' situation in Mongolia (Tumenbayar, 2000, Fernandez-
Gi1nenez and Batbuyan, 2004, Ickowitz, 2003, Mearns, 2004b ). However, the problem 
attached to the single ail structure is quite misleading, if we understand the functions of 
the hot ail. The reason why hot ail has become a single ail lies in the definition of hot 
ail as a group of households. Yet, hot ail can be composed of a single household, 
because the term hot refers to a 'livestock enclosure', so one household with a sizable 
herd creates such an enclosure243 (Sneath, 2006, Sneath, 2007). In other words, hot ail is 
defined more by herd size large enough to create a hot, than by the number of 
households. 
243 It seems that the hot ail is not strictly referring to only the number of households, but to a general 
residential camping structure inclusive of households as well as a sizable livestock herd that can create a 
hot (buuts area with or without a stable). This is because hot also refers to maliin hot (the area where 
livestock lie and sleep overnight at the camp) or to malaa hotluulah (to bring the herd back from grazing 
to the camp overnight). For instance, a HBU bag participant described her camping with one household in 
the following way. "Well, for instance, this hot contains (takes care of) the livestock, which belong to our 
six children ... " (Interview 3). Herders in the southern and northern parts of Mongolia also explained this 
in a similar way during my fieldwork. 
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Thus, due to an increasing trend of household herd size, hot ail is less likely to consist 
of two independent households which collaborate in their production. Upton (2008) 
argued that herder group formation tends to institutionalize social capital building to try 
to achieve effective collective action. Donors perceive the hot ails lack of collaboration 
as an indication of a lack of social capital. In the HBU case area, the hot ail 1s non-
collaboration with others was not due to a single ail being reluctant or having weak 
social capital. Instead, their production strategy shapes their mode of collaboration. 
Their production strategy is based on herd size, available labour and pastoral resources. 
For instance, in the HBU case, some herders were able to collaborate with other 
households due to the small size of their herd. However, some were unable to 
collaborate due to their larger herd and depleted pastoral resources. Thus, depending on 
the 1nanagement of these resources, the herders' mode of collaboration often changes 
and herders cannot be easily organized within clearly drawn social boundaries. This 
i1nplies that the projects do not acknowledge the inevitability of the herding strategy, 
nor do they understand the relationship between the changing patterns of labour demand 
as it relates to variations in herd size, when separating herders into territory based 
groups. 
Furthermore, small geographical territory and weak social ties among group members 
cannot result in building an institution to pursue exclusion. The CPR theory attempts to 
address the issues of difficulty in exclusion and subtractibility through applying the 
design principle of small group size with clearly defined social and resource boundaries 
and a fixed distributional outcome. By reflecting these design principles, many donor 
projects resulted in homogenous membership based on similar living conditions and 
thus, si1nilar production patterns. However, such group formation does not incorporate 
the fluid nature of the herders' mobility (Upton, 2008, Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2008). 
As occurred elsewhere, the HBU case also confronted the problem with small group 
territory. The HBU case revealed that the territorial approach to group formation does 
not take into account the fluid nature · of the herders' mobility. The informal 
collaboration among the herders is not limited to a geographically distinct area, because 
of the ulamjlalt inclusionary approach that necessitates pooling labour, regardless of 
wealth status. This is because the "common basis for co-residence is unequal 
wealth ... wealthy households prefer to have two or three poor households" in their hot 
ail (Sneath, 2007, p 97). Due to the hot ail being composed of single ail, the herders 
supplied their labour demand through visiting otor or migrant herders and their relatives 
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or friends elsewhere, and asking who was available or who has compatible numbers of 
livestock to stay with them. As a result, herders with different social and wealth statuses 
often camp together in patterns of mixed social and spatially locations. This shows that 
the herders' informal collaboration is involves those from outside of their bag. 
Herder groups also face difficulties when pursuing exclusion due to the conflicts 
between the informal and formal access mechanisms. A group's resource boundary is 
defined by the herders' uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi! as those who experience different 
living conditions share pastoral resources via uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. Those with 
large herd size often come and go depending on the availability of the pasture around 
their uvuljuu havarjaa (this is an informal mechanism). When pasture is abundant, they 
can claim the pasture, because they have a legal claim to their uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil (this is the formal mechanism). At the same time, those with average or small 
size herds reciprocate (using an informal mechanism) with both local and visiting 
herders, using their legal uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil (a formal mechanism). These two 
patterns may conflict, and lead to group members facing disputed use of the pasture in 
their attempt to exclude outsiders. If as proposed under a draft pastureland law, setting 
up social boundaries based on a group territorial approach will face challenges in 
accom1nodating these dynamics of inclusionary strategies for production. The draft of 
the new pastureland law addresses the issues of flexibility in mobility, reciprocity and 
exclusion. However, at the time of writing, the substance of the proposed law is still 
under much debate (Upton et al., 2013). 
Larger jurisdictional boundaries may also contradict the key design principle of a 'small 
size' group with well-defined social and resource boundaries. Herders dynamic 
movement does not mean there are no well-defined boundaries beyond that of the 
herder group. Herders' flexible mobility is often confined to a bag or soum 
jurisdictional boundary. For instance, in one case a group social boundary drawn 
through a cross-jurisdictional territory failed as members' seasonal movement was 
limited to their own jurisdictional boundary. Being historical, dual control over 
exclusion and inclusion needs to be practised at the bag level territorial administrative 
unit, which is beyond group pastureland management (Photo 7 .6). This should be under 
conditions where local administrators have effective regulatory frameworks as it would 
' legitimize outsiders' residency status after they obtain the support of the local people. 
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Photo 7 .6: Bag is also where herders gather for social and cultural events as a community 
In an addition difficulty in forming a group is that herders' decisions on 1nobility are not 
subject to a fixed schedule of group formation, but require flexibility in the use of the 
pasture for the production strategy under volatile climate conditions. In this situation, 
scholars have argued, poor households have less mobility than wealthier households 
(Fernandez-Gimenez 2008, SDA 2010). Households with larger size herds can afford to 
pursue higher mobility over longer distances, which in some cases is referred to as 
'predatory pastoralism', which is 'irrespective of the rules and norms of pasture use' 
(Blench personal communication cited in Upton, 2009, p 9, SDC, 2010) . Upton (2009, p 
9)) argued that this "reinvention and reworking of norms may be Btrategically employed 
by the wealthiest and most powerful to their own advantage". In the HBU case, 
participants reinvented and reworked ambiguous legal notions such as household or 
registration of residency (see chapter 6). However, they need to pursue diverse seasonal 
movements, which go beyond jurisdictional boundaries, by using ulamjlalt otor due to 
depletion of seasonal pasture or under unstable weather conditions. This involves 
negotiations with either local herders or the local administration to secure access to 
pasture as it is a necessary step. 
I argue that this is a matter of a conflicting legal environment, which is shaping the 
herders ' access. Herders pursue any available legitimate mechanisms, both legal (for 
exainple residency, uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil) and informal (otor as an informal 
mechanis1n). Also, carrying out otor is not limited to wealthy herders, but is also 
pursued by those with different size herds who are dependent on each other for pooling 
resources. The HBU case revealed that, regardless of herd size, herders pool resources 
( one taking care of the horses and the others sheep etc) to pursue cross-territorial otor 
when a bag jurisdiction lacks the appropriate seasonal pasture in unstable weather 
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conditions. In this case, herders do not go anywhere blindly or practice predatory 
pastorilism by taking chances. The only re-inventing strategy is, instead of using a 
formal organisation; individual herders employ connections with a local administration 
and/or the local herders for seeking their approval to make sure that their access is 
locally legitimate. In chapter 6, the HBU case demonstrated the details of how the local 
administration and local herders as a host approved such movement for visiting herders. 
Difficulties in forming groups is also related to seasonal or cross-territorial 1novements, 
which can be seen as the herders' strategy to 1naximize production yield by adjusting to 
existing cli1natic and geographical conditions in order to derive economic benefit. 
Herders' weather dependent production and seasonal mobility are perceived as a 
survival strategy (Bazargur 1998; Erdenetsogt, 1998; Mearns 2000). Fernandez-
Gimenez (2008) argued that herders' production in fact goes beyond subsistence level 
as they are able to generate extra income to replace former state subsidies in order to 
cover for example medical costs or school tuition fees. Sneath (2007) argued that 
herders pursue mobile pastoralism to gain political and economic benefits in response to 
existing climatic and geographical conditions. 
The HBU case illustrates that, under the transition economy, the actors pursued 
pastoralism more for econo1nic than political benefits. The state as a formal power no 
longer had control over production. As those who control production, the herders pursue 
production for economic benefits, even beyond their survival needs. That is why there is 
an increasing wealth gap among herders as existed in pre-collective period. Some are 
able to take advantage of existing opportunities by targeting their mobility towards 
increasing their economic benefit. This difference in wealth in fact facilitates reciprocity 
in times of scarce pastoral resources. This occurs particularly when there is no strong 
ruling institution to facilitate production and risk management. In this case, the 
perception that the poor are often disadvantaged in pastoralism is quite misleading 
because wealthy herders may also easily fall into poverty by losing livestock. Wealthy 
herders do not agree with the idea of aid supporting only poor households, because aid 
creates dependency but not preparedness (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012). Thus, in the 
HBU case area, local officials support helping herders, who have lost numbers of 
animals, to sustain their production for the future. 
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The last reason for the difficulties in forming groups is that the notion of 
institutionalized collective action has failed because increasing donor support of group 
formation has overlooked the conflicts of interest among the local actors in local pasture 
management. The aspect of stakeholder power in strengthening self-governing 
institutions has always been overlooked as donor support often perceives community 
institutions as independent of the state and the market (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). The 
SLP acknowledges the weakness of the role of local administrations as regulatory 
pastoral institutions, because the local ad1ninistrations have lost control over production. 
Thus, like any other donor project, the SLP perceives herder groups as comprising the 
community that could potentially replace local pastoral property institutions 
(Chantsallkham, 2009, SDC, 2010, Batkhishig et al., 2012). This is due to the popular 
application of the CBNRM approach as a blanket development policy rather than its 
outcomes. This resonates with Ostrom' s notion of crafting local resource institutions 
(Ostrom, 1990, Wollenberg et al., 2007). However, even this perception is problematic 
because many donor programs focus on defining herders' legal role in pasture 
1nanagement through exclusive group possession rights to pasture. However, this does 
not reflect historical authority of the local administrations that regulated access to 
pastoral resources by controlling production components. 
The pro1notion of the herder group was ai1ned at the emergence of a pastoral institution, 
which is, in fact, parallel to the local ad1ninistration. The co-existence of such a parallel 
institution was justified as creating a positive relationship between the herder group and 
the local administration (Schmidt, 2004 ). Also, scholars and practitioners have 
highlighted the local administrations' reluctance to support collective action on the part 
of herder groups (Schmidt, 2004, SDC, 2010, Batkhishig et al., 2012). Moreover, the 
process of group formation raised the question of which one of these two would control 
the benefits gained fro1n regulating access to pastoral resources. 
The HBU case revealed a conflict of interest in who would control aid support and 
govern local pastoral resources between local actors, for several reasons. The state 
territorial unit in pastoralism is not just a form of modem abstract territoriality set up to 
govern resources. It is, in fact, based on a historical pattern of a political and 
administrative system in which is embedded pastoral production. In the HBU case, 
group formation would become a matter of local politics in governing pastoral 
resources. It would depend on the legal authority of the local administration for 
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legitimizing member's social and resource boundaries (in and out-movement of local, 
visiting and migrant herders) by residency status and uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil and 
recognizing them as legal actors. This is because the local administrations partially 
shape social and resource boundaries of a community within the bag jurisdiction. In 
other words, they are de facto involved in both sharing authority over the resources, but 
also shaping the labour aspect of herders' pastoral production. Thus, a group's legal 
status may jeopardize the interest and authority of the state territorial administrations 
and also lead to conflicting territorial interest in controlling resources as a herder group 
seeks to obtain self-governing authority and to control group resources within the 
jurisdictional boundary. 
Moreover, the local administration is inevitably an influential actor in not only herder 
group formation, but in local pastoral institutions in general. By virtue of its power over 
regulating natural and human capital within its jurisdiction, it maintains its economic 
interest. The local administration compensates for its loss from losing control over 
production by authorizing and partially legitimizing visiting or migrant herders' access 
to pastoral resources. This was also clear in the stakeholders' conflicting interest in the 
use of project funding. The local administration's role in the project was limited to 
establishing herder groups. Therefore, who will represent the herders' needs and who 
defines the necessity for local pasture management becomes a power game among the 
stakeholders in order to maintain their influence in governing resources. 
In addition, in the HBU case area, the notion of any group reserving pasture 
independently is a challenging notion. The bag administration is legally more influential 
in maintaining community resource boundaries than a herder group with a small 
territory. Reserving pasture within group territory is crucial for risk management (SDA 
2010). However, this depends on the availability of pastureland in each bag. For 
instance, UU and DD herders carry out more rotations than the HBU bag, because of 
the size of the territory within these jurisdictions. Thus, in the HBU case, local 
territorial administrations play a significant role in reserving pasture, because bag and 
soum legally maintain their jurisdictional boundaries and land management planning to 
secure bag community access. However, the local ad1ninistration also faces challenges 
in maintaining the jurisdictional boundary, as other state based actors are interested in 
controlling resource access due to the HBU RP A (see Chapter 8). 
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Many donor projects have given insuffiecient emphasis to the jurisdictional aspect of 
local administration in exercising property rights to manage pastureland, whilst 
attempting to impose the notion of a herder group managing group territory with 
exclusive possession rights. They have often criticized the local administrations for their 
lack of support for herder groups as there are adequate regulatory frameworks to 
accomplish this (SDC, 2010). This assumption also overlooks the fact that the content 
of these laws is incompatible for local administrations to regulate the herders' changing 
access to pastoral resources. Parallel pastoral institutions (state territorial administration 
and monastery administration) historically succeeded, because each institution 
controlled all three components of the production. Although projects seek to create a 
condition for herder groups to independently control the three components of the 
production, they are unable to do so, because of the de-coupling of the management of 
the land from livestock and labour. Thus, current group pasture management has failed 
due to the changes in the historical pattern of production management. 
7 .5. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the formation of herder groups as a policy option to resolve an 
-
apparent problem of 'open-access'. In accordance with the design principles set out by 
Ostrom, group territorial boundaries developed by the SLP project were set up as mostly 
sn1aller than those of the local jurisdictional bag and soum boundaries, but were cross-
territorial as well. In response to the argument pursued in this chapter, the CBNRM 
territorial approach to community institutions has failed. Thus, the challenges to 
CBNRM were identified by examining herders' 1novements to gain access to seasonal 
pastures. 
The key challenges are legal as much as ecological for the project in defining the group 
social and resource boundaries. The herder group territory was based on the notion of 
neg nutag usniihan and is much s1naller than any jurisdictional boundary. Thus I have 
argued that, first, neg nutag usniihan is more a social networking strategy for herders 
and that this accommodates the necessary flexibility in their mobility and camping, 
rather than referring to a social grouping bounded by a specific territory. A second 
argument is that group territory based on key seasonal pasture is too small for the 
herders' dynamic and diverse seasonal movements, which go beyond group territory. 
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Thus, local community boundaries are mainly drawn as local jurisdictional territories, 
particularly at the bag level due to its role in territorial administration. 
In conclusion, any group territorialisation to define social and resource boundaries 
conflicts with bag community boundaries. In the first place, the local administration has 
the power to shape social boundaries by granting legal residency and uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil. Ideal group boundaries are drawn by the members' location of uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil and have li1nited capacity to improve group pasture management. 
Since uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil does not secure herders' access to quality pastoral 
resources, the herders themselves employ informal rules of pasture use that provide for 
'freedom of movement' within a bag jurisdictional boundary or cross-boundary 
mobility. In the second place, the local administration also shaped the community 
resource boundary by maintaining a jurisdictional boundary. Bag administrations need 
to be defending their territorial boundaries to ensure the availability of pastoral 
resources for their herders' seasonal movement. 
The herders' seasonal mobility is an integral part of both pasture management and the 
herders' overall pastoral production management. The herders' social and resource 
boundaries appear to be 1nore dynamic in both stable and unstable-weather conditions as 
herders' seasonal 1nobility is based on fundamental principles of managing production 
components: herd size, available labour and pastoral resources. Regardless of uvuljuu 
havarjaa ezemshil or group territory, herders with different size herds opt to maintain 
flexibility in their seasonal mobility in order to secure their production. Thus, donors 
should explore initiatives to design pastoral institutions within the herders' own 
production systems rather than only pastureland management. The design principle on 
which group institutions are based may need to take into account the historical patterns 
of resource management because of the institutional arrangements (with rules and 
values) that supported herders' mobility. This will enhance not only the local 
pastureland itself, but the quality of the production as well. This conclusion pertains 
even to another state policy initiative, which intends to support herders ' production 
management by establishing a State Reserve Pasture Area. The next chapter discusses 
the implications and the challenges for improving pasture management in the HBU 
RPA. 
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8 State territorial strategy for natural resource management 
8.1. Introduction 
In 2007, the state re-introduced the policy of Inter-Provincial Reserve Pasture Area 
(RP A) to support herders' production. This policy was meant to address the difficulties 
encountered by herders in gaining access to pastoral resources during distance cross-
boundary otor 1novement in unfavourable weather conditions. The central government 
employed a strategy of territorializing natural resources by zoning, and in doing so, 
regulating herders' access to reserve pasture. This was significant because the previous 
policy approaches of land reform and CBNRM were inadequate in improving local 
pasture management institution. Individual herding households continued managing 
their production independently with little or no support from local ad1ninistrations. As a 
result, herders often confronted major challenges in securing access to reserve pasture in 
their or different jurisdictions during dzud and under drought conditions. These 
challenges exposed herders more to the risks of losing their livestock and diminished 
their production. This situation triggered a government intervention with a historical 
RP A policy to support herders' production and secure herders' access to reserve 
pasture. However, the government confronted challenges in i1nplementing this policy 
and in attempting to regulate the herders' access to the RP A in the conflicting legal 
environment. In fact, the government's territorial strategy with zoning contributed to 
overgrazing and disputed pasture use among local actors. 
In this chapter therefore, I examine the implications of this policy for local pastoral 
management. In particular, I explore why state territorializing of the RP A, which 
focused on supporting herders' production, failed to regulate herders' access to the 
HBU RP A. I argue that the state territorial strategy for both protected areas and RP A 
was more a conservation-oriented, land-based policy rather than a production-oriented 
policy. The RP A policy conflicted with local jurisdictional authority, because it 
overlooked the importance of the herders' seasonal movements within their 
jurisdictional boundary which were a necessary part of herders' production strategy. In 
other words, the state separated the significance of jurisdictional authority from local 
pastoral production management, which amounted to another level of de-coupling of the 
historical production management. 
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In this chapter, my argument is developed in two sections. The first section reviews the 
state's territorial strategy of zoning for natural resource management in the form of 
protected areas and draws its implications for herders' access to pastoral resources and 
local pasture management. This review is significant for my case study, because it 
reveals the weaknesses of the conservation-oriented policy in the context of pastoralism 
without considering production management. Then, I investigate the HBU case, where 
the state applied a territorial strategy in the HBU RP A for pasture management for 
production purposes. These sections are critical to elaborate on the difficulties of 
applying a conservation oriented land-based policy approach in the pastoral context, 
despite its intention to support pastoral production. 
8.2. State territorial strategy for natural resource management in 
Mongolia 
The exercise of the state's coercive power in establishing an RP A is based on its 
territorial strategy of controlling natural resources through zoning. Adopting a territorial 
strategy for controlling natural resources is not a novel concept in Mongolia. The 
herders' use of physical territory is not static, but has often been shaped by the political 
and econo1nic structures of the state in the past. Therefore, the state has been using its 
coercive power to impose territorial strategy for territorial administration and resource 
manage1nent on the grounds of its historical role in shaping the socio-political structure 
of pastoral community (Bold, 2001, Humphrey, 1978, Sneath, 2007, N atsagdorj, 1972, 
Vreeland, 1954). Yet, it is crucial to understand what constitutes state territorial strategy 
with zoning for regulating herders' access to pastoral resources. 
Pre-collective period: Historically, the key factor in the state's territorial strategy for 
controlling natural resources was involvement in and taking control of herder 
production management. Central and local governments passed decrees setting up 
territorial controls in the fonn of protected areas for protecting wildlife, fauna and flora 
and reserve pasture areas for seasonal hunting and grazing as a risk 1nanagement 
strategy for mobile pastoral production. As noted in a UNESCO document244, historical 
documents recorded, 
244 http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/936/ 1996 
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... By the time of Marco Polo, there were already rules specifying closed hunting 
seasons for rabbits, deer, saigas and gazelles. Later, the laws of Khalkha Juram, 
promulgated between 1709 and 1799, designated 16 mountains to be protected 
from hunting, cultivation and logging. Bogd Khan Mountain has been 
continuously protected since the 13 th century as a holy mountain. It became 
Mongolia's first officially protected area in 1778 (Badarch et al., 2003, p 23). 
Also, in an official state document sent to the provinces in 1294, these 
1nountains were designated as natural reserves. 
The n1ling institution at each level succeeded in enforcing this territorial strategy for 
several reasons. First, they set it up within the different levels of jurisdiction245 which 
controlled herders' production and acted as formal pastoral institutions. The ruling elites 
reserved the best pasture for their exclusive use within their localities (Bold, 1996, 
Sneath, 2007). They also regulated their subjects' access to strategic pastoral resources 
in times of dzud (Sneath, 2007, p 127, Bold, 1996). Second, instead of zoning, they used 
natural landmarks, which worked with local social cultural rules and norms of resource 
use. Thus, they were able to control the herders' access and adjudicate on any 
conflicting claims to these resources. 
Collective period: The modem state in the 20th century applied zoning as its territorial 
strategy for controlling resources. This marked the beginning of the modem state 
strategy for controlling natural resources (Vandergeest and Peluso, 199 5). Under 
socialism in the 20th century, the Mongolian government claimed ownership of all 
natural resources in the country. Unlike in the pre-collective period, it pursued this 
territorial strategy in two separate forms: conservation and production. First, the central 
govem1nent established a protected area administration for conservation in the MNE 
(Ministry of Nature and Environment). From 1957-1976, the state established several 
protected areas including Gobi Gurvan Saihan, one of the largest protected area in 
Mongolia. As a statutory mechanism, the state provided protected area administrations 
with specific manage1nent rights and zoning authority to impose the different levels of 
exclusion. Zoning provided a clarification on all aspects of resource protection: the type 
of resources, the users and their rights within a well-defined territorial boundary. 
Second, the state pursued the territorial strategy for RP A under the jurisdiction of the 
MF A (Ministry of Food and Agriculture). This was to support herders' production by 
securing herders' access to the RP A as the government re-formalized the ulamjlalt 
245 200 years later UNESCO recognized ulamjlalt protection mechanisms, which involve local and 
national level pastoral institutions (territorial units or monasteries) , and the worship of specific mountains 
and hills over many generations. http:l/whc.unesco .orn/en/tentativelists/936/1 996 
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herding strategy of short or long distance cross-boundary otor movements during tirnes 
of e1nergency weather conditions. Unlike during the pre-collective period, the state 
territorialized natural resources by imposing the zoning over parts of the territories of 
different territorial ad1ninistrative units. 
One contentious issue with these territorial policies was whether the state had addressed 
all the actors' production management as a whole when territorializing their pastoral 
resources under this zoning strategy. Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) argued that zoning 
is quite different from the local use of the physical territory as it often contradicts 
"people's social relationships and histories of their interactions with the land" 
(Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995, p 389). The negative effects of the territorial strategy on 
the herders' historical use of land soon became apparent in Mongolia. For instance, 
during the establishment of the Huh Serh National Park in the socialist era, " ... within 
five years of its 1977 establishment, all pastoralists and their livestock had been 
removed" (Bedunah and Schmidt, 2004, p 168) in the effort to protect the wildlife 
habitat. Although the territorial strategy changed the people's historical interactions 
with the physical territory, the Mongolian government succeeded in its territorial 
strategy for conservation and production without much opposition from herders. One 
reason for this successful action was that the central government controlled the 
interaction between different state-based actors such MNE, MF A or local territorial 
administrations. A second reason was that the state retained the historical model of the 
pastoral production management. Under centralized economic planning, the state 
allowed each negdel or RP A aj ahui to control its own production management (land, 
livestock and labour) within its jurisdictional boundary (Chapter 4). In other words, 
these formal pastoral institutions already regulated the herders' production and seasonal 
movements. Thus, the state succeeded in resettlement of herders. 
Transition period: The state ' s territorial strategy for both protected areas and RP As 
appears to conflict to a certain extent with herders' grazing patterns because of its sole 
focus on conservation rather than incorporating herders ' production management. After 
the transition, in terms of the protected areas, the Mongolian government pursued the 
territorial strategy mostly for conservation purposes. It dropped the production aspect as 
negdel and aj ahui no longer controlled herders' production. It expanded its protected 
areas under advice fro1n international development programs in a response to a 
perceived loss of biodiversity and apparent land degradation after the transition 
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(Bedunah and Schmidt, 2004 ). Scholars noted that a growing number of households and 
livestock increased pressure on rangelands biodiversity (Bedunah and Schmidt, 2004 ). 
The government divided protected areas into four types: Strictly Protected Areas (SP A), 
National Parks (NP), Nature Reserves (NR) and Natural and Historical Monuments 
(NHM) in terms of function. In each group, it applied an extensive zoning approach in 
order to pursue exclusion as a protection mechanism (Bedunah and Schmidt, 2004). 
Three of these except SP A allow livestock grazing to a certain extent under: a) a special 
use zone, with pennits being issued in severe winters in the NPs; b) a travel and tourism 
zone along with a limited use zone; and c) in Nature Reserves (Wingard and Odgerel, 
2001 ). The state protected areas increased to 20.5million hectares by 2000, which 
comprises 13 per cent of the total area of Mongolia. The state aimed to cover 30% of the 
national territory by 2030 (Bedunah and Schmidt, 2004). 
Similar to what happened in the collective period, the zoning strategy resulted in 
changes in the herders' mobility and in their production. As Bedunah and Schmidt 
(2004) noted, the government ignored the herders' pasture use pattern when expanded 
protected areas by taking over parts of their territories from local territorial 
ad111inistrations. This restricted the access of local herders, who had long used these 
areas (Bedunah and Schmidt, 2004). For instance, whilst establishing Hustai Nature 
Reserve in order to re-introduce the Przewalskii horse (wild horse), Altanbulag soum 
ad111inistration lost some of its territory and herders were barred from using their 
seasonal grazing area (Bedunah and Schmidt, 2004, p 168). Moreover, the zoning led to 
herders' losing their seasonal grazing area (Bedunah and Schmidt, 2004, p 170). 
Furthermore, "the establishment of the Gobi B Ecological Reserve reduced winter 
grazing areas for local herders" (Bedunah and Schmidt, 2004, p 168). The reduction in 
seasonal pastures in these jurisdictions resulted in a shortage of pasture in reserve, 
particularly when these jurisdictions experienced increasing numbers of campsite 
possession (see Chapter 6). It also constrained the flexibility of the herders' movements. 
Unlike in the collective period, the state's territorial strategy was constrained by an 
apparent fuzziness in the authority of the different state agencies regulating pastoral 
resources. The government created a conflicting legal environment by regulating only 
the natural resources through its land-based policy approaches, rather than 
acknowledging the herders' jurisdiction-based production management. Although the 
state no longer controlled the herders' pastoral production management or supported it 
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through PRA, each local administration was legally responsible for regulating the 
herders' access to seasonal pasture or organizing their cross-boundary 1novement to 
access pasture elsewhere. In emergency weather conditions, the local administration 
now must obtain a permit from the protected area administration for its herders' to 
access reserve pasture in the protected areas . However, this led to the local 
administration losing authority over their grazing land to park administration, resulting 
in contested claims among these actors for authority over pastoral resources. For 
instance, local official X claimed that his herders had the right to gain access to the 
special zone in the nearby protected areas due to severe winter weather, whereas park 
director Y argued that he could not issue such a permit because of the restrictions246 to 
access the park zone. 
In addition, the protected area has become a legal mechanism by which powerful 
outsiders can derive benefits. Conflicting claims to authority over pastoral resources 
arise when protected area management only weakly enforce exclusion of outsiders. For 
instance, one local government was in dispute with the protected area administration in 
park X over the increasing trend of outsiders logging illegally with the help of protected 
area administration staff247 , and witnessed by herders. This is mainly related to the 
state's incapacity to enforce monitoring over abstract space (Vandergeest and Peluso, 
1995). This fuzziness in authority is not due to the ambiguity of the herders' property 
rights over pastureland. On the contrary, the statutory authority of the local 
ad1ninistrations and the herders' informal rights appear to be diminished in the 
conflicting legal environment (see Chapter 6). In other words, the state has overlooked 
the relevance of pastoral production management in regulating resource management. 
Currently, international and national advocates emphasize the significance of 
maintaining the reserve pasture area to support the herders' production. The territorial 
administrative units have lost their former reserve pasture areas due to the depletion of 
the pastoral resources, from the destruction of the water resources and overgrazing as 
most former areas have already been occupied by herders and their campsites (SDC, 
2010). Without access to reserve pasture, individual herding households struggle to 
cope with severe droughts or winters during unstable climatic conditions, regardless of 
the donor projects' effort to form herder groups to pursue risk management and ensure 
246 A 2000 fieldwork 
247 Mongol TV news broadcasts (2006). 
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preparedness (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012). Thus, the advocates prioritize national 
level policy initiative to re-introduce RP A in all level territorial units (SDC, 2010, 
Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012). The significance lies in the 
... perils of unregulated otor movements during dzud and the way that this can 
increase the vulnerability of receiving communities if they are not prepared with 
designated otor reserves and cross-boundary agreements cannot be effectively 
1nonitored and enforced (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012, p 847). 
As a response, the state re-established former RP As which existed in the collective 
period. The next section discusses the complexities which arose in re-introducing the 
territorial strategy of controlling pastureland with zoning in the form of the state RP A. 
This is a rarely examined form, in which the state tries to resume its historical role of 
regulating herders' pastoral production partially by introducing RP As. Also, the PRA 
needs to deal with various actors (the ministry, visiting and hosting local administration 
and herders) in supporting herders' production. Thus, examination of the state RP A, 
rather than protected areas, provides more insights in exploring challenges arising in the 
state territorial strategy through zoning. 
8.3. Territoriality in natural resource management in the HBU case 
study area 
The HBU RP A case is critical because it was the first and largest RP A established after 
the transition. It presents very diverse patterns of herder mobility with regard to visiting 
herders gaining access to state RP A. In 2007, the state re-introduced the RP A policy. Its 
aim was, 
... to protect and maintain sustainable use and management of Interprovincial 
otor RP As and create or repair RP As including wells and water resources and 
ensure its proper use and maintenance and overall establish a comfortable and 
convenient environment for herding households, who pursue extensive mobile 
pastoralism248 , to overcome winter and spring [ weather conditions] and reduce 
livestock loss (MOF A, 2010). 
To achieve these goals, the state set the following objectives: a) to create a legal 
environment to support RP A management; b) to establish new RP As; c) to improve 
herders' access to water resources in RP As; d) to improve livestock capacity to 
248 HBU RP A is not for intensive livestock husbandry such as ranching or farming as it does not have the 
facilities to take care of livestock that have become adapted to sedentary farming. Also, this is for winter 
only and all livestock except horses will be allowed. A dedicated horse RP A area will be designated 
perhaps in Dornod steppe (Interview 16). 
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overcome severe weather conditions; and e) to provide herders on otor movement with 
necessary services. The central government perceived this aim to be necessary for 
several reasons. First, the Mongolian state has a constitutional responsibility indicating 
that "Livestock is a national treasure and will be protected by the state"249 ('The 
Constitution of Mongolia,' 1992). Therefore, the state perceives its ownership of 
pastureland as a sound legal mechanism, if not the whole production management. 
Second, local administrations were ineffective in arranging herders' access to reserve 
pasture. Third, the state officials perceived that herder group formation had been 
ineffective in terms of strengthening local pastoral institutions and tackling herders' 
vulnerability to climate related production risks (Interview 19). 
Fourth, among the many agendas contained in the RP A policy250 , the state took over 
former inter-provincial RP As in different localities, except their own local reserve 
pasture if there were any. This is because the herders' individual production 
manage1nent was vulnerable when their inability was restricted to their particular 
jurisdictional territory, particularly under unstable climatic conditions. For instance, 
during a series of dzud and droughts since 2000, herders have travelled greater distances 
in their inter-provincial otor movements, with 4-5 million head of livestock annually251 . 
These 1novements increased disputes over the use of pasture among hosting and visiting 
herders and local administrations due to the ineffectiveness of negotiations among local 
administration. Also, visiting herders lacked a social welfare system that would provide 
them with services such as schools and hospitals whilst on otor movement out of their 
own jurisdictions. Thus, the government has taken various state policy measures252 
including RP A management in response to herders' vulnerability to massive livestock 
loss and to support ulamjlalt livestock production. 
249 Article 1.5.5 , Constitution of Mongolia, 1992. 
250 
'Re-establish, re-enhance the protection of inter-provincial otor RP As ' was articulated in provision 
10.3 of implementing the first stage (2003-2008) of the 'State Food and Agriculture policy' approved by 
decree No 245 , 2003 of the Government 'ofMongolia. 
251 http://www.otor.mn/ Department ofinterprovincial RPA Management, MFA. 252 Exempting herders from tax, help from international organizations in providing aid such as forage and 
fodder and several micro-credit programs to help herders re-stock themselves. 
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8.3.1. Implementation of the HBU RP A 
The state was to achieve its goal through a territorial strategy of zoning RP A as a state 
special needs territory, in accordance with the land law253 . The state assigned this task to 
the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Light Industry (MOFA). At the MOFA, the Ih 
Hural (Parliament) established Aimag dundiin Otriin Belcheer Ashiglaltiin Zahirgaa, 
'Department of Interprovincial Reserve Pasture Area Management' (hereafter called 
'The ministry')254 on 1st September, 2007. Its responsibility was to organize and 
implement a nationwide mission of establishing and managing interprovincial RP As. 
The MOF A designed a whole project, aiming to cover 10 per cent255 of Mongolia. It 
drew256 the boundaries of seven areas, covering 649,300 hectares or 0.6 per cent of the 
total pastureland in all ecological zones (Map 8.1). The largest (192.800he) is the 
Herlen Bayan-Ulaan Reserve Pasture Area (HBU RP A), which hosts herders from 
eastern and south Gobi and central provinces. 
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Map 8.1 Map of Inter-Provincial Reserve Pasture Areas in Mongolia257 
The ministry re-introduced the RP A model, which had been used in managing 
production in the collective period. The ministry specially chose HBU RP A as a model 
given its historical role of being a reserve pasture. The ministry re-established a 
Te1nporary Committee which regulated access to the RP As at the inter-provincial level 
253 Article 16.1.6, Law on Land, Mongolia 2003 
254 In accordance with decree No 187, 2007 of the government of Mongolia. 2"" )) 1,565,000sq.km 
256 De facto nine places (Interview 15) 
257 Source: DIPRPU document, MOFA, 2010 
2,.,,., _) _) 
by deciding on the number of livestock that could enter as well as all other management 
issues (Interview 25). The committee is composed of ministry officials in charge of the 
RP A depart1nent along with hosting and visiting soum governors and their livestock 
husbandry officials. The governor of the host territorial administration led the PRA 
committee as it was during the collective period. The ministry assigned the governor of 
the HBU bag/village to lead the committee until 2009, with regard to the HBU horoo 
role in hosting the RP A in the collective period. Then, the ministry assigned the 
governor of the Delgerkhaan soum in 2010 due to the issues related to legitimacy of 
soum territorial authority258 (Interview 16 & 25). On the ground, the ministry assigned 
one officer to be responsible for management during otor and off-seasons. The officer 
regulates access by issuing entrance permits, based on herders' livestock health 
certificates, on arrival to each herding household and collects pasture use fees, the 
amount of which is dependent on the number of livestock as shown in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1 Pasture use fees in the HBU RP A 
Livestock number Fee amount 
300 10,000MNT 
300-500 20,000MNT 
500-1,000 40,000MNT 
1,001-1,500 80,000MNT 
1,501-2,000 160,000MNT 
2,000< 320,000MNT 
The state invested approximately 400,000,000mnt constructing and fixing 20 wells and 
irrigation systems with fences in order to plant fodder and expand pasture use in the 
RP A. This also created employment (Interview 16). To improve the condition of the 
HBU RP A pasture, the ministry enforced two exclusionary policies: reservation by 
zoning of the HBU RP A and rehabilitation for two years. 
8.3.2. Reservation of HBU RP A 
The 1ninistry considered the establishment of the RP A by zoning for reserving the 
pasture to be used only in winter and only for otor movement. The pre-collective use of 
258 Until 2009, it was the decision of the ministry to keep the governor of HBU bag as the head of the 
HBU RP A. This was a favourable condition for the ministry to decide in collaboration with the HBU 
village governor independently of the soum for cultivating the agrarian plot in the HBU bag without 
pennission from the soum administration. An amendment to the law on territorial administrative units in 
2008 emphasized the authority of the soum administration over the bag administration and its power to 
decide on territorial matters (2009 Committee meeting protocol, DIPRPU document, MOFA) 
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reserve pasture was only limited to the HBU mountain. Now, the department used the 
collective era boundary, which included parts of the territories from the surrounding 
soums in Hentii Aimag.The RP A now controls over four seasonal pastures in the HBU 
bag and the partial winter and spring pasture of DD bag in the north (Map 8.2). The 
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department emphasized that the zoning over these seasonal pastures creates a useful 
buffer zone to protect the HBU Mountain RP A from any livestock use259 (Interviews 5 
and 16). The ulamjlalt period for using the RP A was historically during the coldest 
259 It is common for horses or non-milking cattle herds to cross the territorial boundary for grazing, until 
their owner collects them, as they mainly graze on their own with oversight from the owners. This grazing 
practice was common in UU or DD or other bags surrounding HBU Mountain. Thus, the officials in the 
collective and current periods assumed it was necessary to set wide and extensive boundaries around the 
HBU Mountain and to include other seasonal pastures. 
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winter months, from December to February. Now, the department extended the period 
fro1n November 1 to April 1, considering the change in the period of different seasons. 
Now, this state re-zoning is facing challenges in pursuing exclusion for several reasons, 
even though it succeeded in the collective time. First, the herders' physical use of 
territory is limited to the bag jurisdictional boundary. Thus, the zoning of seasonal 
pastures has led to conflicts over the jurisdictional boundaries between HBU and DD 
bags. This is because the zoning exposed the sensitivity of the disputed jurisdictional 
boundary. After the transition, the ministry assigned the management of the RP A to the 
governor of the HBU bag/village; this led to disputed claims for campsite possession in 
the buffer territory, which now defines the jurisdictional boundary. This conflict 
occurred due to the contradictory legal environment of land management. The 
ambiguity in the control over this buffer territory led to overlapping claims by herders' 
of de jure possession over the same campsites. With its authority, de facto, the HBU bag 
government assumed the former otor territory to be HBU bag territory. It took 
advantage of the fuzziness of the buffer territory between two bags. After the 2003 
amendment of the land law, it provided clearance for campsite possession in this buffer 
territory for its migrant residents. However, this disregarded the legal possession of the 
same campsites by DD households, who had claimed these earlie-r under the 1994 law. 
As a result, each bag disputed the authority of the other, because it is an important 
spring seasonal pasture which both bags lack. One HB U bag herder ref erred to the 
dispute: "DD bag would tell us to leave ... The border area is in X, where our campsite is 
located. This is the old border. The new one is not clear. It happened before the otor 
administration in 2007 or 2008" (Interview 25). DD officials pointed out that officials of 
HBU bag had taken advantage of being located within the former RP A territory to 
expand the area of much needed seasonal pasture through legal campsite possession. 
This indicates that the zoning system increases the significance of the authority of local 
officials in controlling their jurisdictions due to the inadequate legislation on land. 
The second challenge is related to the conflict over jurisdiction, which reflects the 
different interests of the state based-actors in controlling pastoral resources. This zoning 
approach of the RP A alarmed both the HBU and DD bags, because of the growing 
impact of allowing otor herders into the RP A territory. DD bag officials were concerned 
about losing their historical (pre-collective and current) claim to the HBU mountain 
area. Simultaneously, HBU bag had an historical claim over the collective era RP A 
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boundary, which included its spring and summer pastures. Currently, both bag officials 
employ uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil as a mechanism to claim the authority over their 
territory. A HBU herder who claims a campsite claimed that, 
DD bag official would state that we either have to transfer our residency to DD 
[in order to keep their havarjaa ezemshil] or leave for HBU bag [to maintain 
HBU residency] (Interview 25) 
Bag governors had a dispute at a meeting as I have heard. There were 5-6 
households on DD bag territory. Then our bag governor [HBU] told them that 
she will not give us up for DD (Questionnaire-25). 
This indicates that the loss of uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil has lead to a reduction of 
jurisdictional territory, which affects the officials' ability to benefit from controlling the 
jurisdictional unit. The HBU bag officials struggle to provide its new residents with 
spring pastoral resources in order to maintain its population, to retain its status as a 
village and to keep up its financial authority. In comparison, DD bag faces a shortage of 
seasonal pasture260 from losing its historical authority over the HBU Mountain. Thus, 
their interest in retaining their authority over HBU Mountain and border territory 
translates into controlling access to benefits. 
Moreover, the officials' interest in controlling access to benefits goes beyond the bag 
level, involving cross-level authorities. The new soum governor26-1 resolved the dispute 
over havarjaa ezemshil by invalidating the approval for HBU bag and maintaining the 
claims of DD bag herders. Since the transition, DD bag legally resumed some of its old 
territory after the collapse of the HBU RP A ( see Chapter 5). HBU bag officials 
disagreed with the soum Js decision, noting that the soum Hural could have 1naintained 
the clain1s of the HBU bag herders since both bags belong to the sa1ne soum (Interview 
22). To claim their territory back, they employed a new amendment to the law on 
territorial ad1ninistration, which authorized the bag Hural to regulate access to resources 
and decide on its boundaries. HBU bag also solidified its position by gaining the 
support of the ministry to keep HBU village as the RP A centre. These interests of HBU 
bag officials challenged the authority of Delgerhaan soum officials over the HBU 
bagterritory. According to a soum level official, 
260 The discussion in Chapter 6 showed that regular bag officials also benefitted from controlling pasture 
as most of them are herders or have wage-earning herders working for them. 261 Saum hural and governor have the power to make decisions on territorial issues according to the land 
law. 
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Since this law passed, the bag Hural head emerged and was authorized with 
more power, but is exercising power over his area plus over other bag 
territories ... telling these otor households 'you can or cannot enter and if you 
enter you have to deal with us' (Interview 25). 
This challenge is the key reason Delgerhaan soum administration supported DD bag 
claims as the administration favours the interests of both DD bag and Delgerhaan soum 
in maintaining the historical authority over the HBU bag territory. Thus, the soum 
officials are in the process of changing the HBU bag practice in order to control the de 
facto power exercised by the HBU bag officials with regard to RP A matters and its 
collaboration with the authority of the PRA administration and its temporary committee. 
The soum government is developing a policy that allows the HBU RP A to conclude a 
contract with each bag administration with the approval of the soum governor in order 
to consider the HBU bag capacity for hosting otor households (Interview 24 & 25). This 
border dispute represents the ultimate struggle over territorial control between different 
state-based actors to maintain the benefits accruing from the exploitation of pastoral 
resources. 
8.3.3. Two-year rehabilitation policy 
Within its territorial strategy of controlling pastoral resources, the ministry also put in 
place an exclusionary strategy by prohibiting all livestock grazing262 in the HBU RP A 
for two years. This was a significant step in the plan to rehabilitate the pasture which 
had been degraded by over-use by migrant and otor households prior to the 
establishment of the HBU RP A (Interview 5, 16). Initially, the DD bag hural proposed 
the government to preserve the HBU Mountain pasture. They planned to use the RP A as 
a mechanism to reduce the number of unorganized otor or migrant households entering 
their territory (Interview 22 & 36). The ministry translated this proposal into a policy of 
expulsion of all herders, including those from HBU and DD bags) from their seasonal 
pastures. The department enforced this edict by coercion in collaboration with the soum 
and bag governor's decree, demanding that the herders leave, otherwise large fines of 
500,000mnt would be levied (Questionnaire 35)263 . The ministry organized resettlement 
of the herders and their herds by relocating them to sparsely populated border areas in 
the eastern aimags some 500km away (MOF A, 2009a). However, the herders refused to 
262 Ministry decree No 165, 167 issued March 1, 2009; Enforced in late spring after herders had finished 
delivering baby livestock, though movement began in June. ?6~ 
- .) 1 USD equals approx l,700MNT 
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go to these areas as it was too expensive to travel and the area was unsuitable for their 
livestock, with different water sources and pasture conditions. Herders preferred to 
move to the UU bag, Bayanjargalan or Bayandelger soums in Tuv aimag because they 
were closer (20-80km), and they had connections there and familiarity with the 
landscape264 . The department later accepted these choices. The department negotiated 
with visiting and host local administrations in the Inter-provincial RP A temporary 
committee meeting to formalize access rights for a specified number of visiting herders 
and livestock from HBU and DD bags and allocate grazing areas in those soums. The 
department allocated 3 million MNT of funding to the soum administration for those 
with fewer than 100 head of livestock or for those who could not afford transportation 
(Interview 21 ). 
Photo 8.1: Spring shelter is an invaluable asset in pastoral production 
However, the state failed to enforce this exclusion due to lack of thorough consultation 
with local herders, in accordance with the law265 , with regard to their production 
management. This consultation was necessary for the following reasons. First, this 
policy again conflicted with the land law. The department is responsible for protecting 
RP A campsites for otor herders, but not herders' legal uvuljuu havarjaa ezems hi! 
264 These bags are within 20-80km from HBU bag. 
265 Article 20.2.5, The law on Land, Mongolia decreed that the state appropriate land for special needs 
after negotiation with the local governor and present the proposal to the respective level hural 
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(Interview 5 & 16). Consequently, some herders in DD refused to leave because they 
were reluctant to leave behind their campsites and livestock shelters unprotected (Photo 
8.1 ). In response, the ministry criticized the Delgerhaan soum officials for not enforcing 
the state policy. The soum officials argued that the state exclusion policy needed to 
determine a mechanism for protecting the herders' private property when enforcing 
exclusion. The department disagreed, stating that it is not the state's responsibility to 
protect herders' private assets under the law (MOP A, 2009a). Later, the ministry ruled 
that the department accept the soum proposal to protect the herders' private assets. 
Secondly, the state ignored the needs of the herders' production management in the 
situation of the deteriorating pastoral conditions. The HBU bag administration struggled 
to enforce the exclusion for households who owned fewer than 100 livestock and could 
not afford transportation266 and labour costs, or households with large herds who were 
concerned about the lack of secure access to spare pastoral resources in other 
jurisdictions (Interview 6, 26 & 34 ). According to one of the respondents in HBU bag) 
Last year, local officials and the department said that no matter what, we should 
leave. There should be no such approach ... In fact, I think it is wrong to go and 
stay near someone else's pasture. That's why I stayed here (Questionnaire 35) 
This indicates that herders were well aware of their limited ability to gain access to 
pastoral resources in a different jurisdiction. 
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Figure 8 .1 Otar frequency by households in different bags 2000-2010 
Third, the state overlooked the fact that the herders' decision to pursue otor movement 
is shaped by their production strategy based on the prevailing ecological conditions, 
266 However, the funding issue was rather blurred in the local soum administration. My inquiry about 
funding revealed a limited but interesting insight. HBU bag officials stated that they were not allocating 
any funds to their herders, because most returned back after a month (the earliest arrived back on 1st 
August) (Interview 21 ). The soum had allocated funding for 4-5 DD households ( each was given 
100,000mnt for transportation and petrol), which managed to leave on a major long-distance otor, but lost 
a large number of livestock. 
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whereas the state employed otor movement to achieve the exclusion of herders from 
particular pastures. In the HBU case area, herders had different levels of experience in 
pursuing otor outside of their jurisdictional boundary. As shown in Figure 8.1, herders 
in HBU and DD bags pursue otor less, because the HBU RP A is located within their 
jurisdiction. 
Pursuing otor indicates more about the availability of the pasture in the host area than 
the size of the herd because this is only a temporary stay. The two-year policy provided 
the first opportunity for a majority of the HBU bag participants to carry out a major 
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Figure 8.4 Ulaan Uhaa otor frequencies by livestock number 2000-2010 
otor, regardless of their herd size (Figure 8.2). Only a small number of migrant 
households had moved such a long distance outside of their own locality more than 
three times, because of the lack of opportunities to access seasonal pasture for their 
large herds (Figure 8.2). A small number of DD participants pursued otor regardless of 
their herd size, because both their winter and spring campsites were located in the HBU 
RP A (Figure 8.3). Otherwise, the remaining DD participants had either never 
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experienced otor because their uvuljuu havarjaa was outside the HBU RP A or had 
experienced otor only once, because their uvuljuu was inside, but havarjaa was outside 
of the RP A. Most UU participants had had experience in pursuing long-distance otor, 
regardless of their herd size (Figure 8.4). This is because they lived outside of the 
jurisdiction where HBU Mountain is located. Thus the pursuit of distance otor refers to 
a cross-boundary movement. Therefore, herders decided to pursue cross-boundary otor 
based on the availability of the pasture within their own jurisdictional territory, unless 
otherwise decreed by the state. 
Fourth, the state overlooked the conflicts over jurisdiction. Although having gained de 
jure access rights negotiated among the ministry and different levels of local officials, 
many herders in HBU and DD bags were unable to maintain their access rights to 
pastoral resources in the hosting area. In fact, the experience they shared reveals the 
extent of the pressure267 (MOF A, 2009b) from local residents and local administrations. 
For instance, one local HBU bag herder told me that, 
We had been told quite often to leave right away. They would chase our 
livestock away from there. Local officials presented us with an official letter to 
leave ... We managed to stay [there] for two months; persisted a lot, moving here 
and there and avoided seeing local officials etc (giggling) (_ Interview 13 ). 
This indicates that the ministry's negotiation with other jurisdictions over herders' 
access right were not, in practice, legitimate in the UU bag in Bayanjargalan soum. One 
of the reasons for this is the ambiguity of the arrangements made in the Temporary 
Committee among the stakeholders. The ministry blamed Bayanjargalan officials for 
breaching the ministry's policy of granting access, which was based on a consensus 
among stakeholder officials. Bayanjargalan argued that the negotiation was limited to 
verbal understanding between aimag officials at the co1nmittee meeting, but was not 
necessarily concluded with a contract to make it a legal act. Another reason was that 
visiting herders stayed close to local herders for water and labour resources, where they 
were not allowed. Bayanjargalan soum considered this as going against their policy by 
residing without permission on the local people's spring pasture268 (Interview 56) that 
267 In some areas, physical fighting and verbal attacks on visiting herders were reported. These were 
recorded not only in the committee meeting minutes (MOFA, 2009b), but also stated by many 
participants during my fieldwork in 2010. 
268 This is also because locals spring campsite is expanded to summer pasture, where visiting herders 
were staying 
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was left vacant by the local herders for rehabilitation269 . Moreover, Tuv aimag officials 
accused HBU bag herders of remaining close to HBU bag as a strategy to maintain 
access to the pastoral resources in HBU RP A. HBU bag herders camped in UU 
territory, but let their livestock graze in HBU bag territory across the river (MOF A, 
2009a). Thus, the Tuv aimag officials suggested the ministry send HBU bag herders 
elsewhere on long-distance otor or send them back to their own bags. Therefore, in this 
instance, the conflict over jurisdictional territory was due to a lack of collaboration 
between the state-based actors in addressing herders' production management needs. 
Fifth, the state failed to pursue exclusion because it was employing conflicting formal 
and informal n1les and norms to regulate depleting pastoral resource. The stakeholders 
were not able to reach a consensus due to this conflicting legal environment. 
Bayanjargalan officials defended their position of forbidding visiting herders as legal 
under the land law. The soum acted in accordance with the aimag and soum hural 
decree (MOFA, 2009a) in order to avoid more land degradation arising from activity in 
previous years, which was partially due to the increasing numbers of uvuljuu havarjaa 
ezemshil and the ever-increasing numbers of otor herders passing through their territory 
to come to HBU RP A. For a time, Bayanjargalan soum sent its own herders long-
distances to other areas as they could not enter HBU RP A due to-the two-year ban. Its 
officials stated, "We will co1nply with the decision of our soum and aimag 
ad1ninistration and protect the interests of our herders" (MOF A, 2009a, p 4). Moreover, 
Tuv aimag (Bayanjargalan) officials disagreed with the ministry's proposal, stating that 
it was wrong to i1npose cross-territorial otor on an area when there was no more room 
for additional grazing (MOFA, 2009a). However, the ministry pointed out that the state 
1nust i1npose reciprocity among different jurisdictions by organizing otor. For instance, 
in future emergency situations, the state may need to organize otor in HBU RP A or 
HBU bag territory for Bayanjargalan herders. Thus, the ministry insisted that 
Bayanjargalan reciprocate by accommodating HBU bag herders at this time (MOFA, 
2009a). This shows that the ministry intended to employ such reciprocal mechanisms, 
which was an ulamjlalt pasture use principle, in its policy enforcement in order to 
incorporate flexibility into cross-boundary movement mobility. 
269 Some UU herders left their area for elsewhere considering that HBU RP A would be closed for two 
years. 
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Sixth, the state had ignored the existence of informal control by the herders' of access to 
pastureland. Bayanjargalan officials agreed to accept visiting herders, while levying 
some fines or pasture use fees (Interview 42 & 56, Questionnaire 8& 14). However, 
their decision was conditional and depended on the local herders, who de facto 
controlled access to the pastoral resources through uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. When 
resources were scarce, local herders demanded local officials take action against visiting 
herders' whose herds were grazing on their seasonal pasture (Interview 56). One HBU 
bag herder told of his experience, 
These days, there are no unoccupied areas; even when I tell others to leave, 
especially otor households and their horses. In BJ, all winter and spring 
campsites belong to someone ... thus, it is the same everywhere, people will tell 
you to leave (Questionnaire 35). 
Similar pressure is felt in relation to all visiting herders elsewhere. One of the UU 
herders complained that, 
Last year, we went north to X soum early because HBU RP A was closing for 
two years. However, when we got there we were told to leave, I guess our soum 
did not have a contract with that soum. X soum was asking for a payment. Also, 
local households were not welcoming and were complaining that we were 
camping in their winter pasture areas (Questionnaire 66). 
Thus, conflicts of interest arose between the stakeholders as the herders still retained a 
measure of informal control over pastoral resources. 
Seventh, the state should have acknowledged the herders' production strategy like it did 
in the collective time as the pursuit of exclusion demands secure access to pastoral 
resources. Regardless of the challenges presented by long- distance otor, herders in 
HBU and DD bags departed because of the constant visits by local officials and the 
RP A officer, who were determined to enforce compliance with the government decree. 
Herders along with HBU bag officials were under the assumption that the committee 
arrangement was official in terms of granting herders access right to pasture in host 
areas. Many of them, in fact, recognized these policies as beneficial for their production 
and for preserving HBU Mountain's historical role as RPA (Interview 21). However, 
the herders encountered other herders' seasonal pasture wherever they went because of 
the depleting seasonal pastures in other jurisdictions. 
When we camp, we follow the water resource. The locals would say that this 
was their seasonal pasture (Questionnaire30) 
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We left in June. Then we went to someone else's area, it was closer to the locals 
winter and spring pasture areas (Questionnaire 36). 
In summer, herders maintained their access through a series of frequent short summer 
otor moves through any available patchy pastures. One HBU bag herder recounted that, 
"We moved 30km to X, Z, and Y [other jurisdictions]. Then we moved 4-5 times again 
out there" (Questionnaire27). This strategy came in handy as they would stay in one 
area for a short period and then move away again in response to local pressure. This 
short distance otor is quite different to open access as herders practice this more often 
on quality summer pastures which are shared among local herding households. 
Nevertheless utilizing this strategy was li1nited in terms of gaining access to quality 
pastoral resources ideal for their herds. As an HBU bag herder described, "Whenever 
we go, our livestock cannot get used to the area easily270 and are not able to graze and 
stay" (Questionnaire28). Thus the herders' ability to gain access to pastoral resources is 
shaped by not only their herd size but also the suitability and availability of pastoral 
resources. 
Eighth, the state was not capable of regulating herders' access to pastoral resources as it 
did not acknowledge that herders' seasonal movement necessary for pastoral production 
has been developed to work under the existing climatic conditions: The inconsistency in 
the enforcement of the two-year reservation policy was the trigger for many otor 
herders breaking the state restrictions on access to HBU Mountain for two years. Many 
herders fro1n HBU bag and neighbouring bags and soums complained that some 
households or livestock were allowed to stay behind while others were expelled. A local 
HBU bag herder said, 
... Well, this policy was enforced, but people did not leave, which means their 
livestock did not leave ... But then the decree was cancelled by December. And 
yet, most households were actually on the mountain before that (Interview 23). 
Under such competitive conditions for resource access, herders often questioned the 
legitimacy of the state policy to ensure that they were not disadvantaged. Thus, the state 
remained powerless to pursue exclusion, particularly during the severe winter 
conditions. 
270 Herders use the term ma! togtohgui (the livestock movement is unstable), livestock move around often 
and cannot graze in stable manner to get fat and maintain the fat. 
245 
As a result, ineffective policy enforcement created de jure open access as herders 
managed their own production by adjusting their mobility in response to the existing 
climatic conditions, as they had in the past. The dzud in 2009 left herders all over 
Mongolia no option but to pursue long-distance otor. As there were no solid 
arrangements between local administrations to secure visiting herders' rights to pastoral 
resources, herders all around the HBU Mountain returned to the HBU RP A in late 
autumn seeking natural shelter and reserve pastures. The abrupt return of herders was 
more to secure access to pastoral resources as a risk management strategy than a 
deliberate infringement of state regulations. Herders were frantic to 1nove before 
snowfalls blocked their way, particularly in the UU river valley. UU herders described 
this chaotic situation during the move to HBU Mountain, 
... We used to stay in our own winter campsite. However, we needed to stay in 
HBU Mountain last year. If not, we would have lost everything (Questionnaire 
65) 
.... Yes, those who managed to come back, saved some of their livestock and 
those who did not come to HBU Mountain lost all of their livestock (Interview 
7). 
The state shifted its policy from a two year-policy to a seasonal reservation of pasture 
fro1n spring to winter. However, the department failed to enforce this policy as well. 
The following spring and summer, the herders faced a drought in other seasonal 
pastures in the HBU case area. Many visiting and local herders were unable to leave the 
mountain until late spring of 2009 and 2010. This draught also affected their autumn 
mobility in 2010 (Photo 8.2). According to a UU respondent: 
We recently went through HBU Mountain, B and C valleys in the mountain. 
There are households already staying. At the saine time, they milked their mares, 
built extra gers on almost every single buuts or built their livestock fences. They 
are very close to each other [those were not all real households]. They do it 
because they are looking at staying there for the winter (Interview 5 5). 
The department and local administrations had little to say in this matter. This indicates 
that unstable cli1natic conditions are also a driving factor of state territorial strategy if it 
overlooks the herders' production management under conflicting legal conditions for 
regulating access to pastoral resources. 
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Photo 8.2: Households already built their gers in the RP A by September 2010 
8.3.4. Outcome and challenges 
The ineffective implementation of the state territorial strategy through zoning and 
exclusion policies led to a variety of environmental, social and institutional outcomes, 
all of which contributed to the CPR dilemma. It led to the disputed use of pasture and to 
overgrazing. In 2009 dzud, herders pursued otor in a rather chaotic manner in the HBU 
RP A due to the two-year rehabilitation policy. Hundreds of visiting herders who came 
later than the usual time to the HBU RP A experienced difficulties in finding campsites. 
Local herders, who managed to return earlier to the RP A, had already claimed many 
buuts as their campsites. Among many otor herders, one said "we did not know if it was 
owned, but the owner showed up later" (Questionnaire 82). This problem affected both 
visiting and local households, because the recognition of the certificate of possession 
was not observed on the ground27 1. This was particularly difficult for visiting herders 
who had gained access through ulamjlalt arrangements for otor. Another otor herder 
shared his experience, 
... They [RP A administration] are supposed to [ tell you to leave] I guess. Yet, 
local people tell you to leave quite often because they claimed that we were 
staying on a campsite which belonged to them or their son or which was located 
next to their campsite etc (Interview 46). 
27 1 At the time of fieldwork, many respondents in HBU bag did not have their certificates with them as 
the local administration kept them all for several years with the excuse of changing them over to the new 
version of the certificates. 
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Thus it appears that local herders take this condition for granted while securing access 
to multiple campsites to keep flexibility in rotation. As a result, many otor herders were 
not able to benefit from gaining access to pastoral resources. 
Social outcome: The zoning of local herders' seasonal pasture and the failed attempt to 
exclude them from their seasonal pasture also led to diminishing production as both 
visiting and local herders' lacked access to buuts or natural shelters. Those who lost 
their livestock shelter (used by visiting otor herders or travellers) were essentially 
struggling to secure livestock production. The following excerpt from a HBU bag 
herder, who lost his livestock shelter to fire, explains the importance of gaining access 
to secure shelter for their production, 
... We camped at an old burned campsite. It was very hard for our livestock that 
they got sick from ashes and their eyes got very bad (Questionnaire 32) ... We 
used to stay really comfortable in our old shelter. But last year, we really 
struggled with the winter. It was on this winter campsite. We could not fix it yet. 
It used to have a really nice shelter with black roofing (waterproof). So last year, 
it was really hard for us to stay here. We really struggled to overcome the winter 
[conditions]. It was really cold. Livestock kept urinating. We sheltered them in 
our rock wall, but then their buuts kept freezing instantly, which was really bad 
for the sheep to lie down. So, we kept the sheep out and made them stay out in 
the open overnight. Then, I broke that frozen buuts and used it to build another 
horoo on that burned ash and sheltered our livestock on it. But then after a 
1nonth, it was frozen again. So, then I built another little one. That is why we 
have this continuous long buuts here. Otherwise, we used to have very neatly 
arranged buuts. And we built another shelter on it and that is how we managed 
to survive the winter (Interview 12). 
Moreover, the chaos of the otor led to the spread of livestock disease. In the risky 
weather conditions particularly in the winter dzud of 2009, some visiting herders 
departed hu1Tiedly, leaving their rubbish and/or carcasses from dead livestock behind272 
(Photo 8.3). This resulted in broken, unhygienic campsites and the spread of livestock 
disease. Thus, the herders were unable to use some buuts and pasture later. RP A officers 
and the HBU bag ad1ninistration were unable to enforce compliance with RP A rules to 
clean up the campsites. Another disadvantage they encountered was economic: some 
herders lost numbers of livestock. On their way out, some visiting herders departed 
keeping few livestock, which separated from local herds. Unlike previous systems, 
272 Local herders and officials in HBU and Dolood bags were critical of the ministry department, because 
local and visiting herders lost many livestock in 2009 in the HBU RP A as their movements were blocked 
by dzud, but the ministry still reported to the nation that there was no dzud in the HBU RP A. 
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herders no longer bothered to separate them as they were rushing to move before the 
d h 273 ba weat er . 
Photo 8.3: Spring campsite tarnished and polluted with carcasses by visiting households ( on the way out 
of the HBU Mountain) May, 2010. 
Institutional outcome: Ineffective state territorial strategy also challenged the land law 
and the legitimacy of the HBU RP A. As shown in Table 8.2, all participants do 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the department in organizing otor. Yet, as shown 1n 
Table 8.3, they are less convinced of the effectiveness of the department to enforce 
Table 8.2 Determination of the key actors in organizing the otor 
Key actor 
The department 
Local administration 
Individual herding households 
Total participants (N=97) Multiple choices 
allowed by% 
40 
25 
54 
Table 8.3 Satisfaction with current arrangement of otor 
Rate 
Content 
Neutral 
Discontented 
Total participants (N=97) Multiple choices 
allowed by% 
20 
43 
") ") 
.J .J 
preservation and rehabilitation policies, but rely on their own arrangernent, given the 
current circu1nstances of climatic, socio-economic and legal conditions for pursuing 
otor. For instance, herders from UU were reluctant to pay pasture use fees in HBU RP A 
273 Livestock thievery also occurs at the same time. However, this act is not strictly conducted by only 
visiting herders. 
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because they were sceptical that the fees would lead to better pasture management in the 
HBU RP A (Interview 5). At the same time, the department lacked the human capacity 
and funding from the state to enforce payment for pasture use. Thus, the department not 
only lost revenue from pasture use fees but also failed to improve the reserve 
pastureland, whilst diminishing herders' access. 
As a result, many of the research participants questioned the legitimacy of the RP A. On 
one hand, herders in HBU and DD bags often complained about the ineffectiveness of 
the HBU RP A and the local administration as the legal mechanism for regulating 
visiting herders' access in the RP A. Visiting households graze over DD herders ' winter 
pasture in the mountain as they often arrive with the maximum number of livestock in 
their hot274 in order to benefit as much as possible from their short stay. On the other 
hand, visiting otor herders argue that there should be no local herders and/or legal 
campsite possession in the state RP A. They face difficulties in gaining access to pastoral 
resources due to the local herders claiming most of the more convenient buuts as 
cainpsites. For instance, visiting herder from UU claimed that they have use rights 
under both the state legal RP A policy and the informal ulamjlalt right to pursue otor in 
HBU RP A because of their ancestral use rights during pre-collective and collective 
periods. 
The challenge to the legitimacy of the RP A occurred due to the state overlooking the 
fact that pastoral production and pastureland management must take place where the 
relevant actors seek to gain benefits through various levels of formal and infonnal 
authority. Visiting herders in UU bag suggests that the RP A should be free of any local 
households or local campsite possession in order to enable otor movement. This 
challenges the rights of the local herders from HBU and DD bags to legal possession of 
campsites. HBU bag suggests that the RP A should only control the mountain, and let 
HBU and DD bags control its other seasonal pastures. Yet, the ministry is interested in 
controlling both mountain and agrarian land in the seasonal pasture in HBU bag/village 
centre275 . DD bag also suggests cancelling the policy of RP A establishment in HBU 
Mountain. DD bag was against the idea of establishing the RP A within a fixed territory 
274 Creating more buuts on pasture is actually not helpful for pasture growth. Many otor herders pool their 
resources of labour and mobility and camp together on the same buuts. This strategy often works well for 
short periods of otor movement. 
275 The department has planted different forage vegetation and root vegetables as fodder crops for stock. 
Fieldwork note, October, 2010. 
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regardless of its grazing capacity276 . Instead, it proposed that the RP A should be 
selected annually depending on the potential of the pasture anywhere regardless of the 
jurisdiction, to host visiting otor herders. They suggested that Delgerhaan soum should 
control its own territory, thus making HBU Mountain just the territory for HBU or DD 
bags ( cancel the existence of the whole HBU bag jurisdiction). 
8.4. The relationship between territorial strategy and production 
management 
In pastoral production management in Mongolia, the state and the herders are 
interdependent with each other as both interdependently control access to pastoral 
resources. Since the state privatized the livestock, both policy advocates and herders 
have assumed that pastoral production is non-state business and that herders' access to 
pastureland can be regulated just by referring to exclusive individual rights to uvuljuu 
havarjaa or bag com1nunity access to pastureland. However, this assumption has been 
challenged by the government's intervention in the RP A policy. Herders continue their 
pursuit of ulamjlalt pastoral production. Thus, they remained dependent on the state 
regulating their access to the RP A, because previous policy initiatives failed to do so. 
-RP A policy is the state agenda and highlights its historical role in production 
1nanagement, whilst solidifying its power over regulating access to pastoral resources. 
In designating the ministry department a state-based actor, the state replaced an 
historical pastoral institution which existed in parallel to the local administration. Thus, 
the role of the ministry department, along with other territorial actors, was to enforce 
both exclusion and inclusion of visiting herders, following an ancient, historical access 
pattern, to support their management of pastoral production. 
This chapter has revealed the following outcomes in the implementation of the RP A 
policy. First, the state territorial strategy, in fact, created a barrier for herders' seasonal 
and long distance otor 1novement. Second, zoning of the RP A boundary over the 
jurisdictional territory led to conflict over jurisdiction which reflected the different 
interests of the state based-actors in controlling access to pastoral resources. Third, the 
RP A policy essentially failed to improve the quality of HBU RP A pasture or to solidify 
276 This is less realistic, because the HBU RP A is not just about pasture, but also related to good natural 
shelter for overcoming cold winter. Many local and otor herders explained that regardless of pasture, they 
would move to the HBU Mountain to shelter and feed their livestock with fodder and forage if necessary. 
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state control over access through the zoning exercise through the two-year rehabilitation 
policy. This is because of the ineffective departmental control over herders' access to 
pastoral resources. As a result, this ineffectiveness affected both legal and informal 
mechanisms. Local actors challenged the legitimacy of the RP A. It also diminished 
herders' informal control over imposing exclusion/inclusion of visiting herders. Fourth, 
zoning overall led to CPR problems of disputed use and overgrazing and negatively 
affected local pastoral production. 
The department's failure lay in employing the RP A management approach that had been 
used in the collective period. The RP A model used in the collective period did not fit 
the dra1natically different needs of production management under the transitional socio-
economic conditions or the legal environment for regulating access to pastoral 
resources. This was because, first, the RP A is an alternative state territorial control. It 
differs from jurisdictional territory in that it has control over natural resources only. In 
this regard, it also differs from protected areas as its zoning of natural resources is 
intended to for enforce both inclusion and exclusion for the sake of pastoral production. 
However, similar to protected areas, the RP A created the problem of reducing the 
territory of the surrounding jurisdictions. Re-drawing the HBU RP A boundary over the 
territories of HBU and DD bags in Delgerhaan soum was impractical for the local 
people's production as it went against the "social relationships and histories of their 
interactions with the land" (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995, p 389). Thus, this zoning de-
railed the policies of preservation and rehabilitation. 
Second, zoning led to conflict over jurisdictional issues as uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil 
was important in shaping jurisdictional boundaries. Individual herders' production 
depends on their use rights to community pastoral resources. The social and resource 
boundary of a community is defined by the bag jurisdictional boundary. De facto, 
herders ' use rights to pasture are legitimized by legal campsite possession. In other 
words, herders' legal campsite possession now defines the once-fuzzy bag jurisdictional 
boundary. The RP A zoning therefore exposed the conflicting border issues between DD 
and HBU bags, which emerged from the overlapping claims over the same uvuljuu 
ezems hi! on the fuzzy border area. 
This conflict reflected emerging differences in the interests of state based-actors in 
controlling access to scarce pastoral resources. Unlike in the pre-transition periods, the 
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state did not compensate them for jurisdictional territory that was confiscated, and 
which was used in the RP A, or support them with the necessary productive resources in 
order to avoid conflicting territorial interests. Also, the state dismantled the production 
system, which had once allowed all state-based actors to effectively control their own 
production and regulation of herders' access to pastoral resources. These changes led 
local officials enter into disputes over border territory to maintain their economic and 
political (position offered by a political party) benefits derived from governing a 
jurisdiction. The overlapping claims to border campsites arose due to the ambiguous 
status created by the ministry over the management of the HBU RP A territory. The 
ministry has the legal authority over the RP A territory in accordance with land law 
provisions to appropriate land for special needs277 . The department wanted to keep the 
HBU bag as its centre. This inadvertently enhanced the status of HBU bag/village 
officials, who took advantage of their authority to increase the numbers of residents and 
maintain their village status. Otar herders negotiated with them more than with any 
other bag or soum governors in the surrounding jurisdictions. In other words, this 
process di1ninished the authority of other bag and soum officials in controlling access to 
pastoral resources in their jurisdiction. Thus, officials fro1n these areas became 
concerned about a) the interest of the ministry in taking over their territory using otor as 
a justification and b) the ministry's interest that lead to an imbalance in power relations 
among neighbouring bags and soums. As a result, a dispute arose over the border 
territory, with each party using their authority under the land law. Thus the zoning of 
RP A opened up room for cross-level officials to manoeuvre state regulations towards 
strengthening their own authority and maintaining their personal benefits by regulating 
access to pastoral resources. 
Third, the state ownership of pastoral resources goes beyond the duties and 
responsibilities of state property rights to land, but involves the interdependent 
relationships between the state and the herders over controlling pastoral production. The 
two-year state land-based policy affected the authority of both formal and informal 
control over the resources. The ministry pursued exclusion under the assumption that 
the state owns the pastoral resources. Herders had expected the ministry to be 
responsible for organizing their access since it is the state policy. However, the ministry 
failed to do this. This was not due to the top-down process, whilst ignoring local needs, 
277 Article 16.1.6, the Law on Land 2003. 
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as argued in Peluso (1995). The top-down process succeeded in the pre-transition 
period, because the state controlled all aspects of production. 
On the contrary, the two year policy failed because the state overlooked the importance 
of incorporating control over the herders' production management in its exclusionary 
policies as had been enforced in earlier historical periods. When excluding herders, the 
department reached a rather mechanical solution by letting herders selects only their 
otor area. It barely recognized the legitimacy or the needs of the herders' current 
production management under complicated access conditions, coupled with the scarcity 
of pastoral resources. Also, the ministry placed the herders in a dilemma in terms of 
securing access to their private pastoral assets and pastoral resources. It restricted 
herders' access to seasonal pastoral resources within their jurisdiction without any 
security over their private pastoral assets and uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. Moreover, the 
department overlooked the importance of local patterns of pasture use when imposing 
absolute exclusion, and appeared to be indifferent to the local herders' needs. It hardly 
acknowledged their inexperience in pursuing distance otor in other localities due to their 
proxi1nity to the HBU RP A. Furthermore, the ministry overlooked the conflicts in the 
legislation on exclusion under the land law. With scarce pastoral resources, each actor 
had a legal right to protect their own pastoral resource within their jurisdiction from 
visiting herders. Finally, the insecurity of the herders' private assets and pastoral 
resources in other jurisdiction forced herders to ignore the state policy of exclusion and 
arrange their own mobility. 
Fourth, the current conflicting legal environment does not support the RP A management 
model as it discourages collaboration among different agencies. Under the land law, 
they all have de jure authority, which often contradicts the regulation of the HBU RP A. 
First, it is contradictory to legislate state ownership of pastoral resources and individual 
rights through uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil. Second, it is also contradictory to allow the 
ministry depart1nental jurisdiction over appropriating land from jurisdictional territory 
for the purpose of a RP A and, yet, allowing the local administration and its Hural to 
define and administer its own boundaries and allocate uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil to 
individual herding households. For this reason, the ministry proposed a separate law on 
pastureland, which would apply exclusively to the jurisdiction of the RP A management. 
It perceived the problem as the ministry's lack of legal power to infringe on either the 
authority of the local administration, or a herder's right to uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil to 
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stop herders' choice of 'sedentary' production278 . Fifth, the ministry overlooked the 
herders' infonnal role in pursuing exclusion based on production. Although the pastoral 
resource is migratory and large, contrary to what the CPR theorists have argued (Dietz 
et al., 2003, Feeny et al., 1990), the resource is confined to specific social and resource 
boundaries, enforced by state territorial jurisdiction in Mongolia. Thus, historically, in 
this boundary, the rulers and herders exercised dual control (statutory legal and 
ulamjlalt informal) to exclude and include outsiders, depending on the weather 
conditions. 
Currently, due to the weakness of local administrations, informal control over 
production and land use is strong. In UU bag, local herders controlled visiting HBU bag 
herders' access to convenient pastoral resources. They included them based on 
negotiation or excluded them if necessary due to scarce pastoral resources. This type of 
exclusion/inclusion is inherent in ulamjlalt mobile pastoralism. Their decision is 
ultimately based on their seasonal herding practices and strategies, which are shaped by 
herd size, availability of necessary labour resources and availability of pastoral 
resources (pasture and water). This pattern is quite a different from an open access 
condition, in which everyone could come and overgraze the pasture, in the absence of 
any rules or nonns. Thus, exclusion is not necessarily difficult in the pastureland 
context as long as ulamjlalt dual control over the production is placed in context. Yet, 
herders' informal control can also be diminished in a conflicting legal environ1nent. The 
contradiction between the state RP A as a legitimate mechanism to secure visiting 
herders' access to RP A and uvuljuu ezems hi! as a legal mechanism for local herders 
results in disputes among herders over use or sometimes an 'open access' condition. 
The 1ninistry struggled to resolve this legal conflict. The problem is related to the 
regulation under the property regime concept, where in different regimes some actors 
are less likely to acknowledge ones exclusive individual, group/communal or state 
rights due to the overlapping claims under legal pluralism (Cellarius, 2004, Feeny et al., 
1990). 
Sixth, the legitimacy of the HBU RP A is contested among local officials and herders. A 
lack of collaboration in the conflicting legal environment resulted in insecurity of 
278 This sedentary approach is often explained in relation to the experience of collective herder or new 
herder. This is a very simplistic argument when examining the impacts of more sedentary legal policies 
on diminishing herders' socio-economic situations. My research found that herders' mobility patterns 
depended more on weather conditions and their herd size than on their background. 
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herders' rights to access either seasonal pastures elsewhere or in the HBU RP A in 
severe weather conditions. As a result, herders pursued any 1nechanisms or strategies 
available to them to gain access to already competitive good buuts. Also, they increased 
their financial burden by re-establishing livestock shelters in order to maintain their 
access to pastoral resources through uvuljuu havarjaa possession. However, conscious 
of the depleting pastoral resources, herders often failed to maintain their access and 
benefits as well. Regardless of herd size and herders' ability to use various mechanisms 
and strategies, they still faced the loss of their livestock. Thus, obscure territorial control 
between state-based actors resulted in inefficiency in land investment and protection, 
and also contributed to increasingly disputed resource use. 
In pastureland management in Mongolia, ineffective land-based policies lead to a cycle 
of negative outcomes, which required other changes in policy. This policy approach 
proved to be highly conflicting and impractical in the pastoral context when the state 
allocated resource management rights to different levels of state agencies and actors 
without regulating the components of pastoral production. The state controls resource 
access under the land law, whilst supporting herders' production with the RP A policy. 
In this legal environment, state control over resource access seems unrealistic279 . This is 
because it overlooks the fact that these actors pursue pastoral pro-duction for benefits, 
and must take advantage of existing weather and climatic conditions (Sneath, 2007, 
Natsagdorj, 1972). This was what happened in the HBU case, where herders just 
co1nplied with ulamjlalt patterns of resource use during unstable climatic conditions, but 
lacked effective control over regulating production. Addressing herders' production 
under this legal environment is going to be a challenge for the state in solidifying its 
legitimacy and control over pastoral resources. 
8.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the state's territorial strategy that involved the zoning of 
natural resources and traced the i1npacts of this strategy on natural resource 
management in Mongolia. I argued that the state strategy failed because it did not 
address herder production management as it had done in the past, even when it had 
introduced the territorial strategy with zoning for the RP A. The HBU case confirmed 
279 This is a condition where the state is particularly shaped by societal actions . Because zoning relies on 
strict enforcement, it is not effective when it is not compatible with the local ways of using the resource. 
256 
that this was the reason why herders' changed their access patterns. First, because the 
HBU RP A conflicts with jurisdictional boundaries, which has direct influence on the 
herders' production management. This conflict created an imbalance of power between 
the bags and the soum ad1ninistration. Secondly, the RP A two-year exclusion policy 
blocked the herders' ability to pursue ulamjlalt seasonal and otor movement and 
diminished production due to the ineffective stakeholder collaboration as a result of the 
conflicting legal environment. As a result, the mechanism for accessing reserve pasture 
changed, fro1n a formal RP A mechanism to informal rules, and then in some cases 
changed to an open access condition. Initially, herders complied with RP A rules, but 
then had to rely on informal rules and norms to gain access to the pastoral resources in 
the host area. Although the herders gained access to pastoral resources, they failed to 
maintain access to pastoral resources in most cases because of the ineffective 
arrangements coupled with the depleting pastoral resources. Thus, these herders 
returned to the HBU RP A, claiming it as a necessary otor movement. 
This shift in mechanisms resulted in changes in herder mobility patterns. Herders in 
HBU and DD bags were unable to pursue seasonal mobility in their own territories. 
They attempted to carry out summer otor for short periods elsewhere, but struggled. 
Herders' ability to pursue mobility was not strictly dependent -on heterogeneity in 
wealth and background. Many herders of differing backgrounds managed to gain access 
to pastoral resources by giving support to each other. And yet, even though they gained 
access to HBU Mountain with different mechanisms and/or strategies, they were not 
able to maintain benefits from grazing due to increased competition for campsites. As a 
result of the changes in herder mobility, their ability to comply with ulamjlalt rules and 
norms changed vvhen using HBU Mountain. After increased competition for campsites 
and a great deal of insecure movement, many herders used the campsites in an 
unorganized manner and overstayed until late spring or return to it early autumn. This 
included visiting herders from UU and other bags around the HBU Mountain. This 
resulted in pollution and overgrazing, and led local herders and authorities to challenge 
the legitimacy of the RP A. In other words, the state territorial strategy failed due to 
focusing solely on the exclusion factor, which conflicted with the local use of the 
physical resources. In the next chapter, I conclude the whole thesis in line with my 
research aim. 
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9 Conclusion 
9.1. Introduction to the problem 
As introduced in Chapter 1, this thesis, first, set out to explore, from a theoretical 
perspective, the cultural and institutional aspects of pastoral production and pastureland 
management in Mongolia. The current broader literature on CPR management 
emphasizes the significance of defining property rights institutions in managing CPR. 
However, I have found this literature limited in providing explanations for mobile 
pastoralism and its long established and persisting historical property relationship with 
pastureland in Mongolia. Thus, the first aim is to extend the theories on CPR 
management to a pastoral context. Secondly, at the policy level, this thesis set out to 
explain what factors and local practices of pasture use policy initiatives need to be taken 
into account in developing formal regulatory mechanisms for pastureland in Mongolia. 
A lack of understanding of Mongolian pastoralism and its property relations in the past 
has resulted in 1nisleading interpretations of the problem as the absence of property 
rights in pastureland management in Mongolia. Thus, understanding these factors will 
situate the local notion of property relations in its place in Mongolia. 
Althought mobile pastoralism and its property relationships in Mongolia are self-evident 
for those actors at every level of social scale, who have long been exposed to this 
production system, it is certainly complex for others to understand when comparing the 
historical logic of herders' settlement patterns and their social organization with 
sedentary agrarian or industrial production systems. It seems to pose a problem of 
' legibility' (Scott, 1998). Scott (1998) related the poor outcomes of the modem state 
policy on resource management to the proble1n of legibility: the modem state misread 
the localized rules and norms in its simplified policy concepts as it finds these localized 
patterns very complex and diverse to understand. As Scott argued: 
The pre-1nodem state was, in many crucial respects, partially blind; it knew 
precious little about its subjects, their wealth, their landholdings and yields, their 
location, their very identity. It lacked anything like a detailed 'map ' of its terrain 
and its people (Scott, 1998, p 2). 
Mongolian pastoralism raises a problem of legibility not strictly by the state. Unlike 
Scott's argument, the pre-1nodem states in Mongolian nomadic societies have always 
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had historically strict and refined administrative structures in keeping detailed accounts 
of their subjects and their wealth, migrations and producton yields (Sneath, 2007, 
Vreeland, 1954, Natsagdorj, 1972). The problem of legibility seems to be related more 
to a dominant global trend in economic development theory and practice. Non-pastoral 
societies, which are unfamiliar with the pastoral production system, regardless of 
whether they are from urban or rural, or a western or non-western background, have 
misunderstood Inner Asian mobile pastoralists and their production system, and 
categorized it as 'tribal' with a primitive production system (Sneath, 2007). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, this misunderstanding has led to the misintepretation or re-
invention of these concepts by those who are devising formal policy, as Berry (1993) 
argued in the case of British colonialists who explored African customs in their attempt 
to formalize customary rules and norms and incorporate them into their administration 
of the producton of local communities. This misinterpretation and re-invention further 
led theorists in CPR management to explain that traditional communities need to be 
strengthened or to recommend that their community institutions need to be 'mended~ or 
newly crafted in order to define property rights clearly and adjust to the changes in the 
political and economic systems (McCay and J entoft, 1998, Dietz et al., 2003). In 
contrast, as property theorists (Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006, Berry, 1983, Berry, 
1989a, Berry, 2009, Lund, 2009, Sikor and Lund, 2009) have argued, the concepts of 
property relations, institutions, and co111111unity are often understood and defined in 
ways that lead to prescriptive regulatory perspectives. These perspectives are often 
li111ited in tenns of reflecting the diversity and dynamics which are embedded in a real-
life context. These theoretical approaches have been shown to be inadequate in 
explaining the production-based localized property relations in Mongolia due to the 
legibility problem referred to above. 
To address the aims of this thesis, I employed the access approach. As access theorists 
(Berry, 2009, Sikor and Lund, 2009, Ribot and Peluso, 2003) emphasized, state policies 
may create ambiguity in who has the power to allocate rights, when transferring the 
authority over the resources to the local authorities. This resulted in an overlapping 
system of legitimacy as actors employ both formal (by means of statutory laws and 
legislation) and informal rights-based mechanisms (by customary or relational means 
such as networking, kinship or historical means, or structural means such as funding, or 
technological means) to legitimize their access in the eyes of the state to increase their 
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benefits. In other words, these mechanisms directly shape the outco1ne of the CPR 
management on the ground. In Mongolia, the transition policy initiatives that were 
based on earlier theoretical approaches did not take these issues into account. The 
access theorists consider that access framework is appropriate for examining the variety 
of ways in which different actors have gained benefits from regulating access to pastoral 
resources (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Examining the various mechanis1ns involved in 
gaining benefits from pastoral production, this framework is an adequate means of 
exploring historical property relations of pastoral production as developed by mobile 
pastoralists to gain benefits by taking advantage of existing geographical and climatic 
conditions (Sneath, 2007). Thus, in this thesis, I examined why herders are changing 
how they access (gain, maintain and control) seasonal pastures and how these changes 
affect the management of pastoral land. This has helped to provide a clearer 
understanding of the logic inherent in the historical pattern of property relations and its 
significance in the current resource management regime. 
9.2. The ulamjlalt production system and how it has changed 
The co1nplex pastoral production system is rooted in Mongolia's geographical and 
climatic conditions which shape the herders' pastoral production. Mongolia is a 
landlocked, high altitude country with a dry-land geography and climate. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, 1nobile pastoralism in Mongolia under these conditions has lately been 
positioned within a new paradigm of rangeland, 'disequilibrium ecology', where 
rangelands are seen as being inherently unstable because of the significant climatic 
factors (Swift and Mearns, 1993, Hu1nphrey and Sneath, 1999, Fernandez-Gimenez and 
Allen-Diaz, 1999). In disequilibruim ecology, herders enable their access to pastoral 
resources through various forms of pasture use including the practices of four-seasonal 
movements within their jurisdiction and cross-territorial long and short-distance 
movements (otor) and maintain their production in different terrains under extremely 
diverse and extre1ne climatic conditions. 
Pastoral property relations are deeply embedded in the historical foundations of the 
Mongolian herding system. As Benda-Beckmann (2006) argued, property relations 
emerge through a society's historical process. In particular, as Sneath (2004) argued, 
land tenure in Mongolia evolved as an element of pastoralis1n, which was based on the 
integration of the historical socio-political structure of pastoralists and the natural and 
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material resources available in their environment. As argued in Chapter 3, those who 
controlled production also controlled access to the pastoral resources when pursuing the 
ulamjlalt pastoral production system. Key actors developed the ulamjlalt system to 
obtain political and economic benefits from natural resources in the prevailing climatic 
and geographical conditions (Sneath, 2007, Natsagdorj, 1972). Herders claim rights to 
pastureland through their right to practice ulamjlalt pastoral production within their 
jurisdiction as a resident. Herders pursue seasonal rotations and movements based on 
their production strategy, which depends on the availability of the key production 
components of livestock, labour and pastureland (Chapter 3). The availalbility of 
pasture is shaped by variations in rainfall. These movements require enormous 
flexibility in their frequency and in the distances travelled. Thus, historical property 
relations which are embedded in the herding syste1n, are about regulating pastureland 
use as well as the other pastoral production components. 
The flexibility that is an essential element of the herders' mobility is beyond the 
capacity of de jure property rights that are allocated exclusively to different actors such 
as the state, state-based actors or the herders and which control the herders' access to 
pastoral resources. All these actors are dependent on each other through the production 
system and vice versa. In Chapter 3, I discussed how, historically, the specific 
jurisdictional authorities and parallel pastoral institutions controlled the herders' access 
to these pastoral resources. They regulated access based on a dual system of control 
(formal and informal) over pastoral production. They were able to pursue this in two 
vvays. The first was by controlling the three components of production: labour through 
1nilitary or public service of jurisdictional residents; controlling livestock through 
levying inco1ne tax or owning private livestock; controlling land through li1niting 
herders' mobility within a particular jurisdictional boundary; or organizing cross-
boundary movements under a jurisdictional authority. 
The second was, by allowing herders to informally control the use of pastoral resources 
based on ulamjlalt rules for seasonal mobility.Herders controlled the use of resources by 
complying with the seasonal mobility rules and norms developed to suit the extremely 
unstable climatic and terrain conditions. In doing this, they exercised private or 
com1nunity use rights. A common practice was to exercise the locally recognized use 
rights; this practice was highly flexible and relational as herders reciprocated this right 
with others in exchange for use rights to access other pastoral resources in their own or 
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other jurisdictions. In other words, herders moved according to the availability of 
pastoral resources. Sneath (2004) emphasized the concept of gazar (land) in Mongolia: 
"This ideation emphasizes land use rather than a common substance that can be 
owned or possessed ... The most widely used term for private land is huviin 
gazar ... [ meaning] to divide or apportion. So, items of personal property are 
explicitly part of wider fields--be they do1nestic, district, or state political 
economies (Sneath, 2004, p 170). 
Unlike in many agricultural-based societies, herders did not claim their rights to land 
through specific indigenous or traditional ancestral claims attached to a fixed substance 
or piece of land. Sneath (2004) argued further that "regimes of property and of 
citizenship were constituent elements of the pastoral socio-technical systems that 
provided the productive base of the rural economy" (Sneath, 2004, p 178). Herders 
claimed their rights to pastureland through their 1nembership within a specific 
jurisdiction and their jurisdiction mobilized their entitlement to pursue pastoral 
production. Many scholars later acknowledged that this pattern of rangeland use is not 
open access, but regulated through a set of formal and informal rules (Klein et al., 
2012). 
Moreover, the property institutional arrangement has only focused on exclusion instead 
of addressing an inclusionary paradigm in property relations. Co1nmunities are dynamic 
and changing in terms of sharing resources due to the dynamic move1nents involved in 
their access to pastoral resources. Herding households in Mongolia often do not stay 
together with the same household and/or they may need to join other households, 
groups, kin, or communities in times of severe weather, livestock disease, a lack of 
labour, or poor grazing (Erdenebaatar, 1996). Thus, community membership is often 
changing and is not definite, and subtractibility beco1nes an issue beyond a specific 
com1nunity resource management. This indicates that the production system involves 
different types of CPR and community structures, which are defined by larger socio-
political system critical for CPR management in Mongolia. 
Chapter 4 traced this historical property relationship through the changes following the 
policy to introduce sedentary intensive livestock production in Mongolia. However, as 
in the pre-collective period, legibility was not the problem. Nomadic pastoralism was a 
much more legible production system to the modem Mongolian government. This was 
in contrast to the peasantry for the Soviet Russian government, which carried out 
agriculture "in relative ignorance of the ecological, social, and economic arrangements 
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that underwrote the rural economy" as Soviet Russia did in its domains (Scott, 1998, p 
202). The state in Mongolia maintained the ulamjlalt production system as the 
production allowed the state to continue to benefit from the pastoral resources under the 
predominant climatic and geographical conditions. Government officials in Mongolia 
were influential enough to adjust extensive pastoralism to a mass production system, 
despite the pressure to shift it to an intensive one (Humphrey, 1978, Sneath, 2004). 
They retained the historical principle of controlling both residents and production within 
the soum territorial administrative unit. The state supported the production entities such 
as negdel ( collective institution) or aj ahui, (state funded enterprise). Each controlled all 
three components of the production and was able to regulate the herders' access. 
However, during the transition period, which was discussed in Chapter 5, the legibility 
of the pastoral production system became problematic for both national280 and 
international advocates to introduce a free market econo1ny and clearly define property 
rights. In order to control the benefits from natural resources, the government created a 
hybrid syste1n of resource management through its transition policies. The state 
dismantled the ulamjlalt production system by uncoupling every aspect of the integrated 
production manage1nent system from all other parts. At the same ti1ne, the state 
continued to regulate access to pastoral resources through its territorial administrative 
units. It co1nbined the principles of ulamjlalt pasture use with exclusive individual 
household281 possession rights to campsites under the market system. In this way, the 
state sought to si1nplify and standardize the practices of resource tenure in order to 
match them with western systems. Thus, as Scott (1998) argued, these state policies 
based on simplification, under the transition to market economy, led to poor outcomes 
due to the legibility issue. 
The transition policies led to disputes over the use of pastureland and overgrazing, 
which became the major challenges to the current rangeland management in Mongolia. 
National and international scholars have identified the problem as 'open access' or 
absence of property rights to pastureland as the collapse of former negdel collective 
institution after the transition led to an absence of formal mechanisms to control the 
280 The government is composed of members, some who are pro-privatization and some who are anti-
privatization of pastureland. For instance see Mashbat, S, (no date) , 
http://-wvvw.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/Regiona1Final%20chapters/Chapterl9Sarlagtay.p 
df 
281 See chapter 6.2.1 about possession right to 'hot ail communities' 
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herders' access to pastoral resources (Mearns, 2004b, Griffin, 2003 , Ickowitz, 2003 , 
Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, 2004, SDC, 2010). According to the definitions 
offered by these scholars, the state's formal control over land transferred to the local 
administration was ineffective in terms of controlling herders' access to pastureland. 
This resulted in diminishing the power of the existing informal system as well. As 
differentiated by their living conditions, individual herding households managed their 
production independently and no longer complied with the informal ulamjlalt system in 
trying to gain access to pastoral resources. This new pattern of pasture use led to 
disputes over the use of the pasture and also to overgrazing, contributing partially to 
land degradation. As a response to this problem, the government of Mongolia sought to 
reconstitute or reform property rights over pastureland. Influenced by various 
development policy discourses, it implemented a series of land management policies 
including exclusive individual rights to uvuljuu havarjaa ezemshil (Chapters 5 and 6) or 
exclusive group use rights to pastureland for strengthening CBNRM (Chapter 7). 
However, I argue throughout the thesis that all these policy changes broke down the 
logic of Mongolian pastoralism and affected how herders historically used pastoral 
resources. These policies failed to solve the underlying proble1ns related to disputed use 
and overgrazing. These policies focused more on meeting the aim o-f conservation while 
failing to acknowledge the role that pastoral production management has always played 
in regulating access to pastoral resources. These policies also failed to take into account 
the herders' long-established move1nent patterns in relation to the territorial 
administrative units. In other words, the land policies blocked the herders' ability to 
pursue their usual seasonal 1novement and rotation according to ulamjlal. For these 
reasons, the herders themselves changed their access pattern in order to adjust their 
seasonal mobility to the changing legal environment and to maintain their pastoral 
production under the prevailing climate conditions. 
As set out in the introduction (Chapter 1 ), this thesis aimed to answer the following 
questions: why are herders changing how they access (gain, 1naintain and control) 
seasonal pastures and how does this affect pastoral land management? These questions 
are divided into more specific questions: 
How have changes in policy affected the herders' access to pastoral 
resources? 
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What conditions and factors have influenced the diversification of their 
access strategies? 
What mechanisms are the herders using to obtain access to seasonal 
pastures? 
How and why do these mechanisms and strategies affect herders mobility 
and flexibility? 
9.3. The impact of changing policies on herders' access pattern 
First, the governments' transition policies led to a reduction in the distances travelled 
during seasonal movements (Chapter 5). The government privatized the livestock, 
liberalized the labour while retaining control over the pastureland. In doing so, these 
policies dismantled the ulamjlalt production management and led to the collapse of the 
formal pastoral institution. The absence of collective support for the herders' mobility 
and a lack of the deep engineering wells that are necessary to access the more expansive 
pasture led to the depletion of the country's pastoral resources. At the same ti1ne, 
privatization of negdel assets and the liberalization of labour led to an increase in the 
number of herding households. These changes resulted in the concentration of herding 
households on the available pastoral resources and reduced the- distances travelled 
during their seasonal mobility. However, herders maintained their seasonal rotations as 
they owned small herds under stable weather condition. 
Second, the government's land reforms exacerbated the reduction in 1nobility by 
changing the herders' access to pastures and other resources ( Chapter 6). The 
government passed legislation decoupling campsites from pasture under the land law. 
Campsite possession became the key legal mechanism for obtaining access to pastoral 
resources in the circumstances of depleting pastoral resources. Using campsite 
possession, herders expanded their legal claims to other seasonal pasture as well, 
reducing the space available for flexible grazing between and within each season. This 
also led to so1ne territories such as HBU bag running out of seasonal pastures except 
during winter. Mainly migrant herders' were affected as they have absolutely no access 
to seasonal pasture within their own jurisdictions. In other words, land reform led to a 
reduction of distance of movement and/or to a reduction in the number of seasonal 
rotations within each jurisdiction. 
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Third, the "herder group" policy failed to improve local pasture management in the 
HBU-case area (Chapter 7). This was because of the focus on small group size and its 
fixed social and resource boundaries, which are problematic for CBNRM. Its resources 
boundary was too small to allow herders' to access sufficient pasture and for them to 
have freedom of movement within their jurisdiction and in a cross-boundary situation 
under unstable weather conditions. Depending on the condition of the pasture, herders, 
mainly poor herders, used legal campsite possession in their attempt to exclude others 
from nearby pasture around their campsites. Their attempt collides with the attempt of 
some wealthy herders along with some other poor herders, who left their territory and 
returned to the ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms (herd size is shaped by the market 
need rather than small group territory) to gain access to pastoral resources elsewhere 
(Chapter 6). This dilemma contradicted the ideal of group pasture use rules and norms 
as herders from same area in HBU case often pursued different mobility patterns. Also, 
herders pool their labour with seasonal or wage herders, who come from the same and 
other jurisdictions. Thus, the ideal fixed social boundary of a group herder is small and 
limits the members' social networking ability with others including non-member 
herders from their bag or even outside of the jurisdiction. The herders cannot make 
decisions regarding who are legitimate members as the local administration legally issue 
certificates for campsite possession and residency for wage or sea~onal herders. Thus, 
the social and resource boundaries of a group of herders cannot be fixed, as these often 
fluctuate. 
Moreover, the failed attempt to establish herder groups, in fact, opened up room for 
conflicts of interest between local officials and the SLP project in terms of who 
represents the interests of local herders in improving local pasture management. 
Hovvever, both these parties failed to support the herders' own initiatives to protect 
i1nportant pastoral resources (Chapter 7). Thus, this process has created more 
complexity and proble1ns rather than improving the management of the pastureland. The 
experiences of the other projects in Mongolia also indicated the conflicting interests 
over project funding and benefits. This problem occurs because CBNRM policy 
promotes the statutory legal management role of the herder groups and re-shapes the 
historical role of the jurisdictional authority to share formal manage1nent authority with 
herder groups. 
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Fourth, the RP A department challenged the historical authority of each jurisdiction over 
its territory and the legal claim of local herders to their seasonal pasture. Chapter 8 
discusses how the zoning of jurisdictional territory affected the administrative authority 
of all three bags and two soum governments in regulating visiting and local herders' 
access to their jurisdictional pasture. Although intended to support herders' production 
strategies, zoning over herders' legal campsite possession and excluding them from 
their seasonal or reserve pasture all blocked the herders' seasonal and otor movement in 
and out of the HBU RPA. 
9.4. Emerging conditions and factors that resulted from policy changes 
These policies created an ambiguity in relation to who had authority over the resources. 
Access theorists (Ribot and Peluso 2003, p 162-163) argued that " .. .laws made under a 
single government within a single historical period contradict each other, allocating 
rights to the same resources to different parties", because "laws do not clearly delineate 
all the powers associated with particular rights; conflict ensues over the resolution of 
these ambiguities". The ambiguity in these policies also affected the historical property 
relations as demonstrated in the HBU case area. 
The HBU case reveals the problematic notion of control in the current pastoral context. 
The transition policies led to the collapse of the integrated system that had been 
successful in controlling pastoral resources. As discussed in Chapter 5, the government 
authorised the local administrations to control access to the land by formalizing the 
ulamjlalt pasture use rules and norms. At the same time, it allowed herders to control 
production under the law on privatization and constitutional rights. This created an 
ambiguity in terms of who actually had the power282 to control access to pasture. 
Herders de facto took control over access to land, because they controlled the 
production (livestock and labour), which enabled them to "mediate other's access" 
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003, 158). The fact that the local administrations could not control 
incoming migration and herders' livestock production diminished their authority to 
control both production and the land. 
282 In this case, I refer to power as the "capacity of some actors to affect the practices and ideas of others 
"(Weber, 1978 and Luke, 1986 cited in Ribot & Peluso 2003, p 156) 
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Furthennore, land reform made control of access to resources more problematic by 
creating ambiguity in terms of who controls what resource with which particular right 
(Chapter 6). This is due to separating the concept of campsite from pastureland. The law 
re-instated the legal authority only in the local bag administration to enforce ulamjlalt 
rules and norms and regulate herders' use of bag pastureland, and to allocate campsite 
possession based on bag and soum land management planning. At the sa1ne ti1ne, the 
law li1nited the herders' role in the management of pastureland by only granting 
exclusive possession rights to a campsite to a herding household283 . However, in re-
instating local legal authority to enforce ulamjlalt rules and norms, the law did not 
acknowledge that herders access and control pastoral resources through the informal 
control of production and by exercising ulamjlalt rules and norms. This legislation 
diminished the local herders' role in controlling access to pastoral resources (Chapter 
6). Local administrations de facto lost their ability to 1nediate herders' access to pasture 
as they no longer controlled the labour and livestock. Herders chose where to camp and 
graze based on their production objectives. However, the local administrations, 
particularly HBU bag, exercised their authority over pastoral resources to allow more 
migrant households, regardless of the capacity of seasonal pasture in the area. As a 
result, visiting herders now followed the legal 1nechanism rather than negotiating with 
the local herders, who were once able to informally mediate visiting herders' access to 
pastoral resources. This led to increasing legal campsite possession in HBU bag. 
Unfortunately, these patterns of access also led to a perception of open access condition 
to pastoral resources. As a result, the integrated formal and informal control system was 
denigrated, creating the perception of failed overlapping formal and informal control 
practices. 
Moreover, conceptualizing a herder group as an autonomous property institution to 
legally 1nanage pastureland by exercising exclusive group possession rights presents 
certain proble1ns. This is particularly so if we expect it to work in parallel to the bag 
administration in 1nanaging bag herders' use · rights to bag pasture in a context where 
bag or soum herders' pasture use patterns need to be flexible across a range of territorial 
units. Unlike the parallel institutions (territorial administrative units and monastery or 
negdel or aj ahui) that existed in the previous system, the new herder groups now do not 
independently control all three components of production (Chapter 7). Thus, it is an 
open ended question as to whether herder groups independently function as ezen or the 
283 See chapter 6.2.1 about possession right to 'hot ail communities' 
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authority or the master of their own small territory. In theory, the herder group pursues 
group pasture management by excluding outsiders. This conflicts with the ulamjlalt 
pasture use norm, which embeds both exclusion and inclusion of outsiders within a 
jurisdictional boundary. Donor projects addressed the inclusion of outsiders by setting 
reserve pasture within or beyond group territory within a jurisdiction. However, as 
shown in the HBU case area, separate reserve pasture is virtually impossible under the 
condition of scarce seasonal pastoral resources in all three bags (Chapter 7). The 
establishment of the herder group appears to be based on the notion of aravt or heseg. 
These were grouping patterns set by each jurisdiction in the past for administrative 
purposes (for exa1nple, for collecting taxes and distributing information and news), but 
not as a territorial jurisdiction for pasture 1nanagement to pursue exclusion. The 
establish1nent of the herder group also utilized neg nutag usniihan to set social and 
resources boundaries for the group. This functions more as social net-working than 
setting group social and resource boundaries for pursuing exclusion. Thus, the herder 
group can serve some functions for administrative tasks, but not exclusive group pasture 
management. 
Besides, the policies of CBNRM, specifically herder group or PUG, intend to reflect the 
historical pattern of co-1nanagement of state and community by attempting to embed 
herder groups or PUGs possession right to pastureland within the structure of local 
administrations (SDC, 2010). However, the herder group or PUG autonomous 
organizations and their Association of PU Gs (APUG) as a NGO at the soum level (SDA 
2010) remains complicated. Further it is difficult for the authority of combined state-
based actors such as soumJ bag administrations and self-governing soum bag hurals to 
support and recognize herder group's possessing pastureland (Chapter 7). In other 
words, it seems difficult for the local administration to recognize and to support herder 
group's possession right to pasture, just like it does with herding households' possession 
right to their campsites. This is because the local administration is ineffective in 
controlling campsite possession without its historical formal mechanisms of migration 
control and livestock tax to balance the number of households and livestock with 
available pasture in their jurisdiction. As Cleaver and Franks argued (2005) socially 
constructed values shape people's collective actions. In the HBU case, herders' social 
and resource boundaries are shaped by bag residency and by the bag residents' claim to 
campsite possession and use rights to pasture within its jurisdictional boundary (Chapter 
6). Since campsite possession becomes a mechanism to gain access to pastoral 
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resources, herders network, reciprocate and collaborate with one another within and 
between bags through their bag residency rather than through group membership. The 
bag residency offers the1n more flexibility within their jurisdiction as they can rent their 
campsites depending on the availability of pasture, livestock and labour. Also, the 
donors' assumption of a benevolent state overlooked the fact that the state involves 
different agencies which do not readily give up their authority to derive benefits 
(Migdal, 1988). The land law allowed for the bag soum administration to regulate 
access to campsite possession and the bag soum administration and their Hural, a self-
governing institution, to regulate bag community access to pasture, representing both 
central and local government. Thus, the herder group's exclusive possession rights to 
pasture as an autonomous property management player contradicts the interests and 
authority of these agencies in terms of sharing benefits from a project or controlling 
benefits fro1n governing resources. 
The final RP A policy also created conflicting interests among state-based agencies over 
the authority of the HBU RP A. The key factor is that the department does not control all 
three production components as it did in the previous systems. The department's 
territorial strategy over natural resources conflicts with the state's territorial strategy for 
administrative units, despite the fact that these are parallel state institutions, which are 
involved in governing natural resources (Chapter 8). The RP A function is limited under 
the ambiguous land law, whereby both local administrations and the department had 
strong authority. Although the department had stronger legal claims as the state owns 
the land, the local administrations also have a strong case due to their authority over the 
jurisdictional boundaries and their authority to enforce their residents' exclusive 
individual legal right to claim ca1npsite possession. The ministry took over the 
jurisdictional territory under the RP A despite the fact that the pasture was degraded. 
This step challenged the authority of the local administrations under the land law and 
led them to decide on their territorial boundaries and pasture management issues for 
their interest in obtaining benefits from their territorial authority. First, the zoning 
intensified disputes over territorial boundaries and pasture use in the HBU RP A among 
the three bags. Second, UU officials also claimed their right under the land law to 
protect their pastureland from visiting herders. Third, all three bags and soum 
administrations conflicted with the ministry protecting their herders' access to pastoral 
resources. Consequently, the ministry was unable to relocate the visiting herders from 
HBU and DD bags and secure their access to pastoral resources in other jurisdictions. 
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The inability of the department to stand against the jurisdictional authorities and solve 
their disputes 1nakes the RP A appear to be an ineffective state mechanism. Herders and 
officials in all three bags did not accept the authority of the department and the RP A, 
because it was negatively affecting their territorial boundaries and local pasture 
management. 
9.5. Changes in herders' access mechanisms 
The ambiguities in these policies have led to different actors pursuing a variety of 
means of access to legitimize their claims to pastoral resources. These mechanisms were 
si1nilar to what Ribot and Peluso (2003) argued was a complex set of right-based or 
relational access 1nechanisms that the law is incapable of addressing (Ribot and Peluso, 
2003). As the HBU case revealed, herders employ several mechanisms simultaneously 
to gain access to the pastoral resources. In a legally plural environ1nent (formal and 
informal rules and norms), the state retains the ability to legalize form of access. 
Different actors make strategic choices about the right-based mechanisms (statutory, 
customary and illegal) to justify their claims. As discussed in Chapter 6, migrant herders 
came to the bags around HBU Mountain and used residency as well as campsite 
possession to gain and then maintain access to pastoral resources. As a response to the 
increasing numbers of households, both herders and local officials in general employed 
campsite possession for controlling others gaining access to the pastoral resources (for 
exainple, local herders or poor herders control visiting herders or wealthy herders 
clai1ning apparently unoccupied buuts nearby their campsite). At the same time, herders 
employed ulamjlalt locally recognized use rights (to change their campsites 
temporarily) to gain access to pastoral resources when they lacked sufficient pasture 
around their ca1npsites. Moreover, herders used livestock shelters (means of technology 
or capital as structural 1nechanisms) or split their families (labour and social identity in 
relational 1nechanisms) to gain, maintain and control access to campsite possession 
(Chapter 6). Herders employed different forms of family splitting strategies, which were 
1nade possible under the ineffective policies of registration of residency and formal 
registration of livestock ownership, and the ambiguous notion of household or herding 
households, which includes absentee herders. As Ribot and Peluso (2003) have argued, 
these are many mechanisms that actors can employ to benefit from natural resources 
without claiming exclusive right to pastoral resources. For instance, actors can just 
271 
control or make use of other productive resources, private assets, livestock, information 
and social status. 
This indicates that the distinctions between different right-based or relational 
1nechanisms are not as clear-cut as those observed in different property regimes 
(Verdery 1999). Herders returned to the HBU during the two year rehabilitation period, 
as, according to their ulamjlalJ they needed to pursue otor on the HBU Mountain in the 
severe weather conditions. This went against the policy of the RP A and was considered 
illegal under the land law (Chapter 8). They also employed both right-based and 
relational mechanisms to justify their return to the mountain. Herders in HBU, DD and 
UU bags all have historical claims to the mountain through their kinship, identity and 
ancestral membership and also through legal possession of campsites in their 
jurisdiction. In this case, their move was legal under the land law or through application 
of ulamjlalt production management (under the land law enforced by local 
administration. The local administration did not object to the herders' returning, because 
they could not actually control their movements). Thus, the boundary between legal and 
illegal rights-based 1nechanisms became ambiguous. Herders e1nployed these relational 
mechanis1ns as these embody both an exclusionary and an inclusionary paradigm, 
similar to that in the historical property relations. These relations offer a flexible access 
pattern and freedom of movement based on these relational and right-based 
mechanisms. 
Different state-based actors also employed these mechanisms. They extracted benefits 
by e1nploying these right-based mechanisms. First, HBU bag registered the migrants' 
residency under the constitution and registered campsite possession under the land law 
and in this way, maintained HBU village status and control over the state budget 
(Chapter 6). In attracting visiting herders, HBU bag also used a relational mechanism, 
claiming its historical authority over the HBU Mountain in the collective period, even 
though it had no authority to regulate the RP A. Second, this led to migrant herders 
trying to access the pasture and breach the territorial boundary of DD and UU bag as 
well as the Delgerhaan soum administration and affected the benefits of their local 
officials. Thus, these officials employed bag and soum Hural self-government (land 
law) as a means of claiming the territorial boundary and the local pasture management 
(Chapter 6). They also justified this move by referring to their pre-collective historical 
authority. Third, the department also declared its authority over the HBU RP A area, in 
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particular over the seasonal pastures of HBU and DD bags under the land law, claiming 
the state's historical (relational) state ownership (legal) of the resources and its absolute 
management rights. As structural mechanisms to control the flow of benefits, the 
ministry also used state funding and fencing to close off the corridor to the HBU RP A 
and strengthen its control over the territory. 
Fn1strated by the conflicting authority among the state-based actors, the herders use 
multiple structural and relational mechanisms to gain, maintain and control access to 
pastoral resources. In order to use ulamjlalt reciprocity, herders share labour (for 
seasonal herding and wage-based herding) and capital (through renting campsites) as 
means of exerting control over all the production components. They also used 
knowledge, kinship links and social networking to explore and gain access to pastoral 
resources available elsewhere. For instance, as a means of maintaining their access to 
resources, herders and local administrations both employed neg nutag usniihan as a 
n1eans of social networking involving state-based actors from local and national level 
government to mobilise against mining interests in their areas (Chapter 7). This 
indicates that any statutory policies need to acknowledge the validity of these 
mechanisms, which are based on ulamjlal in order to pursue resource governance in the 
pastoral context. 
9.6. Changes in herders' access pattern to pursue seasonal mobility 
The employment of the means outlined above caused alterations to the herders' way of 
pursuing seasonal mobility or long-distance otor movements. Herders often overstayed 
or pursued pasture use in the off-season. For instance, HBU bag migrant herders often 
stayed in the mountains ( changing locations) through the spring as they had no access to 
separate spring pasture areas. Also, in all three bags, herders expanding their campsite 
possession to other seasonal pastures blurred the boundaries between spring, summer 
and autumn pastures. So1ne herders used this· use of off-seasonal pasture as a strategy 
for risk management to secure their access to more alternative camping and grazing 
under unstable weather conditions. This resulted in herders' changing the distance 
travelled during seasonal mobility either to a dramatically reduced distance within each 
jurisdiction or an extremely long distance outside of ones jurisdiction. For instance, in 
all three bags herders had much smaller seasonal pastures, regardless of herd size. At 
the same time, mostly wealthy herders along with their paid herders adopted a pattern of 
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long distance movement to achieve seasonal mobility. For instance, those herders who 
lacked spring pasture in HBU bag travelled extremely long distances (approx.80-
200km) to access summer and autumn pastures beyond their own jurisdiction. Similarly, 
wealthy DD and UU herders often needed to go beyond their own bag territory for 
su1nmer and autumn otor. 
However, the herders' ability to use different access mechanisms does not often result in 
benefits, as argued in access theory (Ribot & Peluso 2003). Although use of these 
mechanis1ns opens a way to gain access, herders' ability to maintain or control access 
depends on the availability of the pasture. This is because, first, those who carried out 
cross-boundary long distance movements were not able to secure privileges with either 
the hosting local administration or local herders in accord with historical practices 
(Chapter 8). Historical dual control has become quite rare these days as individual 
herding households mainly control access, thereby shaping the decisions of local 
administrations or other neighbouring local herders. As a result, visiting herders 
confronted disapproval from either the hosting local administrations or from local 
herders and struggled to maintain access to pastoral resources. In other words, local 
actors made use of different mechanisms, but these did not always lead to improved 
livelihood or pasture management. Local UU and DD administrat-ion still struggle to 
maintain their benefits as their authority is often challenged by other actors with 
interests in the HBU RP A resources. HBU bag has maintained its benefits at the 
expense of the local herders' access to pastoral resources and their production, but it 
also faces challenges fro1n other jurisdictions. Thus, the officials' ability to benefit 
becomes an on-going struggle to justify their legitimacy. 
Reflecting on the research aim, my research concludes that the property regime 
approach is inadequate in explaining property relations in Mongolia. Its use has led to 
many researchers emphasizing open access to pastureland. This resulted from an 
ineffective state or weak communal management. Thus, these researchers have 
emphasized the need to re-instate a communal property regime. This involves defining 
herder groups property rights to pasture. In re-instating communal management, they 
intended to reflect historical patterns of co-management. Here the property regime is 
one that is dual, including state-based local government's fonnal control and herders' 
(local residents) informal control that were integrated in building a property and 
production management within a territorial unit. However, this co-management was 
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classified as overlapping state and communal property regimes. As shown in the HBU 
case, there is a strong sense of control over the pastoral resources by actors involved in 
local CPR 1nanagement as oron nutagtaa ezen ni baih (be an owner or master to their 
own territory) (Chapter 1 ). In other words, different actors all act as ezen (owners) as 
they own the land not as a sole beneficiary, but share the benefits from the land by 
exercising certain extent of formal and informal control in each level and by belonging 
to the same jurisdiction ( different state-based actors under the state or herders in sa1ne 
jurisdiction). Thus, policy initiatives need to be built upon an analysis that "puts 
property in its place among the many other mechanisms that shape the distribution of 
benefits, landscape of incentives and the efficiency and equity of resource use" (Ribot 
and Peluso, 2003, p 173). This involves understanding the property relations in the 
larger socio-political contexts and in relation to the existence of diverse ecological 
syste1ns (Sneath 2004). Bazargur (1998) highlighted that many studies of pastoralism 
focused only on a single aspect of the key production components and only in a stable 
condition without acknowledging its relations to the other components in dynamic 
conditions. Thus, to improve the management of Mongolia's pastureland, both national 
and international advocates need to develop policies that focus on establishing 
institutional structures or on putting in place more flexible arrangements suited to local 
conditions. In other words, it is crucial to understand the property -relations which are 
embedded in or based on historically localized ulamjtlalt production management. This 
is because today, despite changes in the legislation, these property relations still persist 
locally. 
Therefore, based on my findings from the HBU case, I argue that improvement in 
pastureland management requires a) more than just conservation-oriented land policies; 
b) the continued use of the ulamjlalt pastoral production systems, which also addresses 
the issue of conservation of rangelands; and c) making use of local territorial 
administrative units, which contain all the seasonal pastures. With respect to pastureland 
management, policy 1nakers need to understand the importance of regulating other 
resources relating to pastoral production such as livestock and labour in balance with 
ecologically preferable grazing land within jurisdictional boundaries. Furthermore, the 
regulation of pastureland management needs to be integrated, instead of separating the 
concept of the 'campsite' from pastureland. With respect to property institutions, 
international advocates have recognized the potential of herder groups to regulate access 
to pastoral resources within community based natural resource management (CBNRM) 
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strategies. However, the notion of 'community' in Mongolia is problematic. Clear 
distinctions of what constitutes a community, in tenns of its membership and territory, 
are more likely to be made at the bag level (the smallest local territorial administrative 
unit). This is evident because bag level actors sanction pastoral resources within the bag 
jurisdictional boundary, and can employ either state legal or ulamjlalt mechanisms. 
Finally, for CPR management to succeed, the thesis concludes that the policy makers 
need to develop regulatory policies that solidify the authority of the bag hural to be 
involved in the management of bag herders' pastoral production as a whole due to the 
following reasons. 
First, this arrangement allows integrated control of local administration to extend across 
all three production components. Second, it provides for herders to control members' 
access to pastures within and between different jurisdictional units following ulamjlalt 
pasture use rules and norms, which are based on the availability of labour, pasture and 
on herd size. Third, such an integrated control facilitates flexibility in mobility (right-
based exclusion) and allows inclusion based on reciprocity (a highly relational aspect) 
in the management of the production. This is because ulamjlalt pasture use rules and 
norms confer a high degree of legitimacy upon all actors and they fit the ecological 
context, which has beco111e increasingly unstable in terms of climate and geography. 
Thus, both exclusion and inclusion can be enforced within a jurisdictional context under 
the integrated system. The state's property relations that were based on the ulamjlalt 
pastoral production was integrated, combining all right-based (use-rights), structural 
(state support) and relational 111echanisms (historical, kinship and neighbourhood). 
Whilst 'putting property in its place', this is not to say that arrangements should remain 
the same as in the pre-collective and collective times. This would be impossible due to 
the absolutely different political conditions. Nonetheless, in the pre-collective time, the 
rulers enjoyed private ownership of livestock under private use rights to pasture within 
their jurisdiction. In the collective period, -rulers adjusted this historical pastoral 
production 111anagement to the political and economic conditions existing at that time, in 
keeping with the existing ecological context. Thus, instead of eradicating pastoral 
production and imposing an alien concept of rangeland management, the current 
government needs to make use of the classic model as they did in the collective period, 
but to fit the current economic situation, (for example, an independent business entity 
based within a jurisdictional context). In other words, it needs to allow the private 
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ownership of livestock by herders, as it existed in the pre-collective time, but also 
collaborate with the independent business entity on production management to avoid 
land degradation and increasing poverty in both urban and rural Mongolia. 
9.7. Future research questions 
In this thesis, I have discussed pastureland management in Mongolia in terms of the 
management of pastoral production. The thesis is limited to examining the problems 
related to current policies for regulating access to pastureland for management purposes. 
In the thesis I have identified what is problematic in terms of regulating access to 
pastoral resources and pointed to those who benefit from it as well as those who lose by 
it. The most serious problem with the management is rooted in the policy and this thesis 
examined these aspects of the resource management policies. However, beyond 
exploring pasture management practices, more research is needed regarding the 
marketing of production, and regarding how this marketing affects resource 
management. CPR management is often affected by multi-level cross-scale national and 
international 1narkets and resource exploitation (Berkes, 2009, Ribot and Peluso, 2003). 
Particularly, where there are conflicting legal arrangements in the regulation of access 
to pastoral resources and in the light of depleting pastoral resource-s, it is important to 
examine why herders focus solely on increasing the numbers of livestock, although they 
acknowledged the i1nportance of quality over quantity. Thus, production based research 
requires exploring a) to what extent this value chain operates; b) how the production 
marketing at the national and international levels affects these arrangements; c) how the 
actors control the benefit mechanisms; and d) how this affects herders' decisions to 
increase the number of livestock. 
277 
References 
Addison, J, Friedel, M, Brown, C, Davies, J and Waldron, S (2012) 'A critical review 
of degradation assumptions applied to Mongolia's Gobi Desert', The Rangeland 
Journal 34, 125-137. 
Agrawal, A (2001) 'Co1nmon property institutions and sustainable governance and 
resources', World Development 29: 10, 1649-1672. 
Agrawal, A (2003) 'Sustainable governance of common-pool resources: context, 
methods and politics', Annual Revenue of Anthropology 32, 243-262. 
Agrawal, A (2007) 'Forests, governance, sustainability: com1non property theory and 
its contributions', International Journal of the Commons l: 1, 111-136. 
Agrawal, A and Gibson, C ( 1999) 'Enchantment and disenchantment: the role of 
com1nunity in natural resource conservation', World Development 27 :4, 629-649. 
Agrawal, A and Ostro1n, E (2001) 'Collective action, property rights, and 
decentralization in resource use in India and Nepal', Politics and Society 29:4, 
485-514. 
Baabar (2005) Twentieth Century Mongolia, Global Oriental, Kent. 
Badarch, D, Zilinskas, R A and Palint, P J (2003) Mongolia Today: Science, Culture, 
Environment, and Development, Routledge Curzon, London, UK. 
Barfield, T J (1993) The Nomadic Alternative, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey. 
Basurto, X and Ostrom, E (2009) 'The core challenges of moving beyond Garrett 
Hardin', Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research 1:3, 255-259. 
Batkhishig, B, Oyuntulkhuur, B, Altanzul, Ts and Fernandez-Gimenez, ME (2012) 'A 
case study of community-based rangeland management in Jinst soum, Mongolia' 
in Maria E Fernandez-Gimenez, Xiaoyi Wang, B Batkhishig, Julia A Klein and 
Robin S Reid (eds.) Restoring Community Connections to the Land: Building 
resilience through community-based rangeland managem_ent in China and 
Mongolia CAB International, Wallingford, Cambridge. 
Bazargur, D (ed.) (1998) Geography of Pastoral Animal Husbandry, TTC Company, 
Mongolian Academy of Science, Ulaanbaatar. 
Bedunah, D J and Schmidt, S (2004) 'Pastoralism and protected area management in 
Mongolia's Gobi Gurvansaikhan National Park', Development and Change 35:1, 
167-191. 
Behnke, G B and Scoones, I (1993) Rethinking Range Ecology: Implications for 
rangeland management in Africa. In: Range Ecology at Disequilibrium, new 
models of natural variability and pastoral adaptation in African savannas, ODI, 
London. 
Benda-Beckmann, F V, Benda-Beckmann, KV and Wiber, MG (2006) 'The properties 
of property' in F V Benda-Beckmann, K V Benda-Beckmann and M G Wiber 
( eds.) Changing Properties of Property, Berghahn Books, New York, 1-40. 
Eerkes, F (2009) 'Revisiting the commons paradigm', Journal of Natural Resources 
Policy Research 1:3, 261-264. 
Eerkes, F, Feeny, D, McCay, B J and Acheson, J M (1989) 'The benefits of the 
common', Nature 340, 91-93. 
Berry, S (1983) 'Access to land: property rights as social process' in S Berry (ed.) No 
Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-
Saharan Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 101-134. 
Berry, S (1989a) 'Access, control and use of resources in African agriculture: an 
introduction', Africa 59: 1, 1-5. 
Berry, S (1989b) 'Social institutions and access to resources', Africa 59:1, 41-55. 
Berry, S (1993) No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change 
in Sub-Saharan Africa., University of Wisconsin Press, Madison. 
278 
Berry, S (2009) 'Property, authority and citizenship: land claims, politics and the 
dynamics of social division in West Africa', Development and Change 40: 1, 23-
45. 
Bjorklund, I (2003) 'Sarni pastoral society in Northern Norway-National Integration of 
an Indigenous Management System' in David Anderson and Mark Nuttal (eds.) 
Cultivating Arctic landscapes, Berghahn Press, New York, 124-13 5. 
Bold, B (1996) "'Socio-economic segmentation-Khat-Ail in nomadic livestock keeping 
of Mongolia'", Nomadic Peoples 39, 69-86. 
Bold, B (2001) Mongolian nomadic society: a reconstruction of the 'medieval' history 
of Mongolia, The Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Richmond, Surrey. 
Bradsher, Henry S (1972) 'The sovietization of Mongolia', Foreign Affairs 50:3, 545-
553. 
Broegaard, R B (2009) 'Land access and titling in Nicaragua', Development and 
Change 40: 1, 149-169. 
Bruce, J W and Mearns, R (2002) 'Natural Resource Management and Land Policy in 
Developing Countries: Lessons learned and new challenges for the World Bank' 
IIED, London. 
Bruun, 0, Ronnas, P and Narangoa, L (1999) 'Country Analysis Mongolia' Nordic 
Institute of Asian Studies, SIDA. 
Bruun, Ole (2006) Precious steppe, Lexington Books, Oxford. 
Cellarius, B (2004) "Without co-ops there would be no forests': historical memory and 
the restitution of forests in post-socialist Bulgaria', Conservation & Society 2: 1, 
51-73. 
Chantsallkhain, G (2009) 'Sustainable Rangeland Management in Mongolia: The role 
of herder com1nunity institutions' Land Restoration Training Programme, Island, 
Ulaanbaatar. 
Chatty, D and Colchester, M (2002) Conservation and Mobile Indigenous Peoples: 
Displacement, forced settlement and sustainable development, Berghahn Books, 
British library, United Kingdo1n. 
Cleaver, F and Franks, T (2005) 'How Institutions Elude Design: River basin 
1nanagement and sustainable livelihoods' Centre for International Development, 
University of Bradford, Bradford. 
'The Constitution of Mongolia' (1992) Ulaanbaatar. 
Cooper, L (1993) 'Patterns of 1nutual assistance in the Mongolian pastoral economy', 
Nomadic Peoples 33, 153-162. 
Damdinsuren, Ts (1976) Secret Histo,y of Mongolia, State Printing Place, Ulaanbaatar. 
Denzin, N K (1970) The Research Act: A theoretical introduction to sociological 
methods., Aldine, Chicago. 
Denzin, N K and Lincoln, Y S (1994) Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage, 
Thousand Oaks. 
Devereux, S ( 1996) 'Fuzzy entitlements and common property resources: struggles over 
rights to co1nmunal land in Namibia' Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex, England. 
Dietz, T, Ostrom, E and Stem, P C (2003) 'The struggle to govern the commons', 
Science 302, 1907-1912. 
'Draft law on Pastureland' (2007, 2010). 
Endicott, E (2012) A history of land use in Mongolia, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
Erdenebaatar, B (1996) 'Socio-economic aspects of the pastoral movement patterns of 
Mongolian herders' in Caroline Humphrey and David Sneath ( eds.) Culture and 
Environment: Inner Asia 1, The White Horse Press, Cambridge. 
Erdenetsogt, N (ed.) (1998) Mongolian Nomadic Livestock, 'MMM' Association, 
Ulaanbaatar. 
279 
Evans, D, Gruba, P and Zobel, J (2011) How to Write a Better Thesis, Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne. 
Feeny, D, Berkes, F, McCay, B J and Acheson, J M (1990) 'The tragedy of the 
com1nons: twenty-two years later', Human Ecology~: 1. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, M E (1993) 'The role of ecological perception in indigenous 
resource management: A case study from the Mongolian forest-steppe', Nomadic 
Peoples 33, 31-46. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, M E (1999a) 'Sustaining the steppes: A geographical history of 
pastoral land use in Mongolia', The Geographical Review 89:3, 315-336. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, M E (1999b) 'Reconsidering the role of absentee herd owners: A 
view from Mongolia', Human Ecology 27:1, 1999. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, ME (2001) 'The effects of livestock privatization on pastoral land 
use and land tenure in post-socialist Mongolia', Nomadic Peoples 5 :2. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, M E (2002) 'Spatial and social boundaries and the paradox of 
pastoral land tenure: a case study from post-socialist Mongolia', Human Ecology 
30:1, 49-78. 
Fernandez-Gi1nenez, M E (2006) 'Land use and land tenure in Mongolia: A brief 
history and current issues', in Donald J Bedunah, E McArthur and Maria E 
Fernandez-Gimenez Proceedings of the Conference on Transformations, Issues, 
and Future Challenges, Salt Lake City, UT, Proceedings RMRS-P-39, Fort 
Collins, CO: US Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain 
Research Station. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, M E, Kamimura, A and Batbuyan, B (2008) 'Implementing 
Mongolia's Land Law: Progress and Issues' The Central for Asian Legal 
Exchange (CALE), Nagoya University, Japan. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, M E and Swift, D M (2003) 'Strategies for sustainable grazing 
1nanagement in the developing world', in N Alllsopp, AR Palmer, S J Milton, K 
P Kirkman, G I H Kerley, C R Hurt and C J Brown Proc@edings of the VIIth 
International Rangeland Congress, Durban, South Africa, Juy 26-August 1, 
2003, Document Transformation Technologies, 821-831. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, Maria E (2000) 'The role of Mongolian nomadic pastoralists' 
ecological knowledge in rangeland management', Ecological Applications lQ:5, 
1318-1326. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, Maria E and Allen-Diaz, Barbara (1999) 'Testing a non-
equilibriu1n 1nodel of rangeland vegetation dynamics in Mongolia', Journal of 
Applied Ecology 3 6, 871-885. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, Maria E and Batbuyan, B (2004) 'Law and Disorder: Local 
implementation of Mongolia's Land Law', Development and Change 3 5: 1, 141-
165. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, Maria E., Batkhishig, Band Batbuyan, B (2012) 'Cross-boundary 
and cross-level dynamics increase vulnerability to severe winter disaster ( dzud) 
in Mongolia', Global Environmental Change 22, 836-851. 
Flyvberg, B (2001) Making Social Science Matter, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Fratkin, E (1997) 'Pastoralism: Governance and Development Issues', Annual Review of 
Anthropology 26. 
Fratkin, E and Mearns, R (2003) 'Sustainability and pastoral livelihoods: lessons from 
East African Maasai and Mongolia', Human Organization 62, 112-122. 
George, A L and Bennett, A (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development, MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
Gerring, John (2007) Case Study Research,· Principle and Practices, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
280 
GIMAS (2009) 'Mongolian National Atlas' (ed, Geography Institute of Mongolian 
Academy of Science) II Press, Ulaanbaatar. 
Goldstein, M C and Beall, C M (1994) The Changing World of Mongolia's Nomads, 
Twin Age Limited, HongKong. 
Griffin, K (1995) Poverty and the transition to a market economy in Mongolia, 
St.Martin's Press, New York. 
Griffin, K (2003) 'Urban-rural migration and involution in the livestock sector' in K 
Griffin ( ed.) Poverty reduction in Mongolia, Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 56-
71. 
Hardin, G (1968) 'The tragedy of the commons', Science 162, 1243-1248. 
Heather, P (2010) Empires and Barbarians: Fall of Rome and the birth of Europe, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Humphrey, C ( 1999) 'Rural Institutions' in David Sneath and Caroline Humphrey 
(eds.) The end of nomadism: Society, state and the environment in Inner Asia, 
Duke University Press, Durham, 68-136. 
Humphrey, C and Sneath, D (1999) The end of Nomadism? , Duke University Press, 
Durham. 
Humphrey, Caroline (1978) 'Pastoral nomadism in Mongolia: the role of herdsmen's 
cooperatives in the national economy', Development and Change 9, 133-160. 
Ickowitz, A (2003) 'Poverty and the environment' in K Griffin (ed.) Poverty reduction 
in Mongolia, Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 95-112. 
Izumi, Kaori (1999) 'Liberalization, gender and the land question in sub-Saharan 
Africa' in Caroline Sweetman (ed.) Women, Land and Agriculture, Oxfam GB, 
Oxford. 
Kaplonski, Ch (2010) 'Introduction' in D Sneath and Ch Kaplonski (eds.) The History 
of Mongolia Volume 111: The Qing Period Twentieth-century Mongolia, Global 
Oriental, Kent. 
Khazanov, AM (1994) Nomads and the Outside World Second edition, University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison. 
Khazanov, A N (1998) 'Pastoralists in the Contemporary World: The problems of 
Survival' in J Ginat and AM Khazanov ( eds.) Changing Nomads in a Changing 
World, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 7-23. 
Klein, J A, Fernandez-Gimenez, M E, Wei, H, Y, Changqing, D, Ling, Dorligsuren, D 
and S, Reid R (2012) 'A participatory framework for building resilient social-
ecological pastoral systems' in M E Fernandez-Gimenez, Xiaoyi Wang, 
B.Batkhishig, J A Klein and R S Reid ( eds.) Restoring community connections 
to the land: Building resilience through community-based rangeland 
management in China and Mongolia, CABI International, Oxfordshire. 
Korsun, G and Murrel, P (1995) 'Politics and economics of Mongolia's privatization 
program', Asian Survey XXXV:5, 472-486. 
Kottak, C (2006) Mirror for Humanity, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Kradin, N (2011) 'Heterarchy and Hierarchy among the ancient Mongolian Nomads', 
Social Evolution & History lQ: 1. 
Kyburz-Graber, R (2004) 'Does the case-study methodology lack rigour? The need for 
quality criteria for sound case-study research, as illustrated by recent case in 
secondary and higher education', Environ1nental Education Research 12.: 1, 53-
65. 
Lamb, H (1927) Genghis Khan, the Emperor of all men, International Collectors 
Library American Headquarters, Garden City, New York. 
Larson, FA (1930) Duke of Mongolia, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston. 
Lastarria-Cornhiel, S (1997) 'Impact of Privatization on Gender and Property Rights in 
Africa', WorldDevelopment25:8, 1317-1333. 
281 
Lattimore, 0 (1932) Manchuria cradle of conflict, The Macmillan Con1pany of 
Canada, Toronto. 
Lattimore, 0 (1941) Mongol Journey, Doubleday, Doran and Co, New York. 
Lattimore, 0 (1962) Nomads and Commissars: Mongolia Revisited, Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
'Law of Mongolia on Administrative and Territorial Units and their Governance' 
(1993). 
'Law of Mongolia on Environmental Protection' (1995). 
'Law of Mongolia on Land' (1994). 
'Law of Mongolia on Land' (2002). 
Legrain, L (2009) 'Confrontation on the river Ivd, or, how does music act in social 
life?', Inner Asia ll, 335-358. 
Leisher, C, Less, S, Boucher, TM, Beukering, P V and Sanjayan, M (2012) 'Measuring 
the impacts of community-based grasslands management in Mongolia's Gobi' in 
Plus one: Open Access Freely available online, Vol. 7. 
Lopez, B (2001) Arctic Dreams, Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 
New York. 
Lopez, Barry (1986) Arctic Dreams, Vintage Books, New York. 
Lund, C (2009) 'Recategorizing 'Public' and 'private' property in Ghana', Development 
and Change 40:1, 131-148. 
Marshall, G.R (2008) 'Nesting, subsidiarity, and community-based environmental 
governance beyond the local level', International Journal of the Commons 2: 1, 
75-97. 
Mau, G and Chantsallkham, G (2006) 'Herder Group Evaluation: A study of herder 
groups, their present status and future potential' UNDP, Ulaanbaatar. 
McCay, B J and J entoft, S ( 1998) 'Market or community failure? Critical perspectives 
on common property research', Human Organization 57: 1, 21-29. 
McCay, B.J and Acheson, J.M (1987) The Questions of the Commons: The Culture and 
Ecology of Communal Resources, University of Arizona, Tucson. 
Mearns b, Robin (2004) 'Decentralisation, rural livelihoods and pasture-land 
management in post socialist Mongolia', European Journal of Development 
Research 1§: 1, 133-152. 
Mearns, R (1996) 'Community, collective action and common grazing: The case of 
post-socialist Mongolia', The Journal of Development Studies 32, 297-339. 
Mearns, R (2004a) 'Sustaining livelihoods on Mongolia's pastoral commons: Insights 
from a participatory poverty assessment', Development and Change 3 5: 1, 107-
139. 
Mearns, R (2004b) 'Decentralisation, rural livelihoods and pasture-land management in 
post socialist Mongolia', European Journal of Development Research 1§: 1, 13 3-
152. 
Meijl, T V (2006) 'Who Owns the Fisheries? Changing Views of Property and its 
Redistribution in Post-colonial Maori Society' in F V Benda-Beckmann, K V 
Benda-Beckmann and M G Wiber (eds.) Changing Properties of Property, 
Berghahn Books, New York, 170-. 
Meinzen-Dick, R, Pradhan, R and Grigorio, M D (2004) Collective action and property 
rights for sustainable development, CAPRI, Washington D.C. 
Meinzen-dick, RS, Brown, LR, Feldstein, H S and Quisu1nbing, AR (1997) 'Gender, 
Property Rights and Natural Resources', World Development 24:8, 1303-1315. 
Meredith, M (2005) The Fate of Africa: A History of fifty years of independence, Public 
Affairs, Perseus Book Group, New York. 
Meyer, Christine Benedichte (2001) 'A case in case study methodology', Field Methods 
_Ll_:4, 329-352. 
282 
Migdal, J S (1988) Strong societies and -weak states: State-society relations and state 
capabilities in the third vvorld, Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 
Miller, D and Sheehy, D (2008) 'The relevance of Owen Lattimore's writings for 
nomadic pastoralism research and development in Inner Asia', Nomadic Peoples 
_Ll_:2, 103-115. 
MOFA (2009a) 'The meeting protocol from the Committee of Inter-Provincial Reserve 
Pasture Area', Vol. July 3 (ed, Department of the Inter-Provincial Reserve 
Pasture Area) Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Light Industry, Ulaanbaatar. 
MOP A (2009b) 'The meeting protocol from the Committee of Inter-Provincial Reserve 
Pasture Area', Vol. December 28 ( ed, Department of the Inter-Provincial 
Reserve Pasture Area) Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Light Industry, 
Ulaanbaatar. 
MOP A (2010) 'Action plan for reserve pasture areas' ( ed, Department of Inter-
Provincial Reserve Pasture Area) Ulaanbaatar. 
Munkh-ochir, D (2012) Mongol Ulsiin aimagJ hoshuuJ sumiin lavlah, Ulaanbaatar. 
Murphy, D J (2012) 'Ecology of rule: territorial assemblages and environmental 
governance in rural Mongolia', Anthropological Quarterly Special Issue: Hybrid 
nature, 1-28. 
Namkhainyambuu, Ts (2000) Bounty from the Sheep, The White Horse Press, 
Cain bridge. 
National-Research-Council (1986) 'Proceedings of the conference on common property 
resource management', in National Research Council Common property 
resource management, Washington DC, National Academy Press. 
Natsagdorj, Sh (1955) 'The life of Sukebatur' in Owen Lattimore (ed.) Nationalism and 
Revolution in Mongolia, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 94-186. 
Natsagdorj, Sh (1967) 'The economic basis of feudalism in Mongolia', Modern Asian 
Studies 1:3, 265-281. 
Natsagdorj, Sh (1972) Saum) khamjlagaJ shavi, ard, Academy of Science Publishing, 
Ulaanbaatar. 
Natsagdorj, Sh (1975) 'Main characters of Feudalism: The Mongolian society as an 
example' in XIV International Congress of Historical SciencesUlaanbaatar, San-
Francisco, 1-18. 
Nixson, F and Walters, B (2006) 'Privatization, income distribution, and poverty: the 
Mongolian experience', World Development 34:9, 1557-1579. 
Osterle, Matthias (2008) 'From cattle to goats: The transformation of East Pokot 
pastoralism in Kenya', Nomadic Peoples _Ll_: 1, 81-91. 
Ostrom, E (1990) 'Reflection on the commons' in Elinor Ostrom (ed.) Governing The 
Commons, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1-28. 
Ostrom, E (2009) 'Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex 
economic systems'. 
Ostrom, E, Burger, J, Field, C B, Norgaard, RB and Policansky, D (1999) 'Revisiting 
the commons: local lessons, global challenges', Science 284, 278-282. 
Potanski, T (1993) 'Decollectivization of the -Mongolian pastoral economy (1991-92): 
some economic and social consequences', Nomadic Peoples 33, 123-135. 
Razavi, Sh (2003) 'Introduction: Agrarian Change, Gender and Land Rights' in Sh 
Razavi ( ed.) Agrarian Change, Gender and Land rights, Blackwell Publishing, 
Oxford, 296 cm. 
Reid, A (2003) The Shaman's Coat: A Native History of Siberia, Phoenix, London. 
Reid, R S, Galvin, K A and Kruska, R S (2008) 'Global significance of extensive 
grazing lands and pastoral societies: an introduction' in KA Galvin, R S Reid, 
Jr RH Behnke and N Th Hobbs (eds.) Fragmentation in Semi-Arid and Arid 
283 
Landscapes: Consequences for Human and Natural Systems, Springer, 
Dordrecht. 
Ribot, J C (1998) 'Theorizing access: forest profits along Senegal's charcoal commodity 
chain', Development and Change 29, 307-341. 
Ribot, JC (2009) 'Authority over forests: empowerment and subordination in Senegal's 
De1nocratic decentralization', Development and Change 40:1, 105-129. 
Ribot, J C, Agrawal, A and Larson, A M (2006) 'Recentralizing while decentralizing: 
how national governments reappropriate forest resources', World Development 
34:11, 1864-1886. 
Ribot, JC and Peluso, NL (2003) 'A theory of access', Rural Sociology 68:2, 153-181. 
Robbins, P (2004) Political ecology : a critical introduction, Blackwell, Malden, MA. 
Rosenberg, Daniel (1981) 'The collectivization of Mongolia's Pastoral Production', 
Commission on Nomadic Peoples 9, 23-39. 
Schlager, E (ed.) (2004) Common-Pool Resource Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts. 
Sch1nidt, S M (2004) 'Pastoral Community Organization, Livelihoods and Biodiversity 
Conservation in Mongolia's Southern Gobi Region', in Annual Meeting of 
Society for Range Management, Salt Lake City, USA. 
Scott, J (1998) Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human 
condition have failed, Yale University Press, New Haven, London. 
SDC (2010) Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC, Ulaanbaatar. 
Shirendev, B. and Natsagdorj, Sh. (1966) BNMAUyn tuuh, terguun boti, Ulsiin Hevleh 
Uildver, Ulaanbaatar. 
Sikor, T and Lund, C (2009) 'Access and property: a question of power and authority', 
Development and Change 40:1, 1-22. 
Sikor, Th, Stahl, J and Dorondel, S (2009) 'Negotiating post-socialist property and 
state: struggles over forests in Albania and Romania', Development and Change 
40:1, 171-193. 
Sikor, Th and To, Ph X (2011) 'Illegal logging in Vietnam: lam tac (forest hijackers) in 
practice and talk', Society and Natural Resources 24, 688-701. 
Sneath, D ( 1993) 'Social relations, networks and social organisation in post-socialist 
rural Mongolia', Nomadic Peoples 33, 193-207. 
Sneath, D (1998) 'State policy and pasture degradation in Inner Asia ', Science's 
Compass 281:21, 1147-1148. 
Sneath, D (2003) 'Land Use, the Environment and Develop1nent in Post-socialist 
Mongolia', Oxford Development Studies 11:4, 441-457. 
Sneath, D (2004) 'Property regimes and sociotechnical systems: Rights over land in 
Mongolia's "Age of the Market"' in K Verdery and C Humphrey (eds.) Property 
in question: Value transformation in the global economy, Berg, Oxford, New 
York, 161-182. 
Sneath, D (2006) 'The rural and the urban in pastoral Mongolia' in O Bruun and Li 
Narangoa ( eds.) Mongols from country to city: floating boundaries, pastoralism 
and city life in the Mongol lands, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 14-161. 
Sneath, D (2010) 'Political mobilization and the construction of collective identity in 
Mongolia', Central Asian Survey 29:3, 251-267. 
Sneath, David (2007) The Headless State, Columbia University Press, New York. 
Solongo, A (2007) 'Growth of Internal and International Migration in Mongolia' in 
Migration, development and poverty reduction, 8th International Conference of 
Asia Pacific Migration Research Netvvork, May 25-29, 2007, Fuzhou, Fujain 
province, ChinaFunian Normal University, Fujian, China. 
284 
Sowerwine, J C (2004) 'Territorialisation and the politics of highland landscapes in 
Vietnam: negotiating property relations in policy, meaning and practice', 
Conservation & Society 2: 1, 97-136. 
Spoor, M (2009) The political economy of rural livelihoods in transition economies: 
land1 peasants and rural poverty in transition, Routledge, London and New 
York. 
Stake, R E ( 199 5) The art of case study research, Sage Publications, New York. 
Stake, R E (2010) Qualitative research: Studying how things work, The Guilford Press, 
New York. 
Sternberg, T (2008) 'Environmental challenges in Mongolia's dryland pastoral 
landscape', Journal of Arid Environments 72, 1294-1304. 
Sturgeon, J C and Sikor, T (2004) 'Post-socialist property in Asia and Europe: 
variations on 'fuzziness", Conservation & Society 2: 1, 2-17. 
Swift, J (1988) 'Major issues in pastoral development with special emphasis on selected 
African countries' F AO, Rome. 
Swift, J and Mearns, R (1993) 'Pastoralism in Mongolia', Nomadic Peoples 33, 3-239. 
Te1npler, G, Swift, J and Payne, P (1993) 'The changing significance of risk in the 
Mongolian pastoral economy', Nomadic Peoples 33, 105-122. 
The-World-Bank (2004) Environmental Challenges of Urban Development, The World 
Bank, Ulaanbaatar. 
Tumenbayar, N (2000) 'Land Privatization option for Mongolia', in "Constituting the 
Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium "1 the Eighth 
Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Common 
Property, Bloomington, Indiana, May 31-June 4. 
Ulziisuren, B., Tsogtbaatar, B. and Shagdar, Sh. (2010) 'Han Hentii Tovchoon' Beat 
Press, Ulaanbaatar. 
Undargaa, S (2006) Gender and pastoral land use in Mongolia: dilemmas of pastoral 
land tenure, Centre for Development Studies, The University of Auckland, 
Auckland. 
Undargaa, S, Tungalagtuya, Kh and Narangerel, Ya (2007) 'Community Organization, 
Mobility and Com1non Property Management of Pastureland Resources in the 
Gobi' NZNI/IPECON, Ulaanbaatar. 
Upton, C (2005) 'Institutions in a pastoral society: processes of formation and 
transformation in post-socialist Mongolia', Comparative Studies of South Asia1 
Africa and the Middle East 25:3, 584-599. 
Upton, C (2008) 'Social capital, collective action and group formation: Developmental 
trajectories in post-socialist Mongolia', Human Ecology 36, 175-188. 
Upton, C (2009) "'Custom" and contestation: land reform in post-socialist Mongolia', 
World Development xx:x, xxx-xxx. 
Upton, C, Moore, Kate, Nyamaa, N and Erdenebaatar, B (2013) 'Community, Place and 
Pastoralism: Nature and society in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Mongolia Country 
Report' University of Leicester. 
Vainshtein, S (1980) Nomads of South . Siberia, Cambridge University Press, 
Cain bridge. 
Vandergeest, P and Peluso, NL (1995) 'Territorialization and state power in Thailand', 
Theory and Society 24, 3 85-426. 
Verdery, K (1999) 'Fuzzy Property: Rights, Power, and Identity in Transylvania's 
Decollectivization' in M Burawoy and K Verdery (eds.) Uncertain Transition: 
Ethnographies of Change in the Post-socialist World, Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Lanham, 53-82. , 
Verdery, K (2004) 'The property regime of socialism', Conservation & Society 2: 1, 
190-198. 
285 
Vetter, S (2005) 'Rangelands at equilibrium and non-equilibrium: recent developments 
in the debate', Journal of Arid Environments 62, 321-341. 
Vreeland, H H (1954) 'Mongol community and kinship structure' Walter Hines Page 
School of International Relations, The John Hopkins University, New Haven. 
Weatherford, J (2004) Genghis Khan and the making of the modern -world, Crown 
Publishers, New York. 
William, D M (1996) 'The barbed walls of China: a contemporary grassland drama', 
The Journal of Asian Studies 55:3, 665-691. 
Wingard, J R and Odgerel, P (2001) 'Compendium of Environmental Law and Practice 
in Mongolia' GTZ Commercial and Civil Law Reform Project, Ulaanbaatar, 
Mongolia. 
Wollenberg, E, Merino, L, Agrawal, A and Ostrom, E (2007) 'Fourteen years of 
monitoring community-managed forests: learning from IFRI's experience', 
International Forestry Review 9:2, 670-684. 
Yin, R K (2009) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage, Thousand Oaks. 
Yngstrom, I (2002) 'Women, Wives and Land Rights in Africa: Situating Gender 
Beyond the Household in the Debate Over Land Policy and Changing Tenure 
Systems', Development Studies 30, 21-40. 
286 
Appendices 18 HBU Spring camp Hill/winter 16/05/2010 11: 15am 
19 HBU Spring camp Hill/winter 16/05/2010 12:00pm 
20 HBU Spring camp Hill/winter 16/05/2010 12 :55 pm 
21 HBU Spring camp Hill 16/05/2010 1:55 pm 
Lists of questionnaires 22 HBU Spring camp Hill 16/05/2010 2:35pm 
23 HBU Spring camp Hill 16/05/2010 3:35pm 
24 HBU Spring camp Hill 16/05/2010 4:30pm 
25 HBU Spring camp Hill 18/05/2010 9:30am 
No Bag Season Location Date Time 26 HBU Spring camp Hill 18/05/2010 10:20am 
1 HBU Spring camp HBU Mountain 14/05/2010 9:55am 27 HBU Spring camp Hill 18/05/2010 10:50pm 
2 HBU Spring camp HB U Mountain 14/05/2010 10:20am 28 HBU Spring camp Hill 18/05/2010 11:30am 
-
3 HBU Spring camp HBU Mountain 14/05/2010 11:00am 29 HBU Spring camp Hill 18/05/2010 12:05am 
4 HBU Spring camp HBU Mountain 14/05/2010 12:00am 30 HBU Spring camp Hill 18/05/2010 1:20pm 
5 HBU Spring camp HBU Mountain 14/05/2010 2:00pm 31 HBU Spring camp Rivergrass 18/05/2010 2:20pm 
6 HBU Spring camp HB lJ Mountain 14/05/2010 2:40pm 32 HBU Spring camp Rivergrass 18/05/2010 3:00pm 
7 HBU Spring camp 1--lBU Mountain 14/05/2010 3:30pm 33 HBU Spring camp Hill 18/05/2010 4:45pm 
8 HBU Spring camp HBU Mountain 14/05/2010 5:10pm 34 HBU Spring camp Hill 18/05/2010 5:30pm 
9 1-IBU Spring camp HBU Mountain 14/05/2010 5:50pm 35 HBU Spring camp Hill 18/05/2010 6:15pm 
10 HBU Spring camp HBU Mountain 14/05/2010 6:50pm 36 HBU Spring camp Hill 20/05/2010 12:10pm 
11 HBU Spring camp Steppe 15/05/2010 9:55am 37 HBU Spring camp Hill 20/05/2010 12:45pm 
12 HBU Spring camp Hill 15/05/2010 10:45am 38 HBU Summer camp Rivergrass 28/07/2010 2:00pm 
13 HBU Spring camp HBU Mountain 15/05/2010 11:pm 39 HBU Spring camp Rivergrass 20/09/2010 7:15pm 
14 HBU Spring camp Hill 15/05/2010 1:15pm 40 HBU Spring camp Rivergrass 22/09/2010 2:25pm 
15 HBU Spring camp Hill 15/05/2010 2:00pm 41 DD Spring camp Hill 20/05/2010 10:00am 
16 HBU Spring camp Hill 15/05/2010 4:55pm 42 DD Spring camp Hill 20/05/2010 11 :00am 
17 HBU Spring camp Rivergrass 16/05/2010 10:25am 43 DD Spring camp Hill 20/05/2010 1:00pm 
287 
44 DD Spring camp Hill 20/05/2010 2:00pm 71 uu Spring camp Steppe 24/05/2010 5:30pm 
45 DD Spring camp Hill 20/05/2010 2:35pm 72 uu Spring camp Steppe 24/05/2010 7:15pm 
46 DD Spring camp Hill 20/05/2010 3:15pm 73 uu Spring camp Steppe 25/05/2010 9:30am 
47 DD Spring camp Hill 20/05/2010 4:00pm 74 uu Spring camp Steppe 25/05/2010 10:55am 
48 DD Spring camp Steppe 20/05/2010 5:30pm 75 uu Spring camp Steppe 25/05/2010 11 :30pm 
49 DD Spring camp Steppe 20/05/2010 6:20pm 76 uu Spring camp Steppe 25/05/2010 12:15pm 
50 DD Spring camp Steppe 20/05/2010 7:20pm 77 uu Spring camp Steppe 25/05/2010 1:30pm 
51 DD Spring camp Steppe 20/05/2010 7:55pm 78 uu Spring camp Steppe 25/05/2010 3:00pm 
52 DD Spring camp Hill 21/05/2010 9:25am 79 uu Spring camp Steppe 25/05/2010 8:45pm 
53 DD Spring camp Hill 21 /05/2010 10:20am 80 uu Spring camp Steppe 26/05/2010 9:10am 
54 DD Spring camp Hill 21/05/2010 11:25am 81 uu Spring camp Hill 26/05/2010 10:30am 
-
55 DD Spring camp Hill 21/05/2010 2:00pm 82 uu Spring camp Hill 26/05/2010 11:30am 
56 DD Spring camp Hill 21/05/2010 3:50pm 83 uu Summer camp Steppe 26/05/2010 1 :50pm 
57 DD Summer camp Rivergrass 1/08/2010 10:30am 84 uu Summer camp Steppe 26/05/2010 2:25pm 
58 DD Spring camp Rive·rgrass 1/08/2010 12:00am 85 uu Summer camp Steppe 26/05/2010 3:10pm 
59 DD Spring camp Rivergrass 1/08/2010 2:20pm 86 uu Summer camp Steppe 26/05/2010 4:45pm 
60 DD Spring camp Rivergrass 1/08/2010 3:15pm 87 uu Summer camp Steppe 26/05/2010 5:50pm 
61 DD Spring camp Rivergrass 1/08/2010 4:30pm 88 uu Summer camp Steppe 26/05/2010 6:66pm 
62 DD Spring camp Rivergrass 1/08/2010 6:00pm 89 uu Summer camp Steppe 27/05/2010 9:00am 
63 DD Spring camp Rivergrass 13/08/2010 3:15pm 90 uu Summer camp Steppe 27/05/2010 10:05am 
64 uu Spring camp Hill 23/05/2010 12:00pm 91 uu Summer camp Steppe 27/05/2010 11:20am 
65 uu Spring camp Hill 23/05/2010 1:10pm 92 uu Spring camp Steppe 27/05/2010 1:00pm 
66 uu Spring camp Steppe 23/05/2010 1:45pm 93 uu Spring camp Steppe 27/05/2010 2:55pm 
67 uu Spring camp Steppe 23/05/2010 2:40pm 94 uu Summer camp Steppe 14/08/2010 12:20pm 
68 uu Spring camp Hill 24/05/2010 12:45pm 95 uu Sununer camp Steppe 16/08/2010 2:45pm 
69 uu Spring camp Steppe 24/05/2010 2:00pm 96 uu Summer camp Steppe 16/08/2010 4:00pm 
70 uu Summer camp Rivergrass 24/05/2010 3:00pm 97 uu Summer camp Steppe 16/08/2010 6:35pm 
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List of interviews 2:00pm; 21 HBU Autumn HBU bag 15/10/2010 4:30pm 
22 HBU Winter HBU Mountain 1/12/2010 11:30pm 
No Bag Season Location Date Time 
Summer; 31/07/2010; 12:15pm; 
23 DD Winter Delgerhaan 30/11/2010 3:05pm 
1 HBU Summer camp HBU bag 21 /07/2010 11 :30am Summer; 31/07/2010; 2:20pm; 
2 HBU Summer camp HBU bag 21/07/2010 12am 24 DD Winter Delgerhaan 30/11/2010 1:00pm 
Summer camp: River grass, 20/07/2010; 25 DD Summer camp Steppe 12/08/2010 11 :30am 
3 HBU Winter camp HBU Mountain 02/12/201 7:00pm 26 DD Summer camp River grass 12/08/2010 1:00pm 
4 HBU Summer camp HBU bag 21 /07/2010 2:35pm Summer camp; River grass; 12/08/2010; 2:35am; 
Summer camp: 21/07/2010; 4:40pm: 27 DD Autumn camp River grass 23 /09/2010 10:35 
5 HBU Autumn camp Steppe,Hill 02/12/10 12:00pm 28 DD Summer camp Steppe 12/08/2010 6:16pm 
6 HBU Summer camp River grass 26/07/2 010 10:30am 29 DD Summer camp River grass 13/08/2010 2:20pm 
7 HBU Summer camp River grass 26/07/2010 12:20pm 
Summer camp: River grass, 26/07/2010: 2:00pm; 30 DD Summer camp River grass 13/08/2 010 11 :30am 
8 HBU Winter camp HBU Mountain 01/12/2010 4:30pm 31 DD Summer camp River grass 13/08/2010 5:40pm 
Summer camp; Hill, 26/07/2010; 3:35pm; 
9 HBO Autumn camp HB U Mountain 01/12/2010 10:55am 
32 DD Summer camp River grass 14/08/2010 9:20pm 
Spring; Summer 16/05/2010; 5:00pm; 33 DD Summer camp Steppe 21 /09/2010 3:40pm 
10 HBU camp HBU bag 27/07/2010 11 :30am 
Summer camp: River grass, 29/07/2010; 10:20am; 
34 DD Autumn camp Steppe 23 /09/2010 1:05pm 
11 HBU Winter camp HBU Mountain 02/12/2010 2:00pm 35 DD Autumn camp Steppe 23/09/2010 2:00pm 
12 HBU Summer camp River grass 29/07/2010 1:00pm 36 DD Autumn Steppe 23/09/2010 3:25pm 
13 HBU Summer camp HBU bag 30/07/201 12:10pm 37 DD Autumn Steppe 24/09/2010 10:30am 
14 HBU Summer camp HBU bag 30/07 /2 01 14:40pm 38 DD Winter Delgerhaan 30/11/2010 2:30pm 
15 VB Autunm UB 16/09/2010 10:50pm 39 uu Summer camp River grass 14/08/2010 2:00pm 
16 HBU Autumn camp River grass 20/09/2010 7:50pm 40 uu Summer Bayanj argalan 16/08/2010 11:30pm 
17 HBU Autumn camp 1--lBU Mountain 21/09/2010 11:30am 41 uu Summer Bayanjargalan 16/08/2010 12:40pm 
Autumn camp: 21/09/2010: 1:35pm: 
18 HBU Winter camp HBU Mountain 01/12/2010 2:00pm 
42 uu Summer Steppe 18/08/2010 11:15am 
19 HBU Autumn camp Hill 22/09/2010 1 :40pm 
43 uu Summer Steppe 18/08/2010 12:45pm 
15/10/201 O; 10:55am; 44 uu Summer Steppe 18/08/2010 14:15pm 
20 HBU Autumn; Winter HBU bag 2/12/2010 8:30pm 45 uu Summer Steppe 18/08/2010 4:00pm 
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Summer; River grass; 19/08/2010; 
46 uu Autumn Steppe 23/11/2010 10:30am 
Summer; River grass; 19/08/2010; 12:00pm; 
47 uu Autumn Steppe 23/11/2010 12:05pm 
48 uu Summer Spring camp 19/08/2010 4:30pm 
49 uu Summer River grass 20/08/2010 1:25pm 
Summer: River grass; 20/08/2010; 4:45pm; 
50 uu Autumn Steppe 23/11/2010 1 :55pm 
51 uu Summer Steppe 25/09/2010 11:05am 
52 uu Autumn River grass 26/09/2010 12 :55pm 
53 uu Autumn Bayanjargalan 27/09/2010 10:55am 
54 uu Autumn Hi ll 16/10/2010 12:10pm 
55 uu W inter Ba yan j argalan 22/ 11/2010 1:55 pm 
56 UB Winter UB 2/11/2010 1:50pm 
57 UB Winter UB 10/11 /201 3 :05pm 
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Questionnaire for a herding household 
Date 
-----
Day ___ _ 
Questionnaire # 
Location 
---
Time Name 
----
----
Context Background 
1. Which bag, soum, aimag are you from? _________ _ 
2. How long have you been living here? _________ _ 
How old are you? _____ _ 
Your education 
-------
Sex a. male b. female 
3. What is your marital status? Please underline the one, if it is 'c' 
a. Married 
b. Single 
c. Single head of a household (male/female) 
4. How many people are there in your family? _________ _ 
5. How many livestock do you have by approximate number? 
Sheep ______ _ 
Goat 
--------
Cattle/yak _____ _ 
Horse 
--------
Camel 
-------
Total 
--------
6. How long have you been a herder? Since; 
a. More than 20 years (collective) 
b. l 0-20 years (transition herder) 
c. 3-5 years (new herders) 
Context Resources 
7. Do you have a livestock campsite? If' no ', please skip next question. 
a. Yes b. No 
~ Campsite Status 
a. winter 
b. spring/autumn 
c. summer 
Livestock shelter 
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8. Is your campsite licensed? If ' no ' please skip next question. 
a. Yes b. No 
9. Do you pay a fee for your campsite? If 'yes' please explain what amount? 
a. Yes b. No 
10. How many times do you move within a normal year? (Rotational) 
a. 2 times 
b. 2-3 times 
c. 3-4 times 
d. more than 4 times (please explain) _________ _ 
e. do not move at all 
11. How far do you move for each season except the long distance otor? (Seasonal) 
a. Winter to Sp/Sm/km _____ _ 
b. SpringtoSm/km _____ _ 
c. Summer to Aut/Wnt/km 
------
d. Autumn to Wnt/km 
-------
12. Do you go for otor? If 'no', please answer the question 17. 
13. How often do you go for otor? Can you explain major otor movements you did last ten 
years, please? 
14. How far do you go for otor? Can you mention the name of the places and the distance, 
please? 
15. Did you pay for the campsite in otor place? If 'yes' please explain what amount? 
a. Yes b. No 
16. Did you pay for the pasture use in otor place? If 'yes' please explain what amount? 
a. Yes b. No 
1 7. Where do you get your water? 
a. Wel 
b. River 
c. Both 
d. Other 
-----
e. All 
18 . Do you pay for water resources? If 'yes' please explain what amount? 
a. Yes b. No 
19. Do you reserve a pasture for haymaking? 
a. Yes b. No 
20. Do you use any other natural resource except pasture and water? If 'yes' please li st and 
explain 
a. Yes 
Context Pasture management 
b. No 
21. Do you market your livestock and its products? If 'no', skip next question. 
a. Yes b. No 
22. Where do you usually sell them? Answer can be more than one 
a. Sum centre 
d. Aimag centre 
e. City/town 
f At the border 
g. To intermediary traders 
h. Others 
23. Are you a member of an organized community group? If 'yes' how long have you been? If 
'No' please answer the question 28. 
a. Yes 
--------
b. No 
24. What is the status of your community? 
a. Informal herder's group 
b. NGO 
C. 
d. 
e. 
Enterprise 
Other (please specify) _____ _ 
Do not know 
25. Do you have a CM.A around your seasonal pastures? If' no' , please skip next question 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Never heard of it 
26. Do you collaborate with other households? If 'yes' can you please circle from the following 
choices? lf no skip next question 
a. Yes (shearing livestock, preparing winter food, marketing, fixingshelter, 
herding, maintaining well, reserving pasture, making hays, helping to 
move, going on otor, growing vegetable and others, conservation and 
others) 
b. No 
27. Who do you co ll aborate? Answers can be more than one 
a. Neighbor b. Relatives c. As a groups d. Either 
28. Do you look after other's livestock? 
a. Yes b. No 
29. Do you herd it for wage? If 'yes' can you explain what means they pay? 
a. Yes b. No 
30. Do you ask other households to look after your livestock? 
a. Yes b. No 
31. Do you pay? lf 'yes' can you explain what means they pay? 
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a. Yes b. No 
32. ls there any institution that offers you herding employment? If 'yes' please clarify which 
institution? 
a. Yes b. No 
33. Is anyone in your family involved in non-herding/self employment? If 'yes', please clarify 
which member? 
a. Yes b. No 
34. Do you pay any tax including income etc? If 'yes' please explain how much for what? 
a. Yes b. No 
35. Do you get micro-credit? If 'no', please explain why 
a. Yes b. No 
36. Do you get any donor aid support from the local administration? If 'no', please explain why 
a. Yes b. No 
3 7. Do you get any veterinary service? If' no', please explain why 
a. Yes b. No 
Context Dispute 
38. A.re there any disputes regarding pasture and campsite use in your area? If 'yes' please 
explain? If no, skip next question. 
a. Yes b. No 
39. How do you solve it? 
a. Approach the sourn governor/land officer 
b. Approach the bag governor 
c. Approach otor administration 
cl. Negotiate each other 
e. Other (please specify) 
f All 
g. Do not solve 
40. Has anybody ever used your campsite without your permission? If 'yes' please explain 
why? 
a. Yes b.No 
41. Have you ever used other's campsite/pasture? If 'yes', please explain why 
a. Yes b. No 
42. Have you ever stayed with otor household? If 'yes', please explain why 
a. Yes b. No 
43. Have you ever need to deny to share your campsite with others? If 'yes', please explain 
why. 
a. Yes b.No 
44. Have you ever been denied to share a campsite by others? If 'yes', please explain why. 
a. Yes b. No 
45. Which institute is most practically involved in regulating daily pastureland use? (Which 
institute practically regulates it now, can you please describe it) 
a. individuals 
b. community/group organization 
c. bag 
d. local government 
e. otor administration 
f others (please specify) 
46. Which institute is most practically involved in regulating otor movement (Which institute 
practically regulates it now, can you please describe it) 
a. individuals 
b. community/group organization 
c. bag 
d. local government 
e. otor administration 
f others (please specify) 
47. How satisfied are you with current pastureland management arrangement? Please choose 
one of the rating scales in the following and explain why? 
Very satisfied I Satisfied I Neutral I Dissatisfied I Very 
dissatisfied 
48. How satisfied are you with current pastureland otor arrangement? Please choose one of the 
rating scales in the following and explain why? 
Very satisfied I Satisfied I Neutral I Dissatisfied I Very 
dissatisfied 
49. What means do you use to express your point of views on pastureland use to the broader 
level/national policy dialogue? If 'c' please answer the question 34. (Could herder/community 
organization be an important tool to engage in policy dialogue and then how?) 
a. through individual contact 
b. through bag 
c. through community/group organization 
d. none 
e. others (please specify) 
50. What are the challenges for you to pursue herding lifestyle? 
a. lack of water 
b. overgrazing 
c. isolation/ lack of services 
d. livestock thieve 
e. mmmg 
f others (please specify) 
-------------
----
51. Is there any issue that I haven ' t asked and you would like to discuss? 
Thank you for your interest and time spent in answering my questions©. 
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In-depth interview guideline 
Herders 
How did you become a herder? 
How did you obtain your livestock assets? 
Why and how did you settle down in HBU? (process including residency transfer, 
connections) 
How did you find locations for your current camping in different seasonal pastures? 
(why pick specific nutag, connections and consultations with others, application for 
buuts) 
Have you had any situations that you were not able to camp in your own spring and 
winter campsites? If so how do you find campsites elsewhere? (why pick specific 
nutag, connections and consultations with others) 
How do you select your campsite spot in summer and autumn? (customary or 
recognized areas) 
How do you manage moving? Do you get help from anyone? 
How do you organize otor if you need to carry-out one? Can you explain the process 
in detail, please? (why pick.specific areas, connections and consultation, logistics and 
collaboration) 
How different was your mobility for last two decades (1990-2000-2010)? Why? 
1--Iow different was the environment in your area for last two decades (1990-2000-
2010)? Why? 
Does possessing a buuts/campsite attribute to only a campsite or certain extent of 
pasture around the campsite? 
Who are your neighbours around your campsites in four different seasons? Can you 
draw and name them, please? 
Why are you responsible for managing a well? (process of assigning responsibility 
and :financial management, absence and impact of managing wells) 
Local officials 
Background (position, duty and responsibility, natural resources in use, main actors, 
property right status, tax) 
Pasture ( campsite, possession in seasonal pasture, distance between campsites, data 
on campsite possession, application procedure and availability of campsites, 
migration process and availability of pasture, agrarian land use, environmental issues) 
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Otar (interprovincial contracting process, data, allocation of pasture, restnct1ons on 
livestock number, payment for pasture use, otor service, overuse of seasonal pasture, 
effectiveness of otor administration, special use, decision making involvement, 
territorial authority, condition to accept otor, committee process, social welfare, aid 
distribution, bag meeting, public opinions, residency issues for otor households 
Official from the otor administration 
Background (position, duty and responsibility, natural resources in use, main actors, 
prope11y right status, tax) 
Policy ( establishment, management and future vision of RP As, decision making 
process, policy of reservation and rehabilitation, process of allowing otor households, 
payments, pasture capacity, use of the revenue) 
Pasture use (HBU RP A management regulation and contracting, function, duty and 
responsibility of the administration, assets for protection, issues of recognizing otor 
campsites, committed meeting process, overuse of the RP A, RP A otor services, 
campsite possession and RP A management, disputes use of otor and local 
households, challenges for HBU RP A management, zoning, monitoring, agrarian land 
use) 
Well (RP A management of wells, irrigation, research on locations, decision making, 
auction for well building, quality and maintenance. 
